A COMMENTARY ON XENOPHON'S 'ÀPOLOGIA SOKRATOUS'

Timothy (Thor) J. Polson

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil
at the
University of St Andrews



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A COMMENTARY ON XENOPHON'S *ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ*

by

Timothy (Thor) J. Polson

A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the degree of M.Phil.
at the University of St. Andrews (September 15th, 1998)



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Abstract

This thesis is a commentary on Xenophon the Athenian's Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους (*Apology of Socrates*), a work written in the first half of the 4th century B.C. with the express purpose of explaining Socrates' self-aggrandizing behavior during his trial in 399. The commentary is prefaced by three essays which treat the issues of authenticity, dating, and possible non-Platonic influences on the work, while the four appendices contain comparisons with Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and Plato's *Apology* as well as treatments of Socrates' daimonic sign and his arrogant behavior during the trial as described by Xenophon. Based on the 1919 Oxford Classical Text edited by E. C. Marchant, the commentary itself is a line-by-line analysis concerned primarily with providing a social, historical, and literary context for each passage under consideration.

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A Few Prolegomena

The bulk of twentieth-century scholarship has now come to recognize Xenophon's Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους (Xen. *Ap.*) as a genuine part of the Xenophontic corpus, and because of the stature of its Platonic counterpart a full English commentary on this neglected *opusculum* is long overdue. Since an introduction is the best of all places to be sparing of words, I will limit these prolegomena to the following remarks:

• As the basis of this dissertation I have focused primarily on Xenophon's Socratica (Marchant ed.), the four Platonic Socratica connected directly with the trial (Burnet ed.), Aristophanes' *Clouds* (Dover ed.), and Libanius' *Apology* (Foerster ed.). All abbreviations of these and *other* works by Xenophon and Plato will appear without the authors' names unless there is danger of confusion (as in the case of Xen. *Ap.* and Pl. *Ap.*, for example). *Clouds* will appear simply as *Nu.*, and Libanius' work as Lib. *Ap.* The German term *Schutzschrift* refers to *Comm.* I.1-2.
• With the exception of the abbreviations *Comm.* (= *Mem.*) and Xen. (= Xenophon), I have used those listed in Liddell-Scott-Jones' *A Greek-English Lexicon* (9th ed.) and the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*; where abbreviations for specific titles have not been provided, I have improvised freely. *PA* indicates the numbering used in Kirchner's *Prosopographia Attica.*
• All Greek proper nouns (e.g. "Diopithes") appear in their Latinized forms, and all English spellings and idioms (e.g. "fulfillment...at etc." on the title page) are American.
• Throughout the dissertation, I have chosen to use the Greek word ἀπολογία in place of the English "apology" since the latter is not commonly used in English in any sense approximating the Greek usage. (Unfortunately, the English word "apologia" also tends to evoke unwelcome connotations associated with Christian writings.) The title itself (in abbreviated form) is excepted.
• Marchant's text and the information about the manuscript tradition have been included in this thesis solely for the convenience of the examiner/reader.

Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Harry Hine and the School of Greek, Latin and Ancient History at the University of St. Andrews for having given me the opportunity to complete my post-graduate studies here, and I am especially grateful to Professor Stephen Halliwell for his many useful suggestions, for his accessibility as a supervisor, and for his warmth and kindness as a human being. I would also like to thank Professor Lawrence Okamura of the University of Missouri in Columbia, whose singularly humane approach to the humanities still stands out like a strong beacon to me after so many years. My thanks to you all.

Essay A: The Issue of Authenticity

The *Ap.* was considered genuine in antiquity,[1] and it was only with the comments of Valckenaer in the late eighteenth century[2] that its authenticity came to be questioned. Since then, it has been predominantly the classicists of the nineteenth century, most notably Wilamowitz,[3] who have considered it spurious, while the majority of twentieth-century classicists concerned with the question have returned to the position of the ancients in accepting it as genuine. Opponents of its authenticity usually call it a pastiche made up of pieces from Pl. *Ap.* and the *Comm.* and refer in particular to its insignificance and mediocrity as well as to a characterization of Socrates which does not seem worthy of him.[4] A more balanced approach is called

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[1]The sources are admittedly late: Demetrius of Magnesia (first century BC) ap. D.L. 2.57, Herodicus of Babylon (first or second century AD) ap. Ath. 218E-F, and the Schol. ad Pl. *Ap.* 18B (see Breitenbach 1894, Frick 7-8, and Hackforth 42 n. 3: for the Herodicus attribution, see Wilamowitz [1897] 99 n. 1).

[2]In I. A. Ernesti, ed., *Apomnemoneumata (Commentarii), seu Memorabilium Socratis dictorum libri IV* (5th ed.), Leipzig, 1772. Valckenaer's seminal remarks (ap. Frick 86-87) deserve to be quoted in full:

> *On* Comm. I.1.1: *Sed illud imprimis notabile, quod* [*Xenophon*] *scribit in Epist. 15, p. 38, 10:* Δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς συγγράφειν ἃ ποτε εἶπεν ἀνὴρ καὶ ἔπραξεν· καὶ αὕτη ἀπολογία γένοιτ' ἂν αὐτοῦ βελτίστη καὶ εἰς τὸ νῦν τε καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα· *Haec* ἀπομνημονεύματα *praebent Xenophonteam Socratis Apologiam: respondet enim in his Xenophon ad singula accusationis capita: praeterea in Arte Rhetor. inter Opera Dionys. Halic. 2, p. 103, 34, Socratis* ἐγκώμιον *scripsisse dicitur Plato* ἐν ἀπολογίας σχήματι· *Xenophon autem* ἐν τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασιν· ὡς γὰρ ἀπολογούμενος ὑπὲρ Σωκράτους ἐγκώμιον Σωκράτους περαίνει. *Quae vulgata prostat ut Xenophontis* Σωκράτους ἀπολογία, *est illa hoc ingenio capitali si quid iudico prorsus indigna, ab eodem conflata, cui finem Cyropaediae debemus et alia quaedam, quae vulgo leguntur ut Xenophontea.*
>
> *On* Comm. III.3.9: *Eadem, verbis tamen diversis usus, tradiderat in K.Π. I p. 19.7, legunturque talia in his Socraticis longe plurima, eorum similia, quae prostant in K.Π. nec tamen iisdem verbis narrata. Et crederemus Xenophontem sua ipsius, quae dederat in Hist. Graeca, centena continua in Agesilai encomio transscripsisse? aut Apologiam scripsisse Socratis, in qua nihil alicuius inveniatur momenti, quod non legatur in his commentariis?*

Frick (pp. 84-85) prefaces these quotations by noting that it was actually C. Heumann (*Acta Philosophorum*, Halle, 1715-27, vol. 1 pp. 497-98), not Valckenaer, who was the first modern to question the authenticity of the *Ap.*

[3]Wilamowitz (1897) *passim* (see too Derenne 158); for an exhaustive review of scholars' remarks on the *Ap.* since Heumann, see Frick 83-166. Wilamowitz, who began to write his article with entirely different intentions, decided to change his focus when he perceived that a new generation of classicists was coming to consider the *Ap.* a legitimate work (p. 106), though he seems to have altered his own opinion years later ([1919] 2:50) and even originally admits ([1897] 100) that its style and the repetition of Xenophontic passages give the work its distinct flavor. In partial response to Wilamowitz, Menzel (p. 5 n. 3) believes that the *Ap.*'s authenticity is actually of secondary importance when compared to its possible historical value: *[Die Apologie] könnte von Xenophon herrühren und dennoch historisch wertlos sein und umgekehrt.* Marchant ([1919] Add. et Corr. s.v. Ap.) is not swayed by Wilamowitz' arguments: *Ne Wilamowitzius quidem mihi persuadere potuit hoc opusculum ab imitatore esse conscriptum.*

[4]See, for example, Ollier 84 and Vrijlandt xviii. To be sure, any conscious or unconscious comparison with the Platonic dialogues will naturally find this more cursory work lacking in many respects. For considerations of Platonic influence, see Essay C and the comment on §1.

for, and it is appropriate to begin this essay with Vrijlandt's remarks (p. xvii) directed towards those who have questioned the authenticity of the work:

> *Non ignoramus raro in nostra arte pro certo, sicut apud mathematicos, aliquid demonstrari posse. Probabilitatem et verisimilitudinem plerumque tanquam summas deas veneramur. Contra procul habendi sunt ei quorum unica libido esse videtur omnia in dubium vocare. Quibus adnumerandi sunt viri docti qui Apologiam Xenophonteam Xenophonti abiudicant.*

In what follows I will reproduce a representative, chronologically arranged sampling of opinions on the matter, then consider the results collectively in arriving at my own conclusions.

Schmitz (pp. 221-22) begins his examination by asserting that Ath. 218E-F (see n. 1 above) is a misquoted version of *Ap.* 14 (on Delphi), and it follows that the surviving version of the *Ap.* cannot resemble the one he read.[5] Diogenes Laertius mentions the work twice (in 2.57 & 3.34), and it is likely that he is referring to the extant version since Stobaeus quotes at length from §§25-29 (pp. 222-223).[6] Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus were not very critical writers, however, and the fact that any reference to the *Ap.* is conspicuously missing in other writers leads one to question their ascription of the work to Xen. (p. 223). The author of *Socratic. Ep.* 15 does not mention the *Ap.* per se but considers the *Comm.* to be an ἀπολογία, hence he must have lived prior to the appearance of the manuscripts in their present form (pp. 223-34). Note too that the first editions of Xenophon (the Juntina and Aldina) do not contain this *opusculum*, and it is only since Reuchlin's edition that it has regularly appeared as part of the corpus (p. 224).

Schmitz refers to Valckenaer's observations and agrees that the extant *Ap.* does not contain anything substantially different from what appears in the *Comm.* He also refers to the opinions of contemporary German scholars (e.g. Schneider) who believe that the *Ap.* originally formed the conclusion of the *Comm.*, from which it was eventually severed and altered by a grammarian (p. 225). The μεγαλῃγορία evident in the *Ap.* is quite different from the characterization of Socrates in other Socratica, including the *Comm.* and Pl. *Ap.* (p. 226), and points to be found that are not brought

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[5]The Athenaeus passage substitutes ἐπερωτήσαντος and ὑπέρ for ἐπερωτῶντος and περί, respectively, shifts the position of πολλῶν παρόντων, and omits ἐλευθεριώτερον.

[6]See Stob. III.1.81 & III.7.58 Hense. Professor Halliwell notes that Stobaeus also quoted from earlier anthologies, not necessarily from original works. The fact that Demetrius Magnes (ap. Diogenes Laertius) numbers the *Ap.* among the authentic works of Xen. is for Chroust a crucial factor in favor of its authenticity ([1955] 1 n. 1 & [1957] 17).

up in the *Comm.* appear in §§7-9, 14, 23, 26, 28-30. This additional information has little or nothing to do with Xen.'s professed purpose, which is a consideration of Socrates' μεγαληγορία, and all that is truly important must therefore be derived from the *Comm.* The opening statement of the *Ap.* seems to indicate 1) that much time has passed since the death of Socrates, 2) that the author derived his information exclusively from books, and 3) that Socrates had actually been guilty of μεγαληγορία, something which Xen. himself would never have said (p. 227). The language of the work is admittedly worthy of Xen. and his age, though it could have been imitated beyond detection by a gifted author, a phenomenon observed, for example, in the writings of Quintus Curtius and Dio Chrysostom (p. 228). Such imitators betray themselves through rhetorical exaggeration, of which there is an abundance in this work, most notably in the treatment of Socrates' arrogance.[7]

Schmitz draws the following conclusions: 1) The *Ap.* was written by a sophist or grammarian in the 1st or 2nd century AD (i.e. sometime between Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Athenaeus), 2) the author used portions of the *Comm.*, either literally or in an abridged form, to explain Socrates' μεγαληγορία, and 3) he added other information from other sources as he saw fit, including anecdotal material (p. 229).

In a collaborative effort, Wetzel and Immisch respectively present arguments in support of the *Ap.*'s authenticity as follows: 1) The *Comm.* borrow extensively from the *Ap.*, hence the latter is necessarily from Xenophon's hand,[8] and 2) linguistic considerations make its authenticity all but certain. Immisch introduces his linguistic analysis of the work by considering what constitutes Attic Greek in general and Xenophontic Greek in particular (p. 405), and related considerations include 1) the fact that there was no universal lexical norm for the Greek language in the early fourth century, 2) the lack of any strict rhetorical schooling at the time, 3) personal elements in the lives of individual writers, and 4) the considerable differences among the various dialects (pp. 405-406). Xen. has always been known, and was known even in antiquity, for the poetic elements in his lexis, and these elements are difficult to distinguish from the Ionisms that seem to have crept into his language as the result of his wanderings in Ionian-speaking regions in the East, influences which signal the beginnings of Koine (p. 407).[9] Immisch does not rule out the possibility of a forgery,

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[7]Gray (pp. 139-40: see too Wetzel 71) believes that Xen.'s interest in rhetorical considerations might well undermine the historical value of the work as a whole.

[8]Wetzel 392. For Wetzel's specific observations, see Appendix A.

[9]It is interesting to note that Xen. shows similarities with Ctesias, who wrote a sort of inchoate Koine (pp. 408-409).

but if the *Ap.* is in fact an imitation of some kind, one would be compelled, as he puts it, *...ein Raffinement der Stilnachahmung [anzunehmen], das ebenso für die verhältnismäßig frühe Zeit unwahrscheinlich ist, in welche das Schriftchen zugestandenermaßen gehört, wie es auch außer allem Verhältnis zu der inhaltlichen Dürftigkeit der Arbeit stehen würde* (p. 410). In the remainder of his article, Immisch examines specific examples of words appearing in the *Ap.* and concludes by declaring it to be authentic on the basis of their similarities to the general Xenophontic lexis.

Beyschlag subsequently published a lengthy and well-considered argument against the authenticity of the *Ap.* as follows: There are definite references to Xen.'s style in Hermogenes and Photius, and we are aware of others,[10] from all of which we can assume that there were philological studies of the "Attic Bee" made as early as Alexandrian times (p. 496). It is not implausible, then, that a later imitator might have used such sources as well as excerpts from the *Comm.* to create a pseudo-Xenophontic *Ap.* Isocrates' rhetorical school, founded ca. 390, concerned itself with *Musterbeispiele*, an activity already tending towards direct imitation, and with the death of Demosthenes and the loss of freedom an archaizing tendency set in. Students of rhetorical schools consequently looked towards the past masters for inspiration and wrote *Seitenstücke* based on famous models as school exercises (p. 497),[11] and beginning in the 2nd century BC the better of these eventually found their way into the genuine corpora (pp. 497-98).

Therefore the *Ap.*, which Beyschlag describes as *...keine bewußte Fälschung, sondern ein späteres Exercitium, ein rhetorisches Schulthema*, originates in the author's intention to offer a counterpart to Pl. *Ap.*, as Xen. *Smp.* mirrors Plato's work of the same name, a fact which also becomes evident by comparing the similar openings of Xen. *Ap.* and *Smp.* (p. 498).[12] Beyschlag notes that the citing of Hermogenes as a principal source for his argument is not entirely convincing (p. 498), and the fact that the *Ap.* appears separately from the other Socratica in D.L. 2.57 and also in the exemplary Vatic. B 1335 manuscript means that it indeed found acceptance but was incorporated late into the corpus (p. 499: see too Wilamowitz [1897] 99 n. 1). Immisch's list of Xenophontic usages is not persuasive, since a clever imitator could have simply reproduced them, and the meagerness of the

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[10]Namely, according to Beyschlag, in Harpocration, Hero, Zeno, Metrophanes, Theon, Tiberius, Longinus, Phrynichus, and Heiladius.

[11]See too Derenne 181. For the use of Socrates' case as an exercise in the rhetorical schools, see Procl. *in Ti.* 21A-B (= 1.65.22 Diehl) and Max.Tyr. 3.1.

[12]Beyschlag respectively compares, for example, δέ and μεμνῆσθαι of the former with ἀλλ' and ἀξιομνημόνευτα of the latter.

linguistic evidence in general renders any analysis of Xenophon's language futile (pp. 499-500). An example of definitely un-Socratic usages in the *Ap.* are δοκεῖν and φαίνεσθαι versus the far more Socratic κινδυνεύειν used elsewhere by Xen.: This is due to the fact that the ancient grammarians falsely considered the usage to be a λέξις Πλατωνική, not a λέξις Σωκρατική (p. 499), and one should also ask oneself why, as Immisch holds, there are so many Xenophontisms in what purports to be a speech delivered by Socrates (p. 501).

Beyschlag (p. 501 ff.) believes that two passages in particular reveal the inauthenticity of the *Ap.*, i.e. §26 (on education) and §30 (on βαναυσία):

> 1) *On Education*: Note that all passages in which Socrates is described as a teacher are spoken by his detractors, e.g. by Polycrates in Isoc. *Bus.* 5 (μαθητής), by Critias ap. *Comm.* I.2.31 (διδάσκειν), and Antiphon ap. *Comm.* I.6.3 (διδάσκαλος κακοδαιμονίας); otherwise the issue of teaching is avoided by Xen., who generally uses more innocuous wording.
> 2) *On* βαναυσία: Beyschlag considers a number of passages and concludes that Socrates was in fact pro-banausic.[13] Note too that Plato's Socrates says that, of all the people he has examined, it is only the craftsmen who surpass the others in knowledge (see Pl. *Ap.* 22D), and it is in fact only later (e.g. in *R.* 590C) that Plato's philosophy takes on an anti-banausic quality. It is only natural that Socrates would speak fondly of craftsmen since he was the son of a stoneworker, whereas Xen. and Plato came from a more elitist background.[14] It is therefore Xenophon, not Socrates, whose views are represented in the relevant passages in the *Comm.* and *Oec.*

Beyschlag concludes his comments on these two issues as follows: *Bei diesen Ergebnissen bleibt immer wieder zu betonen, daß auch Xenophon in einer Apologie seines Meisters ihm keine Lehren aus dem Eigenen imputieren darf, die in diesem Zusammenhang der Anklage nur Wasser auf die Mühle geführt hätten.*[15]

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[13]Namely, *Comm.* I.2.37, I.2.56, III.10, IV.4.5 and *Grg.* 491A. I remain unconvinced (see the comment on §14).

[14]For remarks on Plato's aristocratic bias, see Vrijlandt 27-28.

[15]Additional points include the following: 1) How can one account for the discrepancy between the Anytus portrayals in the *Men.* and *Ap.*? According to Beyschlag, the forger was familiar with the former (cp. αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς in *Men.* 90B with αὐτὸν τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ἀξιούμενον in *Ap.* 29) but misunderstood the description of the failed father/son relationships in Plato as referring to the bad relationship between Anytus and his own son (p. 506). 2) Contrary to Immisch's opinion, the last sentence in §31 can be retained since a contrast does in fact exist when one looks at the larger context, i.e. καὶ τετελευτηκὼς τυγχάνει κακοδοξίας vs. θεοφιλοῦς

Like Immisch before him, Feddersen believes that only an exhaustive word analysis can determine the authenticity of the *Ap.* (p. 12). On the basis of earlier studies,[16] he (pp. 13-24) conducts a lengthy grammatical, syntactical, and rhetorical analysis of the *Ap.* and concludes that it is indeed genuine.[17] He further maintains (p. 32) that the fact that the *Ap.* contains so many rhetorical elements indicates that it was intended to be recited: This is reflected in the *verba declarandi,* e.g. οὐ τὰ πάντα εἰπεῖν...ἐσπούδασα (§22), μεμνῆσθαι (§§1 & 34), διασαφηνίζω (§1), and δηλῶσαι (§22).[18] According to Feddersen (pp. 33-34), Diogenes Laertius (2.57) separated the *Ap.* from the other Socratica because he wanted to group it with other works that would have been suitable for recitation (e.g. the *Vect.* and *Hier.*).[19]

Frick also subjects the *Ap.* to a careful word analysis (pp. 9-15) and finds it compatible with Xen.'s writing in general, adding that, if in fact the work is not authentic, it must have found its way into the Xenophontic corpus at least by the 2nd

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μοίρας τετυχηκέναι (p. 507: see the comment on this section *ad loc.*). 3) It is clear that the *Ap.* appeared after the *Euthphr.* (cp. καίτοι ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν δήπου τίνες εἰσὶ νέων διαφθοραί in §19 with *Euthphr.* 2C: τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτοὺς), and certain inconsistencies (e.g. *Comm.* IV.8.9-10 vs. *Ap.* 26) show that the *Ap.* was written after the *Comm.* (pp. 510-12). §28 is also clearly borrowed from *Phd.* 89B, and §32 from *Phd.* 58E. Since the latter is generally dated to ca. 367, all of these considerations place the writing of the *Ap.* to some time after 367, over thirty years after the trial. Since this seems unimaginable, the work must be spurious (p. 515). 4) Finally, the borrowing of *loci* in the *Ap.* (e.g. Apollodorus, Palamedes, etc.) can be attributed to the Greek literary practice of mimesis, i.e. *die Weiterbildung eines einmal geprägten literarischen Typus* (pp. 515-16).

[16]Namely, those of K. Schulze ("Quaestiones grammaticae ad Xenophontem pertinentes", progr. Berol. 1888), F. Wissmann ("De genere dicendi Xenophonteo", diss. Giess. 1888), H. Schacht ("De Xenophontis studiis rhetoricis", diss. Berol. 1890), and A. Zucker, ("Beobachtungen über den Gebrauch des Artikels bei Personennamen in Xenophons Anabasis", progr. Norense, 1899); Frick (see below) also refers to these same groundbreaking studies. See too Feddersen's contemporary Richards (see bibl.), who believes that the consideration of individual words tells very much in favor of the *Ap.*'s authenticity. L. Gautier (p. 130 n. 1) is inclined to follow Immisch, Richards, Frick, and Feddersen while observing that the *Ap.* is *...de trop peu d'étendue pour que les arguments linguistiques soient décisifs.*

[17]Feddersen also addresses Beyschlag's remarks concerning the work's un-Socratic language and sentiments as well as the *falsarius* issue (pp. 24-28). Vrijlandt (p. 144) also rules out a forgery on the following grounds: 1) The language and style of writing are Xenophontic. 2) The ancient testimonies attribute the work to Xen. 3) There are too many inconsistencies in Plato's Socratica to appeal to an imitator attempting to piece them together into an intelligible whole (note Vrijlandt's assumption concerning Xen.'s sources). 4) *Similia saepe dissimilia sunt. Saepe prorsus contrarium apud Xenophontem legitur atque apud Platonem. Hoc imitatoris non est.* 5) The Socrates in Xen. *Ap.* has a totally different behavior from that of the Platonic Socrates, a difference more indicative of a writer like Xen. who has his own source (i.e. Hermogenes). Menzel (p. 5) also notes that the procedural deviations from the potential Platonic and Xenophontic sources (e.g. Socrates' refusal to propose a counter-penalty) make it impossible that the *Ap.* is a mere compilation.

[18]See the comment on §34 for Feddersen's rhetorical analysis of that section.

[19]Feddersen's argument is not particularly persuasive since most ancient writings were intended for recitation and since any speech, fictive or otherwise, would necessarily contain rhetorical elements to some extent.

century BC (p. 8).[20] In general, the *Ap.* is too Xenophontic in style and diction to allow for an interpolator, and who would have expended so much effort on such a minor work?[21] Frick concludes his remarks by stating that, while the *Ap.* is to be ascribed to Xen., his account of the trial certainly detracts from the traditional view of him as representing a reliable Socratic source (pp. 80-82).

In his remarks on the authenticity of the *Ap.*, Fritz ([1931] 37-38) begins by considering if it is to be understood as a *Mosaikarbeit* made up of Platonic and Xenophontic pieces,[22] then responds in particular to the previous work of Immisch, Wetzel, and Arnim.[23] In response to these approaches, Fritz (p. 40 ff.) focuses on four points in the remainder of his article - the counter-penalty, Anytus, the daimonic sign, and considerations of possible sources - and concludes his comments (p. 68) by stating the following in favor of its inauthenticity: *Ein zusammenfassendes Argument...für die Unechtheit [der xenophontischen Apologie]...besteht...darin, daß sich - abgesehen von ganz nichtssagenden Stellen - für alle ihre Teile Berührungen mit verschiedenen anderen Schriften nachweisen lassen, und dies gerade auch in solchen Dingen, die sicher nicht historisch sind.*

Individual points in favor of the *Ap.*'s authenticity include the following: A number of scholars have found its cohesiveness to be a convincing factor,[24] and

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[20]In particular, around the time of Herodicus ap. Stob. III.7.58 Hense. Although some problems arise in that certain words appear in the *Ap.* which are rare or non-existent in other writers and which anticipate Koine, Frick is inclined to accept its authenticity, citing among other pieces of evidence the similarity of D.Chrys. 28.13 to *Ap.* 6 (pp. 9-16), a tenuous comparison at best. For the use of poetic vocabulary in the *Ap.*, see Frick 11-13.

[21]See p. 8: *quod tandem consilium secutus tantam ingeniosus ille homo operam in libello collocavit tam mediocri?* Cp. Immisch's comment above.

[22]Fritz (p. 64) believes that the *Ap.* consists of the following pieces taken from various Socratic writings: the defense (§§10-21), the conclusion (§§24-27), additional remarks (§§22-23), the Apollodorus episode (§28), and the Anytus episode (§§28-31), none of which has anything to do with μεγαληγορία, and all of which were consequently synchronized by the author and added to those sections which treat the arrogance theme.

[23]According to Fritz (pp. 38-40), one cannot, like Immisch, prove its authenticity on linguistic grounds alone since so much depends on the motives of the forger: If philosophical, the language will vary considerably; if literary, the language can closely resemble the original. Wetzel treats the dating issue separately from the authenticity issue, while Arnim takes its authenticity as already having been proved by Immisch and Wetzel and consequently draws conclusions about its dating by using these results to re-confirm its authenticity. Wetzel believes that the *Ap.* contains correct information from Hermogenes, which Xen. later misinterpreted in the *Comm.*, while Arnim sees in the latter *allenthalben Verbesserungen der noch undeutlichen Angaben der Apologie.* This reversability of arguments used to establish the same sequence (i.e. *Ap.* ---> *Comm.*) is problematical, especially when the question of authenticity is left open. Any deviations from, or degeneration of, the original text could in fact be attributed to a writer who was not well acquainted with the information. Wetzel's idea, though believable, perhaps, if applied to isolated examples, therefore becomes untenable when applied to an entire work.

[24]See Schmid 224 n. 1, Nickel 81, Edelstein 149, Ollier 85-89, and P. Meyer 716. Gigon ([1946] 220) observes that, while it is the supposedly weak structure of the *Ap.* which has caused scholars to

related to this are considerations of style: Ollier[25] holds that the *Ap.* is authentic not only in diction and style but also in content, while Breitenbach (col. 1893) observes that there are no anachronisms or irregularities that would mark the work as belonging to another author. Scholars have countered the conflation argument by referring to Xen.'s penchant for internal borrowing: In particular, the fact that the *Ap.* shares passages with the *Comm.* proves nothing since Xen. borrows freely from himself elsewhere (e.g. from the *Ages.* for use in the *HG*).[26]

Besides the various criticisms directed against the cohesiveness and style of the *Ap.* (see too Beyschlag's and Fritz' argumentation above), the following arguments against its authenticity have also been advanced: Although it refers specifically to Pl. *Ap.*, A. E. Taylor's statement that "Plato has no doubt done for Socrates what men like Demosthenes did for their own speeches before giving them to the world" ([1926] 156) could just as easily apply to Xen.'s work of the same name: In other words, some element of fictionalizing cannot, of course, be ruled out in the case of either author, and in the case of Xen. *Ap.* this causes the distinction between authenticity and historicity to become quite blurred. Lincke (p. 711) believes that the *Ap.* is spurious and that its author has attempted to reconcile the irreconcilable, namely, Hermogenes' report that Socrates did not intend to defend himself and the Academic tradition that he did in fact hold a speech. Kaibel (p. 581 n. 1) summarily dismisses it for two reasons, i.e. *die absurde Erweiterung des Gesprächs zwischen Sokrates und Hermogenes* and *die klägliche Parodie auf [die platonische Apologie], besonders die niederträchtige Prophezeiung am Schlusse (§30).* Finally, Wilamowitz ([1897] 102-105) weighs in with the following observations: 1) Xen. cannot possibly be the author of the *Ap.* since the apologetic part of the *Comm.* which influenced the *Ap.* was written in reaction to Polycrates, and the only way to salvage the authenticity

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question its authenticity, this could also be said of the *Comm.* Note too that any disjointedness that appears in the *Ap.* could well be due to the disjointedness of Socrates' actual speech in court.

[25]Ollier 84. In contrast to Schmitz et al. (see above), Ollier notes that the rhetorical element is almost entirely missing, something which would no doubt characterize a later forgery.

[26]See Breitenbach 1776 & 1893, Delebecque 218-19, Arnim 21, and Chroust (1955) 1 n. 1 & (1957) 17. Ollier (pp. 84-85) also alludes to this practice in such authors as Isocrates and Demosthenes. The authenticity of the work has also been questioned because of discrepancies between *Ap.* 12 ff. and *Comm.* I.1.2-4 in the description of the daimonic sign, but this has been countered by Gigon's argument that the matter rests on the intention, not on the precise language of the passages in question, that is, Xen. is not accustomed to use the same terminology twice for the same subject (see Gigon [1946] 221 ff., Nickel 80, Fritz [1931] 56 ff., and Breitenbach 1889). (The problem centers on the use of the word φωνή in the *Ap.* and its omission in the *Comm.*) Schanz' argument for authenticity (pp. 83-84) seems to beg the question through his assertion that, since the *Ap.* does not respond to Polycrates, it must have been written before the appearance of the Κατηγορία, and since it was written before the Κατηγορία, it must have been written by Xen., who otherwise would have responded to Polycrates' charges (see Essay C).

argument would be to place the *Ap.* before the *Comm.* and Polycrates' writing, which is impossible. 2) The *Ap.* shows some of the growing accretions to the Socrates legend, e.g. in the reference to the speakers in his defense (§22), and in Socrates' Pythia-like inspiration vouched for by his friends (§13). The *Ap.* also increases the godliness of Socrates in that he possesses the apocryphal ability to prophesy, a point reinforced by the fact that the Anytus prophecy had supposedly already been realized by the time of its writing. 3) In general, then, the work was intended to serve both as a fictional epilogue to the *Comm.* and as an explanation of Socrates' μεγαληγορία as represented in Pl. *Ap.*[27]

The major arguments against the authenticity of the *Ap.* can be disposed of rather quickly as follows:

1) *The* Ap. *is mentioned only in late sources.* It was a minor work which was perhaps not even intended for publication, and even if it had a fairly large readership, it naturally paled in the withering light of its Platonic counterpart.
2) *It appears separately from the other Socratic works of Xenophon in Diogenes Laertius and the Vatican MS.* In both cases it was naturally categorized with other *opuscula.*
3) *The* Comm. *can also be considered an* ἀπολογία *of sorts, and ancient references to an* Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους *might in fact refer to the* Schutzschrift. Although the title Ἀπολογία can certainly be considered a misnomer in many ways (see the comment *ad loc.*), it nevertheless fulfills the more technical meaning of the word more satisfactorily than does the corresponding *Comm.* section, which can also, of course, be considered an ἀπολογία in a more figurative sense.
4) *The fact that the* Ap. *contains passages that correspond almost verbatim with certain passages in the* Comm. *shows that it is a compilation of some kind.* The overlap makes up a small portion of the total work, and Xen. was given to internal borrowing, as we see in the case of the *HG* and *Ages.*
5) *The author of the* Ap. *also seems to have borrowed heavily from Platonic sources, i.e., from the* Ap. *and* Phd. If true, this does not figure in the authenticity question since Xen. himself could have borrowed from Plato as easily as a later writer. This objection also does not take into account overlapping references to actual historical events or to a common written source. Moreover, even if the *Ap.* is a conglomerate of

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[27]Wilamowitz' more specific observations appear *ad loc.* throughout the commentary.

other Socratica, including Plato's, that does not necessarily diminish its historical value if it was composed around the time of Socrates' execution (see n. 3 above).
6) *The discrepancies between the two accounts of the trial are due to the interpolations of a later author.* This does not take into account the possibility of fictionalizing on the part of Plato, a characteristic of the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί in general, and the beginnings of the Socrates myth (e.g. the gradual transformation of his daimonic voice into a distinct entity and his prophecy concerning Anytus and son) might well have have been underway as early as his own lifetime.[28]
7) *The mediocre style and exceptional characterization of Socrates in the* Ap. *are decidedly un-Xenophontic.* The first part of this objection is too subjective for comment,[29] while the characterization question hinges on Socrates' μεγαληγορία, a trait which, while certainly represented to an extreme in the *Ap.*, is not wholly uncharacteristic of the Socratic figures in both Xen. and Plato.[30] As regards teaching and βαναυσία, the teaching question is equally vexed in Plato, and Beyschlag's suggestion that Socrates was in fact pro-banausic is ill considered, even if we do allow for an aristocratic bias in Plato and Xen.
8) *The language is also un-Xenophontic.* Only a few scholars (e.g. Beyschlag) have raised this objection, and their opinions have remained in the minority for good reason: Although no one has yet subjected the text of the *Ap.* to a complete stylometric analysis, the results of the extensive pre-computer analyses summarized above are decisive and unanimous in favor of its authenticity.
9) *The* Ap. *is to be understood as a clever forgery.* This cannot, of course, be ruled out, but such a forger would have had to be thoroughly steeped in Xenophon's language and thoroughly acquainted with the other Xenophontic Socratica, especially the *Comm.* in general, with which the *Ap.* shares countless thematic similarities. These shared thematic elements have alone sufficed to convince me of its authenticity.

In sum, the burden of proof continues to rest on those who would challenge the *Ap.*'s place among the other Xenophontic writings, and no convincing argument for its spuriousness has yet been advanced. Croiset (vol. 4 p. 365) nicely sums up his

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[28]Modern examples of similar, near-contemporary historical fiction would be such films as Oliver Stone's *JFK*. In general, the Burnet-Taylor thesis concerning historical accuracy (see Appendix B) is seriously weakened by the inherently fictive nature of the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί and by the expectations of Plato's and Xen.'s readers, which cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
[29]On Fritz' subjectivity, for example, see Breitenbach 1891.
[30]See Vrijlandt's remarks in Appendix D.

short treatment of the question as follows: *Il est plus simple et plus conforme à la vraisemblance de laisser l'*Apologie *à Xénophon, dont la gloire n'en sera d'ailleurs ni accrue ni diminuée sensiblement.*

Essay B: The Issue of Dating

The dating of the *Ap.* is a particularly vexed question which, like the authenticity problem (see Essay A), has involved considering its sequential relation to Xen.'s other Socratica as well as fitting it into a constellation formed by Xen.'s Socratica, Pl. *Ap.*, and Polycrates' diatribe. What follows is a relatively brief review of the various opinions on these matters, followed in turn by my own observations.[1]

I shall begin, however, with a brief presentation of Delebecque's proposed dating of the Xenophontic corpus. His conclusions (pp. 506-509: see Nickel 6-8 for a synopsis), based on the stations in Xen.'s life as related in his works and on his changing attitude towards Sparta, appear below in tabular form:

Stimuli	Resulting Works
1) Acquaintance with, and influence of, Thucydides (Athens)	First two books of *HG* (402 BC)
2) Military service with Spartans	*Lac.* begun (387)
3) Stint as landholder in Scillus; criticism of former Cyreans against him	*An.* (including criticism against Sparta) & "Parabasis" (*An.* V.3.7 to end): self-justification and more criticism against Sparta (ca. 385-377)
4) Education of sons and justification of Socrates' actions	*Cyn.* (391/90) *Ap.* (385-82: unpublished)
5) Socratic works underway	*Eq.* (ca. 380: unpublished) Preliminary work on *Comm.* & *Oec.* (ca. 381)
6) Praise of Agesilaus	Continuation of *HG* (379/8)
7) Expulsion from Scillus after Leuctra; sojourn in Corinth	Last chapter of *Lac.* & ch. V.4 of *HG*, both anti-Spartan (369)
8) Recall to Athens (last 10-12 years of life) with a larger reading audience (see n. 10 below)	*Eq.*, *Oec.*, *HG*, and *Comm.* completed *Smp.*, *Cyr.* & *Hier.* (365-?54)
9) Death of Agesilaus (and Persian threat)	*Ages.* (355)
10) Writing continued (Xen. addresses pressing political questions of the day)	*Eq.Mag.* & *Vect.* (357-54)
11) Last work	*Comm.* III & IV (355/4)

The question of the relationship of Pl. *Ap.* to Xen. *Ap.* is rather thorny,[2] with most scholars assuming (not without some literary bias) that the former precedes the

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[1]Guthrie ([1978] 3:340 n. 1) provides a shorter summary of the various positions on the question. For more remarks on the various sequence-of-publication problems mentioned below, see Appendices A, B, and D.

[2]See my remarks in Appendix B, which allows for at least the possibility that Xen. was influenced in some way by Plato. Feddersen (p. 37) offers the following caveat concerning the priority issue: *Sed licet Platonis Apologia antecedat Xenophontis Apologiae, tamen utriusque consilium ab alterius multum differre non obliti concedemus sane ultra illud hac illius rationem haberi non esse consentaneum.* Ollier (p. 92) correctly observes that priority can only be established, if it can be established at all, through internal evidence (see my conclusions below).

latter. It is common to suppose that Xen. *Ap.* was intended to stand as a corrective to Plato's account, a view based on the assumption that Xen. is also referring to Plato when he refers to ἄλλοι in §1 (see the comment *ad loc.*): In this view, any significant discrepancies between the two works (e.g. Socrates' refusal to propose a counter-penalty) as well as Xen.'s professed purpose in writing his version of events can be seen as being a reaction to Plato, among other writers.[3] A minority of scholars prefer to place Xen. *Ap.* before Pl. *Ap.*: Wetzel (p. 397), for example, feels that the influence of Pl. *Ap.* on the *Comm.*, not evident in Xen. *Ap.*, indicates the priority of Xen. *Ap.* and the probability that Xen. did not read Plato's account before writing his own. Diès (1:222) believes that Xen.'s work was superseded by Plato's, which awakened additional memories of Socrates in Xen.: This, combined with the appearance of Polycrates' work, would have then prompted Xen. to write the *Comm.* Vrijlandt's thesis (p. 147 ff.) also deserves some mention: According to Xen. himself, the information in §§2-10 had never been brought up before in previous Socratic writings. Since, however, it does appear in one form or another in Pl. *Ap.*, it follows that, provided that Socrates did not say the same things twice,[4] Plato had not yet written his ἀπολογία and consequently used Xen. as a source. Vrijlandt believes that in composing his own version Plato came upon Xen. *Ap.* and borrowed from it several things to embellish his account, i.e. the content of the conversation with Hermogenes and what Socrates said as he was leaving the proceedings (p. 150).[5]

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[3]This raises the further problem of dating Pl. *Ap.*, a work which can be grouped quite comfortably with Plato's earlier dialogues while its precise dating remains an open question (see Guthrie [1978] 4:71-72). Vander Waerdt (pp. 13-14) believes that no firm date can be established for either ἀπολογία, while most scholars want to date Pl. *Ap.* soon after the trial, and some (for example, Guthrie *idem*) after 394, most likely the earliest possible year for the composition of Xen. *Ap.* (see my conclusion below). Arnim (pp. 68-69) observes that nearly everyone has assumed that the former was written shortly after Socrates' death, but without reason: Plato could not hope to change the Athenians' minds directly after the trial, and the provocative language in the speech certainly has not been softened in any effort to win over the public. Delebecque (p. 215) believes that Pl. *Ap.* was written ca. 396 and the *Cri.* shortly afterwards. Beyschlag (p. 508) feels that Pl. *Ap.* was written ca. 399 and adds that it is highly unlikely that Xen. would have been unaware of its existence after 387, the year of Anytus' death (mentioned in §31) and a possible *terminus post quem* for Xen. *Ap.* (see below). Such divergent opinions could be multiplied infinitely, though most scholars agree that Pl. *Ap.* was a relatively early work. The possible references to *Phd.* 58E & 89B (see §§32 & 28, respectively) would provide another possible *terminus post quem* for the composition of Xen. *Ap.* (see Wilamowitz [1897] 102, Busse 229, and Beyschlag 515), and by Beyschlag's reckoning (*idem*), Xen. *Ap.* as written could only have appeared after 367, over thirty years after the trial, a conclusion which he uses to declare it spurious. Delebecque (p. 218) suggests the appearances of the *Men.* and perhaps the *Cra.* as additional *termini post quos* in connection with the mention of Anytus' death in §31 (see below).

[4]See p. 148: *Xenophon enim ridiculus fieret, si denuo iteraret quae in alio scripto (Apol. Plat.) iam legerentur, quamquam in praefatione praedixerat nova se collaturum esse.*

[5]See below for Arnim's remarks on the priority issue.

Since the issue of priority between Xen. *Ap.* and the *Comm.* cannot be completely resolved (see Appendix A), a sequence of publication cannot be used as a criterion in dating the former. Both works were composed with different, though not unrelated, intentions, and the question becomes one of each scholar's perspective: Did Xen. "pirate" the *Ap.* for the *Comm.*, or vice versa? Are the *Comm.* an expansion of ideas contained in the *Ap.*, or does the *Ap.* represent a distillation of ideas contained in the *Comm.*? Although the former alternative seems far more likely, these questions simply cannot be answered with a complete sense of certainty.[6]

Frick (pp. 52-64) lists and considers four criteria for dating Xen. *Ap.*, from which he eventually concludes that it was written sometime between 390 and 370. These are 1) §1, in which Xen. refers to other, unknown writers of ἀπολογίαι and sets forth his reasons for writing his own (pp. 52-53); 2) §31, in which Anytus' death is mentioned (pp. 53-57); 3) the work's relation, if any, to Polycrates' Κατηγορία (pp. 57-70); and 4) the unusual characterization of Socrates' response to the charges and his pre-trial efforts to win an acquittal (pp. 60-64). It would be best to address these points one by one:

1) Vander Waerdt narrows ἄλλοι in §1 down to Plato, interpreting the plural as a singular in the process (pp. 14-15), but the reference must necessarily remain unclear (see the comment *ad loc.*).
2) Obviously, if the Anytus in §31 is identical with the σιτοφύλαξ mentioned in Lys. 22.8 (see the comment *ad loc.*), then this would provide a *terminus post quem* of 385/4 for the composition of Xen. *Ap.*[7]
3) Delebecque (pp. 215-16), among others, believes that Polycrates wrote his Κατηγορία ca. 393 in reaction to the eulogistic treatment of Socrates by the Socratics, who were beginning to re-assert themselves, and that the tract glorifies the undertakings of the democrats. Delebecque's dating of Xen. *Ap.* would therefore place it within the current literary climate stirred up by the publication of the Κατηγορία around this time in 393/2. Any corresponding attempt to date Xen. *Ap.* in relation to Polycrates' work rests on the assumption that Xen. would have reacted in some way to Polycrates' accusations, as he did in the *Comm.*: On this assumption, the

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[6]See Appendix A. Breitenbach (col. 1893), for example, feels limited to remarking only that the two works show a typically Xenophontic *Arbeitsweise* and were written around the same time and relatively late.
[7]See too Busse 229, Ollier 89, Delebecque 218, Montuori 74, and Breitenbach 1891. Toole (p. 4) feels that the publications of Xen. *Ap.* and *Comm.* are directly linked with Anytus' death: Τοῦτο δέ, διότι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα ἐθεωρεῖτο ὡς ἄηθές νὰ ἀποδίδωνται εἰκονικοὶ λόγοι εἰς ζῶντα πρόσωπα.

lack of any response in Xen. *Ap.* would indicate that it was written beforehand; conversely, any trace of Polycratean influence (e.g. in the διδάσκαλος charge in §20) would show that it was written afterwards.[8] The weakness of this argument is the likelihood that Xen. intended to treat Polycrates' charges in full in the *Comm.* while reserving the *Ap.* for a treatment of Socrates' μεγαληγορία only (see §1), a view supported by his own statement of purpose in §22, where he also reveals that his account of events is by no means a full one (ἐρρήθη μὲν δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πλείω ὑπὸ...αὐτοῦ).

4) The characterization of Socrates in Xen. *Ap.* cannot be considered a legitimate criterion because of its necessarily conjectural basis. It would be possible, for example, to say that the portrayal of Socrates' arrogance makes a later dating more likely since such a characterization would have been repellent to the Athenian public immediately after the trial. We are in no position, however, to judge how the Athenians reacted to Socrates' execution in the intervening years, nor do we know against whom, if anyone, Xen. directed his *Ap.* (It could just as easily be argued, for example, that Xen. wrote the work in anger as soon as he learned that his friend had been put to death by the Athenians, who in addition had no doubt compelled him to leave Athens because of the cavalry's complicity with the Thirty.)[9]

Using these and other criteria (in particular, the supposed references in Xen. *Ap.* to Platonic works other than the *Ap.*), various scholars have suggested various sequences of events surrounding the writing of Xen. *Ap.*, each of which has its own particular charm yet nothing to raise it from the murky nether-regions of the merely plausible into the limpid light of the highly probable. I have reproduced some of these sequences below for the reader's edification:

- Xen. takes part in the expedition of Cyrus.
- The rhetoricians meanwhile begin to publish fictitious accounts of the trial.
- Xen. returns to Athens and hears Hermogenes' report.[10]

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[8]Schanz (p. 83) prefers the former view because he sees no such influence in Xen. *Ap.* (including §20, which he believes formed part of the original indictment). For thoughts on the Plato-Xenophon-Polycrates triangle, see Guthrie (1978) 4:71-72; for a fuller treatment of possible Polycratean influence on Xen. *Ap.*, see Essay C.

[9]Two opposing opinions are illustrative of this point: Diès (1:221) believes that a late publication of Xen. *Ap.* would be pointless and that the Hermogenes testimony is of value only if Xen. *Ap.* precedes the *Comm.* and Pl. *Ap.* Arnim (pp. 9-10) similarly states that Xen. *Ap.* will appear as a strong witness only if it was written before the *Schutzschrift* and Pl. *Ap.*

[10]Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Xen. returned to Greece before 394, the implications of *An.* VII.7.57 notwithstanding.

• He publishes his *Ap.* to emphasize Socrates' *Todesverachtung* and to counter the rhetoricians' versions.
• Xen. then reads Pl. *Ap.* and other accounts, from which he learns of the Polycratean charges brought up at the trial.
• He consequently writes *Comm.* I.1, I.2.1-8, I.2.62-64 & IV.8. Sections I.2.9-61 are added after Xen. reads Polycrates, while the rest of the *Comm.* can be attributed to the presence of the many contemporary λόγοι Σωκρατικοί.[11]

• Polycrates' Κατηγορία is published in 393/2.
• The *Schutzschrift* is published as a response and separate essay between 392 and 390.
• The *Ap.* (written particularly on Socrates' behavior at the trial with a brief response to Polycrates) is published sometime after 386/5.
• The remainder of the *Comm.* appears sometime after 370.[12]

• The *Ap.* appears within ten years of the trial as a sketch, followed by the Κατηγορία, then by the *Comm.*, previously conceived as memoirs and as an explanation of Socrates' singular behavior in court.[13]

• Anytus dies, and the relevant works are published in the following order: Xen. *Ap.*, Pl. *Ap.*, Polycrates' Κατηγορία, and the *Comm.* (meant to replace the *Ap.*). The *Ap.* itself can be dated to 392, that is, after Xen.'s return from Asia Minor and during the Olympics, when he could conveniently gather the relevant information from Hermogenes.[14]

• The *Ap.* can be dated to Xen.'s Scillus period, when he was particularly interested in the upbringing of his sons. It is therefore appropriate to date the work to the period 384-82, that is, when his sons were in mid-adolescence, shortly after the *An.*, and before the first two books of the *Comm.* (written ca. 381).[15]

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[11]Wetzel 404-405.
[12]Chroust [1955] 3 n. 6 & 5 n. 10.
[13]Ollier 91. Stokes ([1997] 3-4) proposes a similar sequence, with Pl. *Ap.* appearing first and Xen. *Ap.* at any point afterwards. Stokes places too much emphasis in his dating on the supposedly literary nature of Polycrates' charge regarding Critias and Alcibiades, however, since public indignation against the two may well have been historical.
[14]Diès 1:222. Note that Diès does not accept the Anytus/grain-official identification, a refreshing show of dissent from the usual dogmatic approach to this problem.
[15]Delebecque 218. Frick (34 n. 120) also favors dating the *Ap.* to the late 80's. Breitenbach (col. 1893) disagrees with Delebecque's proposed dating and wants to make it later.

• Since parts of the *Ap.* appear in the *Schutzschrift*, the oldest part of the *Comm.*, it follows that the *Ap.* not only precedes this and Polycrates' work, but also Pl. *Ap.*
• On the other hand, two things speak against an early date for Xen. *Ap.*: the mention of Anytus' death and the apparent borrowing from *Phd.* 89B in *Ap.* 28.
• The *Ap.* therefore could have appeared between the death of Anytus and the composing of the *Schutzschrift*, which was written in response to Polycrates, and must have appeared shortly after Anytus' death since his death would have quickly lost any relevance to the public.[16]

Arnim's arguments above deserve to be treated in some detail as being representative of the controversy surrounding the entire issue. In his exhaustive comparison of the *Ap.* and *Comm.*, he (p. 66) makes the *Ap.* the earliest of Xen.'s Socratica to appear in a completed form. He points out that, since the *Schutzschrift* is considered by some scholars to be the oldest part of the *Comm.*, the following sequence has been traditionally favored: *Schutzschrift* ---> *Ap.* ---> *Comm.* IV.8.1-11 (pp. 54-55). By carefully comparing all three of these "ἀπολογίαι", Arnim arrives at the conclusion that the corresponding passages in *Comm.* I.1 ff. & IV.8 are based on the *Ap.*, not vice versa , with *Comm.* IV.8 ff. (excluding §11) depending entirely on the *Ap.* (p. 26). He also observes the following:

1) Since parts of the *Ap.* appear in the *Schutzschrift*, the oldest part of the *Comm.*, it is clear that the *Ap.* not only precedes this and Polycrates' Κατηγορία, but also Pl. *Ap.* (pp. 21-22).
2) Two things speak against an early date for Xen. *Ap.*: the mention of Anytus' death and the apparent borrowing from *Phd.* 89B in *Ap.* 28 (p. 22).
3) Xen. *Ap.* could have appeared between the death of Anytus and the *Schutzschrift*, which was written in response to Polycrates' pamphlet (p. 23).
4) Xen. *Ap.* must have appeared shortly after Anytus' death since no one would have remained interested in him for very long afterwards (p. 23).
5) To call *Comm.* I.1 ff. & IV.8 spurious because of their similarities with the *Ap.* is unjustified since Xen. borrowed internally on other occasions, e.g. from the *HG* for his *Ages.* (*idem*). Furthermore, the same material was used for two different

[16]See Arnim (pp. 21-23), who comments elsewhere (p. 12) that, since Plato also goes into the reasons behind Socrates' μεγαληγορία, it does not necessarily follow that Pl. *Ap.* preceded Xen. *Ap.* For a lengthy response to Arnim's argument, see Hackforth (p. 13 ff.), who also favors an early date for Xen. *Ap.* and its priority over Plato's work.

purposes: In *Comm.* IV.8 Xen. wanted to show that the fact that Socrates' actions resulted in death did not belie the existence of the daimonic voice, while in the *Ap.* he wanted to emphasize Socrates' willingness to die, the point in common being Hermogenes' report that the voice discouraged Socrates from defending himself (pp. 26-27).

6) On the other hand, Xen. wrote the *Schutzschrift* to replace the flawed *Ap.*, and the fact that he plundered the previous work shows that he meant to abandon it (p. 66: see too Gomperz [1924] 173).

7) Since the *Comm.* and *Ap.* were written for the same overall purpose, the *Ap.* faded in comparison with the updated version (pp. 53-54), though Xen. was not successful in suppressing his *Ap.*, as shown by its inclusion in Diogenes Laertius' register of Xenophontic works (2.57).[17]

8) The *Ap.* was intended only to explain Socrates' ἄφρων μεγαληγορία, while the *Comm.* (in particular, the *Schutzschrift*) was intended as a rebuttal to Polycrates' attack in particular and to anti-Socratic sentiments in general (pp. 67-69).

In comparing Xen.'s ἀπολογία with Plato's, Arnim makes the following points:

1) Xen. *Ap.* will appear as a strong witness only if it was written before the *Schutzschrift* and Pl. *Ap.* (pp. 9-10).

2) Since Plato goes into the reasons behind Socrates' μεγαληγορία even more so than Xen., Xen. *Ap.* must come earlier in view of his statement about other authors not having treated this theme adequately (p. 12 ff.).

3) Xen. knew about the oracle (*Ap.* 14) but was not aware of the Platonic connection between it and Socrates' mission, hence the priority of Xen. *Ap.* over Plato's work (p. 44).

4) Everyone has assumed that Pl. *Ap.* was written shortly after Socrates' death, but without sufficient proof: Plato could not hope to change the Athenians' minds directly after the trial, and the provocative language in the speech certainly has not been softened (pp. 68-69).

5) The publication of Pl. *Ap.* caused Xen. to revise in the *Comm.* what he had said in the *Ap.* (p. 66), and Plato's work also caused him to reassess the reliability of

[17] Arnim further points out here that the *Ap.* does not appear among Xen.'s Socratica in Diogenes' list (p. 54), though this seems to have had more to do with its length than with its subject matter (see Essay A).

Hermogenes' report while re-awakening half-forgotten memories of Socrates (pp. 66-67).

6) Finally, it is inconceivable that Xen. wrote his ἀπολογία after Plato's since Plato *...durch die Veröffentlichung seiner Reconstruction der Rede Xenophons kümmerlichen Versuch würde verbleichen lassen, wie die Sterne vor der aufgehenden Sonne verbleichen* (p. 74). The publication of Xen. *Ap.* can therefore be placed at the end of the 90's after the publication of Polycrates' diatribe (p. 44).

The preceding represents one scholar's approach to placing Xen. *Ap.* within a literary context. In general, any attempt to contextualize the work must take the following into consideration: 1) the purpose of the *Ap.*, 2) its nature, particularly its brevity, 3) its relationship to the *Comm.*, with which it shares nearly identical passages and a similar purpose, 4) its relationship to Pl. *Ap.*, which represents the only contemporary example of the ἀπολογία genre, and 5) the mention of Anytus' death in §31. I have reproduced Arnim's tedious argumentation above to demonstrate the pitfalls inherent in over-intellectualizing what can only be considered meager evidence. Let us examine these five points one by one:

1) Xen. states explicitly in §1 of the *Ap.* that his purpose is to explain Socrates' μεγαλῃγορία. This he does amply, as shown by the insufferably arrogant tone of Socrates' speeches throughout the work. There is no reason to assume that he intends to rebut Polycrates' attack, nor is it necessary to assume that his reference to other writers in §1 includes Plato.[18] Wilamowitz ([1897] 102), for one, holds that the *Ap.* was written in the 70's, long after Polycrates' attack had appeared. His basis for this conclusion is the similarity of *Ap.* 28 (i.e. the Apollodorus scene) to *Phd.* 89B & 117D, and this later date would also explain why the *Ap.* contains no demonstrable reaction to Polycrates' accusations. According to his view, the question of Socrates' innocence had long been settled in the author's estimation, hence the cursory treatment of the trial and the effort to make Socrates seem more *erhaben* through his μεγαλῃγορία: In short, *jede spätere Darstellung steigert den Helden.*[19] Again, there is no reason to suppose that Xen. *Ap.* would have necessarily contained any response

[18]I should add that there seems to be a widespread assumption among scholars that works of ancient authors were readily available to the far-flung Greek reading public immediately after "publication". This is certainly open to question (see Dover *Lysias* 151-54), and I consequently use the word "publication" in reference to any ancient work to mean any effort on the author's part to make his work known to the "public", under which I include friends and family members.

[19]See Wilamowitz ([1897] 102 n. 2), who also points out the similar treatment of Christ in the relatively late Gospel of John.

to Polycrates, especially since Polycrates' work supposedly contained many accusations that were not brought up at the original trial because of the amnesty, and the view that Xen. *Ap.* does not respond to Polycrates' accusations also would not prove a pre-393 date since the subject had already been amply treated in the *Schutzschrift.*[20]

2) This limited purpose might account for the brief and sketchy nature of the *Ap.*, an opinion which is at least partly the result of the reader's automatic tendency to compare it with its lengthier Platonic counterpart. No matter when it was written or whether or not its contents were pirated for parts of the *Comm.*, it is important to remember that, given the professed scope of Xen. *Ap.* (see §22), it could easily and successfully exist *in vacuo,* as its inclusion in Diogenes' list of Xenophontic works seems to indicate.

3) The relationship of Xen. *Ap.* to the relevant passages in the *Comm.* cannot be ignored, though the sequence of writing, in spite of Arnim's thoughtful and often ingenious analysis, cannot be established with any certainty. It seems likely, however, 1) that *Comm.* IV.8 ff., because of the appearance of passages nearly identical to certain passages in the *Ap.* and because of its polished nature generally, was probably written afterwards, and 2) that the same must hold true for the *Schutzschrift,* which constitutes a far better defense than the *Ap.*[21]

4) The relationship of Xen.'s ἀπολογία to Plato's is also difficult to ascertain since there is no *direct* evidence of mutual or even uni-directional influence which would assist in placing the former within a certain sequence or time frame (see Hackforth 28). Gomperz ([1924] 170-71) argues that Xen. *Ap.* 1 (γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου [περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας καὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τοῦ βίου] καὶ ἄλλοι) must refer to Pl. *Ap.* since no ἀπολογία is ascribed to any other Socratic, a point which would certainly lend support to the argument that Xen. intended to present his own rationale for Socrates' attitude in court and did not intend to offer his work as a "serious" piece of literature. On the other hand, such an argument does not take into account the possibility that other authors, Socratic or otherwise, might have dealt with Socrates' megalegorical attitude in court in a different context, or simply that the lack of any citations is due to happenstance.

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[20]See Chroust (1957) 74 and Breitenbach 1893. Wilamowitz' argument ([1897] 103 n. 2) that the similarity with Ps.-Pl. *Theages* with respect to the daimonic voice places Xen. *Ap.* around the same time period (i.e. after 370) is equally tenuous.

[21]See Appendix A. For general arguments concerning the sequence of publication, see Gomperz (1924) 171 and Chroust (1957) 45.

5) Finally, the reference to Anytus in *Ap.* 31 is only problematical if this Anytus is to be identified with the grain inspector named Anytus who is mentioned in Lys. 22.8. This too is open to question (see the comment on §29).

As in the case of the authenticity essay (q.v.), I feel compelled out of a simple sense of dismay to apply a critical blade to the tumescent growth of unnecessary and largely unjustified speculation and dogmatism which also surrounds the dating question. In general, we are left with several possible *termini post quos* for the composition of the *Ap.*:

1) It is possible, though probably unlikely, that Xen. began the work while he was on campaign with the Spartans in Asia Minor, where he undoubtedly would have come in contact with Athenians who were at least indirectly familiar with the events at the trial.[22] I am quite willing to admit that Pl. *Ap.* exerted some sort of influence on Xen.'s writing (see Appendix B), but this is of little use in dating the latter since the former has been dated to as early as 399 or somewhat later.[23] I also see no convincing evidence for the influence of any other Platonic dialogue on the *Ap.*, and any consideration of Platonic influence on Xen.'s writings must take into account the question of the circulation of "published" works at the time, Xen.'s itinerant life as a soldier of fortune, and his eventual retirement at Scillus, a remote corner of the Peloponnese.[24]

2) It is far more likely that Xen. began writing the work after his return to Greece in 394, where, despite his likely participation on the Spartan side in the Battle of Coronea and despite his banishment from Athens, he would have had ample opportunity to meet and discuss the trial with his compatriots. Since Hermogenes may simply serve as a literary foil in the *Ap.*, his appearance there can be of no use to us in dating the work, and even if his testimony can be considered legitimate, there is of course no way of determining when Xen. might have received it.[25]

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[22]See *HG* III.1.4, where Xen. states that Athens dispatched 300 cavalrymen to the Spartan army under Thibron to be rid of them. There is nothing to have prevented Xen. from writing the *Ap.* while on campaign (cp. similar works by Julius Caesar and Marcus Aurelius, and, in our century of "total war", by Owen and Wittgenstein), a circumstance which may, in fact, account for its sketchiness. Tuplin (p. 1630) describes Xen. *Ap.* as "a brief (perhaps very early) work" but provides no reason for his supposition.

[23]See, for example, Beyschlag 510 and Guthrie (1978) 4:72. If Xen. *Ap.* was in fact written before the *Schutzschrift,* a possible *terminus ante quem* would be the period in which Polycrates' tract was supposedly composed.

[24]On this last point see Delebecque 208.

[25]See the comment on §2. It would be interesting to know what sort of relationship, if any, existed between Xen. and Callias, Hermogenes' half-brother, who, having the financial means to travel freely,

3) There are few, if any, traces of a response to Polycrates in the *Ap.*, but since Polycrates' work is usually dated between 394 and 390,[26] we return to the provisional *terminus post quem* of 394 suggested above.
4) The Anytus identification remains indeterminate. If it could be made, however, it would provide a definite *terminus post quem* of 385/4 that would coincide nicely with the beginning of Xen.'s retirement at Scillus, presumed to have begun with the conclusion of the King's Peace in 387.[27]
5) Delebecque's notion (see above) that Xen. began the *Ap.* and his Socratic writings at Scillus is appealing for the simple reason that he would have had the leisure there to compile information and to become better acquainted with the work of his predecessors (see §1).[28] If the *Ap.* was in fact written before the *Comm.*, this would push the date of its composition back towards the beginning of this period.
6) Finally, it is possible, though far less likely, that Xen. wrote the work after the Spartan defeat at Leuctra forced him to abandon his estate at Scillus. However, a later dating would explain Xenophon/Socrates' at times vituperative tone directed towards a degenerate Athenian democracy for which Socrates had become merely a public icon and, in this case, a convenient vehicle for Xen.'s moralizing, who was motivated, perhaps, by the same public spirit which drove him to write the *Vect.* and *Eq.Mag.*

I conclude, then, that the *Ap.* could have been written anytime after 394, more likely after 392, and most likely after 385.

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might possibly have relayed Hermogenes' account to Xen. at Scillus or elsewhere (see Delebecque 214). Diès' suggestion (p. 222) that Xen. received his information about Socrates' trial at the Olympics of 392 is quite attractive. See too Arnim (p. 69) and Toole (p. 4), the latter of whom places the composition of the *Ap.* anytime between this year and 363.
[26]See Guthrie (1978) 4:72 and Essay C.
[27]The year of Anytus' tenure as a grain official is variously given (see the comment on §29).
[28]In this respect I agree wholeheartedly with Frick (p. 80), Fritz ([1931] 40-41), and Kahn (p. 30). Kahn's short argument in favor of dating Xen.'s Socratica to the 60's is not persuasive, however.

Essay C: Possible Non-Platonic Influences on Xenophon

Vrijlandt (pp. 143-51) specifies and treats three distinct schools of thought regarding the *Ap.*'s genesis, i.e. those scholars who maintain 1) that it is spurious and consists of material from other Socratica, especially Plato's, 2) that Xen. wrote it specifically as a corrective to Pl. *Ap.*, or 3) that both Xen. and Plato drew independently from a common source and altered the information for their own purposes.[1] The first two issues are treated in Essay A and Appendix B, respectively, while the following remarks will concern themselves with a consideration of other possible influences on Xen. in his writing of the *Ap.*[2]

Chroust ([1957] 220-22) believes that both Xen. and Plato might have been influenced by accounts of Anaxagoras' trial for impiety (see Feddersen 13-24 and Usher 70),[3] and the case of Antiphon, the anti-democrat implicated in the putsch of 411 and executed after a brilliant defense speech (see Th. VIII.68.1-2), also bore characteristics in common with Socrates' trial. In any case, we can safely imagine that Xen., like many Athenians, was well acquainted with his polis' judicial system and contemporary trials for capital crimes, an assumption corroborated to some extent by the abundance of rhetorical figures and vocabulary in the *Ap.* In general, Xen. probably felt compelled, if he followed Thucydides' precedent, to question the remaining Socratic witnesses, to read all available Socratica, and to take notes,[4] and his account of the perusal of ἐκλογαί by Socrates and his associates in *Comm.* I.6.14 may well describe his own research techniques (see Nickel 124 and Chroust [1957] 106).

Isocrates' *Euagoras* (a work dated to ca. 365) represents one of the first prose encomia written by a contemporary of the subject. This was soon followed by Xen. *Ages.* (ca. 360), and whereas the former work had been a mixture of static eulogy and chronological account, the latter was a more factual chronology combined with a non-chronological, systematic review of the king's virtues, a sort of *Life and Works of Agesilaus*.[5] Xen. admired Agesilaus for his attention to religious observance, his

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[1] An obvious question is, To what extent was Xen. influenced by Socrates himself in his writing? Socrates becomes in a sense another oral source of Xen.'s Socratica (see Nickel 107), but to disentangle what is essentially Socratic from Xen.'s Socratic writings obviously lies far beyond the scope of this dissertation (see Joël *passim* for his Herculean effort to do so).

[2] See the comment on §1 for the possible influence of other ἀπολογίαι on Xen.

[3] See D.L. 2.12-14, D.S. XII.39.2, and Plu. *Per.* 49. Chroust (*ibid.*, p. 221) adds that Anaxagoras would have served as a suitable model in that he also had a reputation for not having troubled himself with worldly affairs.

[4] See Delebecque 211. Arnim (p. 71) boldly concludes from his analysis of the text 1) that Xen. did not work from his own notes, 2) that his information from Hermogenes, whether written or not, was unreliable, and 3) that Xen., while not fully acquainted with Socrates' way of thinking, nevertheless tried to deliver a stylistically accurate piece of work, the result of which was something that resembles modern newspaper reports on scientific lectures.

[5] Momigliano 49-51 (see too Leo 94 and Grant 134). Leo (pp. 91-92) remarks that Xen. developed his antecedents by separating the description of virtues from the subject's deeds, a characteristic of ancient

dealings with other men, and his sense of duty, and this encomiastic treatment of the Spartan king is similar in many ways to his shorter treatment of Socrates in the *Ap.*[6] An encomium of Timotheus appears in Isocrates' *Antidosis* (ca. 355), another contemporary example of the genre which also bears many resemblances to Pl. *Ap.* and which inspired many other encomia.[7] Ion of Chios and Stesimbrotus of Thasos also wrote prose memoirs and sketches of politicians,[8] while Euripides, Thucydides, and the sophists focused on the individual personality. Any or all of these literary developments might have had some effect on Xen. as he composed the *Ap.*[9]

Delebecque (208 ff.) speculates that Xen. probably came into contact with Phaedo, Echecrates, and possibly Euclides during his years at Scillus, while Wetzel (pp. 72-73) feels that Xen.'s affiliation with the Spartans would have caused him to remain estranged from the other Socratics. In any case, Xen. seems to have been influenced to varying degrees by the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί of Antisthenes, Aristippus, Aeschines, and Plato, a genre which Aristotle (*Po.* 1447B9-13) grouped with mimes because of its similar mimetic quality.[10] In considering these λόγοι, it is important to remember that they represent a type of *mimetic* literature, that is, they are by no means historical reconstructions but rather fictionalizations of Socratic conversations.[11] The

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biography in general, and he states elsewhere (p. 67) that the typical division of the subject's traits into virtues and shortcomings can be seen in general as originating with Isocrates and Xen. (It should be noted in passing that Isocrates was Xen.'s fellow demesman.)

[6]See Usher 82-83 (see too Xen.'s necrologies on Proxenus and Meno in *An.* II.6.16 ff.). Dover ([1974] 66) defines the encomium as "a genre in which we may find a useful enumeration of virtues", and it is interesting to note that the qualities which he cites from the *Ages.* (δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, and σοφία) correspond exactly to the Socratic qualities spelled out in *Ap.* 14-15, while the courage (ἀνδρεία) ascribed to Agesilaus in *Ages.* 6.1-3 was considered an essential characteristic of a free (ἐλεύθερος) man (*Ap.* 14). It should be remarked that, although it contains some elements common to ancient biography, e.g. the enumeration of Socrates' virtues, the *Ap.* cannot by its very nature be considered an example of that genre.

[7]Leo 92-93. Consider, for example, the many encomia written afterwards in honor of Xen.'s son Gryllus, who fell in battle against the Thebans (see D.L. 2.55). Feddersen (p. 10) bases his monograph on the thesis that, since all other Socratic testimonia are inadequate in one way or another, we are in fact forced to rely on the *Antidosis* and Xen. *Ap.* as our only means of attempting to reconstruct the original speech of Socrates. Although he finds many rhetorical elements in the *Ap.*, Feddersen (p. 34) does not think that that provides sufficient cause to identify the author of the work with a follower of Isocrates named Xenophon (*PA* 11308).

[8]Grant 134. Leo (p. 90) believes that Xen. specifically used Ion of Chios' *Epidemiae* as a model for the *Comm.*, though Socrates holds a more central position in Xen.'s memoirs and the emphasis lies specifically on recollections.

[9]Gigon ([1946] 216) suggests that parts of Hermogenes' report in Xen. *Ap.* (i.e. §§5-7 & 26) are based directly on an encomium, and that Xen. drew Hermogenes' name from a list or from a λόγος Σωκρατικός (see following).

[10]For Xen.'s reliance on other Socratica, see *Comm.* IV.3.2. For general references to the λόγοι, see Arist. *Rh.* 1417A20, Isoc. *Bus.* 6, Pl. *Ep.* 314C, and D.L. 2.64. Stock (p. 6) lists Alexamenus of Teos, Aeschines, Aristippus, Bryson, Cebes, Crito, Euclides, Glaucon, Phaedo, Simmias, and Simon the cobbler as writers of Socratic dialogues; Kahn (p. 30) believes that Xen. borrowed heavily from Antisthenes, Aeschines, and Plato, but that he found the first two authors more congenial for his purposes (p. 393). Obviously, the more stature Xen. acquires as an independent writer, the more difficult it becomes to determine his reliance on Socratic sources (Nickel 107-108). Jaeger ([1954] 26) believes that it was in fact the *Ap.* that first brought Xen. into the circle of Socratic writers.

[11]Vander Waerdt 7 (see too Maier 27 n. 1, Havelock 285-86, and Chroust [1957] 138). Nickel (p. 111) describes the genre as a cross between a literary portrait and a true portrayal, and Jaeger ([1944] 3:64)

dialogue form particularly suited the genre since 1) it corresponded to the dialectical process and 2) the Socratics wished to add a personal element which was not possible in other forms (Bruns 232 ff.); it is therefore not surprising that the symposium, for example, became a stock setting for this genre (Waterfield 219).[12]

It stands to reason, then, that Xen. would have used other Socratica to make his own more convincing, and it is perhaps best to see Xen.'s four Socratic writings as part of a new literary development motivated by a belief in having captured the "real" Socrates, a purpose set out, for example, in the opening sentences of the *Ap.*[13] The conversational nature of Xen.'s Socratica would allow us to assume that the influence of the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί is at least partially evident here, and Chroust ([1957] 178-79) cites as one example *Comm.* III.7.1-9, where we see the possible influence of the contemporary Alcibiades literature.[14]

To what extent was Xen. influenced by the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί in writing the *Ap.*? According to Chroust ([1955] 2 n. 4), the Socratics seem to have advanced two theories as to the true motive behind the trial and condemnation of Socrates, with both groups trying to show that these events did not proceed from any noble motive: The first held that Anytus had instigated the trial out of revenge for a personal insult from Socrates (see Xen. *Ap.* 29 ff. and Pl. *Men.* 95A), while the second maintained that Aristophanes was ultimately to blame for Socrates' conviction (see Pl. *Ap.* 19C). Be that as it may, Chroust is certainly correct in focusing his attention on *Ap.* 29, since it seems at least plausible that it is based on another Socratic writing of some kind, perhaps one written by Antisthenes, who is said to have borne particularly hostile

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considers the λόγοι to be the first examples of individual psychology in Western literature. Isocrates indicates in *Bus.* 6 that a considerable number of Socratic writings existed by 390, the probable date of the work (see Chroust [1955] 3 n. 6, [1957] 138, and Hackforth 8), so that they were well established by Aristotle's day. The argument that both Xen. and Plato might have based their accounts on other λόγοι carries less weight in light of Gomperz' observation ([1924] 170-71) that no ἀπολογία is listed among the works of the Socratics. This remark is not entirely correct, however (see the comment on *Title*).

[12]This fictionalization and freedom in composition lies at the heart of the Socratic question, and comparing two λόγοι Σωκρατικοί (even Plato's and Xen.'s) does very little to help us reconstruct the historical Socrates since two fictions, like two lies, do not make one truth (Chroust [1957] 139). See Vander Waerdt 5: "The generic conventions of the Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι allowed considerable fictionalization in the portrayal of Socrates' biography and philosophy, such that the historical figure himself provided only a minimal control for later Socratics who sought to appropriate his authority in expounding their own version of his philosophy." Chroust ([1957] 138) comments that it had not yet become standard practice to write in one's own name or on one's own authority, hence the practice of fictionalizing the historical Socrates.

[13]See Nickel 106. Hackforth (pp. 32-33) considers all of Xen.'s Socratica to be a legitimate part of the genre in that Xen. is interested not so much in accuracy but in presenting a picture of Socrates' character. Field (p. 135) remarks that the *Cyr.* represents a good example of historical distortion in the non-Socratic writings which might also apply to the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί in general.

[14]Chroust believes that Xen. substituted Charmides for Alcibiades in this passage since he wanted to downplay the latter's association with Socrates, and sees a similar substitution in *Comm.* IV.2.1-10, where Euthydemus appears. For the possible influence of the Socratics on the writing of the *Comm.*, see Leo 94.

feelings towards Anytus (see D.L. 6.9-10).[15] In general, anything in the work that lends itself to dialogue form (i.e. Socrates' opening conversation with Hermogenes, the short exchange with Meletus in court, the post-trial conversations with his followers in general and with Apollodorus in particular, and the prophecy concerning Anytus and his son) may be considered to have a λόγος Σωκρατικός as a possible basis, and this may even hold true for much of the content of Socrates' speeches delivered before the jury. To claim anything more without sufficient evidence is irresponsible and ultimately counter-productive.[16]

The specificity of the charges leveled at Socrates by Meletus in §20 and elsewhere (see below) may indicate a possible reaction by Xen. to an anti-Socratic work written by a certain rhetorician named Polycrates after Socrates' trial and execution. According to the primary sources, this Polycrates 1) was a contemporary of Isocrates (Isoc. *Bus.* 50) and an Athenian citizen (Suid. s.v. Polycrates), 2) was connected directly with the trial (Suid. *loc. cit.*, Them. *Or.* 269C, and Hermippus ap. D.L. 2.38), and 3) was responsible for forging a scandalous treatise on love to discredit Philenis (Ath. 335CD, where he is also described as sly and evil-tongued).[17] Demetrius (*Eloc.* 120) takes issue with his lack of earnestness, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Is.* 20) mentions him in the same breath as Antiphon, Critias, Thrasymachus et al. while deploring his frigidity, vulgarity, and lack of grace. He supposedly became a sophist due to a serious, undeserved misfortune (Isoc. *Bus.* 1, the hypothesis to which states that he also taught in Cyprus), and Pausanias (VI.17.9) connects him with the court of Jason of Pherae, where he supposedly vied with the aging Gorgias. Almost all ancient sources seem to hold that Polycrates' Κατηγορία Σωκράτους was actually connected with Socrates' trial, an opinion which Favorinus (ap. D.L. 2.39) calls into question because of Polycrates' reference to the subsequent re-building of the Long Walls. Lysias, Theodectes, Demetrius, and Isocrates (Isoc. *Bus.* 4-6) all wrote rebuttals to Polycrates' pamphlet, and the *Schutzschrift* portion of the *Comm.*, where Polycrates is perhaps referred to as ὁ κατήγορος, has also been considered by many since Cobet's remarks[18] to be a response to the Κατηγορία, a conclusion based on two scholia on Aristid. 3.320 & 3.480.

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[15]This could no doubt be said of many of the other Socratics, however.

[16]Busse (p. 222) takes a refreshingly balanced, comprehensive, and sober view of the matter: *Eine wiederholte Analyse [der xenophontischen Apologie] lehrt indessen, daß hier ein Geistesprodukt ganz eigener Art vorliegt, ein Mosaik entlehnter Ausdrücke, Sätze, Gedanken, die vom Verfasser teils eigenen, teils fremden Schriften entnommen sind.*

[17]For references to the pertinent scholarship on Polycrates, see Chroust (1955) 4 n. 9 and Edelstein 84 n. 17; for a list of references in the primary literature, see Guthrie (1978) 3:331 n. 1; and for general treatments of Polycrates, see Schanz 23-45, Wilamowitz (1919) 98-105, and Chroust (1957) ch. 4.

[18]See C. Cobet, *Novae Lectiones,* Brill, Leiden, 1858, p. 662 ff. Grillnberger (*passim*) carefully reviews the history of the Polycrates attribution and responds negatively to a number of selected objections to Cobet's thesis; Toole (p. 8) expresses enthusiasm for it but provides little argumentation. Rutherford (p. 49), citing N. R. Livingstone, observes that there are a number of difficulties with the κατήγορος/Polycrates identification, and if there are, in fact, any grounds for identifying the two

That Polycrates was the author of a Κατηγορία Σωκράτους is mentioned in D.L. 2.38-39, Them. *Or.* 269C, Isoc. *Bus.* 4, Ael. *VH* 11.10, Schol. ad Arist. 3.320 & 3.480, Quint. *Inst.* II.17.4, and Suid. (s.v. Polycrates, where two λόγοι κατὰ Σωκράτους are mentioned). Scholars have not only turned to the *Comm.* to reconstruct Polycrates' tract but also to Libanius, who apparently relied heavily on the Κατηγορία for the writing of his *Ap.*, an observation first made in 1697 by R. Bentley in his *Diss. de Ep. Soc. VI.*[19] Libanius' work is cast in the form of a forensic (or possibly epideictic) speech meant to rebut Anytus, which speaks for its validity as a response to Polycrates since the latter used Anytus as his mouthpiece.[20] Xen. seems to have arranged his rebuttal logically, while Libanius was more interested in oratorical effect, a quality perhaps reflecting Polycrates' own oratorical skills (see Isoc. *Bus.* 4-5 and Chroust [1957] 84). Of course, to what extent Polycrates' polemic can be accurately reconstructed from, or even convincingly connected with, Xen. and Libanius remains an open question, but it is worthwhile to consider the possibility that at least some of the seemingly stray remarks which appear in our three extant Socratic ἀπολογίαι might refer ultimately to the many unofficial 'charges' which undoubtedly were being bruited about during the time of Socrates' trial. In any event, the Κατηγορία as reconstructed from Xen. and Libanius cannot possibly be based upon actual events at the trial of Socrates and could not have been delivered at that time since it contains specific political charges ruled out by the very amnesty which Anytus himself had done so much to promote.[21] The reference in Polycrates' speech to the re-building of the Long Walls (see above) provides a *terminus post quem* of 393, and the fact that Conon and Thrasybulus are looked to as leading statesmen in Lib. *Ap.* 160 indicates that the Κατηγορία was possibly composed before 391.[22] It would be justified to surmise that the work was motivated by professional ambition and/or by Anytus himself (Chroust [1957] 198-99), but far-fetched to conjecture that Polycrates' speech was discovered as part of Anytus' *Nachlaß* (Arnim 23).

On the assumption that *Comm.* I.2.9 ff. is in fact written in response to Polycrates, his four basic charges against Socrates can be summed up briefly as

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figures, I would only comment that Xen.'s word κατήγορος refers far more naturally to Polycrates' Anytus-persona than to Polycrates himself.

[19]See Russell (pp. 17-18) for his comments on Polycrates' possible influence on Libanius.

[20]See Chroust ([1957] 46, 72-74 and Hirzel 239-41. Russell (p. 17) notes, however, that the author of *Socratic. Ep.* 14 makes Meletus the deliverer of a speech written by Polycrates.

[21]Again, it is quite possible that these issues were at least intimated in some form by the prosecution, but by no means could they have formed the basis of the actual case against the philosopher (see the comment on §11).

[22]See Chroust ([1957] 73), who comments elsewhere (pp. 139 & 161) that a relatively early date for the work would make it unlikely that Polycrates used Xen. or Plato as a source, hence one of the other Socratics, perhaps Antisthenes, becomes a likely candidate. An early date also makes it more likely that Polycrates influenced Xen. when he composed his ἀπολογία (see below). Dodds ([1959] 29), who considers the Κατηγορία's relationship to Pl. *Grg.*, does not believe that any firm *terminus ante quem* for Polycrates' work can be established.

follows: Socrates was accused of harboring a disrespect for the democratic institutions of Athens (I.2.9 ff.), of exerting a pernicious influence on Critias and Alcibiades (I.2.12 ff.), of instilling in the young a disrespect towards their elders (I.2.49 ff.), and of capriciously interpreting the words of poets to suit his own purposes (I.2.56 ff.).[23] Xen. does not take up all the charges mentioned by Libanius, who therefore seems overall to be a richer source for any reconstruction, and Xen. also omits Polycrates' specific evidence, which Libanius treats more fully (Chroust [1957] 74). The tone of the reconstructed Κατηγορία seems to indicate that the late sophists did not feel any compunction about disregarding the spirit of the general amnesty (*ibid.*, p. 182), and there was obviously no restriction on Polycrates to imply, for example, that Socrates was the intellectual leader of the oligarchs and had sided with them in 404 (*Comm.* I.2.63). In short, Polycrates was able to include all the extra-legal accusations that Meletus and the other prosecutors had been forced either to omit or to treat in a more cursory fashion.

In considering the possible influence of Polycrates on the *Ap.*, I will be relying on Markowski's reconstruction of the Κατηγορία, which appears as follows:

1. Socrates undermines the democratic institutions of Athens
   a. by inducing young men to despise the existing laws,
   b. by hating the democratic constitution of Athens as well as by seeking to establish a tyranny,
   c. by doing all possible harm to the city, and
   d. by abolishing the rule of the people;
2. Socrates teaches neglect of the gods worshipped by the city;
3. Socrates corrupts the youths of the city;
4. Socrates objects to the most highly respected poets and abuses their authoritative sayings
   a. by criticizing them and
   b. by quoting them in support of his abominable teachings;
5. Socrates induces people to commit serious crimes such as theft, fraud, sacrilege, acts of violence, and perjury;
6. Socrates practices vices in secret which are even worse than those he practices openly;
7. Socrates leads the citizens to idleness

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[23]Since all of Polycrates' charges in his Κατηγορία appear to have been connected in some way to the original corruption-of-the-youth charge, it seems fairly certain that all attempts to justify the original impiety charge had collapsed by the time of its composition (Hackforth 85: see, however, *Ep.* 325B, where Plato [or Pseudo-Plato] gives impiety alone as the reason for the accusation).

a. by inducing them to abstain from all types of economic pursuits, including the tilling of the land,
b. by being not only himself averse to all participation in active public life, but also by preventing others from doing so, and
c. by spurning the quest for money and remaining a pauper who gives no consideration to the problem of taxes and public revenues;

8. Socrates is the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades; and
9. Socrates is a dangerous sophist, and the Athenians have severely punished certain sophists in the past.[24]

The Κατηγορία seems to have unleashed a flurry of Socratic ἀπολογίαι, and it is possible (see D.L. 2.38) that in responding to it Xen. might have interpreted the work as a record of the actual court proceedings.[25] As for possible responses in the *Ap.* to Polycrates' anti-Socratic charges as they appear above,[26] the following areas of potential influence can be discerned (a matter which should be approached, of course, with an appropriate measure of circumspection):

1) *Misodemy*: A disavowal of any potential identification of Socrates with Lycurgus and the Spartan form of government might lie at the basis of Socrates' reference to the former in §15, and in §20 he explains his belief in expert teachers by referring to the preeminent position of qualified military leaders in the Athenian democracy.
2) *Teaching Neglect of the Gods*: See §19: σὺ δὲ εἰπὲ εἴ τινα οἶσθα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γεγενημένον...ἐξ ευσεβοῦς ἀνόσιον.

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[24]See H. Markowski, "De Libanio Socratis defensore" in *Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen* 40 (1910), pp. 5-20; the outline above is based on Chroust's synopsis ([1957] 76). For other attempts at reconstructing Polycrates' charges, see *ibid.* 99-100, Wilamowitz (1919) 2:98-105, and Humbert 29-31.

[25]That Xen. generally uses the formulation ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, for example, seems to indicate that he considered these charges historical; on the other hand, the fact that he uses the present tense in *Comm.* I.2.26 and leaves Polycrates anonymous throughout indicates, perhaps, that he was well aware of the fictional nature of the indictment (Chroust [1957] 136). Grillnberger (pp. 8-9) feels that, since forms like εἶπε, ἔφη etc. did not always refer to spoken utterances, there is in fact no tense problem and that Xen. was in fact unaware of the fictional nature of the Κατηγορία. Edelstein (p. 91 n. 30) is sure of Xen.'s belief that Polycrates' accusations were brought up in court (see *Comm.* I.1.1), which does not necessarily mean that Xen. mistook Polycrates' work for the actual speech of the prosecution. Beyschlag (p. 510) presents a good argument against Xen.'s possible reliance on Polycrates: *Xenophon kann unmöglich...die Anklageschrift des Sophisten für eine Wiedergabe der historischen Klagerede des Anytos gehalten haben, da diese Möglichkeit durch den in jener Rede enthaltenen Anachronismus vom Mauerbau Konons, den zudem Xenophon selbst in den Hell. IV, 8, 9 erzählt, verhindert wird.*

[26]Wilamowitz ([1897] 102), Arnim (pp. 23 & 69), Wetzel (p. 401), Frick (p. 34 n. 120), and Ollier (p. 91) find no trace of Polycrates in Xen. *Ap.* Various reasons are offered for this: Frick (*idem*) suggests that it was due to Xen.'s remoteness from Athens. Gigon ([1946] 231-32) thinks that, since the *Ap.* treats the two indictment charges more broadly, and since the work is specifically concerned with Socrates' μεγαληγορία, Polycrates' material would have been ill-suited for it. Chroust ([1955] 5 n. 11 & [1957] 69: see too Maier 22) bases his remark on a difference in intentions, that is, since Xen. had already rebutted Polycrates' charges in the *Schutzschrift*, there was no need to treat the same issue in the *Ap.* The question depends, of course, on the sequence of publication.

3) *Corruption of the Youth*: Polycrates apparently went beyond the original indictment charges in attempting to show, among other things, that Socrates had attempted to destroy all feelings of filiopiety in his young followers (see especially *Comm.* I.2.49). This issue figures quite largely in *Ap.* 20, where Socrates is accused of, and readily admits to, causing young people to follow the advice of pedagogical experts over that of their elders, and it seems clear that Polycrates in general was quite determined to show how insidious Socrates' teachings had been for the young.[27] The most telling example of education gone wrong, however, is offered by Xen. in *Ap.* 29-31, where Anytus is shown to be incompetent in raising his own son, a young man who had presumably demonstrated considerable promise under Socrates' tutelage. This section of the *Ap.*, if intended as a reply to Polycrates, would have been all the more scathing since it was Anytus who was the impetus behind the indictment of Socrates and who served as the actual spokesman for the prosecution in Polycrates' Κατηγορία.

4) *Misuse of Poetry*: Libanius (*Ap.* 62 ff. & 117-126) links the charge above with Socrates' misuse of poets, hence the original charge might have been presented by Polycrates as follows: By undermining traditional values associated with certain poets, Socrates undermines all societal values as well, including filiopiety (Chroust [1957] 84-86). The accounts of Xen. and Libanius seem to agree in connection with Socrates' use of quotations from ancient poets (*ibid.* 74 & 89), though Xen. only mentions Homer and Hesiod. Socrates' well-founded and unassailable reference to Palamedes and Odysseus in Xen. *Ap.* 26 might be considered a pointed response to this Polycratean charge.

5) *Causing Others to Commit Serious Crimes*: Although Socrates in more general terms denies exerting a maleficent influence on his followers (§19) and denies being guilty of serious crimes himself (§25), there is no direct mention made of his causing others to commit such crimes as those mentioned in Markowski's reconstruction above.

6) *Practicing Secret Vices*: The public nature of Socrates' behavior, at least as regards his religious practices, is strongly emphasized in §11: ἐπεὶ θύοντά γέ με ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων βωμῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες ἑώρων καὶ αὐτὸς Μέλητος, εἰ ἐβούλετο.

7) *Inducement of Idleness and Contempt for Lowly Occupations*: Libanius defends Socrates at great length against the charge of preaching idleness (*Ap.* 21, 84-89,

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[27]See *Comm.* I.2.9, I.2.12 ff., I.2.49 and Lib. *Ap.* 136 ff. Xen. *Ap.* 20 (cp. *Comm.* I.2.49) has drawn the most attention from those who find Polycratean influence in the work (see, for example, Chroust [1955] 2-3, [1957] 35 and Maier 15), and Gigon ([1946] 226) sees a possibly direct parallel with Polycrates' work, with Meletus replacing Anytus as Polycrates' mouthpiece. Breitenbach (col. 1890) advises caution, however, since this passage could be considered a response to *Nu.*, while Edelstein (p. 88 n. 25: see too Schmid 224 n. 1) believes that the correspondence with the *Comm.* passage may indicate that the filiopiety charge was actually brought up in court.

127 ff.), and it would seem that this made up a considerable part of Polycrates' accusation. Precedents existed for this accusation, i.e. an Athenian law called a γραφὴ ἀργίας to which Polycrates might have referred, and Pisistratus had made idleness a criminal charge (Chroust [1957] 94). Libanius (*Ap.* 89-90) suggests that Socrates' interest in self-betterment over amassing wealth was considered idleness, and the fact that Xen. and Libanius stress repeatedly that Socrates was a frugal person might also be related to Polycrates' charge (*ibid.*, p. 93). Socrates himself speaks out against idleness in *Comm.* II.7.1-14, which might better represent Xen.'s attitude than Socrates' (*ibid.*, pp. 94-95).[28] In Xen. *Ap.* 17-18 Socrates' self-reliance (which could be construed as the ability to live without a ready source of income) is emphasized, and he issues a direct challenge to his accusers in §19 to produce a youth γεγενημένον...ἐκ φιλοπόνου μαλακόν. There seems to be some truth in the statement that Socrates considered the life of a craftsman to be detrimental (see *Comm.* III.7.5-7, *Oec.* 4.1-3, and D.L. 2.31: see too the comment on §30), and his disdain for menial labor is brought out clearly in the description of Anytus' trade in Xen. *Ap.* 30: ὥστε φημὶ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ δουλοπρεπεῖ διατριβῇ ἣν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ παρεσκεύακεν οὐ διαμενεῖν. The distinction is ultimately one between ἀργία and σχολή.

8) *Association with Critias and Alcibiades*: Both Xen. (*Comm.* II.2.12 ff.) and Libanius (*Ap.* 136 ff.) refute the allegation that Socrates was the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades.[29] Xen.'s κατήγορος makes Critias and Alcibiades directly responsible for inflicting evils on the city, while Libanius' opponent seems to hold Socrates himself directly responsible (Chroust [1957] 82). Lib. *Ap.* 136 ff. can almost be considered a brief Ἀπολογία Ἀλκιβιάδου since the author dwells on his more positive achievements, perhaps in response to Polycrates' exaltation of Thrasybulus and Conon, which was delivered to provide an oratorical contrast to his denunciation of Critias and Alcibiades (*ibid.*, p. 96). In short, Socrates was apparently accused by Polycrates of having groomed the two for their later misconduct, and the appropriate punishment for such treasonous activity would be execution (*ibid.*, p. 97). A response to this might appear in Xen. *Ap.* 17-18, where Socrates replies to the corruption-of-the-youth allegations by admitting that he does, in fact, attract followers of every kind, both citizens and aliens. He proceeds, however, to lay special emphasis on his self-restraint and his ability to

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[28]See Chroust (1957) 94-95, who also notes that, according to Aelian (*VH* 10.14), Socrates called ἀργία the "sister of freedom" while alluding to various peoples to prove his point, an attitude which would perhaps better accord with the Cynics' point of view.

[29]For the issue of teaching, see the comment on §20. Aeschines Orator (*contra Timarch.* 173) is often quoted as evidence for this public perception after the trial.

rely on the pleasures of his own soul, qualities conspicuously absent in his two notorious students.[30]

9) *Crime and Punishment*: Polycrates seems also to have referred to Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Diagoras of Melos as historical precedents for acting against Socrates (see Lib. *Ap.* 153 ff.), and it is likely that he tried to identify him with some of their teachings as well as with those of other sophists and philosophers (Lib. *Ap.* 102). In Xen. *Ap.* 20 Socrates defends the right of experts to impart their special knowledge and in the following section challenges the appropriateness of the capital charge in such a case (see too §25).

More generally, Xen. himself seems tacitly to concede the justness of the death penalty by at least implying a causation between Socrates' wilful μεγαλῃγορία and his willingness to die. If, then, we understand this term to mean "self-aggrandizement", it becomes most plausible to consider Xen. *Ap.* with its expressly corrective purpose as a response to other megalegorical descriptions of Socrates as they appeared in Polycrates' Κατηγορία and the other anti-Socratic literature mentioned in Xen. *Ap.* 1.

[30]Reeve (p. 99 ff.) explains the omission of any direct reference by noting that the relevant issues (i.e. politics, ethics, and religion) are sufficiently addressed elsewhere in the *Ap.*

The Manuscript Tradition

There are five extant manuscripts of Xen. *Ap.*: *Vaticanus gr.* 1335 (10th or 12th century) = **A**, *Vaticanus gr.* 1950 (14th century) = **B**, *Mutinensis* 145 (15th century) = **C**, *Harleianus* 5724 (15th century) = **H**, and *Vaticanus Palatinus gr.* 93 = **P** (a 13th-century codex containing only excerpts).[1] The indirect tradition is represented by Athen. 218E (= *Ap.* 14) and Stob. III.7.58 Hense (= excerpts from *Ap.* 25-29).[2] Johannes Reuchlin's *editio princeps* (= **R**) was published by Thomas Anselm as a special edition (along with the *Ages.* and *Hier.*) in Hagenau in 1520 (see Muenschner 236 n. 2), and in writing this dissertation I have used Marchant's Oxford Classical Text edition (1901: 2nd ed. 1919)[3] while consulting Lundström (1906), Thalheim (1913), and Ollier (1961) for variant readings, which appear scattered throughout my commentary below.[4]

Schmoll's stemma appears as follows:



[1] See Schmoll 314-17. Schmoll (p. 314), following A. Diller (*JWarb* 24 [1961] 316), dates *Vat. gr.* 1335 to the 10th century, while Marchant, Lundström, Thalheim, and Ollier place it in the 12th. Lundström is the only one who includes *Vat. Pal.* 93 in his apparatus. For other remarks on the manuscript tradition, see Marchant (1900) 264-65, Thalheim xi, and Ollier 98-99.

[2] See Ollier 99 and Schmoll 316-17 (see too Lundström 6 for references to the various Stobaeus codices). Xen. *Ap.* is also mentioned in Schol. ad Pl. *Ap.* 18B (on Anytus).

[3] Marchant no doubt originally ignored *Mutin.* 145 because its editorial value is, as Ollier (p. 99) puts it, *très contestable*, and it was only with the subsequent publication of E. Kalinka's comments in *Innsbrucker Festgruß* (1909) that it was included in the *addenda et corrigenda* of Marchant's second edition.

[4] See D. Morrison (1988) 67 ff. for other editions. Bibliographical references to textual criticism and commentary concerning the work appear in Morrison (pp. 71-73) and Thalheim (pp. xii-xvi).

Schmoll agrees with previous editors in re-asserting the pre-eminent authority of *Vat. gr.* 1335, which, he feels, is in itself sufficient to serve as the basis for a text (p. 321).[5]

Marchant's sigla, which differ from Schmoll's, appear below:

B = *Vaticanus* 1335, saec. xii
B_2 = Vaticani corrector prior, saec. xiv
A = *Vaticanus* 1950, saec. xiv
Harl. = *Britannicus Harleianus* 5724, saec. xv
C = *Mutinensis* 145, saec. xv
Reuchlin = editio princeps Reuchliana, a. 1520

For the sake of convenience, I have preferred to use these sigla throughout the dissertation.

[5]I would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Schmoll for having introduced me to Xen. *Ap.* during my post-graduate study at the University of Missouri.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ
[ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΑΣ]

[1] Σωκράτους δὲ ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὡς ἐπειδὴ ἐκλήθη εἰς τὴν δίκην ἐβουλεύσατο περί τε τῆς ἀπολογίας καὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τοῦ βίου. γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ πάντες ἔτυχον τῆς μεγαληγορίας αὐτοῦ· ᾧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἐρρήθη ὑπὸ Σωκράτους. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἤδη ἑαυτῷ ἡγεῖτο αἱρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ βίου θάνατον, τοῦτο οὐ διεσαφήνισαν· ὥστε ἀφρονεστέρα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ μεγαληγορία.

[2] Ἑρμογένης μέντοι ὁ Ἱππονίκου ἑταῖρός τε ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξήγγειλε περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα ὥστε πρέπουσαν φαίνεσθαι τὴν μεγαληγορίαν αὐτοῦ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἔφη ὁρῶν αὐτὸν περὶ πάντων μᾶλλον διαλεγόμενον ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης εἰπεῖν· [3] Οὐκ ἐχρῆν μέντοι σκοπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ὅ τι ἀπολογήσῃ; τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνασθαι· Οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι ἀπολογεῖσθαι μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτὸν ἐρέσθαι· Πῶς; Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄδικον διαγεγένημαι ποιῶν· ἥνπερ νομίζω μελέτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀπολογίας. [4] ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν πάλιν λέγειν· Οὐχ ὁρᾷς τὰ Ἀθηναίων δικαστήρια ὡς πολλάκις μὲν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλάκις δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οἰκτίσαντες ἢ ἐπιχαρίτως εἰπόντας ἀπέλυσαν; Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, καὶ δὶς ἤδη ἐπιχειρήσαντός μου σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον. [5] ὡς δὲ αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν· Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις, τὸν δ' αὖ ἀποκρίνασθαι· Ἢ θαυμαστὸν νομίζεις εἰ καὶ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ ἐμὲ βέλτιον εἶναι ἤδη τελευτᾶν; οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην <ἂν> βέλτιον ἐμοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ὅπερ γὰρ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν, ἥδειν ὁσίως μοι καὶ δικαίως ἅπαντα τὸν βίον βεβιωμένον· ὥστε ἰσχυρῶς ἀγάμενος ἐμαυτὸν ταὐτὰ ηὕρισκον καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὶ συγγιγνομένους γιγνώσκοντας περὶ ἐμοῦ. [6] νῦν δὲ εἰ ἔτι προβήσεται ἡ ἡλικία, οἶδ' ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἔσται τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν τε χεῖρον καὶ ἀκούειν ἧττον καὶ δυσμαθέστερον εἶναι καὶ ὧν ἔμαθον ἐπιλησμονέστερον. ἂν δὲ αἰσθάνωμαι χείρων γιγνόμενος καὶ καταμέμφωμαι ἐμαυτόν, πῶς ἄν, εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ἔτι ἂν ἡδέως βιοτεύοιμι; [7] ἴσως δέ τοι, φάναι αὐτόν, καὶ ὁ θεὸς δι' εὐμένειαν προξενεῖ μοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν καιρῷ τῆς ἡλικίας καταλῦσαι τὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ᾗ ῥᾷστα. ἂν γὰρ νῦν κατακριθῇ μου, δῆλον ὅτι ἐξέσται μοι τῇ τελευτῇ χρῆσθαι ἣ ῥᾷστη μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου ἐπιμεληθέντων κέκριται, ἀπραγμονεστάτη δὲ τοῖς φίλοις, πλεῖστον δὲ πόθον ἐμποιοῦσα τῶν τελευτώντων. ὅταν γὰρ ἄσχημον μὲν μηδὲν μηδὲ δυσχερὲς ἐν ταῖς γνώμαις τῶν παρόντων καταλείπηταί <τις>, ὑγιὲς δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἔχων καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δυναμένην φιλοφρονεῖσθαι ἀπομαραίνηται, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τοῦτον ποθεινὸν εἶναι; [8] ὀρθῶς δὲ οἱ θεοὶ τότε μου ἠναντιοῦντο, φάναι αὐτόν, τῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπισκέψει ὅτε ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ζητητέα εἶναι ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὰ ἀποφευκτικά. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο διεπραξάμην, δῆλον ὅτι ἡτοιμασάμην ἂν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἤδη λῆξαι τοῦ βίου ἢ νόσοις ἀλγυνόμενος τελευτῆσαι ἢ γήρᾳ, εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ χαλεπὰ συρρεῖ καὶ μάλα ἔρημα τῶν εὐφροσυνῶν. [9] μὰ Δί', εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐδὲ προθυμήσομαι, ἀλλ' ὅσων νομίζω καλῶν τετυχηκέναι καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἣν ἐγὼ δόξαν ἔχω περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, ταύτην ἀναφαίνων εἰ βαρυνῶ τοὺς δικαστάς, αἱρήσομαι τελευτᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνελευθέρως τὸ ζῆν ἔτι προσαιτῶν κερδᾶναι τὸν πολὺ χείρω βίον ἀντὶ θανάτου.

[Marchant's sigla appear with the information on the MS tradition; his apparatus appears as follows:]
In tit. πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς om. Stob. et Diog. Laert. ii. 57 Demetrium Magneta citans 1.3 οὖν om. A post πάντες fort. θαυμάζοντες vel simile quid excidit 3.1 καὶ ὅ τι] ὅ τι καὶ Schneider 3.3 ἐπεὶ Dind.: ἔπειτα codd. αὐτὸς cit. Schenkl ὅτι om. Harl. 4.1 αὐτὸς cit. Schenkl 5.1 αὐτὸς cit. Schenkl λέγεις] λέγειν Reuchlin ἢ] εἰ B Harl. 5.3 ἂν add. Schneider coll. *Com.* 4. 8, 6 5.4 μοι C et Reuchlin: μὲν cet. 5.5 ταῦτα Harl. 6.2 ἐπιτελεῖσθαι *Com.* 4. 8, 8: ἀπολεῖσθαι Harl.: ἀποτελεῖσθαι codd.: fort. ἀποτελέσαι 7.2 τὸ om. Harl. 7.5 τῷ τελευτῶντι A_2C: τῶν τελευτῶν cet. (τῶν om. Harl.): τοῦ τελευτῶντος Gesner 7.6 καταλίπηται codd.: corr. Stephanus τις add. Schenkl 8.1 μου Reuchlin: μὲν codd.: μοι cit. Schenkl 8.2 ἡμῖν] ὑμῖν Weiske 8.5 ἔρημον cit. Schneider 9.2 ὅσον Harl. καλῶν τετυχηκέναι B: τετυχηκέναι καλῶν cet. 9.3 ταύτην] ταῦτ' Hirschig βαρυνῶ Hirschig: βαρύνω codd.: ταῦτ' ἣν ἀναφαίνων [εἰ] βαρύνω conicio

[10] οὕτως δὲ γνόντα αὐτὸν ἔφη [εἰπεῖν], ἐπειδὴ κατηγόρησαν αὐτοῦ οἱ ἀντίδικοι ὡς οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζοι, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέροι καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθέροι, παρελθόντα εἰπεῖν· [11] Ἀλλ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοῦτο μὲν πρῶτον θαυμάζω Μελήτου, ὅτῳ ποτὲ γνοὺς λέγει ὡς ἐγὼ οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω· ἐπεὶ θύοντά γέ με ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων βωμῶν καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες ἑώρων καὶ αὐτὸς Μέλητος, εἰ ἐβούλετο. [12] καινά γε μὴν δαιμόνια πῶς ἂν ἐγὼ εἰσφέροιμι λέγων ὅτι θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται σημαίνουσα ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν; καὶ γὰρ οἱ φθόγγοις οἰωνῶν καὶ οἱ φήμαις ἀνθρώπων χρώμενοι φωναῖς δήπου τεκμαίρονται. βροντὰς δὲ ἀμφιλέξει τις ἢ μὴ φωνεῖν ἢ μὴ μέγιστον οἰωνιστήριον εἶναι; ἡ δὲ Πυθοῖ ἐν τῷ τρίποδι ἱέρεια οὐ καὶ αὐτὴ φωνῇ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ διαγγέλλει; [13] ἀλλὰ μέντοι καὶ τὸ προειδέναι γε τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ προσημαίνειν ᾧ βούλεται, καὶ τοῦτο, ὥσπερ ἐγώ φημι, οὕτω πάντες καὶ λέγουσι καὶ νομίζουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν οἰωνούς τε καὶ φήμας καὶ συμβόλους τε καὶ μάντεις ὀνομάζουσι τοὺς προσημαίνοντας εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο δαιμόνιον καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι οὕτως ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀληθέστερα καὶ ὁσιώτερα λέγειν τῶν τοῖς ὄρνισιν ἀνατιθέντων τὴν τῶν θεῶν δύναμιν. ὡς γε μὴν οὐ ψεύδομαι κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχω τεκμήριον· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φίλων πολλοῖς δὴ ἐξαγγείλας τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβουλεύματα οὐδεπώποτε ψευσάμενος ἐφάνην.

[14] ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούοντες οἱ δικασταὶ ἐθορύβουν, οἱ μὲν ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς λεγομένοις, οἱ δὲ καὶ φθονοῦντες, εἰ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν μειζόνων ἢ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνοι, πάλιν εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτην· Ἄγε δὴ ἀκούσατε καὶ ἄλλα, ἵνα ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῶν ἀπιστῶσι τῷ ἐμὲ τετιμῆσθαι ὑπὸ δαιμόνων. Χαιρεφῶντος γάρ ποτε ἐπερωτῶντος ἐν Δελφοῖς περὶ ἐμοῦ πολλῶν παρόντων ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον. [15] ὡς δ' αὖ ταῦτ' ἀκούσαντες οἱ δικασταὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰκότως ἐθορύβουν, αὖθις εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτην· Ἀλλὰ μείζω μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν χρησμοῖς περὶ Λυκούργου τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίοις νομοθετήσαντος ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ. λέγεται γὰρ εἰς τὸν ναὸν εἰσιόντα προσειπεῖν αὐτόν· Φροντίζω πότερα θεόν σε εἴπω ἢ ἄνθρωπον. ἐμὲ δὲ θεῷ μὲν οὐκ εἴκασεν, ἀνθρώπων δὲ πολλῷ προέκρινεν ὑπερφέρειν. ὅμως δὲ ὑμεῖς μηδὲ ταῦτ' εἰκῇ πιστεύσητε τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον ἐπισκοπεῖτε ὧν εἶπεν ὁ θεός. [16] τίνα μὲν γὰρ ἐπίστασθε ἧττον ἐμοῦ δουλεύοντα ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμίαις; τίνα δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἐλευθεριώτερον, ὃς παρ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε δῶρα οὔτε μισθὸν δέχομαι; δικαιότερον δὲ τίνα ἂν εἰκότως νομίσαιτε τοῦ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα συνηρμοσμένου, ὡς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι; σοφὸν δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἄν τις εἰκότως ἄνδρα φήσειεν εἶναι ὃς ἐξ ὅτουπερ ξυνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα ἠρξάμην οὐπώποτε διέλειπον καὶ ζητῶν καὶ μανθάνων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν; [17] ὡς δὲ οὐ μάτην ἐπόνουν οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν καὶ τάδε τεκμήρια εἶναι, τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν πολίτας τῶν ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων, πολλοὺς δὲ ξένων, ἐκ πάντων προαιρεῖσθαι ἐμοὶ ξυνεῖναι; ἐκείνου δὲ τί φήσομεν αἴτιον εἶναι, τοῦ πάντας εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἥκιστ' ἂν ἔχοιμι χρήματα ἀντιδιδόναι, ὅμως πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐμοί τι δωρεῖσθαι; τὸ δ' ἐμὲ μὲν μηδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἀπαιτεῖσθαι εὐεργεσίας, ἐμοὶ δὲ πολλοὺς ὁμολογεῖν χάριτας ὀφείλειν; [18] τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οἰκτίρειν ἑαυτούς, ἐμὲ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπορώτερον διάγειν ἢ ὅτε τὰ μάλιστα ἡ πόλις ηὐδαιμόνει; τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους μὲν τὰς εὐπαθείας ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς πολυτελεῖς πορίζεσθαι, ἐμὲ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνευ δαπάνης ἡδίους ἐκείνων μηχανᾶσθαι; εἴ γε

10.1 οὕτω A εἰπεῖν del. Leonclavius 10.2 μὲν ἡ C: ἡ μὲν B A 11.2 γνοὺς τεκμηρίῳ Cobet coll. *Com.* I. 1, 2: fort. ὅτῳ ποτὲ τρόπῳ 11.4 καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ B: καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ cet. alterum καὶ] κἂν Richards 12.1 μοι Wyttenbach: μου codd. 12.3 τεκμαίρονται C et Reuchlin: τεκμαίρωνται cet. βροντάς Gesner: βρονταῖς codd. 12.4 ἡ] εἰ A B_1 13.1 καὶ om. B_1 13.3 ὀνομάζουσι] νομίζουσι Voigtländer 13.7 κατὰ] καὶ τα (sic) Harl. 14.1 ταῦτ' A 14.2 εἰ καὶ] εἴ τις Cobet 14.5 ἐπερωτήσαντος Ath. v. 218 15.2 ἐθορύβουν εἰκότως Reuchlin ἀλλὰ C. Harl.: ἄλλα cet. 15.5 πολλῶν codd.: corr. Reuchlin 16.1 γὰρ om. Harl. in fine versus 16.4 νομίσητε vel νομίσειτε codd.: corr. Schäfer post τοῦ add. οὕτω Cobet 17. 2 ξένων] ξένους C 17.3 post πάντας add. μὲν et 17.4 post ὅμως add. δὲ Schneider εἰδότας cit. Thalheim ἥκιστ' ἂν Bornemann: ἥκιστα codd. 17.5 εὐεργεσίαν Stephanus 18.3 εὐδαιμόνει A_2 C: εὐδαιμονεῖ cet.

μὴν ὅσα εἴρηκα περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ μηδεὶς δύναιτ' ἂν ἐξελέγξαι με ὡς ψεύδομαι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἤδη δικαίως καὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινοίμην;

[19] ἀλλ' ὅμως σύ με φῄς, ὦ Μέλητε, τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύοντα τοὺς νέους διαφθείρειν; καίτοι ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν δήπου τίνες εἰσὶ νέων διαφθοραί· σὺ δὲ εἰπὲ εἴ τινα οἶσθα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γεγενημένον ἢ ἐξ εὐσεβοῦς ἀνόσιον ἢ ἐκ σώφρονος ὑβριστὴν ἢ ἐξ εὐδιαίτου πολυδάπανον ἢ [ὡς] ἐκ μετριοπότου οἰνόφλυγα ἢ ἐκ φιλοπόνου μαλακὸν ἢ ἄλλης πονηρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἡττημένον. [20] Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Μέλητος, ἐκείνους οἶδα οὓς σὺ πέπεικας σοὶ πείθεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς γειναμένοις. Ὁμολογῶ, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, περί γε παιδείας· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσασιν ἐμοὶ μεμεληκός. περὶ δὲ ὑγιείας τοῖς ἰατροῖς μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι πείθονται ἢ τοῖς γονεῦσι· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις γε πάντες δήπου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς φρονιμώτατα λέγουσι πείθονται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς προσήκουσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ στρατηγοὺς αἱρεῖσθε καὶ πρὸ πατέρων καὶ πρὸ ἀδελφῶν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία γε ὑμεῖς πρὸ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, οὓς ἄν ἡγῆσθε περὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν φρονιμωτάτους εἶναι; Οὕτω γάρ, φάναι τὸν Μέλητον, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ συμφέρει καὶ νομίζεται. [21] Οὐκοῦν, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτην, θαυμαστὸν καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, τὸ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσι μὴ μόνον ἰσομοιρίας τυγχάνειν τοὺς κρατίστους, ἀλλὰ καὶ προτετιμῆσθαι, ἐμὲ δέ, <ὅτι> περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ ἀνθρώποις, περὶ παιδείας, βέλτιστος εἶναι ὑπό τινων προκρίνομαι, τούτου ἕνεκα θανάτου ὑπὸ σοῦ διώκεσθαι;

[22] Ἐρρήθη μὲν δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πλείω ὑπό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ τὰ πάντα εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐκ τῆς δίκης ἐσπούδασα, ἀλλ' ἤρκεσέ μοι δηλῶσαι ὅτι Σωκράτης τὸ μὲν μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἀσεβῆσαι μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄδικος φανῆναι περὶ παντὸς ἐποιεῖτο· [23] τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ᾤετο λιπαρητέον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ καιρὸν ἤδη ἐνόμιζεν ἑαυτῷ τελευτᾶν. ὅτι δὲ οὕτως ἐγίγνωσκε καταδηλότερον ἐγένετο, ἐπειδὴ ἡ δίκη κατεψηφίσθη. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κελευόμενος ὑποτιμᾶσθαι οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο οὔτε τοὺς φίλους εἴασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἴη ἀδικεῖν. ἔπειτα τῶν ἑταίρων ἐκκλέψαι βουλομένων αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐφείπετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπισκῶψαι ἐδόκει ἐρόμενος εἴ που εἰδεῖέν τι χωρίον ἔξω τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἔνθα οὐ προσβατὸν θανάτῳ.

[24] Ὡς δὲ τέλος εἶχεν ἡ δίκη, εἰπεῖν αὐτόν· Ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες, τοὺς μὲν διδάσκοντας τοὺς μάρτυρας ὡς χρὴ ἐπιορκοῦντας καταψευδομαρτυρεῖν ἐμοῦ καὶ τοὺς πειθομένους τούτοις ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ πολλὴν ἑαυτοῖς συνειδέναι ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τί προσήκει νῦν μεῖον φρονεῖν ἢ πρὶν κατακριθῆναι, μηδὲν ἐλεγχθέντι ὡς πεποίηκά τι ὧν ἐγράψαντό με; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀντὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἥρας καὶ τῶν σὺν τούτοις θεῶν οὔτε θύων τισὶ καινοῖς δαίμοσιν οὔτε ὀμνὺς οὔτε νομίζων ἄλλους θεοὺς ἀναπέφηνα. [25] τούς γε μὴν νέους πῶς ἂν διαφθείροιμι καρτερίαν καὶ εὐτέλειαν προσεθίζων; ἐφ' οἷς γε μὴν ἔργοις κεῖται θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ἱεροσυλίᾳ, τοιχωρυχίᾳ, ἀνδραποδίσει, πόλεως προδοσίᾳ, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀντίδικοι τούτων πρᾶξαί τι κατ' ἐμοῦ φασιν. ὥστε θαυμαστὸν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι ὅπως ποτὲ ἐφάνη ὑμῖν τοῦ θανάτου ἔργον ἄξιον ἐμοὶ εἰργασμένον. [26] ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέντοι ὅτι ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκω, διὰ τοῦτο μεῖον φρονητέον· οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἀλλὰ τοῖς καταγνοῦσι τοῦτο αἰσχρόν [γάρ] ἐστι. παραμυθεῖται δ' ἔτι με καὶ Παλαμήδης ὁ παραπλησίως ἐμοὶ τελευτήσας· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ νῦν πολὺ καλλίους ὕμνους παρέχεται Ὀδυσσέως τοῦ ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντος αὐτόν· οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἐμοὶ μαρτυρήσεται ὑπό τε τοῦ ἐπιόντος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου ὅτι ἠδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πώποτε οὐδὲ

19.4 ὡς del. Gesner 20.3 σωκράτη B 20.5 πάντως οἱ ἀθηναῖοι πάντες δήπου Reuchlin 20.7 secundum πρὸ om. A 20.8 ἡγεῖσθε codd. 21.2 σωκράτην Harl.: σωκράτη cet. 21.4 ὅτι add. Stephanus εἶναι εἰ C, fort. recte 22.3 τὸ Reuchlin: τότε codd. 23.3 ἐγίγνετο A Harl. ἐπειδὴ B: ἐπειδὴ καὶ A_2: ἐπεὶ καὶ cet. διεψηφίσθη B A 23.4 αὐτὸς B_2: αὐτῶν B_1: αὐ(ὐ)τὸν cet. 24.3 πολλὴ B Harl. 24.5 ἐγράψατο A οὐδὲ Hartung: οὔτε codd. 24.6 νομίζων Schäfer: ὀνομάζων codd. 25.1 καρτερίᾳ καὶ εὐτελείᾳ Reiske 25.2 ἱεροσυλίαι, τοιχωρυχίαι, ἀνδραποδίσις, . . . προδοσία codd.: corr. Zeune 25.4 ὥστε om. Stob. εἶναι om. Stob. *Paris.* ὅπως A et Stob.: ὅπου B Harl. 25.5 τοῦ A et Stob.: τὸ τοῦ B Harl.: τοῦ del. Cobet εἰργασμένον Stob.: om. codd. 26.3 γάρ om. A corr. et Stob. δ' ἔτι] δέ τί Dind. 26.5 μαρτυρήσετε codd.: corr. Stephanus

πονηρότερον ἐποίησα, εὐηργέτουν δὲ τοὺς ἐμοὶ διαλεγομένους προῖκα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν.

[27] εἰπὼν δὲ ταῦτα μάλα ὁμολογουμένως δὴ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀπῆει καὶ ὄμμασι καὶ σχήματι καὶ βαδίσματι φαιδρός. ὡς δὲ ἤσθετο ἄρα τοὺς παρεπομένους δακρύοντας, Τί τοῦτο; εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, ἢ ἄρτι δακρύετε; οὐ γὰρ πάλαι ἴστε ὅτι ἐξ ὅτουπερ ἐγενόμην κατεψηφισμένος ἦν μου ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως θάνατος; ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἰ μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιρρεόντων προαπόλλυμαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς εὔνοις λυπητέον· εἰ δὲ χαλεπῶν προσδοκωμένων καταλύω τὸν βίον, ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ὡς εὐπραγοῦντος ἐμοῦ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν εὐθυμητέον εἶναι. [28] παρὼν δέ τις Ἀπολλόδωρος, ἐπιθυμητὴς μὲν ὢν ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ, ἄλλως δ' εὐήθης, εἶπεν ἄρα· Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαλεπώτατα φέρω ὅτι ὁρῶ σε ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκοντα. τὸν δὲ λέγεται καταψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν· Σὺ δέ, ὦ φίλτατε Ἀπολλόδωρε, μᾶλλον ἐβούλου με ὁρᾶν δικαίως ἢ ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκοντα; καὶ ἅμα ἐπιγελάσαι.

[29] λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἄνυτον παριόντα ἰδὼν εἰπεῖν· Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνὴρ ὅδε κυδρός, ὡς μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν διαπεπραγμένος, εἰ ἀπέκτονέ με, ὅτι αὐτὸν τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ἀξιούμενον οὐκ ἔφην χρῆναι τὸν υἱὸν περὶ βύρσας παιδεύειν. ὡς μοχθηρὸς οὗτος, ἔφη, ὃς οὐκ ἔοικεν εἰδέναι ὅτι ὁπότερος ἡμῶν καὶ συμφορώτερα καὶ καλλίω εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διαπέπρακται, οὗτός ἐστι καὶ ὁ νικῶν. [30] ἀλλὰ μέντοι, φάναι αὐτόν, ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔστιν οἷς τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου προγιγνώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα, βούλομαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμῳδῆσαί τι. συνεγενόμην γάρ ποτε βραχέα τῷ Ἀνύτου υἱῷ, καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι οὐκ ἄρρωστος τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· ὥστε φημὶ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ δουλοπρεπεῖ διατριβῇ ἣν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ παρεσκεύακεν οὐ διαμενεῖν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν σπουδαῖον ἐπιμελητὴν προσπεσεῖσθαί τινι αἰσχρᾷ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, καὶ προβήσεσθαι μέντοι πόρρω μοχθηρίας. [31] ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν οὐκ ἐψεύσατο, ἀλλ' ὁ νεανίσκος ἡσθεὶς οἴνῳ οὔτε νυκτὸς οὔτε ἡμέρας ἐπαύετο πίνων, καὶ τέλος οὔτε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει οὔτε τοῖς φίλοις οὔτε αὐτῷ ἄξιος οὐδενὸς ἐγένετο. Ἄνυτος μὲν δὴ διὰ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ πονηρὰν παιδείαν καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀγνωμοσύνην ἔτι καὶ τετελευτηκὼς τυγχάνει κακοδοξίας.

[32] Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ τὸ μεγαλύνειν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ φθόνον ἐπαγόμενος μᾶλλον καταψηφίσασθαι ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίου τὸ χαλεπώτατον ἀπέλιπε, τῶν δὲ θανάτων τοῦ ῥᾴστου ἔτυχεν. [33] ἐπεδείξατο δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ῥώμην· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔγνω τοῦ ἔτι ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι αὐτῷ κρεῖττον εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ πρὸς τἆλλα τἀγαθὰ προσάντης ἦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἐμαλακίσατο, ἀλλ' ἱλαρῶς καὶ προσεδέχετο αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπετελέσατο.

[34] ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ κατανοῶν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τήν τε σοφίαν καὶ τὴν γενναιότητα οὔτε μὴ μεμνῆσθαι δύναμαι αὐτοῦ οὔτε μεμνημένος μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν. εἰ δέ τις τῶν ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων ὠφελιμωτέρῳ τινὶ Σωκράτους συνεγένετο, ἐκεῖνον ἐγὼ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀξιομακαριστότατον νομίζω.

27.1 δὲ] δὴ Stob. om. quod sequitur δὴ 27.2 σχήματι Stob.: σχήμασι codd. 27.3 ἢ del. Cobet: ἢ Stephanus ὅτι Stob.: ὅτι post ἐγενόμην C: om. cet. 27.4 θάνατος Stob. et codd.: ὁ θάνατος B_2 28.2 ὢν add. Stob.: om. codd. ἄρα et Ἀλλὰ om. Stob. 28.3 ὅτι ὁρῶ om. Stob. 28.5 μᾶλλον Harl.: μᾶλλον ἂν A et Stob.: ἂν post μᾶλλον del. B_2: μάλ' ἂν B ἢ ἀδίκως om. Stob. 29.1 ὅδε γε Stob. 29.2 καὶ om. Harl. 29.4 ὡς] ὦ Stob. ὃς Stob.: ὡς codd. 29.5 ὅτι οὗτος Harl. ἐστι καὶ] ἐστιν Stob. 31.3 αὐτῷ codd.: corr. Stephanus Ἄνυτος C (et sic vertit Aretinus): αὐτὸς cet. 31.4 αὐτοῦ codd.: corr. Stephanus 32.2 ἐπαγαγόμενος Cobet 33.2 αὐτῷ] αὐτὸ Harl. 33.3 πρὸς τἆλλ' ἀγαθὰ Richards 34.2 post prius μὴ add. οὐ Cobet

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ: Marchant, following Stob. III.1.81 Hense and D.L. 2.57, omits the words πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς from the manuscripts, and since the full title is technically inaccurate because of the non-forensic pro- and epilogues, I am compelled to agree.[1] Breitenbach (col. 1888), considering the shorter title which appears in D.L. 2.57, feels that these words were an ancient addition and that perhaps the inappropriate title was added in consideration of Plato's and Lysias' works of the same name,[2] while Beyschlag (p. 513) believes that the expanded title is borrowed from *Comm.* IV.8.5.[3]

Originally, an ἀπολογία was a defendant's rebuttal in a heliastic court to charges brought against him by the prosecution, and the term refers secondarily to a real or fictive speech in which the speaker/writer defends actions or ideas (his own or someone else's) against public criticism of any kind. Although Xen. and Plato have probably attempted to preserve at least the essence of Socrates' speech in court, their works must necessarily be grouped within the latter category. In these two contemporary ἀπολογίαι, the Socrates figure goes beyond addressing the specific charges and uses his final appearance in public to present a justification of his life in general, a far more philosophical defense which established a precedent for all later examples of the genre: In effect, Socrates' legal defense soon became the literary vehicle for the defense of his philosophy in general. Chroust ([1957] 42), basing his opinion on Xen. and Plato, divides all Socratic ἀπολογίαι into two groups: 1) those that hold that Socrates followed an inner, "tragic" compulsion, i.e. that his mission inexorably led to his doom in a corrupt society and that he was prompted to die by a divine command, and 2) those that hold that he no longer cared about life, i.e. that his death was due to Greek fatalism and to the sort of mysticism found in the *Cri.* and *Phd.* Chroust is on firmer ground, I believe, when he states elsewhere (*ibid.*, p. 200) that the Socratic ἀπολογίαι can be grouped differently, i.e. into one group occasioned by the trial itself (e.g. Pl. *Ap.*) and into another written in response to anti-Socratic literature or as a corrective to a prevailing opinion against him (e.g. Xen. *Ap.*).[4]

Xen. himself states in *Ap.* 1 that others had written about Socrates' defense, and that, while others had addressed the subject of his μεγαληγορία, they had not

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[1]See too Wilamowitz ([1897] 99), Feddersen (p. 32), and P. Meyer (col. 716), who also feel that the longer title is inappropriate; Thalheim and Lundström include them in their editions. Marchant has chosen to add Ξενοφῶντος to the title, as it also appears in Reuchlin and *Mutin.* 145.

[2]Breitenbach notes in col. 1892 that the very title Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους immediately puts it in a competitive relationship with Plato's ἀπολογία, and in col. 1888 he suggests restoring the title from §1 to read as ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΚΕΙΝΟΥ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΣ.

[3]Feddersen (p. 35) rejects internal borrowing here on the basis of priority of publication but believes nevertheless that the title is Xen.'s own.

[4]It has been argued that Socrates never actually defended himself since his conviction was a foregone conclusion (suggested by Maximus of Tyre [3.5-8]: see too Gomperz [1924] 171 n. 1 and Oldfather *passim*). If true, this might account for the wide differences in character of the later ἀπολογίαι. It should be added that the writing of an Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους eventually became a universal school theme for fledgling rhetoricians (see Essay A).

adequately explained it. Xen. seems to be referring here to other ἀπολογίαι, a fair number of which must have existed by this time. Isocrates (*Bus.* 6) seems to indicate that several Socratic ἀπολογίαι existed ca. 390, and Diogenes Laertius (2.40) states that Lysias wrote a defense speech for Socrates which he rejected.[5] This story is probably a fiction based on the appearance ca. 390 of a Socratic ἀπολογία ascribed to Lysias which was written in reaction to an anti-Socratic tract published ca. 392 by the sophist Polycrates, and to resolve this problem, some scholars have attempted to distinguish between an ἀπολογία written by Lysias for the trial and one written as a rebuttal to Polycrates.[6] Although Aeschines' *Alcibiades* seems to have been written for similar purposes,[7] ancient references to other ἀπολογίαι are scarce, and there is no record of an ἀπολογία having been written by any Socratics other than our two sources.[8] Aristotle (*Rh.* 1399A) quotes from a Socratic ἀπολογία of the fourth-century orator and tragedian Theodectes of Phaselis[9] and from other similar passages which may have originated in other, anonymous ἀπολογίαι, and Demetrius of Phalerum wrote an ἀπολογία within several generations after the trial.[10] The latest extant Socratic ἀπολογία was written in the fourth century A.D. by the rhetorician Libanius, who draws upon and counters the charges of Polycrates.

Comm. I.1.1-2.64, the so-called *Schutzschrift*, should be introduced briefly here, a part of the *Comm.* which can easily be considered as an ἀπολογία in its own right.[11] This part of Xen.'s Socratic memoirs seems to have been written in response to Polycrates, while the similarly trial-specific *Comm.* IV.8.1-11 contains passages nearly identical with some in the *Ap.*, on which it is apparently based. The *Schutzschrift* itself has a tripartite structure: §§I.1.1-2.8 deal with the official indictment, §§I.2.9-61 address Polycrates' charges, and §§I.2.62-64 return to the trial. As a whole, it represents a far more polished defense of Socrates, a fact which would seem to place it after the publication of Xen. *Ap.* (see Appendix A). The *Schutzschrift*

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[5]Also mentioned in Val. Max. VI.4.2, Plu. *Vit. dec. orat.* 836, Stob. III.7.56 Hense, Quint. *Inst.* II.15.30, XI.1.11, and Cic. *de Orat.* I.54.231 (see Sauppe & Baiter 2:203-204 for the collected fragments).

[6]Chroust [1955] 3 n. 6 & [1957] 20 (see too Breitenbach 1892, Hackforth 4-5, Blass 1:351, Riddell xxvii, and Hirzel *passim*). For general information on Polycrates, see Essay C.

[7]See Field (p. 150), who on p. 154 also notes the ἀπολογία-like tone of Alcibiades' speech in Pl. *Smp.*

[8]This is the opinion of Gomperz ([1924] 170-71), who seems to have ignored Suidas' reference to one written by Crito (s.v. Κρίτων = Giannantoni VI. B43). Gigon ([1946] 212-13) quite rightly observes, however, that the fact that the title 'Απολογία does not appear among the lists of works attributed to the Socratics does not necessarily mean that they did not treat the trial (cp. the non-descriptive title *Phaedo*, for example).

[9]See Blass 2:447. Aristotle's quotation runs as follows: εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνα θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει; For the meager fragments, see Sauppe and Baiter 246-48.

[10]Guthrie (1978) 4:73. Lesky (p. 543) also lists Theon of Antioch and Plutarch (see too Oldfather [p. 204], who adds Zeno of Sidon). For references to the use of Socrates' case as an exercise in the rhetorical schools, see Procl. *in Ti.* 21A-B (= I.65.22 Diehl) and Max.Tyr. 3.1.

[11]See Chroust (1957) 44-68 for a full treatment.

will be discussed more fully in dealing with Socrates' response to the indictment charges in §11 ff.[12]

1. Σωκράτους δὲ ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι μεμνῆσθαι κτλ.: The use of the verb μεμνῆσθαι is significant for its possible allusion to Xen.'s ἀπομνημονεύματα.[13]

The particle δέ after Σωκράτους in the first line has received a lot of attention, with the controversy revolving around the question of the *Ap.*'s relationship to the *Comm.*, that is, was the *Ap.* at one time attached to the longer work? Wilamowitz ([1897] 99-100), who questions the authorship of the *Ap.*, believes that the particle does in fact indicate a connection to the *Comm.*, the conclusion of which largely corresponds to the contents of the the former work, though this connection was most probably due to a publisher, not to the original writer.[14] Maier (pp. 21-22: see too Breitenbach 1888) notes that the *Oec.*, *Smp.*, and *Ap.* all begin with connecting particles and offers the following explanation: *Die wahrscheinlichste Erklärung für diese sprachliche Abnormität scheint die zu sein, daß Xenophon die Absicht gehabt hat, seine sämtlichen sokratischen Schriften zu einer schriftstellerischen Einheit zusammenzufassen,* that is, he considered them all to be of a similar nature, and this is reflected in the use of the particles.[15] Arguments against any connection run as follows: 1) The very sense of the opening words of the *Ap.* (excluding δέ, which is surely an editorial addition) shows that it cannot be a continuation of the *Comm.*[16] 2) Frick (p. 82: see too Beyschlag 499) observes that Xen. *Ap.* appears separately in *Vaticanus gr.* 1335, our best manuscript, i.e. *not* as part of the *Comm.* 3) Xen. liked to begin his works with adversative particles to produce an "archaizing effect" (Busse [p. 229], who provides no examples). 4) The δέ, like the δέ in the *Oec.* and the ἀλλά in the *Smp.*, does not signify any connection with a larger work but introduces a casual, conversational tone (Ollier [p. 7 n. 1], citing Denniston's *Greek Particles,* 2nd ed., pp. 21 & 172). Ollier offers the strongest argument, I feel, and the fact that so much material is shared between the *Ap.* and *Comm.* makes it unlikely that the two

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[12]See too Appendix A and my remarks on Polycrates in Essay C.

[13]For a detailed comparison of the two works, see Appendix A.

[14]In general, Wilamowitz (*ibid.*, p. 105) feels that the work was intended to serve as an epilogue to the *Comm.* and indirectly to Pl. *Ap.* and *Phd.* (see too Arnim 93, Frick 82, and Jaeger [1954] 26). Frick (p. 82) believes that the *Ap.* was probably found posthumously among Xen.'s writings, and that the publisher must have given the work its title and altered the initial words in this way so that it would seem to follow the *Comm.*

[15]Wetzel (p. 400), however, compares the beginnings of the *Ap.* and *Oec.* and observes that Socrates is mentioned by name in the former. His conclusion: *So kann kein Nachtrag bzw. kein Bruchstück einer Schrift anfangen, die nur von Sokrates handelt; kein einziges Kapitel der Memorabilien beginnt mit dem Namen des Sokrates,* and the δέ therefore must have been inserted by a later editor.

[16]Arnim 54 (see too Vrijlandt 151). Feddersen (p. 28) believes that the *Ap.* must be independent of the *Comm.* on the basis of structure, and that it is in fact more likely that, in this sense at least, the *Smp.* supplements the latter work. Feddersen (p. 31) also defends the opening δέ.

works were ever joined. In general, the opening of the *Ap.* is quite conventional (Stokes [1997] 5).

Edelstein (p. 139 nn. 2-3) believes that ἐπειδὴ ἐκλήθη εἰς τὴν δίκην means that the events described in the opening section occurred after the preliminary hearing and before the actual trial, an interval of approximately five days; this would have provided enough time for the daimonic intervention and for any considerations of attempting to win an acquittal. Fritz ([1931] 50-51) disagrees, persuasively maintaining that Xen. means to emphasize that the events described did indeed occur after the proceedings had begun but in fact *immediately* before the trial. He supports his argument by citing the corresponding passage in *Comm.* IV.8.4 (ἤδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γράφην), which simply means that the deposition had been submitted. This is confirmed by the use of the imperfect in Hermogenes' question in *Ap.* 3 (οὐκ ἔχρην μέντοι σκοπεῖν...;) and by the use of the contemporaneous present-tense verb ἐναντιοῦται and δίς in Socrates' response (§4), as opposed to the *Comm.* passage, where the present tense is used (ὡς χρὴ σκοπεῖν κτλ.) and the aorist form of the verb (ἠναντιώθη) without δίς in the following section. Fritz (p. 51) also compares *Comm.* IV.8.9 (ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀδίκως ἀποθανοῦμαι) with *Ap.* 7 (ἂν γὰρ νῦν κατακριθῇ μου) for this contrast between extended time and immediacy.[17]

A relationship between Socrates' defense and his attitude towards death (see the comment on §5) is already established in the opening lines (ὡς...ἐβουλεύσατο περί τε τῆς ἀπολογίας καὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τοῦ βίου), as well as a more specific connection with Socrates' μεγαληγορία, the mention of which in other authors is offered as proof of Xen.'s thesis (ᾧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἐρρήθη ὑπὸ Σωκράτους).

γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ πάντες ἔτυχον τῆς μεγαληγορίας αὐτοῦ: Xen.'s historical procedure is evident here in his consideration of various sources (cp. *Comm.* I.4.1 & IV.3.2), an indication, perhaps, of Thucydidean influence. The ἄλλοι in this section have also been the subject of much debate since it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the influence of other writers of Socratic dialogues on Xen. (see Essay C).[18] Kaibel (p. 581 n. 1), who questions the Xenophontic authorship of the *Ap.*, suggests that the word ἄλλοι in this section refers to the epideictic ἀπολογίαι prompted by Polycrates which Ps.-Xen. seems to have

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[17]This argument is not contradicted by *Ap.* 8 (ὀρθῶς δὲ οἱ θεοὶ κτλ.) since this statement *...enthält die deutliche Voraussetzung, daß Sokrates jetzt keine Zeit mehr hat, seinen Entschluß noch zu ändern, die Gerichtshandlung also gleich beginnen wird* (pp. 51-52). Fritz' point is also supported by the abrupt transition in §10.

[18]Vander Waerdt (pp. 14-15) comments that the word πάντες in this section should be treated with caution since it might in fact refer to a single source (cp. the use of the plural in the apparent reference to Pl. *Clit.* in *Comm.* I.4.1).

taken as genuine, and observes that the opening words promise to deal with far more than the defense speech alone.[19] Wetzel (p. 397) believes that Xen. cannot be referring to Pl. *Ap.* since Plato's Socrates figure cannot be said to be guilty of μεγαληγορία in spite of such disclaimers as the one that appears in §20E (μηδὲ ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν).[20] Gigon ([1946] 212) and Schmid (p. 224 n. 2) vote for Lysias as being the most likely candidate for consideration,[21] and Busse (pp. 221-22) suggests Antisthenes and Aeschines since Polycrates would not have felt compelled to publish his Κατηγορία in 393 unless works by these two Socratic writers were not already available. Vlastos (p. 292 n. 159) boldly names Plato, Lysias, Polycrates and possibly Theodectes as "the others". I believe that ἄλλοι might well refer to Plato, among others (see Essay C).

Marchant suggests that a complementary participle such as θαυμάζοντες be included with ἔτυχον, but Thalheim refers to Pl. *R.* 523B and Th. II.35.3 to justify its omission.

2. Ἑρμογένης μέντοι ὁ Ἱππονίκου ἑταῖρός τε ἦν αὐτῷ: Hermogenes of Athens (*PA* 5123) was the illegitimate son of Hipponicus (*PA* 7658); the name of his mother is unknown. Hipponicus was a nephew of Cimon and husband of Pericles' ex-wife, and he served as a successful general during the Peloponnesian War. According to many sources, he was also the richest Greek of this time due to his interests in the mines at Laurium, a fact which made him the target of contemporary comic playwrights (Davies [1971] 262 and Swoboda 1908-9). Diogenes Laertius (2.121) makes Herm. the son of Crito, an error which seems to be due to Diogenes' hurried reading of Pl. *Phd.* 59B, where the name Hermogenes appears in close conjunction with the name Critobulus, Crito's son (Wellmann 2:40:56). Herm. was the half-brother of Hipparete, Alcibiades' wife, and of the rich Athenian nobleman Callias, whom Plato portrays as a lavish patron of the sophists in the *Prt.*[22] Herm. himself was present at the death of Socrates (*Phd.* 59B), spoke with Socrates shortly before his trial (*Comm.* IV.8.4-10 & *Ap.* 2-3), and is mentioned by Xen. as being one of the

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[19]He further notes (*idem*) that the author's conclusion concerning μεγαληγορία and based on the *writings* of others seems odd since he would have had ample opportunity to consult any of those who were actually present at the trial, e.g. Hermogenes and the τοὺς ἄλλους mentioned in *Comm.* IV.8.10.

[20]See Appendix D for a full treatment of this question. Wetzel's argument here is simply too subjective for serious consideration: For example, P. Meyer (col. 757) reaches the same conclusion because he finds so many general *similarities* between the two works.

[21]Since Socrates supposedly rejected Lysias' speech (D.L. 2.40), it is unlikely, according to Vander Waerdt (pp. 16-17), that Xen. is referring to it in this section. This leaves Pl. *Ap.* as the only remaining possibility in the ἀπολογία genre referred to here.

[22]See too Pl. *Ap.* 20A, where he is described as sparing no expense on them, *Ax.* 366C, where he plays host to Prodicus, and Xen. *Smp.* 1.5, where Socrates criticizes Callias for his expensive pursuit of σοφία as opposed to his own and his followers' interest in φιλοσοφία.

best-known followers of Socrates.[23] It is plausible that Herm. might have served as the Athenian ambassador to Tiribazus in 392 (*HG* IV.8.13), though this post would have pre-supposed some change in his status as a citizen, a change due perhaps to the re-enactment of Pericles' citizenship law during the later stages of the Peloponnesian War (see Davies [1971] 269-70).

Herm. also appears as an interlocutor in the *Cra.*, which, combined with Xen.'s depiction of him in the *Smp.*, provides a glimpse into his character: In the former, Herm. and Cratylus argue about semantics in the context of the νόμος-φύσις antithesis. Herm. believes that "names" (ὀνόματα) are the arbitrary result of convention, while Cratylus holds that everything has "one natural and proper name, the same for Greeks and foreigners" (Guthrie [1978] 3:206). They refer the question to Socrates, who engages Herm. in the first part of the dialogue.[24] In 391C we learn that Herm. is not in possession of an inheritance from his father (οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς...τῶν πατρῴων), the statement on which the assertion that he was a νόθος and Callias' half-brother is based, a condition which seems also to account for his impoverishment and diminished social status in general. It should be added that Diogenes Laertius (3.6) is apparently thinking of this dialogue when he states that Herm. was an Eleatic philosopher and the teacher of Plato, who became acquainted with Parmenides through Hermogenes and with Heraclitus through Cratylus.[25]

Xen. also portrays Herm. as being poor and describes his financial need in *Comm.* II.10, where Diodorus (also described as Socrates' ἑταῖρος) is encouraged by Socrates to befriend Herm., who indeed proves to be a useful friend in helping Diodorus look after his domestic affairs. A Proclus scholion (*in Cra.* 21 Pasquali) seems to indicate that, at least according to Aeschines' characterization in the Socratic

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[23]*Comm.* I.2.48 (see also *ibid.* II.10.3-6 and *Smp.* 1.3, 4.46-49, 6.1-4). [Most editors have adopted G. van Prinsterer's emendation "Hermogenes" for the manuscript reading "Hermocrates" in *Comm.* I.2.48, but see Burnet (1911) xix n. 1.] Was Herm. a ἑταῖρος in the sense of adhering to specific doctrines espoused by Socrates? For evidence of this kind of following, see, for example, Pl. *Phd.* 77A, where Cebes is described as being reluctant to accept Socrates' arguments (see too Pl. *Ap.* 21A, where the word is used of Chaerephon in a neutral sense: [Χαιρεφῶν] ἐμὸς τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει). Xen. avoids using the word μαθηταί for Socrates' followers, preferring instead such expressions as συγγιγνόμενοι (§5), συνόντες (*Comm.* I.1.5), ἐπιτήδειοι (*ibid.* I.1.6), συνδιατρίβοντες (*ibid.* I.2.3), ὁμιλητά (*ibid.* I.2.12), and συνῆθες (*ibid.* IV.8.2) (see Grillnberger 4-6). For comments on Socrates' followers, see §17; on his alleged role as a teacher, see §20.

[24]Cp. *Comm.* III.14.2-4 for Socrates' interest in defining terms. Plato's characterization of Hermogenes is summarized by Dittmar (pp. 226-27) as follows: *Plato zeichnet im Kratylos Hermogenes' geistige art* [sic *for all capitalization*]. *dieser ist wenig scharfsinnig, Sokrates weist ihn einmal freundschaftlich zurecht, daß er unaufmerksam sei (414B). er zeigt sich im dialog als guter, einfacher, weicher und nachgiebiger mensch. von seiner gemütsverfassung, seinen äußeren verhältnissen erfahren wir einiges. mit einer gewissen animosität äußert er, daß er im leben viel von schlechten menschen zu leiden gehabt und wenige gute menschen kennen gelernt habe. Sokrates stellt es so dar, als sei Hermogenes keineswegs in sein schicksal ergeben. ein σκῶμμα des Kratylos, das Hermogenes unverständlich bleibt, deutet er aus mit den worten: Hermogenes trachte zwar immer nach dem besitze von reichtum, ihn zu erlangen mißlinge ihm aber stets.*

[25]Natorp (1913). Allan (pp. 277-78) demonstrates that "Hermippus" should be substituted here for "Hermogenes", an apparent misreading.

dialogue *Telauges*, Herm. tended to ignore such indigent (though worthy) companions as the fictional Pythagorean Telauges because of his own attraction to money: ὅτι Ἑρμογένης παρ' Αἰσχίνῃ κωμῳδεῖται ὡς χρημάτων ἥττων· ἀμέλει τὸν Τηλαύγη ἑταῖρον ὄντα καὶ χαρίεντα παρεώρα ἀθεράπευτον.[26] In Xen. *Smp.* 4.35, the Antisthenes character's reference to two brothers of different means (οἶδα δὲ καὶ ἀδελφούς, οἳ τὰ ἴσα λαχόντες ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν τἀρκοῦντα ἔχει καὶ περιττεύοντα τῆς δαπάνης, ὁ δὲ παντὸς ἐνδεῖται) applies perhaps to Callias and Herm., though this suggestion is admittedly tenuous (see Chroust [1957] 233-34 n. 85). Both brothers appear in Xen. *Smp.*, which is set in Callias' house, and this characterization of Herm., like Plato's, is also sympathetic: He is concerned about Callias' welfare (§§6.1 ff. & 8.12), looks to the gods for comfort (§4.47 ff.), and appears to have few friends (§3.14). In §8.3 Socrates calls him σπουδαῖος, μέτριος, πρᾷος, and ἵλαρος.[27]

Hermogenes is the only source which Xen. quotes by name in his Socratica (Chroust [1957] 233 n. 85: see too Hackforth 34), and Herm.'s report at the beginning of the *Ap.* should be closely compared with *Comm.* IV.8.4 ff., where Socrates raises the following points in response to his question, i.e., that his life has been more than a sufficient defense against the charges of his prosecutors, that to prepare a formal defense would be to act against his daimonic sign, that he will have died with his reputation among his friends and followers assured, that he has only the infirmities of old age to look forward to, and that shame will rest on his executioners, not on him, because of his innocence. It remains unclear, of course, if, when, and how Herm. actually transmitted to Xen. the information given in *Ap.* 2 ff. and *Comm.* IV.8.4. ff. Was it sent by letter? Did Herm. meet Xen. while the latter was on campaign with the Spartans? Did he meet Xen. at his estate in Scillus or after his re-settlement in Corinth (or Athens)? Did Callias somehow relay what he had heard from his half-brother? These questions must perforce remain open.

καὶ ἐξήγγειλε περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα: To understand the *Ap.*, one must bear in mind that it is seen through Herm.'s eyes, whose perspective must somehow be explained: If his role in the work is in fact Xen.'s own creation, why would he choose to associate Herm. with Socrates in this particular setting? Whether or not he actually spoke with Socrates before the trial, were their attitudes nevertheless related in some way? Can Herm. be seen as an example of uncorrupted youth or as a model citizen in

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[26]For more information on this dialogue, see Dittmar 213 ff. Hermogenes' attraction to money is also mentioned in *Cra.* 384C: οἴεται γὰρ [Κράτυλος] ἴσως σε χρημάτων ἐφιέμενον κτήσεως ἀποτυγχάνειν ἑκάστοτε.

[27]Ἑρμογένη γε μὴν τίς ἡμῶν οὐκ οἶδεν ὡς, ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ καλοκἀγαθία, τῷ ταύτης ἔρωτι κατατήκεται; οὐχ ὁρᾶτε ὡς σπουδαῖαι μὲν αὐτοῦ αἱ ὀφρύες, ἀτρεμὲς δὲ τὸ ὄμμα, μέτριοι δὲ οἱ λόγοι, πραεῖα δὲ ἡ φωνή, ἱλαρὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος; τοῖς δὲ σεμνοτάτοις θεοῖς φίλοις χρώμενος οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπερορᾷ; See Dittmar 228 and Bruns 399 ff. for more on Xen.'s characterization of Herm.

general? I agree with Pangle (pp. 27-28) when he states that the two figures as presented by Xen. are linked by a strong sense of piety,[28] though I begin to feel rather uneasy when he remarks 1) that Herm.'s diminished social status was the cause of his apparent highmindedness, 2) that Socrates, like Herm., had come to question the customary notion of καλοκἀγαθία, or 3) that Herm. projected his own feelings onto his account of the trial proceedings (*idem*). Pangle returns to firmer ground when he supposes that Herm.'s highmindedness and reputation make him a good choice as a witness (p. 29), and that Socrates' speech is calculated to enrage most men but to appeal to those like Herm. (p. 33). Shero (p. 107) quite appropriately observes that the characterizations of Herm. in Pl. *Cra.* and Xen. *Smp.* do not give us any reason to question his reliability as a reporter.

The use of Hermogenes as a source lends credibility to Xen.'s report through its reference to an eye-witness,[29] while it also allows the author some additional flexibility in his treatment of, and relationship to, the events described: Again, by using Hermogenes as his mouthpiece, Xen. is both responsible and, at the same time, not entirely responsible for the information conveyed in the body of the *Ap.* A sort of framing device is in use here, with Xen. introducing Hermogenes as his source, who in turn relates the actual events of the trial.[30] A similar framing device appears in the *Comm.*, where the long series of dialogues is framed at beginning and end by references to Socrates' trial and where each dialogue in turn is introduced as being either a conversation at which Xen. himself was present or as one heard at second hand, with the source not always provided (cp. Plato's approach to composing the *Phd.*). The *Smp.*, on the other hand, purports to be Xen.'s direct account of the events of a dinner party (§1.1: οἷς δὲ παραγενόμενος ταῦτα γιγνώσκω δηλῶσαι βούλομαι), an event which took place at the house of Callias ca. 422, when Xen. was little more than a boy (see Pomeroy 215 and Waterfield 220). In this case, Xen. briefly introduces his personal voice into the text as a way of vouching for the accuracy of its contents and of removing any distance between the narrator and the events related. Finally, the *Oec.* contains an example of a clearly demarcated conversation within a

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[28]Can the καινὰ δαιμόνια of the indictment be equated, for example, with Herm.'s unnamed gods in *Smp.* 4.47?

[29]*Xenophon autem in sua Apologia novam materiem [sc. colloquium cum Hermogene] quae habitum Socratis ante iudices probabiliorem redderet* (Vrijlandt 66-67). See too Busse (p. 229), Sandbach (p. 479), and Delebecque (p. 214), who suggests a similar purpose for the inclusion of Hermogenes et al. in Pl. *Phd.* Arnim (pp. 72-73) supposes that Xen. included Socrates' speeches in the Hermogenes report to cover any of his own variations from his other sources.

[30]See Wilamowitz (1897) 100. Xen.'s intention of distancing himself from his source is also supported by his less direct approach towards introducing the events to be related (ἐξήγγειλε περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα), as opposed to the more direct wording used in *Comm.* IV.8.4: λέξω δὲ καὶ ἃ Ἑρμογένους τοῦ Ἱππονίκου ἤκουσα περὶ αὐτοῦ (Ollier 95 n. 2). Delebecque (p. 214) believes that this is due to the fact that the events related in the latter work are set in a more distant past and were therefore less subject to the scrutiny of Xen.'s contemporaries. Arnim (pp. 31-32) wonders if Xen. had possibly queried Hermogenes face-to-face in the interim, an event which would explain the omission in the *Ap.* of the other witnesses mentioned in *Comm.* IV.8.10.

conversation, with Xen. using Socrates' colloquy with Critobulus as a means of introducing the practical advice he once received from Ischomachus or, rather, re-learned through the process of ἀνάμνησις. The narrative, however, does not return to the original conversation.[31]

What is the effect of Xen.'s use of such narrative devices? In the case of the *Ap.* and *Comm.*, they serve to lend each work a distinctly anecdotal, story-within-a-story quality which brings out the more personal aspect of Socrates' relationships with his many followers and which clearly joins the two works together as a distinct group. Xen.'s more direct narrative approach in the *Smp.* quite appropriately causes the events described to seem more vivid by ostensibly removing any "fictional" element in the narrative, while the structure of the *Oec.*, with its one clearly articulated transition, removes the narrative to a more remote, more venerable past when upstanding noblemen like Ischomachus formed the backbone of a prosperous Athenian state. Again, Xen.'s claims that he was present during certain Socratic conversations can be generally disregarded as a narrative device used to lend an air of authenticity to the events in question.[32]

It is important to note that, although Xen. does play a narrative role in the *Ap.*, he does not introduce himself as an actual witness to events as he does in the *Smp.*, for example,[33] and it is perhaps worthwhile to speculate briefly on the nature of Hermogenes' actual influence on Xen. There are a number of references to Socrates' followers taking notes (see Pl. *Smp.* 172C ff., *Tht.* 142D ff., *Prm.* 126C, and D.L. 2.48 & 122), and Nickel (pp. 125-26) supposes that in some cases Socrates might have encouraged his students to write accurate accounts of his conversations by having them return to him for proper reconstruction, or that Xen. took notes during lectures while he was still in Athens. It is therefore plausible to assume that Xen. constructed

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[31]It is tempting to consider here the possibility that Socrates' conversation with Herm. is based on Phaedo's conversation with Echecrates. Gigon ([1946] 216) believes that Xen.'s Socrates is to Hermogenes what Plato's Socrates is to Simmias and Cebes, and suggests a possible connection between Herm. and the Thebans through a common belief in Pythagoreanism (recall too his connection with the Pythagorean Telauges mentioned above). Gigon points out elsewhere (*ibid.* 214) that in Pl. *Cra.* Herm. knows something about the doctrines of Protagoras and Euthydemus, while Diogenes Laertius (3.6) calls him a follower of Parmenides (see above).

[32]See Breitenbach 1771-75, 1779-81 & 1888. Opinions, as always, vary: Ollier (p. 95 n. 3) seems to belong to the Burnet-Taylor camp (see Appendix B) when he states that, because of the seriousness of the subject matter, the Herm. component could not possibly be a fiction. Arnim (p. 10) describes the Hermogenes device as a *bloße Einkleidung und Fiction* (sic). Hackforth (pp. 37-38) remarks that, since three quarters of the *Ap.* is in reported speech, we can therefore assume that, like the *Comm.*, it is mostly Xen.'s invention. Frick (pp. 65-67) declares the Hermogenes conversation to be fictional because it is so un-Socratic, yet why, he asks (p. 67), should we criticize Xen. for what Plato does freely? *nam cur Xenophonti id juris denegemus, quod sibi sumpsisse constat Platonem, cum sescenta colloquia facit Socratem habentem numquam ab eo habita?*

[33]A narrative technique described as a λογοτεχνικὸν τέχνασμα by Toole (p. 6), and Pomeroy (216) observes that Xen. also inserts himself in a semi-narrative capacity into the openings of the *Comm.*, *Lac.*, *Vect.*, *Ages.*, and *Eq.* Vander Waerdt (p. 6) feels that Xen.'s false claims to have been present at certain conversations must have been characteristic of the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί genre.

part or all of the *Ap.* by consulting his own notes and the notes of other Socratics, e.g. Hermogenes.[34] There also remains the question of the extent to which Hermogenes can be considered a Xenophontic persona used to create an air of objectivity: Xen. used the third person in the *An.*, for example, to offset his subjective approach and self-vindicatory tone, and the work was attributed to a non-existent Themistogenes of Syracuse (see *HG* III.1.2).[35] Of course, the Hermogenes figure lacks characterization in the *Ap.*, but he could represent Xenophon inasmuch as he fulfills the simple function of posing the question in §3 which lies at the basis of the entire work and which must have deeply troubled the exiled Xenophon: Οὐκ ἐχρῆν μέντοι σκοπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ὅ τι ἀπολογήσῃ;

Xen.'s use of dialogue also bears some consideration. In the *Ap.* Socrates appears speaking successively with Hermogenes (§§3-9), Meletus (§§11-21), and Apollodorus (§28), while some sort of interaction is implied in Socrates' addresses to the dicasts (§§14-18 & 24-6) and his immediate followers (§§27-30). Again, Xen. *Ap.* differs from Pl. *Ap.* in that dialogues appear both before and after the trial proper, and the Meletus dialogue resembles the Platonic version in its brevity of responses and would seem to represent, at least to some degree, this verbal exchange as it actually occurred. The undeveloped dialogues in Xen. *Ap.* can be explained by his limited purpose in writing it, the dating of which, if written early in Xen.'s career as an author, would also perhaps explain its sketchy, discursive nature in general. That Xen. *Ap.* contains dialogues of any kind can be explained by the supreme importance of the dialogue for the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί genre (Bruns 232 ff.). The interlocutors in Xen. *Ap.* have a decidedly secondary role, and their individual characters remain largely undeveloped: Hermogenes' youthful incredulity, Meletus' incisive questioning, and Apollodorus' unrestrained grief reveal themselves only briefly in the course of this short work, and it is only in Xen.'s other Socratica that the characterization of the interlocutors is at least somewhat successful. In general, the characterization of individuals (including Socrates, whose personality remains singularly flat) is conspicuously lacking in Xen., though a few good examples can be found in *Comm.* II.1 (Aristippus), II.7 (Aristarchus), III.6 (Glaucon), III.11 (Theodote), and IV.2 (Euthydemus). This lack of characterization consigns them to the role of acting as mere literary devices (Waterfield 57-58).

Again, any use of such narrative tools in the Socratica depends on the author's intentions regarding the question of subjectivity vs. objectivity. Xen.'s involvement in Socratic conversations appears in *Comm.* I.2.53, I.3.8, I.4.2-18, I.6.11-14, II.4.1-7,

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[34]Vrijlandt (p. 20) cites *Comm.* IV.8.10 as evidence that Xen. talked with other Socratics about the trial.

[35]See Momigliano 57. Nickel (pp. 15-18) mentions similar personae: Euthydemus (*Comm.* IV.2), Ischomachus (*Oec.* 7 ff.), Theopompus (*An.* II.1.12-13), Tigranes (*Cyr.* III.1.38), and Callistratus (*HG* VI.3.10-17).

II.5.1-5, II.7.1, II.9.1, II.10.1, III.3.1, IV.3.2-17, IV.4.5, and IV.5.2, while, of the forty conversations that occur in this work, five are introduced by ἤκουσα and παρεγενόμην, five by οἶδα, one by ἐδόκει ἐμοὶ λέγων, and one as a direct report by Hermogenes (Field 140 n. 1). In spite of his brief assertions to the contrary, it is unlikely that Xen. was present either at the dinner party described in the *Smp.* (because of his age) or at the conversation related in the *Oec.* (because of his presence at the Battle of Cunaxa), though it is important to note again that he does not portray himself as actually having participated in these dialogues (see Pomeroy 215 & 250). In general, however, Xen. introduces himself into the text very rarely (note, for example, his single appearance in *Comm.* I.3.8-15). Although his acknowledged presence at a dialogue would seem to entail a greater responsibility for its accuracy (Burnet [1911] ix), the fact that the conversations usually remain dialogues, that no introductory remarks are made, that the interlocutors are often left unnamed, and that Xen. provides few concrete data on Socrates' life, makes it unlikely that Xen. was really there, and it would consequently be a mistake to rely on his statements in the *Ap.* and *Comm.* that he is recording real conversations.[36] It is important to recall that, when it came to reports of speeches or conversations, Greek historians allowed themselves a considerable degree of latitude (Field 142), and that oral tradition was still considered a trustworthy source of information, hence such "subjective" narrative devices in Xen. as ἤκουσα etc. (Pomeroy 215). It should be added finally that there are some scholars (see, for example, Taylor [1932] 17) who quite rightly feel that the vindicatory purpose of the *Ap.* and *Comm.* undermines their historical validity to some degree, which in turn undermines the use of Xen. as a control on the Platonic Socrates.

3. Οὐκ ἐχρῆν μέντοι σκοπεῖν...καὶ ὅ τι ἀπολογήσῃ; Socrates' attitude towards preparing a formal defense is echoed in Pl. *Ap.* 17C (ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν)[37] and in the story that he turned down Lysias' speech for his defense (D.L. 2.40), while Maximus of Tyre (3.5-8) maintains that he did not even bother to defend himself in court, a righteous attitude mirrored by the Xenophontic Socrates' refusal in §23 to propose a counter-penalty and to kowtow to the dicasts.[38]

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[36]See Chroust [1957] 9-10 and Hackforth 33 (see too Kahn 32-33). Chroust, who takes an extreme view in these matters (*ibid.*, pp. 10-11), maintains that the interlocutors appearing in the *Comm.* are invented, substituted, or even wantonly connected with the events described.

[37]There is a distinction, however, as Vrijlandt (p. 71) notes: *[Apud Xenophontem Socrates] omnia causidicorum artificia [spernit].... Socrates [autem] Platonicus non meditatus est* quomodo *diceret...;* quid *diceret fortasse antea commentatus est. Hoc enim eum non fecisse disertis verbis non legitur apud Platonem.* Schanz (p. 80) maintains that, when Xen.'s Socrates says that he has dispensed with any preparation, this is an offhanded reference to the superior prose in Pl. *Ap.*

[38]Cp. Pl. *Ap.* 38D. In *Grg.* 521D ff. Socrates describes how helpless he would be if he ever appeared at court.

In *Comm.* IV.4.10 Socrates states that deeds speak more loudly than words (see below), and Ischomachus (*Oec.* 11.22) seems to speak for Socrates when he says that being a good citizen serves as the best defense.[39] In short, Socrates refuses here to dignify the prosecutors' charges with a formally prepared response.[40]

Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄδικον διαγεγένημαι ποιῶν: This is offered as an explanation of μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι above (see §5 and *Comm.* IV.8.4-6) and can be seen as a general refusal to admit any wrongdoing whatsoever.[41] Xen. takes great pains to point out that Socrates instilled virtue in his followers by example and that he not only was interested in leading them through the relatively unsophisticated Xenophontic dialectic to consider the right course of action but also actively encouraged them to act in accordance with these principles.[42] With regard to the phrase οὐδὲν ἄδικον, it would be worthwhile briefly to summarize the Xenophontic Socrates' views on τὸ δίκαιον as set out in *Comm.* IV.4: Xen. points out that Socrates set a public example through his good citizenship, which consisted in being considerate in private and law-abiding in public. Xen. brings up Socrates' actions during the affairs concerning the prosecution of the Arginusae generals *en masse* and the time when he was ordered by the Thirty to arrest Leon of Salamis and expropriate his estate; he also refused to obey the unlawful authority of the Thirty when they forbade him to speak with the young (see *Comm.* I.2.32-38). That Socrates also refused to ingratiate himself with the dicasts by an emotional plea is also mentioned, though this type of behavior is not in fact said to be illegal in either of the two contemporary ἀπολογίαι (but see *Comm.* IV.4.4). The actual dialogue in *Comm.* IV.4 is between Socrates and Hippias of Elis, who presses the former to reveal his opinions on what constitutes right behavior. Socrates immediately falls back on the position under discussion (§IV.4.10: οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἃ δοκεῖ μοι δίκαια εἶναι οὐδὲν παύομαι ἀποδεικνύμενος; ...ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου

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[39]Οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτὰ ταῦτα διατελεῖν μελετῶν, ἀπολογεῖσθαι μὲν ὅτι οὐδένα ἀδικῶ, εὖ δὲ ποιῶ πολλοὺς ὅσον ἂν δύνωμαι, κατηγορεῖν δὲ οὐ δοκῶ σοι μελετᾶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀδικοῦντας μὲν καὶ ἰδίᾳ πολλοὺς καὶ τὴν πόλιν καταμανθάνων τινάς, εὖ δὲ ποιοῦντας οὐδένα; In a different vein, Plato's Socrates (*Ap.* 31C) describes his poverty as being a sufficient witness to the fact that he has never accepted a fee, and Toole (p. 6) alludes to Gorg. *Pal.* 15 as another example of τὸ ἐπιχείρημα τοῦ προτέρου ἀνεπιλήπτου βίου.

[40]For general remarks on Socrates' unpreparedness, see Guthrie (1978) 4:87-88.

[41]Socrates' righteousness is stressed throughout the *Ap.*, e.g. in §§22 & 25-26 (see too *Comm.* I.2.62-64 & IV.4.1-2).

[42]For further examples, see §§17-18 & *Comm.* I.4.1 (on his influence on his followers), I.6 (on Socrates' lifestyle), I.2.1-8 (on his personal habits), IV.6 (on first principles derived through dialectic), IV.7 (on inculcating self-sufficiency in his followers), *Smp.* 4.56-64 (on Socrates' role as a philosophical "procurer"), 8 (on noble vs. ignoble love as a protreptic to induce Callias to take a more active part in politics), 9.1 (for Lyco's telling remark on the preceding: Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλός γε κἀγαθὸς δοκεῖς μοι ἄνθρωπος εἶναι, an extraordinary statement if this Lyco is indeed to be identified with the prosecutor: see Waterfield 221 n. 1), *Oec.* 2.14-18 (on Socrates' hesitation to offer advice to Critobulus), and 3.6-7 (on Socrates' view that observation is the best advisor: cp. *ibid.* 16.3-5).

τὸ ἔργον εἶναι;), and his right conduct is corroborated by more examples of not having done wrong, i.e. of not having committed perjury, of not having acted as a sycophant, and of not having caused dissension of any kind either privately or publicly. When challenged by Hippias to define the Right positively instead of negatively, Socrates equates it with the Lawful (cp. *Comm.* IV.6.5-6) and proceeds, after a brief objection by Hippias about the instability of human laws, to praise law as the basis of civilized society and to put it on a higher footing by establishing the divine origins of all human laws, which all men share in common through a divine agency which can even transcend language barriers. Hippias must finally yield to Socrates' assertion that the Right must be equated with the Lawful, and we can therefore interpret the phrase in question as referring in Xen.'s eyes to Socrates' unimpeachable conduct as an Athenian citizen and particularly to his adherence to the laws, a quality which he shares to a large degree with Plato's Socrates.

Aristophanes (*Nu.* 112-18) has the character Strepsiades encourage his son Phidippides to learn the ἄδικος λόγος from the philosopher so that he can prevail against Strepsiades' creditors in court. It is indeed difficult to associate the conservative, voyeuristic opinions espoused by the δίκαιος λόγος in l. 961 ff. with anything remotely Socratic, yet the generally anti-democratic tone of the speech accords with some statements made by the Socrates figure in Plato and Xen. (see, for example, *Prt.* 319B ff. and *Comm.* III.7.6). On the other hand, the speech of the ἄδικος λόγος in l. 1036 ff., which is presented as corresponding to the doctrines taught at the φροντιστήριον, endorses a hedonistic lifestyle to be won by rhetorical trickery, and in fact the whole exchange resembles a comically distorted version of the story of Hercules' choice between Ἀρετή and Κακία attributed to Prodicus and related in *Comm.* II.1.21-34. The *Cri.* should also be considered in discussing Socrates' notion of τὸ δίκαιον since, as shown above, Xen.'s Socrates equated the Right with the Lawful: After dismissing Crito's objections to his refusal to flee, which are based on the opinions and power of the majority, Socrates goes on to utter his famous dictum about living well (§48B: οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν), a life which consists in never wronging anyone else, even in retribution (§49C). For Socrates, right action is above all else dictated by the contract between the individual and the laws of the polis (as embodied in this dialogue by the personified Laws).

4. Οὐχ ὁρᾷς τὰ Ἀθηναίων δικαστήρια κτλ.: A reference to the forensic practices of the day, which relied far more on rhetorical effect than on hard evidence (see Pl. *Ap.* 34B-35D & 38D-E). In *Comm.* IV.4.17 Socrates states that the νόμιμος (=

δίκαιος: see the comment on §3) will naturally prevail in court, a belief which, in addition to his reliance on the daimonic sign, might account for his self-confidence before the trial. Vrijlandt (pp. 138-39) notes the choice of the active verb ἀποκτείνειν here (versus the passive use of ἀποθνήσκειν)[43] and remarks elsewhere (pp. 72-73) on Socrates' excited tone in his private conversation with Hermogenes, as opposed to the Platonic Socrates' more subdued tone in court. The corrupt practice of winning favor with the dicasts by emotional appeals is first mentioned here (see the comment on §23), a topic to which Socrates also devotes a considerable portion of his speech in Pl. *Ap.* (see the reference above).

In conversation Professor Halliwell has pointed out to me the potentially anti-democratic tenor of Hermogenes' remarks. I would agree with this insofar as we can imagine him feeling deprived of his rightful inheritance under the Athenian government, and in light of Xen. and Plato's portrayal of him, it would be possible, perhaps, to imagine his remarks as resulting from a related sensitivity towards the corrupt practices of the democracy in general (see the comment on §2).

παραχθέντες: Brylinger (ap. Thalheim) suggests ταραχθέντες as a possible emendation.

ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον: See Appendices A and C. Perhaps Socrates' interrupted preparations for the trial resembled Ischomachus' techniques for keeping himself in practice for the law courts (see *Oec.* 11.23-24).

5.᾽Η θαυμαστὸν νομίζεις εἰ καὶ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ ἐμὲ βέλτιον εἶναι ἤδη τελευτᾶν; The reasons for this view are given in §§5-9, which form one of the longest sections in the *Ap.* based on a single theme and are to be understood as an explanation for Xen.'s μεγαληγορία thesis as introduced in §1. The word καί here is important in that it indicates divine affirmation of what Socrates himself believes, namely, that it would be nobler (βέλτιον) for him to die at this point (ἤδη) after what he and his associates consider to have been a distinguished life. The reasons provided for his willingness to die are the following: 1) He has reached the height of his reputation among his followers, 2) he is secure in the knowledge that he has led a virtuous life, 3) he is at the threshold of decrepitude, 4) his death at this point will be easiest for all concerned, 5) the gods have indicated their wishes by preventing him from offering a formal defense, and 6) he would prefer to keep his self-image intact

[43]See Xen. *Ap.* 26, 29 and Pl. *Ap.* 35A, 38C, 39C-D, 41C. Vrijlandt (p. 139) notes a particularly strong tone in Plato's use of the word: *Videor mihi in Apologia Platonis ipsum Platonem audire qui iudicibus exprobat quod Socratem interfecerunt.*

rather than to face the prospect of a prolonged life to be lived in a way innappropriate to a free-born citizen. In §10 Xen. specifically points out that these thoughts formed the basis of Socrates' speech given in court. His readiness to die is mentioned again in §23 with no reference to divine influence (καὶ καιρὸν ἤδη ἐνόμιζεν ἑαυτῷ τελευτᾶν), and this is given as the reason for his refusal to propose a counter-penalty. To those who wish to spirit him away after the trial, he jokingly replies that he knows of no place outside Attica to which death does not have access (cp. *Cri.* 53D-E). He further states in §26 that his having been put to death wrongly will have its inevitable consequences and by comparing his own situation to that of Palamedes implies that he will also enjoy a similar sort of mythical immortality after his death. Xen. comments on his calm demeanor as he exits the court (§27). To console his followers, Socrates points out to them that all mortals are destined to die and that they should in fact be rejoicing since he is dying under the best possible circumstances. Again, he uses the occasion to tease one of his followers in order to dispel the prevailing sense of gloom (§28: cp. §23). On the basis of Homer's belief concerning the prophetic powers given to a man about to end his life (see *Il.* 16.851-61 & 22.358 ff.), Socrates prophesies the fate of Anytus' son in §§29-31, a prophecy which, according to Xen., eventually came true. The conclusion of the *Ap.* (§§32-34) contains Xen.'s opinion that Socrates did indeed die opportunely and that he showed great fortitude in the face of death.[44]

An examination of Pl. *Ap.* yields somewhat different results:

1) In approaching any life-and-death situation, one should consider one thing only, whether one is acting rightly or wrongly. Once a man has taken his stand, he is bound to remain there, as Socrates did at Potidaea and elsewhere (32A-E & 38E-39B).
2) The prospect of dying is nothing compared to disobeying one's divine calling (29A/D, 30B-C & 37E-38A).
3) Being afraid of death is the same as professing knowledge which one does not have, and while to do wrong is certainly dishonorable, death may in fact be a blessing (29A-B: cp. *Cri.* 43D).
4) A better man cannot be harmed by a worse, even through death (30C-D & 41C-D).
5) Some defendants go to incredible lengths to preserve their lives, as though they would become immortal somehow if they were not put to death, i.e., death is inevitable (35A).

[44]*Comm.* IV.8.1 introduces no new information regarding Socrates' views on death.

6) Men on the verge of death are said to have the gift of prophecy, and in this case Socrates foresees the evil reputation which the Athenians will gain for having put an innocent man to death (39C).
7) Death is either an annihilation or a migration of the soul: The former would resemble the soundest sleep and therefore something quite pleasant, whereas if the latter is true, Socrates will have the opportunity to converse with great figures in the underworld (40C-41C & 42A).

Although a willingness to die is not mentioned in Pl. *Ap.* per se, it nevertheless shares many similarities with Xen. *Ap.* regarding Socrates' attitude towards death, including his insistence on right action, his refusal to make any effort to save himself at all costs, his acquisition of the gift of prophecy, the inevitability of death, the benevolent role of the Divine in the outcome of the trial (cp. *Cri.* 54E), the vindication of his life in generations to come, and his levity and calm manner in general (cp. *ibid.* 43A ff.). More specifically, the statements in 34E (οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα) and 38C (εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς)[45] seem to echo Xen.'s concerning the opportuneness of Socrates' death, though this comparison is somewhat tenuous. In any event, it remains clear that Socrates' arrogant tone was incomprehensible to Xen., hence his need to discover a cause for it, whether real or imagined.

Of all the Socratica, the *Phd.* provides us with the most specific and extended account of Socrates' attitude towards death.[46] Common points with Xen.'s *Ap.* include the benevolent influence of the Divine on Socrates' fate (58E) and his calm bearing in general (*passim*). Additional views include the need to fulfill one's religious duties before death (60D-61C & 118A) and the impermissibility on religious grounds of committing suicide as a means of accelerating the separation of mind from body (61C ff.: cp. Crito's statement concerning paternal obligations in *Cri.* 45C-D). A philosopher should not fear death 1) since his life can be seen as a life-long endeavor to shun the corporeal side of his nature in favor of a more contemplative life-style, which can be seen as a preparation for the permanent separation of soul from body (63E-69E),[47] and 2) since the soul is immortal (70C-77D, 78C-84B &

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[45]See also *Cri.* 43C, 53D-E & *Phd.* 116E-117A
[46]Taylor ([1949] 177) sums up the main lesson of this dialogue as being twofold, i.e., that mental life is not the effect of bodily causes and that physical reality is not explicable in purely mechanical terms. Metzger (p. 313) describes it as follows: *[Die menschliche Existenz] wird [von Sokrates] als Wille zum Freisein von der Macht der Sterblichkeit über unsere Existenz verstanden, als welche sie identisch mit Denken ist.*
[47]This view is summed up nicely in 67D-E.

102A-107B). A philosopher should therefore continually strive to free himself from this fear (77D-78B & 114D-115A) and to purify his soul (80C-84B).[48] Finally, the vivid myth at the conclusion of the *Phd.* (107C-115A) describes three levels of existence after death: a purgative one in the underworld, a temporary spectral existence in the mundane world, and a blessed after-life in the supra-mundane world. Nothing in Xen.'s Socratica resembles this myth.

Navia ([1984] 59) has observed that, although Socrates leaves the question of the immortality of the soul open in Pl. *Ap.*, it is not treated at all in Xen., and that contemporary doctrines on this matter seem therefore to have left Xen. unconvinced.[49] Since it remains unclear, then, to what extent Xen.'s Socrates could look forward to an afterlife, pleasant or otherwise, it becomes even more necessary to consider the thesis that, by approaching his trial as he did, he was essentially committing suicide in order to avoid the onset of decrepitude.[50] Since Xen.'s main purpose in writing the *Ap.* was to treat Socrates' μεγαλῃγορία, there can be no doubt that, under the circumstances, he considered the verdict to be a foregone conclusion and Socrates' approach to his defense to be essentially one of self-destruction (or -immolation, as the case may be).[51] So much is clear. Whether or not this approach constituted an actual act of suicide has been the object of much debate. In addressing Socrates' problematical statements on suicide in *Phd.* 61B-69E, Dorter (*passim*) agrees with the traditional interpretation of Plato's view, that is, that death is indeed preferable to life (cp. *Lg.* 828D), especially for a philosopher, but that suicide is nevertheless unacceptable. Dorter (pp. 35-36) draws an interesting comparison between Socrates' refusal to leave his material prison in Athens and his refusal, as expressed in the *Phd.*, to leave the corporeal prison represented by his body, both of which attitudes seem to stem from his sense of duty to a higher authority. Walton (p.

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[48]See also 64A-B and also *Nu.* 94, where the philosopher's μελέτη θανάτου (cp. *Phd.* 81A) is the object of ridicule.

[49]See too Dover (1974) 261-68. With the exception of Orphism and philosophy, belief in a dualistic eschatology was largely lacking, with the result that the Greeks viewed the prospect of an afterlife with a similar sense of ambivalence (Garland, p. 432). [For the influence of Orphism on Socrates' belief in immortality, see Burnet (1911) l-li and Taylor (1949) 175.] But consider *Comm.* IV.3.14 (ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἥ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει) and the expansion of this idea in *Cyr.* VIII.7.17 ff., ideas which might have been borrowed from Plato or another Socratic, perhaps even from Hermogenes himself (see Burnet [1911] li-ii). Note too that, although Xen. believed in a soul/body dichotomy (see *Comm.* I.2.53, III.13.1 & III.14.7), Plato's concept of an afterlife in which the soul is subjected to a continual purgation in preparation for a subsequent corporeal existence is entirely lacking in Xen. While most scholars conclude that Socrates believed in an afterlife, McPherran (pp. 250-71) detects only a tentative, hopeful note in the evidence, and this attitude, combined with the notion of Socratic ignorance, causes him to conclude that Socrates held an agnostic position on this issue.

[50]Athenian views on suicide were ambivalent (Dover [1974] 168-69: see too the relevant articles by Duff, Frey, Lesser, Smith, and Walton in the bibliography). For the problems associated with old age, see, for example, *Comm.* II.8.2 ff. and *Phd.* 66C.

[51]Vlastos (p. 292) believes that, since Xen. found it difficult to believe that Socrates was unable to persuade the jury, he had to conclude that he had deliberately provoked it (see too Frick 81 and Appendix D).

292) concisely states the view traditionally imputed to Xen. in the *Ap.*: "Xen. would apparently have us believe that Socrates was responsible for his own death, and that Athens' judiciary was merely the instrument he chose to achieve his demise."[52] Vrijlandt (p. 73), citing Pl. *Ap.* 38C (see above) & 41C (ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον), concludes that Socrates was indeed willing to die, and Hackforth (p. 40) finds the former passage particularly convincing. Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 38 & 41) believe that "the Platonic Socrates' own moral and religious commitments...require him to undertake a sincere and effective defense to his jury." Vlastos (pp. 291-92) dismisses Xen.'s μεγαληγορία theory on similar grounds, since this would have caused the jury to commit a grave injustice, i.e. the conviction of an innocent man, and this in contradiction to Socrates' well-attested integrity.[53] As opposed to Brickhouse and Smith, Guardini (pp. 59-60) finds religious convictions to be the very reason for Socrates' willingness to die and states elsewhere (pp. 68 & 106, respectively) that "in a character of such a strong vitality and such positive intellectual clarity there can be no question of any morbid craving for death" and that "it may well be that an inmost 'will to die' is at work in him, ...no longer anything ethical, not even the ethos of philosophical responsibility, but something metaphysical and religious, which bursts all bounds of 'must' and 'may'." In Vander Waerdt's view (p. 20), the behavior of Xen.'s Socrates "does not represent an ignoble escape from the debility of old age but rather an act of benefaction intended to reveal to the jury and to posterity his understanding of justice". Geffcken (p. 41) reminds us quite appropriately of the possibility of considerable coloring on the part of our sources.[54]

I feel that Chroust ([1957] 107) is largely correct in saying that Xen. was probably overreaching the historical Socrates' actual intentions by saying that he was actually seeking his own condemnation and execution, and after countless readings of the text I continue to differ with the contention that Xen.'s Socrates was seeking a type of suicide through judicial process. Xen.'s figure does indeed find death preferable to life, and this accounts for the megalegorical tone of his speech in court (§1). A distinction needs to be carefully drawn, however, between finding the thought of death comforting and actively seeking it out, and this ambivalence towards the results of the trial is clearly expressed in §9: καὶ ἣν ἐγὼ δόξαν ἔχω περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, ταύτην ἀναφαίνων εἰ βαρυνῶ τοὺς δικαστάς, αἱρήσομαι τελευτᾶν

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[52]This view ignores the significance of the daimonic, however. See Appendix C.

[53]Vlastos (p. 291) seems to sit on the fence, however, by writing that Xen.'s Socrates intended to "enhance the chances of conviction" by his behavior in court, a guarded statement.

[54]*Man hat von Sokrates' Todessehnsucht in der [platonischen] 'Apologie' gesprochen, mit Recht. Aber auch diese Stimmung ist nicht 'sokratisch'. Die poetische Ausmalung eines zukünftigen Forscherdaseins im Jenseits erscheint nicht nur als ein Ausbruch platonischen Gefühlslebens, sondern vielmehr als ein Symptom jugendlicher Innerlichkeit, als Nachwirkung von Sokrates' erhabenem Tod. Es wäre nicht weniger menschlich als antik empfunden.*

μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνελευθέρως τὸ ζῆν ἔτι προσαιτῶν κερδᾶναι τὸν πολὺ χείρω βίον ἀντὶ θανάτου. The role of the daimonic must also be taken into consideration in any discussion of Socrates' "suicide".

To what extent can Xen.'s explanation of Socrates' behavior be justified? Socrates' words in Xen. *Ap.* 5-7 closely resemble those of his counterpart in Pl. *Ap.* 41D (ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι), where the word πράγματα can be interpreted more generally as referring to the concerns associated with Socrates' advanced age. The Platonic Socrates also seems at least to sympathize with the notion of dying when life has nothing left to offer,[55] but besides a justification in *Lg.* 873C of suicide under the conditions of unrelieved pain or an intolerable sense of shame, there is no direct reference in Plato to suicide as a means of ending the sufferings associated with old age.[56] How, then, are we to understand Xen.'s conclusion? Guthrie ([1978] 3:404) explains Xen.'s motives by asserting that he was "bothered by the fear that the divine voice might be thought a delusion because Socrates made a point of having received no warning from it about his approaching trial, when in fact he was condemned to death" (see *Comm.* IV.8.1), a point which seems to ascribe a certain life-and-death nature to the daimonic which cannot be supported by the pre-trial references to it (see Appendix C): This argument would only be valid if death were necessarily an absolute evil. Ollier (p. 97) believes that Xen. has perhaps arrived at this conclusion because of his own youthful outlook and the attitude towards youth among the Greeks in general.[57] One should also recall that Xen. stresses throughout his Socratica the practical, soldierly virtues of self-discipline, self-sufficiency, and the realization of one's potential. Equal value is placed on the correct use of the body, with physical health becoming for Xen. a value in itself[58] and its maintenance the responsibility of a good leader (see, for example, *Comm.* II.1 and *Cyr.* II.1.20 ff.). Finally, the issue of ὠφέλεια is particularly relevant here: Every object is good only inasmuch as it fulfills its intended purpose, and this also holds true for human traits and abilities.[59] This

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[55]See *Cri.* 43B, 47E, 48B, 53D-E, *Phd.* 117A, and *Grg.* 505A; for aging in general, see *Grg.* 512D-E and *R.* 328D-329D.

[56]See Dover ([1974] 267), who discusses the Greeks' perception of death as the end of suffering and cites relevant passages.

[57]See too Dover (1974) 104-105. Joël (2:532-33) cites the following Xenophontic passages on aging nobly: *Lac.* 10.1 ff., *Ages.* 10.4, 11.14-16, *Cyr.* VIII.7.6, *Oec.* 7.42-43, and *Cyn.* 12.1, all of which, in Joël's opinion, smack of Antisthenes. Heinz (ap. Frick 88 n. 1) notes that Socrates' *Todessehnsucht* seems odd in light of the many notable Greeks who had lived well into their nineties (e.g. Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Aeschylus, Gorgias, Sophocles et al.). For examples of Greek views on death, see Anacreon 395 and Mimnermus 1 & 2 (Diehl); for a rather quaint, though enjoyable, treatment of the melancholy side of the Greek temperament, see Butcher 133-76.

[58]See *Comm.* III.12 for a discussion of εὐεξία vs. καχεξία.

[59]See *Oec.* 1.1-15, where οἰκονομία is defined as knowledge of the ὀρθὴ χρῆσις of one's property. For a fuller discussion of ὠφέλεια, see the comment on §34 below. For Frick (p. 19), *utilitas* drives Socrates' behavior in court, that is, since life is the highest good for a man of Xen.'s type, he projects

point is frankly stated in *Comm.* I.2.53 ff., where relatives are described as ridding themselves of, i.e. burying, a loved one as quickly as the animated component (ψυχή) has left his body, and in the following section, where humans are described as quite happily ridding themselves, even while alive, of such bodily growths as callouses which are of no use to them whatsoever.[60] Xen.'s emphasis is here, as elsewhere, on the practical.

Note finally the conspicuously defensive tone created by the repetition of the word θαυμαστόν in Socrates' reply to Hermogenes, a word repeated in §§11, 21, and 25 to express both incredulity and a sense of obviousness.[61]

"Ηιδειν ὁσίως μοι καὶ δικαίως ἅπαντα τὸν βίον βεβιωμένον: The verb ἤδειν seems to fly in the face of Socratic ignorance, though it does in fact correspond to the Xenophontic Socrates' professed ability to instill virtue in his followers (see §20), while the adverbs ὁσίως and δικαίως correspond respectively to the impiety and corruption-of-the-youth charges of the indictment (see §10).[62] For a discussion of the Xenophontic Socrates' notion of τὸ δίκαιον, see the comment on §3 above. Its counterpart τὸ ὅσιον represents the same sense of order as it exists outside the human realm,[63] and although it is tempting to connect this statement in some way with the oracle-inspired divine mission elaborated in Pl. *Ap.* 20D-24C, there is unfortunately very little in Xen.'s Socratic works to justify such a comparison (see the comment on §14). At most, Xen.'s Socrates figure sees the oracle's pronouncement as an affirmation of, not as an impetus for, his philosophical activities.

What, then, does this Socrates believe to be a βίος ὁσίως βεβιωμένος? For now, I will limit the answer to this question to those views on religion which appear

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this outlook onto his Socrates figure and concocts the latter's willingness to die before the onset of old age.

[60]Chroust ([1957] 127-28) believes that the idea that practically useless persons or things should be discarded is of Cynic origin, and that Socrates' statement that a corpse, or soulless body, should be buried without ceremony can be connected with Antisthenes' disregard for the material (see too *Cyr.* VIII.7.25 for Cyrus' similar views on the dead). Chroust ([1957] 23 & 106-108) also sees in Socrates' willingness to die the influence of an original Antisthenian *consolatio mortis* (see *Ax.* 367B ff., which shows a similar influence, and D.L. 6.5 & 6.68, which describe Antisthenian attitudes towards death); according to Chroust, this *consolatio* was designed to dispel the fear of death by depicting the horrors of old age. Joël (2:538) feels that, in spite of their differenct backgrounds, the influence of Antisthenes on Xen. is a well-founded assumption: *Es ist also keine Frage, daß in dem Junker, Offizier und Landwirt Xenophon der Pietäts- und Anciennitätssinn stark ausgeprägt war, aber es ist auch keine Frage, daß er sich mit diesen Gefühlen in den Idealen des Antisthenes wiederfand, der die Feudalstaaten des Lykurg und des Kyros gepriesen.*

[61]Cp. the similar use of θαυμαστόν in *Comm.* I.1.1.

[62]See the comment on §10 and also *Comm.* I.2.37, where the two spheres are closely linked (see too Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 92 & 99).

[63]After a careful analysis of the *Euthphr.*, McPherran (p. 71) sums up Socrates' beliefs regarding piety as follows: Pious acts are a species of just acts, whose performance is a service to the gods which assists them with their work productive of a good result, and all these elements exist in the context of a limited agnosticism that precludes their specification n full detail.

elsewhere in Xen.'s Socratica and which are often structured in such a way that the notion of worship develops naturally from some proof of the gods' existence. Each set of views appears in its own respective context as follows:

- *Comm.* I.3.1-4: Socrates is said to have advised his associates to follow the Pythian priestess' injunction to all worshippers to obey their local laws regarding worship. He prayed for what was good in general and felt that a more specific prayer was pointless since the gods themselves know what is best for each worshipper, who in turn is expected to offer sacrifices in proportion to his resources and with a full sense of devotion. Socrates himself invariably obeyed all signs sent to him by the gods, the daimonic voice in particular, and disregarded human opinion if it seemed to conflict in any way with the gods' wishes.[64] In this sense, diviners, seers, oracle-givers and poets are all media, not sources, and require some sort of rationalizing, since knowledge derives from application of one's reason: This must also surely apply to Socrates' dreams and sign (see Vlastos 167-71).
- *Comm.* I.4: Socrates here offers Aristodemus a teleological proof of the gods' existence[65] and points out that the pre-eminent position of man in the hierarchy of living things demonstrates their particular interest in human affairs: for this reason, they deserve to be honored in some way. The significance of divination and prodigies applies to everyone, not just to individuals like Aristodemus, and the ubiquity of the gods should inspire good behavior generally.

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[64]In the context of both ἀπολογίαι, for example, the gods seem to be indicating that Socrates has reached a timely point at which to die. Chroust ([1957] 123) believes that Socrates seems to reflect Antisthenian views when he cautions his listeners against the use of, or reliance on, omens, particularly for trivial matters.

[65]Socrates' "proof" of a benevolent deity appears in *Comm.* I.4.2-19 (see too IV.3.1-18). McPherran (p. 274) summarizes Xen.'s main argument (1.4.2-7) as follows: 1) "Everything that is clearly purposeful...is the product of intelligent design.... 2) Human beings...exhibit 'signs of forethought' [e.g. eyebrows].... 3) Things that exhibit 'signs of forethought' are clearly purposeful. 4) Thus, human beings are the product of intelligent design. 5) The existence of products of intelligent design implies the existence of an intelligent designer-creator." 6) Thus, an intelligent designer-creator of the cosmos exists. McPherran notes that this "is no mere prototype but close to being a full-fledged version of the classic Argument from Design" (*idem*). He concludes that Socrates' deity "appears to be an extrapolation from [Socrates'] own understanding of the human soul" and notes that it is characterized by its omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence, as well as by its desires and affective states (pp. 277-78). The distinction between this single deity and the remaining gods is unclear: Both seem to fulfill similar functions, and to reconcile this with Socrates' apparent polytheism (see, for example, Pl. *Ap.* 29D & 35D) it is possible to imagine that the single deity oversees a community of lesser gods or that the latter are a manifestation of the former (p. 278). [McPherran (pp. 286-89) presents other evidence (including references from Plato) of Socrates' teleological view of religion and remarks (p. 280) that, if Socrates really possessed a teleological view of the cosmos, then he might have exerted "a primary influence on Plato's introduction of the Demiurge into his own philosophy". Regarding the question of mono- vs. polytheism, Joël (1:136) maintains that in the *Comm.* θεός signifies a cosmic godhead, while the plural emphasizes the more manifest, all-caring aspect of divinity.] Socrates' teleology, if it existed, seems to have been influenced by Xenophanes and especially Anaxagoras (p. 289). For a discussion of Diogenes of Apollonia's possible influence on Socrates' teleology, see McPherran 290 and Gomperz (1924) 148-49.

- *Comm.* IV.3: The benevolence of the gods in providing for mankind is discussed,[66] and Socrates tells Euthydemus that the invisibility of the Divine does not disprove its existence, citing as an example the invisible effect of the mind on the body. Socrates repeats the Delphic injunction to honor the gods according to local usage (see above).
- *Comm.* IV.6.2-4: The following conclusion regarding εὐσέβεια is deduced in a chapter which provides several examples of Socratic dialectic: ὁ ἄρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδὼς ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡμῖν εὐσεβὴς ὡρισμένος εἴη. Note that, just as the Right is equivalent to the Lawful where humans are concerned (see above), so is the Religious equivalent to the Lawful where the gods are concerned.
- *Oec.* 5.18-20: Farmers must also pray to the gods to protect their property and to help avert unforeseeable catastrophes.
- *Oec.* 7.22-32: The gods have apportioned each sex its own particular talents and duties, and not fulfilling these functions is a form of impiety.
- *Oec.* 17.2-4: The gods signal the beginning of each sowing season by sending rain.
- *Smp.* 3.14 & 4.46-49: The gods are described as omniscient and omnipotent friends who look after Hermogenes and indicate their intentions to him through various signs which, if unheeded, lead inevitably to negative consequences. He mentions four ways of serving them (of which Socrates readily approves): praise, offerings, inoffensive speech, and truthfulness whenever their names are invoked on any occasion.

According to Xen.'s Socrates, then, a properly religious life involves 1) obeying the gods' behests over human opinion and in accordance with local custom, 2) relying on the gods to know what is best for the individual, 3) becoming familiar with the many ways in which the gods communicate with humans, 4) acting with the certain knowledge that all human activities are under constant scrutiny by the gods, 5) realizing that the invisibility of the gods by no means disproves their existence, 6) conforming to one's assigned lot in life, and 7) knowing how to worship the gods properly. This at least partly constitutes a βίος ὁσίως βεβιωμένος.[67] This question and the implications of the *Schutzschrift* will be treated more fully in the comments on §11 ff., sections which represent Socrates' more specific response to the impiety charge.

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[66]Gomperz ([1924] 148) cites E. *Supp.* 201 ff. as a related proof of the divine through its manifestation in nature.

[67]Xen. certainly does not ignore the fickleness of divine favor (see, for example, *Oec.* 8.16: ἐὰν δὲ [ὁ θεὸς] μόνον μὴ ἀπολέσῃ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντας, πάνυ ἀγαπητόν· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ πάνυ καλῶς ὑπηρετοῦντας σῴζῃ, πολλὴ χάρις...τοῖς θεοῖς).

ὥστε ἰσχυρῶς ἀγάμενος ἐμαυτὸν ταὐτὰ ἡὑρισκον καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὶ συγγιγνομένους γιγνώσκοντας περὶ ἐμοῦ: Cp. *Comm.* I.6.9: οἴει οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; Busse (p. 225) calls this passage *ein Beispiel der in der Apologie üblichen maßlosen Übertreibung*. Socrates' self-avowedly high reputation among his followers, which is at least partially the result of a continent lifestyle (*Comm.* II.1.19 & 33), can be compared with the ignorance of the dicasts, who are unaware of his virtues (see *ibid.* IV.8.9). Ribbing (p. 45) acutely observes that implicit in the idea that Socrates had reached the acme of his career was the concern that his reputation would soon begin to diminish. (See the comment on §17 for more information on Socrates' relationship with his followers.)

6. νῦν δὲ εἰ ἔτι προβήσεται ἡ ἡλικία: Socrates was seventy at the time of the trial (Pl. *Ap.* 17D), and if we can rely on the accounts provided by our witnesses concerning Socrates' healthy and hardy constitution,[68] we can assume that he was still quite healthy at this point in his life, though perhaps a bit frail (Pl. *Ap.* 38C and *Comm.* IV.8.1).

ἀνάγκη ἔσται...καὶ ὁρᾶν τε χεῖρον καὶ ἀκούειν ἧττον κτλ.: Note the stress on those senses and faculties - seeing, hearing, learning, and memory - which are conducive to leading a philosophical life and which stand in jarring contrast to the seemingly un-Socratic emphasis on pleasure in this passage (πῶς ἄν...ἐγὼ ἔτι ἂν ἡδέως βιοτεύοιμι;) and throughout this section. It is tempting to attribute this uncharacteristically hedonistic tone to the influence of a source other than Hermogenes and, in particular, to some Socratic writer such as Aristippus.[69] Whether or not a direct connection can be made between Aristippus and the dialogue with Aristippus on ἐγκράτεια in *Comm.* II.1,[70] at least some Aristippan influence on Xen. is clear, and Aristippus' words in *Comm.* II.1.9 (ἐμαυτόν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς

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[68]See Pl. *Smp.* 219B-D, *Comm.* I.2.1, I.3.5 ff., I.6.2, and *Nu.* 412-19 (see too Dover *Clouds* xli-xlii).

[69]For a list of Aristippus' works, see Mannebach (pp. 29-30); for his philosophy in general, see Guthrie ([1978] 490-99). The hedonistic caveat of the Cyrenaics - that one should be master of, not mastered by, pleasures - is not out of keeping with the beliefs of the Xenophontico-Platonic Socrates, whose utterances could in fact lend themselves to "a utilitarian, and even to a hedonistic, interpretation" (*ibid.*, p. 498). Vlastos (p. 301) takes Socrates' view "to be that if one has not yet come in sight of the Sovereignty of Virtue, hedonism *faute de mieux* would still be better than living in a muddle: it would provide one with a low-grade morality of utility which, bad as it is, could at least save one from the self-destructive ways of the likes of Critias and Alcibiades". For Ribbing (p. 28), the Xenophontic Socrates' philosophy can be described as a type of Eudaemonism, *...insofern damit eine solche Ansicht verstanden wird, die den Wert menschlicher Wirksamkeit nach ihrem Verhältnis zu etwas Anderem mißt...und dabei das sinnlich Angenehme zum Maßstab macht.*

[70]Contrary to Gigon ([1953] 26-27), Fritz ([1965] 269 ff.) believes that Xen. was referring in some way to a lecture or dialogue of Aristippus when he wrote this passage, though there is admittedly a great deal in the dialogue which is undeniably Xenophontic.

βουλομένους ἧ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν[71]) are directly parallel to the passage under discussion and similar thematically in their emphasis on good health as a prerequisite to a good life (with, in Xen.'s view, no Aristippan ἐλευθερία as a middle ground).[72] The interpretation of the passage in the *Ap.* turns on the word ἡδέως, which, in light of the restricted emphasis above on certain senses and faculties, seems far more likely to represent the Platonic type of "true" pleasure.[73] This more moderate interpretation is supported by the more anti-hedonistic, Antisthenic tone of Xen. *Ap.* in general and by the value placed in this section on a life led nobly.[74] As Ollier (p. 97) notes, this section of Xen. *Ap.* puts Socrates' readiness to die in a not ignoble light.

7. καὶ ὁ θεὸς δι' εὐμένειαν προξενεῖ μοι: The verb προξενεῖν denotes all of the duties expected of a state-sponsored πρόξενος (= a public ξένος), including those of patronage and protection, which, if the occasion arose, sometimes included greasing the wheels of the diplomatic process to promote specific interests. The providential nature of Xen.'s gods is summed up nicely by Socrates in *Comm.* I.1.19 and by Hermogenes in *Smp.* 4.47 ff. (see the comment on §5 above).

ἐν καιρῷ τῆς ἡλικίας καταλῦσαι τὸν βίον: Solon's tales of Tellus, Cleobis, and Biton in Hdt. 1.30-31 form a *locus classicus* for the Greek attitude towards dying and, in particular, towards dying opportunely.[75] This attitude accords nicely with what Socrates states in §5 above: He has excelled in leading a virtuous life, an

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[71]Cp. the uses of ῥᾷστα and ῥᾴστη to describe Socrates' type of execution in the following section.
[72]Indeed, in §9 Socrates calls a prolonged life under such worsening circumstances a life led ἀνελευθέρως. See *Comm.* III.12.6-8, where health is discussed in connection with εὐεξία and aging.
[73]Treated in *R.* 583 ff., *Phlb.* 39A ff., 51A ff. & *passim*, and *Phd.* 60B-C, 64D ff., 68E-69A & 114D-E; for examples of Platonic "hedonism" in Xen., see *Comm.* I.2.23, I.5.5, I.6.8-9, II.6.5, IV.5.6, IV.8.11 and *Oec.* 1.22-23 (note here the use of ῥᾷον βιοτεύειν). This notion is summed up well in *Comm.* IV.8.6 (ἄριστα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ζῆν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται), and the word ἥδιστον in *Ap.* 5 can best be taken in this sense. It should be recalled, however, that Socrates, like Aristippus and even Antisthenes (see Xen. *Smp.* 4.38), by no means abstained from the pleasures of the body (*Comm.* I.3.15).
[74]See the comment on ἐγκράτεια in §18 below; for extended comments on possible Antisthenic influence on Xen., see Joël 2:528-32. Taylor ([1932] 75 & note: see too Chroust [1957] 8), noting Xen.'s negative treatment of Aristippus in *Comm.* II.1 (cp. D.L. 2.65) suggests the possible influence of Antisthenes. *Comm.* I.3.2 also represents an Antisthenic perspective comparable with Socrates' view in Xen. *Ap.* that he is the beneficiary of an unprompted divine προξενία. Be that as it may, I see no evidence for Benjamin's unsupported assertion (p. xiii) that Hermogenes was a follower of Antisthenes and was consequently biased in his report to Xen., though we can perhaps assume that they were at least acquainted with each other. [The ancient accounts of Xen.'s antipathy towards Aristippus as set out in Mannebach (p. 26) are vague and untenable.] In general, Socrates' attitude towards death and decrepitude is similar to that of the Cynics and Cyrenaics and may in fact reflect a more accurate tradition (Navia [1984] 60-61).
[75]See How and Wells (1:68) for additional passages on this theme. The Greeks generally considered death as an escape from troubles, not as the soul's release from the prison of the body, as the Orphists and Pythagoreans held.

accomplishment which has won not only his own admiration, but also that of his followers. In his view, his life can only deteriorate from this point on, hence his readiness to die.

τῇ τελευτῇ χρῆσθαι ἡ ῥᾴστη...κέκριται: Cp. §32 (τῶν δὲ θανάτων τοῦ ῥᾴστου ἔτυχεν). Since, therefore, the notion of an easy (i.e. expedient) death is inconsistent with Xen.'s general portrayal of Socrates,[76] it can be concluded that Xen.'s Socrates sees the verdict of the trial as having been preordained by some daimonic power and seeks an explanation not in philosophy but in the Greek tradition of dying opportunely - in this case, at the height of his intellectual and philosophical powers. In short, just as the absence of any daimonic intervention in Pl. *Ap.* indicates a tacit sanction of Socrates' actions, so the apotreptic influence of τὸ δαιμόνιον in Xen. *Ap.* effects an outcome which Xen., elaborating on an actual remark made by Socrates about his old age, chooses to interpret in his own way.[77] To Xen., Socrates has become a participant, not an active agent, in a divinely controlled process.

In this particular context, the word ῥᾴστη can consequently be construed as referring not to a shirking of responsibilities, but to the form of execution he will soon have to face. Three types of capital punishment existed in the period under consideration: precipitation into a pit, a type of execution called ἀποτυμπανισμός (see below), and the ingestion of hemlock.[78] There is no known Athenian source for an example of precipitation actually having been carried out, though references to it appear in Hdt. 7.133 (concerning the execution of Persian envoys) and Pl. *Grg.* 516D-E (on the trial of Miltiades). The practice of ἀποτυμπανισμός is well documented and may have involved an extended clubbing or a bloodless crucifixion involving strangulation and exposure.[79] The imbibing of hemlock was apparently introduced under the Thirty and became accepted practice under subsequent governments.[80] Burnet's description of the effects of hemlock poisoning ([1911] 149-50) seems to be largely influenced by the *Phd.* itself, where the symptoms include a gradual refrigeration and numbness of the body beginning at the extremities until the heart is finally affected; death is accompanied by a spasm. Burnet adds finally that the effects of the poison vary according to the dosage taken and the individual involved. On the

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[76]Note too that the notion of an easy death does not appear in *Comm.* IV.8.4, the counterpart to *Ap.* 7. For the use of military language to describe Socrates' attitude towards death, see the comment on §33 (see too Pl. *Ap.* 28D-E for the image of a soldier standing his ground).

[77]According to E. Meyer (5:227), Xen. gathered from his sources that Socrates' behavior made the verdict inevitable, and since he did not understand the subtleties of Pl. *Ap.* and *Cri.*, he reached his own conclusion about Socrates' readiness to die.

[78]My sources for capital punishment in Athens are Bonner & Smith 2:278 ff. and Lipsius 1:77 ff. Phillipson (p. 223) lists poison, crucifixion, the wheel, decapitation, and stoning; other forms, including hanging, were reserved for a baser class of criminals.

[79]Gernet (p. 254), following Keramopoullos' study, opts for the latter interpretation of the evidence.

[80]See the notorious example of Theramenes' death in *HG* II.3.56 (see too Plu. *Phoc.* 36).

other hand, Gill (*passim*) describes not only the symptoms which appear in the *Phd.*, but far more violent symptoms as described in Nicander and in modern accounts of hemlock poisoning. These include vomiting, choking, impaired vision and hearing, thickness of speech, dilation of the pupils, spasms, convulsions, etc., all a far cry from the tranquil scene depicted in the *Phd.*, especially if Socrates was required to take a larger dose than usual.[81] If Gill's account is indeed the correct one, the interpretation of the word ῥᾴστη in Socrates' case seems to be merely one of degree, though it seems likely that Socrates' crime would not have fallen under any of the capital crimes punishable by precipitation or ἀποτυμπανισμός (see Bonner and Smith 285-87 and Lipsius 1:77 ff.). When one considers the remarks in *Cri.* 53A ff., it should be added that Socrates also might have considered an execution by hemlock "easiest" when compared, for example, to a death in exile, an alternative in all capital cases (Harrison 185-86).

The words ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου ἐπιμεληθέντων in this section apparently refer to the Eleven, who were in charge of carrying out death penalties (see Lipsius 1:77 ff. and Harrison 17), or to one of their minions such as the turnkey who appears in *Phd.* 116B-D.

ἀπραγμονεστάτη δὲ τοῖς φίλοις: The word ἀπραγμονεστάτη probably refers at least indirectly to the potential consequences to Socrates' friends if he had chosen to flee Athens and die elsewhere,[82] and recall Socrates' general point in *Cri.* 49A ff. that it is worse to harm others than to harm oneself. More obviously, this must refer to the burden of a prolonged illness on one's loved ones, and Socrates' concern in this regard is well exemplified by his desire to wash himself prior to his death to spare his female relatives the trouble of washing his corpse.[83] The words πλεῖστον...πόθον ἐμποιοῦσα τῶν τελευτώντων are clearly explained below by ἄσχημον...μηδὲν μηδὲ δυσχερὲς κτλ. below.

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[81]See *Phd.* 63E. Gill dismisses as possible explanations differences in dosage, the type of hemlock, and the inability of an any eye-witness to overlook any of the violent symptoms described. If Plato has therefore falsified his account, what were his motives in doing so? Gill suggests that he intended to demonstrate Socrates' notorious control of mind over body (see Pl. *Smp.* 219E ff.), and that there may have been aesthetic considerations as well. More importantly, however, he probably wanted to illustrate a major theme of the *Phd.*: the liberation of the soul from the body. Since the ψυχή was held to be the animating force in the body, there would be considerable symbolism in Socrates' death as described by Plato, especially in the slow spreading of numbness from the lower extremities towards the heart.

[82]The inevitable consequences of exile are set out humorously in §23 (see too *Cri.* 53A-B).

[83]*Phd.* 115A. The words ἐν ταῖς γνώμαις τῶν παρόντων in the text below also seem to recall the gathering of Socrates' followers on his last day. There might well be an element of Xenophontic utilitarianism in Socrates' concern about troubling his friends, that is, he may feel that he will soon no longer be of any use to his friends because of his approaching infirmity (see *Comm.* II.3.17 and the comments on §§5 & 34). This burden would fall more naturally to one's loved ones (see *Comm.* II.2.8).

καταλείπηταί <τις>: This is Stephanus' supplement of καταλίπηται in the manuscripts. Lundström suggests καταλίπῃ τις.

8. ὀρθῶς δὲ οἱ θεοὶ τότε μου ἠναντιοῦντο κτλ.: Note that it is no longer the daimonic sign but the gods themselves through whom Socrates is dissuaded from seeking an acquittal by any means possible.[84] The shift in emphasis can be explained by Xen.'s desire to personalize the divine motivation behind Socrates' behavior in court (and in general). It is interesting to note that this sentence implies that there was actually a moment at which Socrates and his friends discussed all and every means (ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου) to get him acquitted (Tejera 154).

τῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπισκέψει: To whose λόγος is Socrates referring? Diogenes Laertius (2.40-41) refers to a defense speech written by Lysias for Socrates which the latter rejected and which Chroust interprets as a fiction based on the appearance ca. 390 of a Lysianic speech directed against Polycrates.[85] No matter what truth there is in Diogenes' statement, the use of the plural in §1 (γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου καὶ ἄλλοι) makes it likely that Xen. turned to other Socratic sources in addition to, if not instead of, Lysias' ἀπολογία (see Gigon [1946] 214).

9. ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐδὲ προθυμήσομαι κτλ.: Note that ταῦτα must refer to πάντα τὰ χαλεπὰ κτλ. in the preceding sentence, and that what Socrates tells Hermogenes in this section determines the structure of his speech before the dicasts (Edelstein 143).

Arnim (pp. 19-20) points out that this section is inconsistent with other parts of Hermogenes' report in that Socrates here admits the possibility of being acquitted (ταύτην [τὴν δόξαν] ἀναφαίνων εἰ βαρυνῶ τοὺς δικαστάς[86]). This certainly echoes the intentions expressed by τὰ ἀποφευκτικά in the preceding section and is in keeping with Xen.'s claim in §22 that Socrates made every effort to win an acquittal (cp. Pl. *Ap.* 37A-B).[87] Yet the self-fulfilling tone of the verb βαρύνειν in this section, the account of the aftermath in §32 (Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ τὸ μεγαλύνειν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ φθόνον ἐπαγόμενος), and the repeated indications in Pl. *Ap.* that

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[84]Cp. his prophetic dream in *Cri.* 44A-B. For the use of the imperfect tense, see the comment on §4.
[85]See Chroust ([1957] 20), who also alludes to scholars who want to distinguish between an ἀπολογία written by Lysias for the trial and a separate one written as a response to Polycrates (see Essay C).
[86]Marchant's proposed emendation here, while quite ingenious, is unnecessary (see apparatus *ad loc.*). Vander Waerdt (p. 17 n. 52) finds a possible reference to Xen.'s μεγαληγορία thesis in Epict. II.2.18: εἰ μή τι καιρός ἐστιν ἐπίτηδες ἐρεθίσαι τοὺς δικαστὰς ὡς Σωκράτει.
[87]See Maier 475. Ollier (p. 104 n. 1) believes that the words τοῦ ἤδη λῆξαι τοῦ βίου in Xen. *Ap.* 8 seem to indicate that Socrates is predisposed towards a guilty-verdict.

Socrates does not expect to be acquitted make it clear that his attitude, *not* necessarily his intentions, towards the trial could only have resulted in a guilty-verdict.[88]

It has also been noted[89] that the language here closely resembles that in Pl. *Ap.* 38E (ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ᾠήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, ...ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν). A subtle difference hinges on the words ἀνελευθέρως (Xen.) and ἀνελεύθερον (Plato): Whereas in Pl. *Ap.* Socrates specifically refuses to resort to a self-debasing emotional plea for his life in front of his peers, Xen.'s Socrates will refuse more generally to beg for his life in a manner unsuitable to a free-born man. The latter Socrates' statement can be seen as an indirect reference to the notion of καλοκἀγαθία,[90] and the word ἀνελεύθερος itself is a rather pregnant term which connotes the following:

1) *Ethnic Inferiority*: The vast majority of slaves were not ethnic Greeks but βάρβαροι treated accordingly.
2) *Lack of Means and Economic Dependence*: Both of these conditions were treated with contempt in contemporary Athenian literature (Dover [1974] 40 & 114: see *Oec.* 4.1-3 and *Comm.* I.2.6, II.7-8, III.10.5, IV.2.22).
3) *Parsimony*: Slaves were obviously far more concerned with selfishly securing and maintaining the basic and more individual conditions for survival than were their free-born masters, who could direct their attention towards contributing in some way to the community, hence the mean and illiberal man is often called ἀνελεύθερος (Dover *op. cit.* 115: see *Cyr.* VIII.4.32).
4) *Incontinent and Expedient Behavior*: Σωφροσύνη was considered a characteristic of free men, whereas slaves are described as being primarily driven by their appetites (Dover *op. cit.* 114-16: see *Comm.* I.2.2, I.2.29, I.5.2-3, III.13, IV.2.31, IV.2.39, IV.5.4 and *Oec.* 13.9) and were represented in comedy as frequently taking the path of least resistance (Dover *op. cit.* 114).[91]
5) *Fear and Resentment*: Dover (*ibid.*, p. 284) quotes D. 8.51, where it is stated that the slave differs from the free-born man in that he is deterred from wrongdoing only by the threat of physical pain (see *Comm.* IV.5.3 and *Lac.* 8.2),

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[88]In support of this, Arnim (p. 12) cites the following passages from Pl. *Ap.*: 19A, 24A, 28A, 36A & 37A-B (see too Shero 111 and Chroust [1957] 41). Yet the supposition that Socrates' defense made a positive impression on the court seems to be well demonstrated by the number of those in Pl. *Ap.* who voted for his acquittal, placed by Riddell (pp. xii-xiv) at 220, with 281 voting for a conviction.
[89]See Busse 226, Hackforth 17, Vrijlandt 77, and Arnim 21. Arnim takes this as yet another example of Xen.'s corrective approach to the events of the trial as related by Plato. Vrijlandt compares Xen.'s αἱρήσομαι with Plato's αἱροῦμαι (spoken after the verdict, as in the case of Xen.'s Socrates).
[90]See, for example, *Comm.* I.1.16: τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο [Σωκράτης] καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλῆσθαι (see too Joël 2:1048 ff. and my comment on §34 below).
[91]It is amusing to note, however, that Aristippus' hedonism (see *Comm.* II.1.15-16) actually makes him *unsuitable* for slavery.

and it can be assumed that fear was in general a constant in any slave's life. This is particularly relevant to Socrates' crisis as he describes it in §9, with resentment as a natural consequence (see Pl. *Ap.* 39C ff.: note too how this section of Xen. *Ap.* strikes a note of defiance similar to Socrates' words in Pl. *Ap.* 29C ff.). An implicit reference to a slave begging for his life under court-sanctioned torture might also be intended here.

See too the comments on §§14 and 16 in reference to the Delphic oracle.

Other parallels include the following: The word κερδᾶναι is reminiscent of Socrates' words in *Phd.* 116E-117A (οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὼν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος), and Socrates' concern for his potential loss of reputation resembles the attitude of the Platonic Socrates towards escape and exile in *Cri.* 53A ff. There is, however, no basis for seeking a Platonic influence in this passage since, as elsewhere, close parallels between the two authors might well derive ultimately from Socrates' own words in court.

10. ὡς οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζοι κτλ.: None of the versions of the indictment differs significantly from the others,[92] and this represents one of the

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[92]The other versions of, or direct references to, the indictment appear as follows:

- *Comm.* I.1.1: ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.
- Pl. *Ap.* 24B-C: Σωκράτη φησὶν [Μέλητος] ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά.
- *Euthphr.* 3B: φησὶ γὰρ [Μέλητός] με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεοὺς τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν.
- Favorinus ap. D.L. 2.40: τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.

Favorinus' version supposedly represents the final form of the indictment as he discovered it among the Metroon archives in the temple of Cybele; it is all but identical with the indictment as reported by Xen., who offers a shorter version and uses the verb εἰσφέρειν instead of εἰσηγεῖσθαι (see Gomperz [1924] 130 ff. and A. Ferguson 157-59). The reference to the indictment in *Euthphr.* 3B brings the vaguer reference in Pl. *Ap.* into line with Xen.'s belief that the charge of introducing καινὰ δαιμόνια was directly related to Socrates' innovative belief in a daimonic influence on his actions (Gundert 514: see below). It should also be noted that Plato differs significantly from Xen. in directly linking the impiety with the corruption charge (see Pl. *Ap.* 26B and *Euthphr.* 3A-B), though a possible allusion to this appears in §19 (...τινα οἶσθα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γεγενημένον...ἐξ εὐσεβοῦς ἀνόσιον;).

Hackforth (pp. 60-63: see Phillipson 311) finds no grounds for Burnet's interpretation of νομίζειν in an ambiguous sense in Pl. *Ap.* 26C (see the latter's comment *ad loc.*): Hackforth points out that 29A and 35D (see too *Nu.* 819) confirm the word in the sense of a disbelief in the *existence* of the gods, and concludes that the ἀσέβεια law of 399 must have covered such cases as these. Taylor ([1911] 7), referring to Lys. 12.9, maintains that the words οὐ νομίζειν θεούς does not necessarily refer to atheism, while Reeve (p. 78: see too Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 31) comes out strongly in saying that Burnet's interpretation is untenable since the verb is used elsewhere (26B, 29A & 35D) to mean νομίζειν θεοὺς εἶναι. Unfortunately, most of the texts concerning impiety laws have

few areas in Socratic studies which we can approach with anything resembling complete confidence regarding its historicity. Note that the same sequence of charges is retained in this section as in *Comm.* I.1.1, and that the charges are also addressed in this order in Xen. *Ap.* 11-21 (as opposed to Pl. *Ap.* 24C-28A, where they are treated in reverse order).[93] In what follows, the charges of impiety and corruption of the youth will be discussed separately.[94]

The impiety charge actually encompasses the first two related charges as they appear in the indictment, i.e. not recognizing the state gods and introducing new deities.[95] In general, citizens were left alone if they fulfilled their public religious obligations, did not declare dissenting beliefs publicly, or made an attempt to convert another citizen to another religion, and the existence of the democracy and the presence of resident aliens acted as a mitigating influence against religious bigotry.[96] In Socrates' case, it was not so much the notion of not worshipping the state gods in the traditional way but the notion of a private oracle which was potentially subversive,[97] and this explains the reaction of the dicasts in Xen. *Ap.* 14 (q.v.). It should also be borne in mind that, in responding to the charge of irreligion, Socrates was by no means required to declare himself as a selfless adherent to a state-controlled orthodoxy: Since the state religion had no official theological dogma, Socrates' indictment had nothing to do with any notion of 'heresy' as such, nor was it

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disappeared, but it seems that the γραφὴ ἀσεβείας on which the impiety charge was based had wide applicability; in fact, few prosecutions of this nature actually took place. The types of punishment for ἀσέβεια included death, exile, expropriation, fine, imprisonment (applied infrequently), and loss of civic rights (Phillipson 215-16 & 222).

[93]Vrijlandt (pp. 86-88) observes that both Xen. and Plato preface their refutations of the charges with a recapitulation of the indictment, and feels that the altered order of charges in Pl. *Ap.* 19B further detracts from Plato's overall credibility. Taylor ([1911] 6: see Wilamowitz [1919] 2:47) believes that Favorinus is not a reliable witness for the indictment and that it is likely that Xen., because of his absence, consulted the official records while Plato reported the charges in the order in which Socrates brought them up during the trial. Note too that Xen. and Favorinus speak of introducing novel divinities while Plato speaks only of recognizing them.

[94]See too Appendix C for additional remarks on καινὰ δαιμόνια. Phillipson (p. 212) holds that the death penalty applied to the impiety charge only, and in *Ep.* 325B Plato gives impiety alone as the reason for the accusation (as opposed to Polycrates, who seems to have focused only on the corruption charge).

[95]For discussions of the connection between the main charges themselves, see Reeve 75, Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 36-37, Derenne 155, Maier 478, McPherran 119, Taylor (1919) 1 ff., and Burnet (1924) 102-104; Bonner (p. 170) and Vrijlandt (pp. 98-99) feel that the connection is unjustified. Reeve (p. 97: see too Morgan 17) speculates that either or both charges might have been connected in some way to the publication of Critias' *Sisyphus*, and it should perhaps be added that the subject of ἀσέβεια comes up in Aeschines' *Alcibiades* (see Dittmar 121).

[96]Phillipson 216-18 (see also Kraus 73, Wilamowitz [1919] 1:157-58, Maier 490-91, Parker 210, and Guardini 27-28). In general, the distinction between the state and its religion was very fine indeed (consider, for example, the quasi-divine personification of the Laws in the *Cri.*), and not worshipping the gods in the traditional way put the entire city at risk (Chroust [1957] 49).

[97]See Vlastos 293-97, Gomperz [1924] 158-59, and Waterfield 35. Parker (p. 216) cites Plato's disapproval of the establishment of private shrines in *Lg.* 909D-910D.

an offense to disbelieve the traditional myths.[98] It is important to recall that there was no "letter of the law", that is, what constituted impiety, for example, was what existed in the minds of the dicasts on any given day.[99] In effect, any citizen could bring a γραφή against another, hence the bringer played the roles of both prosecutor and chief witness, a fact which made Meletus in a sense the final authority on what his charges meant and made Socrates' goal during the cross-examination an attempt to discredit him as a witness. In short, Socrates' primary concern was to answer the charges as they were interpreted by Meletus and not the written charges as explicitly identified by the law (Reeve 86).

Although it is clear from both Xen. and Plato that Socrates held a non-traditional view of the gods,[100] it is never explicitly stated in either account of the trial that he did not believe in the traditional myths, a matter which he approaches quite aggressively by referring in Xen. *Ap.* 11 to his conspicuous practice of participating in public rituals and in §24 to his exclusive worship of the Olympians, and less persuasively in Plato through the weak *reductio ad absurdum* in *Ap.* 24C ff. and by the reference to the sun and the moon (versus the major gods) in *ibid.* 26D. It seems clear that Socrates did indeed acknowledge the traditional gods, particularly Apollo,

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[98]See Phillipson 281, Taylor (1919) 15, and Chroust (1957) 26-27. It is interesting to consider Plato's consummate artistry in comparing Socrates' transcendent piety with the ritualistic fanaticism of the seer Euthyphro: Though personally sympathetic with Socrates' plight, the type represented by Euthyphro in fact represents the driving force behind the charge (Chroust [1957] 27), and it is quite likely that Socrates disbelieved the traditional stories about the gods precisely because of the way in which they were being treated by men like him (see *Euthphr.* 6A for Socrates' attitude towards myths). Taylor ([1919] 17 ff.) maintains that the real basis for the impiety charge was Socrates' association with foreign Pythagoreans, a view disputed by A. Ferguson (p. 157 ff.).

[99]McPherran 119 (see too MacDowell [1978] 199-200, Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 119, and Reeve 85). Reeve (p. 86) notes that the prosecutor combined the roles of prosecutor and witness, and the γραφή the qualities of both affidavit and charge: This makes Socrates' arguments directed towards Meletus 100% relevant (as well as his efforts to discredit him).

[100]McPherran (p. 272) describes the "Socratic reformation" as "that moral cleansing of the Homeric deities which frees them of those various unsavory characteristics that make them less than perfect exemplars for us imperfect mortals", and Guardini (p. 218) as follows: "In all this [sc. Socrates' revolutionary emphasis on insight as the proper basis for any action] there appears a new standard of validity and a new ethos determined by it. Instinct, the authenticity of the established order of things, the authority of tradition, the power of irrational religious experiences and the wisdom of symbols lose their reassuring and binding force. They are opposed by the capacity for personal responsibility, resting on insight into the nature of things and the duty of objectivity - an attitude, therefore, which is based on a mind become aware of itself and master of itself." Gomperz ([1924] 153-54) cites the following passages as evidence for Socrates' scepticism regarding the Olympians: *Nu.* 423, *Euthphr.* 6B-C, *Phdr.* 246C-D, *Ti.* 40E ff., and *Epin.* 984D, and he also points out that the so-called proofs for Socrates' belief in the traditional gods in Pl. *Ap.* 27C ff. and *Comm.* I.1.5 are rather weak and ultimately based on the reference to δαιμόνια in the indictment, not on the Olympians themselves (see too Gontar 100). McPherran (p. 77) cites the following as additional evidence for Socrates' attention to ritual: *Phd.* 61B, 118A, *Smp.* 176A, 220D, and *Euthd.* 275C-D; other references to Socrates' orthodox religious behavior appear in *Euthd.* 302A-303A, *Mx.*. 243E-244B, *Phdr.* 229E, and *Comm.* I.1.2, I.1.19, I.2.64, IV.3.16-17, IV.6.4-6. He further notes (p. 140) that Socrates had a household shrine dedicated to Apollo Patroos (see *Euthd.* 302C-D) and would have taken any number of civic oaths in the course of his life. As Arnim (pp. 17-18: see too Riddell xxviii) observes, all of the Platonic Socrates' actions are motivated by religious concerns, and the same could certainly be said of Xen.'s Socrates (see, for example, his rebuttals to the charges of non-conformity in religious practice in *Ap.* 11-13 and *Comm.* I.1.2-20).

in some way: He refers Xen. to the Delphic oracle before Cyrus' expedition (*An.* III.15), and there are numerous references to Apollo in both defense speeches (Xen. *Ap.* 12, 14-15 and Pl. *Ap.* 20D ff., 28E-29A). That the Platonic Socrates is willing to lay down his life to pursue his god-inspired mission is convincing evidence of his piety (Phillipson 304), and the Xenophontic Socrates' unpreparedness directly results from dutifully obeying the daimonic voice.

Examples of famous impiety cases are listed by Dover ([1976] 24-25).[101] The controversial Decree of Diopithes (the only reference to which appears in Plu. *Per.* 32.2) was aimed at τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας, though Dover (p. 47 ff.), because of the questionable validity of most of the primary sources, has taken issue with the long-held opinion that an intellectual witchhunt took place in Athens of this period.[102] Socrates would have nevertheless been inevitably associated with the atheistic Anaxagoras through his brief interest in physical science and through his association with Archelaus, and a bigoted Athenian would have presumably considered Protagoras et al. ἄθεοι by taking the part for the whole, that is, having new beliefs would be considered equivalent to having no beliefs at all.[103] As a result of this public attitude, Plato's Socrates seems only to foster confusion in *Ap.* 26C ff. about Socrates' philosophical antecedents since these new beliefs were associated with atheism, and although the atheism charge should have

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[101] See too Parker 207 ff. Later ἀσέβεια cases against philosophers involved Stilpo, Theodorus, Aristotle, and Theophrastus (Maier 491 n. 2).

[102] Dover (1976) 47 ff. Dover (pp. 39-40) questions the historicity of Diopithes' decree because of its language and its notable absence in other authors and suspects that, if indeed fictional, it shows the influence of Demetrius of Phalerum and the Peripatetics. Reeve (p. 80) lists the following reasons for being sceptical about the existence of Diopithes' psephism: 1) Socrates was charged by γραφή, not by εἰσαγγελία, and 2) the Amnesty of 403 had gone into effect. He also holds that it could not have formed the basis for the prosecution against Socrates in particular because 1) Plutarch is the only source, 2) it would have been virtually nullified by the legislation of 403, and 3) it provided for an εἰσαγγελία, whereas Socrates' prosecutors proceeded against him by an ordinary γραφή (see *Euthphr.* 2A). Reeve (pp. 81-82), however, believes that Diopithes' εἰσαγγελία was doubtless replaced by the less cumbersome form of a γραφή during the law reforms since, with the exception of treason, most were. In any case the decree would have served as a precedent: Since it outlawed as atheistic any naturalistic explanations of meteorological and astronomical phenomena, it is likely that more general charges of atheism could still be made after the amnesty (Brickhouse and Smith [1989] 32).

[103] See Phillipson 298 and Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 34-35. In considering Pl. *Ap.* as a whole, Derenne (p. 147 ff.: see too Phillipson 313) concludes that the prosecutors did in fact bring up the Aristophanic charges of "scientism" and sophism, associating the former with the impiety charge while linking the latter to the corruption of the youth. Vlastos (ch. 6 *passim*) comments at length on Socratic reason vs. religion, observing no real contradiction between the two: "Thus in Ionian *physiologia* the existence of a being bearing [the name of 'god'] becomes optional. What is mandatory is only that to have a place in the real world a deity must be naturalized and thereby rationalized, associated with the orderliness of nature, not with breaches of its order, as it continued to be for the vast majority of Greeks" (p. 159). Vlastos gives little credence to the teleological arguments in *Comm.* I.4.1 ff., IV.3.3 ff., and to other references to Socrates' interest in speculative philosophy (pp. 161-62: see too D. Morrison [1987] 16) and notes the following: "[Socrates'] gods can be both supernatural and rational so long as they are rationally moral." He therefore produced a "moral theology" instead of the Ionians' "natural theology" (p. 162), and this moral philosophy would have seemed just as revolutionary as the physicists' views (p. 166). In general, diviners, seers, oracle-givers and poets are all media, not sources, and require some sort of rationalizing, since knowledge derives from application of one's reason; this must also surely apply to Socrates' dreams and sign (pp. 167-71).

been treated only cursorily because of its groundlessness, he feels compelled to devote an inordinate amount of time to refuting it.[104]

References to the charge concerning the introduction of καινὰ δαιμόνια appear in Xen. *Ap.* 12-13, *Comm.* I.1.3, I.6.2-3, and Pl. *Ap.* 26B ff. Xen.'s Socrates figure counters the charge by comparing his daimonic voice with accepted forms of divination (§12 ff.: cp. *Comm.* I.1.3) and by stating in §24 that the prosecution has in no way proved that he recognizes any non-traditional gods. In light of the additional remark on this matter provided by Plato in *Euthphr.* 3B, namely, that Socrates is considered a "maker of new gods", it seems best to accept Xen.'s words at face value and identify the καινὰ δαιμόνια of the indictment with Socrates' daimonic voice.[105] That Socrates protested against the lack of evidence concerning the corruption-of-the-youth charge (see Pl. *Ap.* 33C ff.) but did not do so in speaking of the impiety charge would support the thesis that the daimonic sign, the existence of which Socrates freely admits, was the cause of the latter (Phillipson 277); another clue perhaps lies in the Aristophanic Socrates' pre-Socratic conception of the word θεός (see *Nu.* 247 ff.).[106] The genius (and weakness) of the accusation lies in the prosecution's use of an ambiguous phrase (such as "religious innovations" in English) which could range in meaning from an abstraction to something more concrete,[107] and it is interesting to note that Xen.'s Socrates interprets it as meaning the former, while Plato's Socrates

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[104]Reeve (p. 82) believes that Socrates' concern about the atheism charge (in §18C, for example) must indicate that there was such a law on the books. That the impiety charge is connected to atheism is expressed clearly by Meletus himself in Pl. *Ap.* 26C, and since practice and belief are two sides of the same coin, Xen. must have also understood the charge in the same way (see Brickhouse and Smith [1989] 31 and McPherran 119-20: see too *Comm.* I.1.5, where the indictment seems to be interpreted as referring specifically to atheism). According to Feddersen (p. 10), the sole surviving words of Theodectes' ἀπολογία (εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν;) seem to show that atheism was not the issue as it is in Pl. *Ap.*

[105]See Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 35, Phillipson 275, 285 ff., Hackforth 68, Wilamowitz (1919) 156 ff., and Arnim 58 (see too Chroust [1957] 236 n. 119 and McPherran 159 for their more general remarks).

[106]The fact that Socrates does not directly address the impiety charge has troubled a number of scholars who interpret it as being either the result of the vague impiety law (see Brickhouse & Smith ([1989] 33-34) or an implicit admission of guilt (Taylor [1919] 9, Derenne 168, and Reeve 83); Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 33-34) remark that Socrates was nevertheless quite willing to dispute points of law regarding the Arginusae affair in Pl. *Ap.* 32B-C. Allen (p. 15) attributes his inability to defend himself adequately to his professed ignorance concerning the nature of piety and virtue as exhibited in the *Euthphr.* and *Men.*, respectively.

[107]See Appendix C. Burnet ([1924] 114) equates the δαιμόνια in the indictment with the δαιμόνια πράγματα in Pl. *Ap.* 27C. Popper (p. 165) maintains that the vagueness of the charges can best be explained by the prosecution's real intention of silencing Socrates for having educated Alcibiades & Co., while Taylor ([1932] 107-109) states that, since the irreligiosity charge had nothing to do with heresy, with disbelief in conventional mythology (or in that of Homer and the poets), or with Socrates' daimonic sign, Meletus' charge was more or less meaningless. The very nature of the case was perforce vague: Dover ([1976] 25 & 41) notes that ἀσέβεια was a widely applied term and generally signified some "variation of religious procedure", and that, to be the victim of a γραφή at Athens, "it was not necessary to have committed an act which was forbidden by law in so many words". The next recorded example of a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας involves the courtesan Phryne (see Ath. 590D-591F), who was indicted ca. 350 on a charge of introducing new divinities. Demades and Aristotle were also accused of kainotheism, which according to two late sources (J. *Ap.* 2.267 and Serv. *A.* 8.187) was proscribed by law (see Parker 214-15).

uses up a considerable amount of his time allotment in linking it with gods, demi-gods, etc., combining, in effect, both impiety charges into one.[108] To the authorities, communion with an unauthorized δαιμόνιον would have allowed Socrates to dispense with the usually recognized means of ascertaining the divine will, hence the charge that the daimonic voice, in motivating Socrates' anti-democratic behavior (as countered in the *Schutzschrift*), posed a threat to the democracy.[109]

Finally, it should be recalled in considering the background of the impiety charges that Athens was in a period of religious flux, with new cults such as those of Sabazius, Cotytto, Bendis, and Adonis having been recently introduced from the East, and that religious quackery (in the form of the Ὀρφεοτελεσταί and ventriloquial prophets) was rife (Phillipson 10: see too Parker ch. 9 and Morgan 15-21 for more general assessments). McPherran (p. 26) mentions the following elements as contributing to the contemporary religious atmosphere: 1) the ritual-focused household and civic religion of the polis, 2) the story-focused religion of traditional poets, 3) popular mystery cults such as that of Eleusis, 4) the sectarian practices and beliefs of groups such as the Orphics, 5) the Pythagorean blend of philosophy and religion, 6) the religious reflections of playwrights like Sophocles, 7) the more criticial probings of literature instanced by some of Euripides' characters, and 8) the new and influential intellectualism of the natural scientists and sophists.[110] It is important to note Parker's comment (p. 215) that "individuals or groups could establish new cults...only with the authorization of the people [i.e. the assembly]", but that, on the other hand, there is no evidence for official approval of Asclepius and

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[108]Gomperz (1924) 144. This is a difficult problem: Opposing viewpoints are represented by Chroust ([1957] 48), who points out that, since no allusion to the daimonic sign in this respect is made in Pl. *Ap.*, it was probably not an issue at the trial, and by Hackforth (p. 84), who states that "the silence of Pl. *Ap.* [concerning καινὰ δαιμόνια] loses its difficulty if we assume that the truth about the δαιμόνιον was known when he wrote it". Neither of these two arguments is very cogent, however, and I feel that the problem of discrepancy loses its difficulty if we take Plato's approach as part of his larger effort intentionally to obfuscate Socrates' religious beliefs in the Meletus dialogue to avoid addressing the impiety charge directly, which he must have considered irrefutable. This would also imply that he had a different and perhaps deeper understanding of Socrates' sign than did Xen., and would explain the absence in Plato of Xen.'s emphasis on Socrates' participation in public sacrifices. Why one author differed from the other can perhaps be explained by his individual relationship with Socrates and more generally by the striking diversity among the Socratics in their interpretation of their master's ideas.
[109]See Phillipson 288-89, who notes elsewhere (p. 218) that the Athenians were nevertheless allowed to have private altars at home and to perform sacrifices there. Note too that the notion of the gods' omniscience represented in *Comm.* I.4.19 prevents the possibility of any transgression going unnoticed.
[110]According to McPherran, Socrates' moral theory was influenced by the last five factors mentioned. Parker (p. 200 ff.) believes that the mutilation of the Herms in 430, the profanation of the Mysteries in 415, and widespread scepticism towards divination in general might have contributed towards creating public unease during the period in question; he adds (p. 206) that five of the persons convicted for impiety in 415 were associates of Socrates, a fact which might have played some role in the trial. Morgan (pp. 21-31) describes the possible influence of new religious developments on Socrates and concludes the following (p. 30): "Adapting these [imported cathartic] traditions, together with his unique method of sophistic examination and rational inquiry, Socrates develops a rational revision of ecstatic ritual based on the conviction that human beings can attain divine status."

other deities (p. 216).[111] On the one hand, the charge of not recognizing the state gods had no real basis since there were far more conspicuous examples of heterodoxy at the time, and there is no record of any prosecution initiated on the grounds of repudiating the traditional myths (Phillipson 203 & 217: see too Parker 203). On the other hand, Gomperz ([1924] 152 & 157-58) points out quite rightly that the impiety charge is understandable when we consider *das weltbildende Daimonion* described by Xen. (see the comment on §5) and quotes Hegel in saying that the impiety charge marked a transition from the belief in oracles to an awareness of individual conscience. In this sense Socrates was indeed guilty.

In *Men.* 92E ff. Anytus intimates that any decent Athenian gentleman is capable of teaching the young, to which Socrates replies that such a person is not necessarily successful at it (cp. Pl. *Ap.* 24E ff. and *Prt.* 324D). This attitude forms the basis of the Xenophontico-Platonic Socrates' opinion on education, namely, that it should be entrusted to experts, not to laymen (see the comment on §21 below), and it also forms the basis of the corruption-of-the-youth charge, since Socrates was by all accounts known to have a following of young men, often the sons of wealthy citizens (most notably Critias and Alcibiades), who frequently associated with him,[112] and it would seem that the term νέοι would apply to anyone under the age of thirty (see

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[111]The steps involved in the official acceptance of a new deity involved an initial epiphany of some kind, popular support, a petition to the government for implementation of the required changes, and approval by the relevant god or gods via an oracle (McPherran 132-33).

[112]In *Grg.* 485D, for example, Socrates is described as habitually whispering with three or four young men in a corner, and Derenne (p. 156 & note) feels that the prosecution surely brought up Critias and Alcibiades as concrete examples of the corruption charge (see the comment on §11 for the possible effects of the amnesty of 403 on the judicial proceedings). For references to the corruption charge in Plato, see *Ap.* 23C-D, 24C-26A, 33A, 33D-34A and *Euthphr.* 2C-3B. While Gontar (p. 99) might be going a bit too far in claiming that the *Euthphr.* can be seen as a work written to express Socrates' support of filio-piety and as a rebuttal to the *Clouds*, there were, of course, powerful religious sanctions supporting respect for one's elders, an attitude which is quite evident in Socrates' shock at Euthyphro's actions (see Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 37). It should be noted in addition that the purely exploitative motives of Alcibiades as represented in Xen. do not agree with his portrayal in Plato.

Toole (pp. 4-5) has conveniently set out the relevant references in Xen. and Libanius as follows:

> ὁ Σωκράτης καθιστᾶ τοὺς νέους...
> - ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀσεβεῖς (*Ap.* 19, *Comm.* I.2.2, Lib. *Ap.* 43)
> - οἰνοπότας (*Ap.* 19, *Comm.* I.2.22)
> - ὑβριστὰς καὶ παρανόμους (*Ap.* 19, *Comm.* I.2.2, I.2.25, Lib. *Ap.* 43, 103, 112)
> - μαλθακοὺς καὶ φυγοπόνους (*Ap.* 19, *Comm.* I.2.2, I.2.25, Lib. *Ap.* 13, 127)
> - σπατάλους καὶ λαιμάργους (*Ap.* 19, *Comm.* I.2.2, I.2.25)
> - ἀκολάστους (*Ap.* 19, *Comm.* I.2.2, I.2.25)
> - ἀπειθάρχους εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς (*Ap.* 20, *Comm.* I.2.49)
> - ἱεροσύλους καὶ κλέπτας (*Ap.* 25, *Comm.* 1.2.62, Lib. *Ap.* 13, 103, 112)
> - ἀνδραποδιστὰς (*Ap.* 25, *Comm.* I.2.62)
> - περιφρονητὰς τῶν νόμων, μισοδήμους καὶ προδότας τῆς πόλεως (*Ap.* 25, *Comm.* I.2.29, I.2.63, IV.4.11, Lib. *Ap.* 13, 48, 54).

Comm. I.2.35 and I.2.31 ff. in general for Critias and Charicles' edict forbidding Socrates to converse with young Athenians).

A comparison of both defense speeches leads one to conclude that, as in the case of the impiety charge(s), Socrates must have actually dealt with the corruption-of-the-youth charge in the course of his interrogation of Meletus (Hackforth 109-10). The defense offered by each Socrates figure is rather disappointing: Unless the accusation concerning disobedience to one's parents can be considered an exception, the lengthy responses as they appear in the *Schutzschrift* are entirely lacking (see Essay C), and this Socrates (as opposed to Plato's, who takes the initiative throughout the dialogue) only brings up the corruption matter passively in response to a well-founded point made by Meletus. The Platonic Socrates is certainly the more impressive debater of the two, but the argument for his innocence, i.e., that he who harms others also harms himself, is unconvincing and could in fact be used to justify any criminal behavior whatsoever.[113]

In short, Xen. does not deny the corruption charge but attempts to explain it; Plato maintains that the prosecution had no clear basis for the accusation, which in effect removes Plato from all consideration in attempting to arrive at any conclusions on this point.[114] In referring his alleged role in corrupting the youth back to the vague charges of the indictment (see *Ap.* 24B-C and *Euthphr.* 3A-B), Plato's Socrates seems to be avoiding addressing the question directly, and whereas he would have no doubt won the sympathy of some of the dicasts through the prosecutors' inability to clarify their vague charges, there is still no explanation for why (and how) they pressed these charges in the first place. This makes Pl. *Ap.* all but useless in trying to determine what the actual grounds for this charge were (see Gomperz [1924] 140-41). Plato's argument is essentially a non-argument.

Did Socrates in fact encourage his followers to turn to more knowledgeable and authoritative sources than their elder relatives in certain cases? Gomperz ([1924] 139 n. 1) notes that they seem at any rate to have used his elenctic techniques on their elders (see *Comm.* I.2.40 ff. and Pl. *Ap.* 23C, 39C-D), and we must conclude in this case that Meletus' Polycratean charge in §20 must hold at least some truth, since Xen.

P.J. Rhodes (ap. Stokes [1997] 11) states that in classical Athens there was no other official accusation of corrupting the youth.

[113]Gomperz (1924) 140 n. 1. Gomperz further observes on the same page that...*diese Verteidigung [gegen Meletos] hält sich...durchaus im Allgemeinen und Formalen.* His conclusions about the corruption-of-the-youth charge appear on pp. 138-39. Phillipson (p. 326) believes that this charge involves Socrates' doctrine that no one errs intentionally.

[114]*Grg.* 521E-522B seems to indicate that the corruption-of-the-youth offense was ethical rather than political (Hackforth 75: see also Anytus' statement in Pl. *Ap.* 29C). The words of the Laws in *Cri.* 53C are also relevant in this respect: ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύς ἐστιν σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι.

would have had no other conceivable reason for yielding on this point to the prosecution.[115]

11. ὦ ἄνδρες: Plato's Socrates also addresses the dicasts as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι while reserving the appellation ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί for those who vote to acquit him (see Pl. *Ap.* 40A and the comment on §24).

τοῦτο μὲν πρῶτον θαυμάζω Μελήτου κτλ.: MacDowell ([1962] 208-10) lists and discusses eight more or less contemporary Meleti, a number of whom he is willing to consider as being identical persons.[116] For our purposes, it is only important to consider if the Meletus in Xen. *Ap.* can be identified with the prosecutor who participated in the impiety trial against Andocides (*de Myst.* 94) which occurred around the same time as the proceedings against Socrates (see Blumenthal 175 ff.), or with the tragedian of the same name mentioned by Aristophanes (*Ra.* 1302 and frr. 117, 156, 453 Kassell & Austin)[117] and identified with Socrates' accuser in a scholion on Pl. *Ap.* 18B.

Whatever is to be learned about the prosecutor of Socrates (*PA* 9830) can be gleaned from the following sources: Xen. *Ap.* 11-21, Pl. *Ap.* 23E-28A, *Euthphr.* 2A-B, D.L. 2.38-40, 2.43, Lib. *Ap.* 2, 29, 33, and D.S. XIV.37.7. On the basis of these passages, we arrive at the following composite picture: The name of Meletus' father (*PA* 9829) was also Meletus (D.L. 2.40), and he himself hailed from the deme Pitthus (*loc. cit.* and *Euthphr.* 2B). According to Socrates' description in the *Euthphr.*, he had long hair, a patchy beard, and a hooked nose, and although Meletus was young and unknown at the time of the trial, it was he who officially brought the indictment against Socrates (*loc. cit.*, Pl. *Ap.* 24C, and D.L. 2.38-40), though in collaboration with Anytus and Lyco (for whose actual participation in the trial, see Lib. *Ap.* 2). All three prosecutors represented individual groups which had grievances towards Socrates, with Meletus in particular representing the poets (Pl. *Ap.* 23E and Antisthenes ap. D.L. 2.39). In spite of Meletus' prominent role in the sources, it seems to have been Anytus who provided the impetus for the indictment.[118]

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[115]Note in particular that an expanded version of the disobedience charge appears in *Comm.* I.2.49-55, and that, as Gomperz ([1924] 132) observes, Xen. surely would not have used the same material twice unless it were substantially true.

[116]Sixteen Meleti of the fifth and fourth centuries BC are listed in Osborne and Byrne's *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* (vol. 2 p. 302).

[117]Aelian (*VH* 2.13) reports that Aristophanes was bribed by Socrates' enemies, including Meletus and Anytus, a chronological impossibility. The Meletus identification in *Frogs* is problematical (see Dover [1993] 350).

[118]See Xen. *Ap.* 29-31, Pl. *Ap.* 18B, 29C, 30B, 31A, D.L. 2.38, and Lib. *Ap.* 29, 33. Zeller ([1954] 191) observes that Anytus and Meletus cannot easily be seen as paragons of the type of traditional public morality formerly exemplified by such men as Miltiades and Aristides.

According to Diogenes Laertius (2.43) and Diodorus Siculus (XIV.37.7), Meletus was put to death by the Athenians after Socrates' execution as the result of widespread public remorse.

In spite of the great number of articles which treat the problem of the multiple Meleti in great detail,[119] the identity of Socrates' prosecutor rests, as Blumenthal (p. 170) himself points out, on one unsatisfactory piece of textual evidence, i.e., *Euthphr.* 2B, a passage in which Meletus is described as being "young" and "unknown" (νέος...καὶ ἀγνώς).[120] MacDowell's arguments ([1962] 208-209: cp. Kahrstedt 503) against identifying this Meletus with the tragedian and Andocides' prosecutor of the same name are as compelling as they are succinct: 1) If our Meletus was young and unknown in 399, he could not have been the same person as the tragedian mentioned in Aristophanes' *Farmers* (produced ca. 424 B.C.),[121] and 2) although it is tempting to connect the tragedian with the fanatically religious accuser of Andocides (see Taylor [1949] 158 and Blumenthal 174-75), the latter can be ruled out for similar reasons, that is, if Andocides' prosecutor had been directly involved in the Leon of Salamis affair, he would not be described in the *Euthphr.* passage as unknown, and Socrates would not fail to mention him in Pl. *Ap.* 32C, where he refers to his own participation in this event.[122] It should be added that the fact that Socrates' accuser acted on behalf of poets (Pl. *Ap.* 23E) does not prove that he (or his father of the same name) was a poet. Dover (*Lysias* 80 n. 80) objects to MacDowell's assertion ([1962] 209) that "Sokrates's colleague in 404 could not have been unknown to him in 399" on the following grounds: 1) MacDowell's statement presupposes that Andocides' allegation of Meletus' complicity in the Leon affair is literally true, 2) Socrates' failure to mention Meletus in Pl. *Ap.* 32C is not a convincing argument since it is at least possible that Socrates did not meet the other four men involved in the affair, and 3) Socrates' words in *Euthphr.* 2B do not necessarily imply that he did not know Meletus at all. These are reasonable objections, yet they bring us no closer to making

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[119]See, for example, Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 27-29 and Blumenthal 169 for overviews of the pertinent scholarship.

[120]Derenne (pp. 124-26) believes that Socrates' statement is ironic, and prefers to identify Meletus with the playwright.

[121]According to Wilamowitz ([1919] 2:47-48), if Meletus' father was also named Meletus, then both were probably tragedians, and it was in fact the father who was named in Aristophanes' *Farmers* (and also probably in *Frogs*); Wilamowitz also believes that Meletus the accuser probably wrote the *Oedipodia* mentioned in Aristophanes' *Storks* (see the scholion on Pl. *Ap.* 18B). The scholiast also states that in *Farmers* Aristophanes called Meletus a lover of Callias (see MacDowell [1962] 208), and it would be interesting to make some connection in this respect between this Meletus and Callias' half-brother Hermogenes, the given source of Xen. *Ap.*

[122]Blumenthal (p. 174 ff.) proposes that Meletus might have prosecuted Andocides as a means of restoring a reputation already tarnished somewhat by his own complicity in the misdeeds of the Thirty, i.e. the arrest of Leon (And. *de Myst.* 94) and the embassy to Sparta (*HG* II.4.36), and that, if Andocides' trial came before Socrates', Meletus' religious fervor might have attracted Anytus' attention. Blumenthal elsewhere (p. 172) strongly supports the identification of the two prosecutors, pointing to the paucity of Meleti and the infrequency of impiety trials during this period.

a positive identification. In sum, due to the scanty evidence and the relatively large number of contemporary or near-contemporary Meleti, *any* identifications are problematical, and for reasons of provenance, lineage, and probable familiarity to Socrates through public notoriety, MacDowell ([1962] 209: see Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 27-29) concludes that Socrates' prosecutor should be treated as distinct from the other seven Meleti on his list.

Whether he spoke alone at the trial or together with Anytus and Lyco, Meletus, as the one who had submitted the indictment, had to conduct the case himself and to submit to questioning by the defendant.[123] If he conducted the case in concert with the other two prosecutors,[124] he nevertheless would have spoken first as the nominal prosecutor (Phillipson 267) and would have concerned himself with the indictment proper, while the other two prosecutors could have dwelled on the political charges and on more general insinuations (Riddell xv).[125] Meletus' speech does not seem to have been particularly cogent, since he would have surely paid a fine for not garnering enough votes if he had not been assisted by the others,[126] though Phillipson (p. 310) recalls that Meletus was a poet and therefore a person who was likely to have better-than-average verbal skills. In general, although neither Meletus figure is fully characterized, what little we see of him does not seem entirely congruent, and it would be best, perhaps, to consider him as a convenient type representing the current prejudice towards Socrates (A. Ferguson 170). It should also be noted that each Socrates figure does his best to make Meletus seem foolish, an effect diminished somewhat in Xen.'s version by Meletus' trenchant rejoinder.

Much has been said about Meletus' being tongue-tied by the amnesty of 403,[127] but the nature of the Athenian courts was such that there was in fact nothing

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[123]See Riddell ix. For the legal basis for the Meletus dialogue, see Pl. *Ap.* 25D and D. *contra Steph.* II.10; see too Riddell xviii-xix. Meletus is mentioned in *Comm.* IV.4.4 & IV.8.4 as the author of the indictment; in *Comm.* I.1 the accusers are simply called οἱ γραψάμενοι (Breitenbach 1891). Toole (p. 7) believes that each Socrates figure's address to Meletus probably has a literary forerunner in Palamedes' address to Odysseus in Gorg. *Pal.* 22. Bonner (p. 175) notes that it is unique to Pl. *Ap.* that the prosecutor is forced to reply under compulsion by the jury.

[124]As seems clear in Pl. *Ap.* 36A-B. See Lofberg's article, in which he contests the thesis that Pl. *Ap.* does not supply a complete account of the trial and that it is a reply to only one of his accusers and to only half of their argument.

[125]I would here add a remark made by Gomperz ([1924] 140 n. 3: see too Vrijlandt 88-91), who finds it rather puzzling that Plato has Meletus behave like such a hapless oaf in Pl. *Ap.* 24D ff. while Xen. has him raise such an incisive objection in *Ap.* 20 (see the relevant comments in Appendix B).

[126]See Derenne 151-52, who bases this opinion on Pl. *Ap.* 35A-B and generally questions the verisimilitude of the Platonic account (p. 167). Derenne (p. 151) adds that, unlike the Platonic Socrates, the real-life prosecutors apparently spoke oratorically (17B-C), persuasively (17A), and patriotically (24B: Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν). Note too that, although the elenctic method is mentioned in *Comm.* I.4.1, it is not used on Meletus by Xen.'s Socrates.

[127]See, for example, Taylor [1949] 162. MacDowell ([1978] 47) sums up the major provisions of the amnesty, which was not completed till 401/400, as follows: "No law passed before 403/2 was valid henceforth unless it was included in the new inscriptions made in the years from 410 to 403; no uninscribed law was to be enforced; no decree could override a law; and no prosecution could be brought henceforth for offenses committed before 403/2." For more information and a bibliography, see Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 32 n. 113.

to have prevented Meletus et al. from mentioning, at least obliquely, any or all of the unofficial charges which appeared later in Polycrates' Κατηγορία (see the comment on §20) as long as they did not appear specifically in the wording of the indictment, which alone would have had to conform to the restrictions of the amnesty.[128] This seems to be reflected in some of Socrates' statements in court: for example, in his denial of having instilled quite specific types of dissipation in his followers (Xen. *Ap.* 19) and in his response to the accusations of his earliest accusers (Pl. *Ap.* 18B-20C).

ὅτῳ ποτὲ γνοὺς: A seemingly clumsy construction which prompts Marchant to propose ὅτῳ ποτὲ τρόπῳ. Thalheim supports it by referring to *Cyr.* I.3.5.

ἐπεὶ θύοντά γέ με ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων βωμῶν: Dover (*Clouds* xlv) nicely sums up Socrates' religious attitude as follows: "The Socrates of Plato and Xenophon is not only a pious man, who participates in the observances of the society in which he lives...but displays an unwavering faith in the reality of the gods...and the providential government of the universe."[129] The Xenophontic Socrates elaborates on the theme of sacrificing in *Comm.* I.3.3 (cp. *ibid.* I.4.2 and *Oec.* 2.5), where he places his sympathies squarely with the common man who, like him, cannot afford lavish offerings to the gods: θυσίας δὲ θύων μικρὰς ἀπὸ μικρῶν οὐδὲν ἠγεῖτο μειοῦσθαι τῶν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα θυόντων.

The stress in Xen. *Ap.* 11 seems to be on public sacrifices, which is quite understandable since Socrates would want to emphasize the more public aspects of his behavior. Why, then, does Plato's Socrates seem to downplay his attention to public ritual?[130] Shero (p. 110) suggests that each author probably focused on those aspects of Socrates' life with which he was best acquainted, and I would suggest that Plato's more intimate knowledge of Socrates' heterodox religious beliefs did not allow him to present his master in such an orthodox way. Again, at least some of the discrepancies existing between Xen. and Plato can be explained away quite reasonably as resulting from their respective relationships with Socrates and from their familiarity with different aspects of his thinking and everyday behavior.[131]

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[128]See Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 37, Derenne 156, and Parker 207.

[129]For more on Xen.'s treatment of Socrates' religious beliefs in general, see *Comm.* I.4.2-18 & IV.3.3-17. As Derenne (p. 153) remarks, *...il leur [les accusateurs] était impossible de soutenir que l'accusé ne pratiquait pas les usages du culte public et privé* (but see Vlastos 290-91).

[130]But see, for example, *Phd.* 118A: Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα (see too the comment on §10).

[131]Because of the inadequacy of the Platonic Socrates' treatment of the impiety issue (which, in its weakness and incompleteness of argumentation, undoubtedly would have caused the judges to conclude that Socrates did indeed believe in gods, but not in the state's gods), Arnim (pp. 83-86) finds it necessary to turn to the supplementary account in Xen. *Ap.* 11-13 and concludes that Xen.'s account must be more accurate in this case. On the other hand, Wetzel (p. 70) believes that the Meletus

καὶ αὐτὸς Μέλητος: Richards' suggestion ([1907] 109) κἂν αὐτὸς Μέλητος is attractive.

12. καινά γε μὴν δαιμόνια κτλ.: See the comment on §10.

λέγων ὅτι θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται σημαίνουσα ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν: Note the strong emphasis in Xen. on the strictly aural aspect of τὸ δαιμόνιον[132] and, as in Plato, on the association of Socrates with the Delphic oracle (see the reference to Delphi at the end of this section). Other similarities with Pl. *Ap.* include a brief acknowledgment of the mantic aspect of the daimonic voice in §40A (ἡ...εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου) and Socrates' condescending approach to Meletus in demonstrating that the latter has been completely mistaken about the nature of Socrates' religious beliefs.

Hackforth (p. 95) is no doubt correct in saying that Xen. would not have been such a strong admirer of Socrates if the latter had been completely sceptical about the traditional forms of divination.[133] Examples of Socrates' belief in divination appear in Pl. *Ap.* 30A, 33C and *Comm.* I.1.5-9, I.4.15, and he describes himself as a μάντις in *Phd.* 85B and *Phdr.* 242B. Although he recommends divination to his followers (*Comm.* IV.7.10), he believes that it should only be employed to determine things outside the human sphere (*ibid.* I.1.6-9) and that such things cannot be manipulated by human agency (*ibid.* I.1.15).

13. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο δαιμόνιον καλῶ: See Appendix C.

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dialogue in Xen. *Ap.* lacks credibility 1) because there is no movement to the dialogue and Socrates' words could just as easily appear in a continuous monologue, and 2) because both Meletus and Socrates speak as if the accusations are being aired for the first time. In spite of these problems, Xen.'s account is probably largely accurate, an example of μεγαληγορία derived, perhaps, from information provided by the authors mentioned in §1.

[132]The noun φωνή does not play such a large role in Pl. *Ap.* (see 31D, for example). As Vrijlandt (pp. 78-79) comments: *apud Xenophontem Socrates in causa defendenda - iusto ergo loco! - de daemonio quod vox erat loquitur.*

[133]See, for example, *Eq.Mag.* 9.9 (my thanks to B. Dunsch for bringing this to my attention). Joël (1:75-80) believes that, in contrast to Xenophon, Socrates himself put little faith in the efficacy of divination, and states accordingly (1:89) that *...sokratisch ist alles, was im xenophontischen Bericht neben die Mantik gestellt ist, in Wahrheit ihr feindlich gegenübersteht: das* δαιμόνιον, *das Berufswissen, die Selbsterkentniss.* McPherran (p. 175 n. 1) lists the forms of divination as follows: 1) divination by lots, 2) interpretation of signs, and 3) the production and interpretation of oral oracles by a seer (μάντις), while Beyschlag (p. 508 n. 2) cites as contemporary evidence for the decline of divination S. *OT* (?ll. 707-709: no specific reference is given), Th. II.54, V.103, VIII.1, and *Euthphr.* 3C.

ὥς γε μὴν οὐ ψεύδομαι κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχω τεκμήριον κτλ.: That Socrates' daimonic sign is always truthful and, by implication, more accurate than the other forms of divination mentioned would seem to be well substantiated by his friends' apparent willingness here to testify on his behalf, yet neither Xen. nor Plato gives a specific example of any distinctly clairvoyant quality of τὸ δαιμόνιον which benefited them, that is, the emphasis seems to be not so much on the nature of the information conveyed but rather on *how* it is conveyed to him (see Appendix C). Contextually, this section is framed by the mention of the Pythian priestess at the end of the preceding section and by the reference to Apollo in the following. The Delphic god, then, who knows everything (cp. *Comm.* I.3.2), passes this information along in advance (προσημαίνειν) to whomever he wishes. The issue of clairvoyance comes up again in §30 (q.v.), though in a different context.

In general, this section is not concerned with rebutting the atheism charge but with emphasizing Socrates' special status among men, a position which only increases the megalegorical tone of the speech as a whole (see Gigon [1946] 224 and Arnim 60 ff.).

14. οἱ δικασταὶ ἐθορύβουν, οἱ μὲν ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς λεγομένοις, οἱ δὲ καὶ φθονοῦντες, εἰ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν μειζόνων ἢ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνοι: As Gomperz ([1924] 158-59) points out, it was not so much the fact that Socrates did not worship the state gods in the traditional way but the notion of a private oracle which was controversial, and this explains the reaction of the dicasts in this section.[134] The passages in Pl. *Ap.* relating to θόρυβος concern

1) Socrates' unforensic style of speaking (17C-D: ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου δι' ὥνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ...μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα),
2) the possible effects of his report concerning Chaerephon on the dicasts (20E-21A: καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· ....καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες),[135] and

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[134]According to Vrijlandt (p. 140), any intention to upset the dicasts seems more appropriate to Xen.'s characterization of Socrates: *Plato Socratem identidem facit orantem et rogantem urbane admodum et demisse iudices ne irascantur causidicorum in modum.* Fritz ([1931] 65 n. 1) notes that...θορυβεῖν *wird in keiner anderen Schrift des Xenophon für eine Bezeugung des Unwillens gebraucht,* and that θορυβεῖν is used more appropriately in Pl. *Ap.* to forestall any strong reaction from the dicasts, while in Xen. *Ap.* it points backwards towards an illogical conclusion about divine favor (p. 65). Note too Euthyphro's statement (*Euthphr.* 3C-D) that he is ridiculed in the assembly whenever he refers to his mantic powers.

[135]See too D.L. 2.38, where the dicasts' envy is also described.

3) his civil disobedience (30C: Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες).

Bers, who concludes that "dikastic θόρυβος" was quite common in Athenian courts,[136] defines it as "any vocal expression that one or more jurymen (δικασταί) direct to a litigant or other members of the jury panel", a phenomenon which was sometimes elicited, of course, by rhetorical manipulation of the jury. Bers (p. 8) also notes that, in Socrates' case as well, bystanders standing at the fringes of the proceedings would have undoubtedly contributed to the uproar. It should also be noted, however, that the fact that Socrates made a positive impression on the dicasts seems to be well demonstrated by the number of them who supposedly voted for his acquittal.

Cobet (ap. Thalheim) writes εἴ τις καί κτλ., and Schenkl (*ibid.*) παρὰ θεῶν καὶ κτλ.

Χαιρεφῶντος γάρ ποτε ἐπερωτῶντος ἐν Δελφοῖς περὶ ἐμοῦ: Little is known about Chaerephon (*PA* 15203). Xen. describes him as belonging to the Socratic circle (*Comm.* I.2.48) and as having difficulties with his younger brother Chaerecrates (*ibid.* II.3.1 ff.). That he was well acquainted with Socrates is borne out by the other Socratic sources.[137] Taylor ([1911] 12), who believes that, as in the case of Antiphon, the chief suspicion against Socrates was that he was the leader of an anti-democratic ἑταιρία, also believes (see too Winspear 83) that any reference to the democrat Chaerephon in Pl. *Ap.* 20E ff. would have been untimely since Socrates had stayed in the city during the rule of the Thirty, though, as Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 23) remark, Socrates' friendships both with the democrat Chaerephon *and* with notable oligarchs might have kept him from being tried any earlier.

πολλῶν παρόντων ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον: For references to Socrates as an ἐλεύθερος, see *Comm.* IV.5.2 ff., *Oec.* 1.17-23, 4.2-3, 10.10, 13.6-12, 14.9, and *Smp.* 1.10; to his δικαιοσύνη, see *Comm.* IV.4.1 ff., IV.6.5-6, IV.4.12,

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[136]Bers 1 (see too Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 211 and Riddell xvii n. 8). Justus of Tiberias (ap. D.L. 2.41) relates that Plato was also shouted down by the dicasts when he attempted to speak during the trial.

[137]Pl. *Ap.* 20E, *Chrm.* 153B-C, *Grg.* 447A-448C, 458C, Ar. *Nu.* 104, 144, 146, 156, 503, 831, 1465, *Av.* 1296, 1564, *V.* 1408, 1412, frr. 295, 552, 584, and Eupolis frr. 180, 253 (see too the scholia on Pl. *Ap.* 20E and *Nu.* 144). The question of Chaerephon's deme (see *Nu.* 156) is treated by Dover (*Clouds* 114-15).

IV.8.11, and *Oec.* 9.13, 14.2-10; and to his σωφροσύνη, see *Comm.* I.2.17-18, I.2.21-23, IV.3.1, IV.5.7, and *Oec.* 21.12.[138]

It seems likely that, due to the penury imputed to him in the primary sources, Chaerephon would have been forced to use the two-bean method of sortition at Delphi, a method which resulted in yes-or-no responses only.[139] The words πολλῶν παρόντων in this section support this (see Parke 250 and Reeve 29), though, as Guthrie ([1978] 3:406 n. 2) believes, the threefold response does not.[140] It has been suggested by Wilamowitz ([1919] 2:52) and Gomperz ([1924] 165 n. 1) that, since people queried the oracle out of necessity, not out of curiosity, Chaerephon's question was prompted by his interest in finding a good teacher, not in seeking confirmation of his own estimation of the man.[141] The crux of the Delphic problem rests in the motivation for the response: If it was delivered by the Pythia or a priest chosen to

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[138]For more observations on these three Socratic qualities, see my comments on §§3, 9, and 16. Note that these qualities are those which are also stressed in traditional encomia (see Essay C n. 6).

[139]See Vlastos 288-89. Stokes ([1992] 59-60) disputes the practice of cleromancy at Delphi.

[140]Schmid (3:1:240 n. 9) believes that Chaerephon in fact posed the Xenophontic version of the question because of the importance of these three concepts for the Socratics. General references to various scholars' conjectures concerning Chaerephon's visit to Delphi appear in Deman (p. 44 ff.) and Reeve (p. 30). Note that Chaerephon's question is ultimately a negative one (as the Platonic Socrates himself interprets it: see McPherran 212), and it is therefore quite understandable that the oracle could so easily answer it in the negative: Since the question required a yes-or-no answer, the oracle simply might have given Chaerephon the answer he wanted (see Wilamowitz [1919] 2:52-53 and Derenne 165). Gomperz ([1924] 165, n. 2) and Parke (p. 250) attempt to re-construct Chaerephon's actual question (see *Ap.* 21A for Plato's version: ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος), and the latter (*idem*) believes that it could indeed have been posed as an alternative question. The oracle's response as it appears in the scholion on *Nu.* 144 (see too Suidas s.v. σοφός) is as follows:

> σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης·
> ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος.

Apollonius Molo (ap. Schol. ad *Nu.* 144) states that this version is spurious: τοὺς γὰρ Πυθικοὺς χρησμοὺς ἑξαμέτρους εἶναι (see Vrijlandt 81, Montuori 68, and Parke & Wormell 2:170), and the reference to Euripides would be anachronistic unless the oracle occurred at a very late date (see below for the issue of dating). In the scholion on Pl. *Ap.* 21A it appears in a slightly different form, as does the version of Diogenes Laertius (2.37), who reproduces the second line only. Vrijlandt (p. 81), following Zeller, thinks that all quotations of the oracle are spurious. Reeve (p. 31) observes that the oracle's choice of Socrates as the wisest, if true, was in keeping with its tradition of honoring humility (see Strycker 42-43 and especially Parke & Wormell 1:384-85, who relate the story about the humble Myson of Oeta, who is judged by the oracle to be wiser than the haughty Chilon), and it should also be recalled that the spirit of the oracle, according to Plato, was that human wisdom is insignificant when compared with that of the gods, a fact which further widens the discrepancy in nature between Plato's and Xen.'s accounts of the oracle (see Stokes [1992] 57).

[141]See Reeve (p. 32), who believes that Chaerephon might have been impressed by Socrates' elenctic "wisdom", and J. Ferguson (p. 71), who holds that the question resulted from the furore created by the comic treatment of Socrates. Many attempts have been made to date Chaerephon's consultation of the oracle, including Reeve's (p. 21), which places it in the 430's with reference to Pl. *La.* 187D ff. See too *Chrm.* 153B, where Socrates is described as resuming his mission after his return from Potidaea in 432/1. For references to other scholars' attempts, see Reeve 21 n. 21, Taylor (1932) 78 & (1911) 140, J. Ferguson 70 ff., Phillipson 35, Parke & Wormell 1:401-402, Strycker 40-41, Stokes (1992) 52-54, and Gomperz (1924) 166 n. 2, who discusses attempts made to date the oracle on the basis of its *not* being mentioned in contemporary comedy. It is clear in any case that Chaerephon would have known Socrates by 423, the year in which *Clouds* was produced. (For Chaerephon's problematic role in the comedy, see Dover *Clouds* xcv-vii).

interpret her answer, either she or he was directly responsible for its content; if by lot, then we need not attribute the verdict to human judgment (Parke 249).

A number of connections between Socrates and Apollo appear in the primary sources: Socrates is said to have composed a poem to Apollo in *Phd.* 60D, he describes himself as a devotee of Apollo in *ibid.* 85B, he is compared to the Pythia in his advice to abide by each city's νόμος in *Comm.* I.3.1, and he is portrayed as discussing the Apollonian injunction γνῶθι σαυτόν with a follower in *Comm.* IV.2.24.[142] Joël (2:772-75: see too Parke & Wormell 1:387-89 for more general information) also links the Delphi story with the legends associated with the Seven Sages, whose wisdom was confirmed by the oracle. In any case, since he sent Xenophon to consult the oracle, Socrates apparently must have believed in it, and since he is prepared to call in Chaerephon's brother to bear witness for him in the matter (see Pl. *Ap.* 21A), it is unlikely that it was an invention of Plato intended to sway the Athenians.[143] In general, the oracular response would have had a stronger effect on the dicasts than his own allusions to a daimonic voice since the former was a recognized authority,[144] and political sympathies might also have played a role in the matter since both the oracle and Socrates were known to be pro-Spartan.[145] This latter view seems to be supported by the reference to Lycurgus in §15 (q.v.).

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[142]See too *Comm.* III.9.6. He is later said to have read these words himself on the temple wall at Delphi (see Arist. ap. Plu. *adversus Colot.* 1118C and ap. D.L. 2.23). That this famous gnome exerted a considerable influence on Socrates' philosophy is also well-attested by the other literary evidence (see *Nu.* 842 and *Alc. I* 124A-B, 129A, *Prt.* 343A-B, and *Phdr.* 229E-230A: see too Joël 2:774-75), and according to Diogenes Laertius (2.32), Socrates was also acquainted with the proverb μηδὲν ἄγαν. W. K. C. Guthrie (*The Greeks and Their Gods,* Methuen, London, 1950, p. 184, n. 1) also lists additional Delphic injunctions which seem appropriate to Socrates' *Weltanschauung*: θυμοῦ κράτει, πέρας ἐπιτέλει, ὕβριμ μείσει, εὔφημος γίνου, τὸ κρατοῦμ φοβοῦ, προσκύνει τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ ῥώμῃ μὴ καυχῶ, and γυναικὸς ἄρχε. Morgan (p. 15) comments that, "if historical, the tale [of Chaerephon] and Socrates' affinity with Delphi would establish Socrates' allegiance to the traditional gap between human achievement and divine status", a tradition which Morgan elsewhere (p. 18) defines as "Delphic theology", that is, as a theology "which viewed the gods as distant and powerful, and men as frail and endangered". See the comment on §10.

[143]Wilamowitz [1919] 2:53 (see too Taylor [1911] 140 and Derenne 166). Vrijlandt (p. 86) suggests that if, as Xen. tells us in reporting his version of the oracle, there were witnesses present when Chaerephon consulted the oracle, these might have included his brother Chaerecrates. Stokes ([1997] 115) believes that both accounts of the oracle are fictions because of 1) the fact that it only appears in these two contemporary sources, 2) the discrepancy between the two versions, and 3) the similarity between Plato's oracle-story and other oracle-stories.

[144]On the connection between the daimonic sign and Delphi in Xen. *Ap.*, Ollier (p. 86) points out that it would be not at all surprising that the gods would bestow their favor on a man for whom they professed such a high regard (see too Derenne 165: *Peut-être aussi les prêtres de Delphes avaient-ils pour le philosophe une estime particulière à cause de son respect pour l'oracle*). Cicero (*Div.* 1.54) speaks of the Athenians' reliance on the Delphic oracle, though their relations with the oracle were less than cordial during the Peloponnesian War (see Th. I.118.3), while the Spartans' ties to Delphi remained particularly close through the death of Lysander in 395 (see Parke & Wormell 1:192-93 & 203-208).

[145]Gomperz (1924) 167 n. 2 & 165 n. 3 (see too Strycker 43). I think that Bury and Meiggs (p. 580) go too far in suggesting that Delphi was trying to enlist Socrates' help against such figures as Anaxagoras.

A principal difference between Xen.'s and Plato's accounts of the Delphi incident lies in each Socrates figure's motives in bringing it up during the trial: Whereas Xen.'s Socrates uses it as a provocative means of rebutting the charge of impiety, the Platonic figure mentions it for the additional reason of explaining the real cause behind the prejudices of the "old accusers": his god-inspired mission to expose the ignorance of his fellow citizens.[146] Hackforth (pp. 89-93) has tried to discount the Platonic version as a fiction by pointing out two difficulties in the role of the oracle in the divine mission: 1) Socrates desired to prove it mistaken and 2) continued his mission after his wisdom had been substantiated,[147] which opinion is supported by the inconsistency in motives appearing in Pl. *Ap.* 33C and by the problem of the unexpectedly great importance attached by Socrates to the oracle. Gomperz ([1924] 163-64) finds it puzzling that Socrates would rely on an oracle when he already had direct access to the daimonic sign and that he would interpret the oracle's words to mean that he was destined to test the wisdom of others as a lifelong mission.[148] The significance of the fact that Xen., who in his Socratica presents many situations in which Socrates does in fact expose the ignorance of his interlocutors, does not make any reference to a Socratic mission cannot be overestimated in any consideration of this problem, and the absence of any mention of the oracle in general in any of the contemporary literature, including the other works of Plato, is nothing less than astounding.[149] In general, the accidental and incomplete quality of the incident raises

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[146]In Xen. the dicasts are to test Socrates as to the truth of the oracle, while in Plato Socrates distrusts it and sets out to test the oracle himself (Breitenbach 1889). The question of which came first, Socrates' reputation as a σοφός or the Delphic pronouncement on his σοφία, has led to an ongoing chicken-or-the-egg debate among various scholars prompted by the following question: Is the oracle to be understood as an impetus for, or as an affirmation of, Socrates' philosophical activity? Most fall on the side of the chicken, e.g. Wilamowitz ([1919] 2:52 & 64); for other views on the subject, see Taylor (1911) 141, Riddell xxiv, Elmore xxxiii, Daniel 84, Stokes (1992) 68-69, and Parke & Wormell 1:403. Hackforth (pp. 102-103) tries to resolve this issue by saying that Socrates' conversations, already well known, took a decidedly elenctic turn after he learned of the oracle's pronouncement, though I would add that Socrates had perhaps already earned a reputation for his ἔλεγχος if the word σοφός in the oracle can be interpreted as meaning δεινός (see *Comm.* IV.3.33). If Plato's account is in fact the true one, the oracle seemed to bring on a spiritual crisis in Socrates and to lead to his subsequent mission, i.e., to convince others of their ignorance and to persuade them to tend to their own souls (Taylor [1932] 78 ff.). Taylor expands on this elsewhere ([1932] pp. 139-40) by describing the goals of the Platonic Socrates' mission as being the attainment of a knowledge of existence as it really is and the ability to distinguish between good and evil: In short, δόξα must be replaced with true knowledge.

[147]See too Gomperz (1924) 164, Vander Waerdt 38, and Vrijlandt 82. Guthrie ([1978] 3:407) counters the former argument with the opinion that Socrates' mission does not entail disobedience to the oracle, i.e., he was merely trying to fathom its meaning. Vrijlandt (83) holds that Socrates' dissembling regarding wisdom seems contradicted by his knowledge of wisdom as expressed in Pl. *Ap.* 29D-E & 30A-B. Riddell (pp. xxiii-xxiv) believes that the reference to Delphi is a subterfuge used to conceal Socrates' real mission, which was to effect nothing less than an intellectual revolution, while Elmore (pp. xxxiii-xxxiv) maintains that the oracle was probably a Platonic literary invention used for compositional purposes, i.e., to mitigate the jurors' bias against Socrates and to anticipate the issue of impiety.

[148]More (pp. 38-39), also a sceptic *vis-à-vis* the Platonic version, explains the Socratic mission as having resulted from a profound disillusionment. See *Oec.* 2.16-18, where the Platonic Socrates' mission seems to be turned on its head.

many questions, and it seems just as doubtful that Socrates himself would have invented it as a rhetorical device (Elmore xxxiii-xxxiv).

The other principal difference beween the two authors concerns the oracular response itself. The Platonic version (see *Ap.* 21A) is as follows:

> ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ [Χαιρεφῶν] εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι.

The Xenophontic version is reproduced here for the sake of comparison:

> πολλῶν παρόντων ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον.

The wording is problematical in the Xen. passage: The adjectives ἐλευθεριώτερον and δικαιότερον are repeated and supported by examples in §16, whereas σωφρονέστερον seems at first glance to have been replaced by σοφόν. There have been various reactions to this: Arnim (p. 87) believes that there is a lacuna in §14, and Gomperz ([1924] 165 n. 2), Richards ([1907] 109-110), and Arnim (p. 87) want to add μήτε σοφώτερον after μήτε σωφρονέστερον so as to parallel the use of σοφόν in §16. Shero (p. 109 n. 9) takes σοφόν in §16 as a specification of σωφρονέστερον and believes that it is also possible that Plato's σοφώτερον, like Xen.'s σοφόν, represents a later interpretation of the oracle's meaning. In any case, the omission of the Platonic word σοφός in the Xenophontic version seems accounted for when the word later appears in §16.[150] The words πολλῶν παρόντων in Xen. *Ap.* would favor the bean method of divination mentioned above, though Montuori (p. 70) raises several strong objections to the possibility that there were onlookers present.[151]

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[149]See Stokes [1992] 55. Its historicity was questioned in antiquity (see Colot. ap. Plu. *adversus Colot.* 1116E ff. and Ath. 218E-219A, regarding the latter of which Vrijlandt [p. 81] notes: *Hic Athenaeus...recte observat Socratem nullius sapientiae, ut aiebat, sibi conscium fuisse*). Vander Waerdt (pp. 28-29) adds that, if the oracle was in fact consulted in the 30's, we would have to suppose that Plato's Socrates and Chaerephon kept it from public knowledge for over three decades, and because of this and the other reasons cited in my text above concludes that Xen.'s version represents his effort to correct the Platonic one.

[150]See Gomperz (1924) 165 n. 2 and Strycker 42; for more general comparisons, see Vrijlandt 79-80 and Schmitz 228 n. 20. Professor Halliwell resolves the problem by interpreting the first sentence of §16 (τίνα μὲν γὰρ ἐπίστασθε ἧττον ἐμοῦ δουλεύοντα ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμίαις;) as an expansion of σωφρονέστερον in the oracle, rendering the structure of the two sections as follows: §14 (ABC) <-> §16 (CAB). This can be supported, I feel, by the fact that Xen. switches from the three comparative adjectives to the positive-degree form σοφόν in the fourth question posed in the latter section. (See *Comm.* IV.8.1 & IV.8.11 for Xen.'s use of superlatives to describe Socrates.)

[151]That is, since the question and answer had to be submitted and received in writing when it involved anyone other than the questioner, since the written reply was sealed and handed to the questioner, and since anyone other than the person directly concerned risked losing his eyes, hand, or tongue if he learned of its contents, it becomes unlikely that the oracle could have been made and received πολλῶν παρόντων.

What, then, are the reasons behind the longer version of the Delphic pronouncement as related by Xen.?[152] Frick (p. 68) believes that Plato's account of the oracle must be the correct one since the notion of σοφία was an important one at the time due to the sophistic movement, while Chaerephon would have had no reason to inquire specifically about ἐλευθερία etc.[153] The discrepancy might also be due to the fact that Plato wanted to emphasize the one, more intellectual aspect of the pronouncement, i.e. the aspect most germane to his treatment of Socrates' mission.[154] Arnim (p. 88) suggests that all of Xen.'s adjectives appeared in the original oracle, but that Socrates focused solely on wisdom as being the most unbelievable while conceding the rest for the reasons cited by Xen. In this respect, most of the *Comm.* could be considered an elaboration on these three Socratic qualities. Conversely, Hackforth considers it likely that it is Xen. who exaggerated the oracle[155] and that, as a follower of Socrates, he was surely aware of its occurrence before he left Greece in 401. In any case, it is likely that Xen. is here borrowing from the Antisthenes source which he also used for *Smp.* 4.42-43, where the same qualities, especially ἐλευθερία, appear, his purpose being simply to reproduce the virtues as he found them in other Socratica.[156]

Whatever the reason for the longer version of the oracle, the effect seems to be quite calculated, as evidenced by the provocation that precedes it: Ἄγε δὴ ἀκούσατε καὶ ἄλλα, ἵνα ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῶν ἀπιστῶσι τῷ ἐμέ τετιμῆσθαι ὑπὸ δαιμόνων. The addition of the words πολλῶν παρόντων, the direct reference to Apollo, and the series of three adjectives can have only contributed to the pervasive

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[152]For a more general treatment of this question, see my remarks in Appendix B.

[153]And yet Xen. might have avoided using the word σοφός for that very reason (see *Comm.* I.6.13, where the sophists are compared with whores). Vander Waerdt (pp. 41-42) believes that Xen. has removed the word σοφία from the oracle's response because of its Platonic associations with ignorance while reaffirming his own interpretation of the term in §16, since "Xenophon construes the doctrine of the unity of virtues so as to admit a plurality of individual virtues each with its own distinctive sphere". For Xen., the term therefore encompasses all of the remaining virtues, including those mentioned in his tripartite version of the oracle (see *Comm.* III.9.5 and my comment on §16). Parke and Wormell (1:403) prefer Plato's version on the grounds that all later versions stress Socrates' wisdom, not his moral character (unless, of course, all later versions derive from Pl. *Ap.*, for which see *ibid.* 2:59 & 170).

[154]See Shero 109, Stokes (1992) 56, and Strycker 41-42. Note again, however, that for Xen. the term σοφία encompasses all of the other virtues. Arnim (pp. 87-88) maintains that Plato's version must be more accurate since his entire work rests on this as the basis for Socrates' mission, while in Xen. the oracle seems merely to complement the notion of divine favor seen in the daimonic voice. Fritz ([1931] 64-65) believes that (Ps.-)Xen.'s version derives from Plato since the forger's version is too verbose for a normal oracular response, while the Socratic-mission aspect of the oracle was too abstract for him to reproduce, hence its omission.

[155]Recall that Xen. himself was not averse to manipulating the oracle for his own purposes (*An.* III.1.4-7 and D.L. 2.49-50), and a yes-or-no oracular response would have made any authorial modification of it easier (Vander Waerdt 39-40).

[156]See Hackforth (pp. 18-21), who also rules out Xen.'s well-attested practice of self-borrowing in this particular case (p. 20 n. 1).

tone of μεγαληγορία in Socrates' speech before the dicasts,[157] and Xen.'s intentions can be taken to be at least partly literary, since the threefold version better motivates what follows and what he intends to say generally.

15. οἱ δικασταὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰκότως ἐθορύβουν: See the comment on §14.

Ἀλλὰ μείζω μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν χρησμοῖς περὶ Λυκούργου τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίοις νομοθετήσαντος ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ κτλ.: This story was well known in antiquity, and it remains to be considered why it is invoked here.[158] The conspicuous inclusion of the word νομοθετήσαντος seems intended to place Socrates squarely within the rank of Greek sages, reformers, and νομοθέται, an allusion which would seem to counter any notion that Socrates was an anti-democratic dissident by suggesting his desire to have order restored to the state after the recent internecine turbulence of 403. For all that, the comparison with the Spartan law-giver seems rather untimely.[159] Wilamowitz ([1897] 103 n. 3) sees this as a clumsy attempt to play on Xen.'s own pro-Spartanism, though he feels that Xen. himself would have rejected this comparison,[160] and I would add that Socrates' counter-productive and apparently disingenuous effort to calm down the dicasts by drawing their attention to the fact that he is not in fact divine can only be construed as yet another example of μεγαληγορία.

ἀλλὰ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον ἐπισκοπεῖτε ὧν εἶπεν ὁ θεός: Vrijlandt (pp. 91-92) compares this passage with Pl. *Ap.* 24C (τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἓν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν) and notes that *...ubi autem [Socrates Platonicus] 26B pergit, non singillatim crimina aggreditur, sed ea miscentur et contaminantur,* nor does Plato's

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[157]In great contrast to the Platonic Socrates' more self-effacing, if not ironic, interpretation of the oracle. Arnim (p. 88) points out quite correctly that even Socrates' reference to himself as σοφώτατος in §23B is not out of keeping with the relatively softer tone of Pl. *Ap.* See Appendix D.

[158]See, for example, Hdt. 1.65 and Plu. *Lyc.* 42B; Parke and Wormell (2:14) provide other references. Arnim (pp. 86-89) compares this passage with the reference to ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία in Pl. *Ap.* 20D and concludes that Socrates' reference to Lycurgus in this passage is probably historical.

[159]Keith Coe (ap. Vander Waerdt 31 n. 86) relates Lycurgus' martyrdom in Plu. *Lyc.* 39.3-5 to Socrates' own; note too that Socrates is compared in *Comm.* I.2.61 with Lichas the Lacedaemonian benefactor. Lincke (p. 712) sees Xen.'s reference to Lycurgus in *Ap.* 15 as a backhanded compliment to Athens: *Gar zu weit durfte doch Athen hinter Sparta nicht zurückstehen.*

[160]For other references to Lycurgus in Xen., see *Comm.* IV.4.15 and also *Lac.* passim, where the famous law-giver all but personifies the contemporary Spartan state. Nickel (pp. 26-27) notes, however, that Xen.'s philo-Laconism was certainly measured (see, for example, *HG* V.4.1 and *Lac.* 14.5 ff.: see too Breitenbach 1699), and that his praise of the Spartan system was obviously affected by his predominantly Spartan sources. (For other references to Socrates' admiration for the Cretan and Spartan forms of government, see *Comm.* III.5.14-28, IV.4.15, *Cri.* 52E, *Prt.* 342A ff., *Hp.Ma.* 283B ff., and Ar. *Av.* 1281.) Vrijlandt (p. 80) observes that Sphaerus of Bosporus (ap. D.L. 7.178) wrote three volumes entitled περὶ Λυκούργου καὶ Σωκράτους which probably had some connection with Xen. *Ap.* 15.

Socrates really answer the impiety charge. He observes in addition that ἕν ἕκαστον refers to the oracle in Xen., to the charges in Plato.

16. τίνα μὲν γὰρ ἐπίστασθε ἧττον ἐμοῦ δουλεύοντα ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμίαις; Socrates now elaborates on the ways in which he has fulfilled the oracle by dealing with each of the three adjectives in turn, beginning with ἐλευθέριος in the sense of ἐγκρατής.[161]

τίνα δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἐλευθεριώτερον, ὃς παρ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε δῶρα οὔτε μισθὸν δέχομαι; Socrates is not only internally free from the desires of his own body but also from any sort of external economic dependence on other citizens.[162] The remark about not receiving any gifts or fees seems contradicted by his statement in §17 (ὅμως πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐμοί τι δωρεῖσθαι), though one could draw a distinction here between the desire to compensate and the actual act of compensation.[163] In *Comm.* I.6.3 Antiphon faults Socrates for not accepting a fee (καὶ μὴν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις), stating that the impoverished condition that results from it offers little hope of material success to his followers. This is reiterated in *ibid.* I.6.5 (ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ [μισθὸν] λαμβάνοντι), where Socrates points out that not accepting a fee allows him to speak with whomever he wishes (cp. *ibid.* I.2.5-6 & I.5.6), and also in *ibid.* I.6.11 (οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττῃ), where Antiphon argues that Socrates apparently does not place any value on the time which he devotes to his philosophical activities.[164] Besides the many references to Socrates' poverty in Pl.

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[161]The importance of examining one's life is stressed in *Comm.* I.1.16 & III.7.9 (see too Pl. *Ap.* 38A). For references to the importance of ἐγκράτεια for Socrates' philosophy, see the comment on §18; for Professor Halliwell's remarks on the relationship between the three aspects of the oracle and their elaboration in §16, see n. 150.

[162]For a fuller treatment of ἐλευθέριος, see the comment on §9 above. Hackforth (pp. 38-40) holds that Xen.'s tendency to follow the λόγος Σωκρατικός genre caused him to add elements of drama and to embellish Socrates' justification of the oracle in this and the following sections, all of which is meant to suggest Socrates' *Todessehnsucht* in general.

[163]The question of compensation is certainly unclear (see D.L. 2.74, for example, where Socrates is described as accepting food and drink), and a similar vagueness applies to Socrates' activities as a teacher. See the comments on §§17 and 20 below.

[164]See too *Comm.* I.2.60, where Xen. portrays a Socrates who gives unstintingly of his time to citizens and foreigners alike, and whose association is exploited by others who in turn exact fees for what they have learned from the master for free. In *Comm.* II.2.6, on the other hand, hiring a suitable teacher is described as being one of the customary responsibilities of good Athenian parents, and in *ibid.* III.1.11 Socrates takes it for granted that one should accept fees for qualified instruction. Xen.'s criticism seems rather to be directed against the specific type of knowledge purveyed by the sophists, and the negative opinion of his Socrates towards them is quite clear (see, for example, *Comm.* I.6.13 and *Cyn.* 13.1 ff.). Guthrie ([1950] 66-71) arrives at the following commonalities among the sophists: 1) the teaching of ἀρετή, 2) a scepticism regarding the acquisition of absolute knowledge, and 3) its corollaries, namely, moral relativity and human action based solely on expediency. Guthrie (*ibid.*, p. 72: see Stone 40 ff.) concludes that Socrates combatted these points by combining them into a philosophical consideration, i.e. ἀρετή = knowledge, an awareness to be arrived at through inductive

Ap., the issue of his not accepting a fee is brought up on three separate occasions (in 19D-E, 31B & 33A-B: see too *Euthphr.* 3D), references intended, as in Xen., to distinguish Socrates' practices from those of the sophists. As in Xen., however, the distinction between fees and gifts remains very fine indeed.

δικαιότερον δὲ τίνα ἂν εἰκότως νομίσαιτε κτλ.: Socrates is here described as being δίκαιος in a sense best translated by "balanced" or "able to adapt oneself to the *status quo*", a meaning brought out clearly by the inclusion of the participle συνηρμοσμένου, and a quality of independent thought which can be understood as a Socratic pre-condition for all just behavior, including that pertaining to a good citizen.[165] In this particular sense it anticipates the description in §18 of Socrates' indifference to the conditions imposed by the siege of Athens and explains his indifference to prosperity or hardships in general.[166] Δίκαιος is similarly used to refer to Agesilaus' indifference to money (*Ages.* 4.1), while δικαιοσύνη is presented as being one of the true riches.[167] In closely related meanings δίκαιος is equated by Xen. with νόμιμος (*Comm.* I.2.24, IV.4.13, IV.6.5 and *Cyr.* I.6.27, II.2.14) and σώφρων (*Oec.* 9.13 & 14.3: see too *Cyn.* 12.17 and *An.* VI.1.3), and the common use of δίκαιος in the sense of "just" is also quite prevalent in Xen. (see his reference to Socrates in *Comm.* IV.8.11, for example).

σοφὸν δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἄν τις εἰκότως ἄνδρα φήσειεν εἶναι κτλ.: For the use of σοφός instead of σώφρων, see the comments on §14 above. The remainder of this sentence (καὶ ζητῶν καὶ μανθάνων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν) conforms to the meaning of the former, while the issue of Socrates' σωφροσύνη re-emerges in §18, where it is elaborated by examples (q.v.), in §19, where the adjective σώφρονος appears, and less directly in §29, where the dissipated behavior of Anytus' son is described. In general, the notion of σωφροσύνη is closely related to that of ἐγκράτεια.

Σώφρων has various nuances in Xen., but its fundamental meaning appears in *Comm.* I.2.23:

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argument and general definition. Taylor ([1911] 161-62) maintains to the contrary that Socrates' thought can be seen neither as a result of nor as a reaction to sophism *per se*.

[165]*Comm.* IV.2.11. The aspect of balance is well illustrated by the use of the word to refer to fair portions allotted to bees (*Oec.* 7.33) and to soldiers (*Cyr.* VIII.4.30). For Socrates' notion of a βίος δικαίως βεβιωμένος, see the comment on §3.

[166]See *Smp.* 4.42, where δίκαιος and εὐτελής are described as being closely related. Earlier in the dialogue (4.1 ff.) Callias playfully perverts this meaning of δίκαιος by suggesting that he improves his friends' moral behavior by giving them money, a practice which, he claims, prevents them from stealing. The effects of the presence or lack of money on public morality are also mentioned in *Vect.* I.1.

[167]*An.* VII.7.41. See too *Cyr.* VI.1.55, where it is opposed to πλεονεξία, and *Ages.* 11.3, where Xen. puns on its ambiguity. Its potential ambiguity is also revealed in Socrates' conversation with Euthydemus (*Comm.* IV.2.12 ff.), which eventually leads to the latter's ἀπορία.

πάντα μὲν οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἀσκητὰ εἶναι, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ σωφροσύνη. ἐν γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι συμπεφυτευμέναι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἡδοναὶ πείθουσιν αὐτὴν μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταχίστην ἑαυταῖς τε καὶ τῷ σώματι χαρίζεσθαι.

The lack of σωφροσύνη is associated with youth (*Comm.* I.2.26) and sexuality (*Ages.* 5.4 and *Lac.* 3.4 ff.), and σωφρονεῖν is frequently opposed to ὑβρίζειν (*Comm.* I.2.19, III.10.5, *Cyr.* III.1.21, VIII.1.30, VIII.6.16, and *Ages.* 10.2) and once to the adjective ἄφρων (*Cyr.* III.1.17). It occasionally appears connected with εὐσεβής or other similar expressions (*Comm.* IV.3.17 ff., *Oec.* 5.20, and *Cyr.* IV.1.6). It can indicate a sort of common sense or self-control which presupposes some measure of forethought (*Comm.* I.2.21, I.6.13, II.2.14, IV.3.1 ff., *Smp.* 4.26, *HG* II.3.34, IV.3.6, and *An.* V.8.24), and in a more negative sense refers to the obedient behavior appropriate to wives (*Oec.* 7.15) and slaves (*Oec.* 7.41 & 9.19), a meaning brought out far less ambiguously in the verb σωφρονίζειν.

Xen. frequently uses the adjective σοφός negatively because of its association with the noun σοφιστής, a meaning which would support the view that he intentionally omitted the adjective in his report of Chaerephon's question.[168] Σοφός in this sense appears in one of the Polycratean charges against Socrates in the *Schutzschrift* (*Comm.* I.2.52), in Antiphon's criticism of Socrates as being δίκαιος but not σοφός for refusing to accept fees (*Comm.* I.6.1 ff.), and in Xen.'s comparison of sophists and philosophers.[169] More positive is the use of the adjective as meaning "skilled", as applied, for example, to the divine δημιοῦργος[170] and to Prodicus, Lycurgus, and Daedalus (*Comm.* II.1.21, *Hier.* 1.1, and *Comm.* IV.2.33, respectively). Σοφία is described by Xen. as an ἐπιστήμη (*Comm.* IV.6.7) and as the opposite of ἀμαθία (*Comm.* IV.2.22), though it does not consist in mere book-learning (*Comm.* IV.2.9), and in its most positive sense is defined as a virtue which encompasses all others, including δικαιοσύνη (*Comm.* III.9.5: for Xen.'s concept of the unity of virtues, see the comment on §14). The adjectives σοφός and σώφρων are often closely linked (*Comm.* III.9.4).

ἐξ ὅτουπερ ξυνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα ἠρξάμην οὐπώποτε διέλειπον καὶ ζητῶν καὶ μανθάνων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν: According to my theory (see Appendix C and Pl. *Ap.* 31D), Socrates would have first begun to become aware of the daimonic voice during childhood.

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[168]See too Pl. *Ap.* 38C and *Euthphr.* 11C, where Socrates denies being intentionally σοφός. The reader should occasionally be reminded to allow for possible omissions or distortions due to Xen.'s reliance on Hermogenes' account.

[169]*Cyn.* 13.6 ff. For an example of σοφός meaning "clever", see *Hier.* 5.1, where the tyrant discusses the various threats posed to his rule by the ἄλκιμοι, σοφοί, and δίκαιοι.

[170]*Comm.* I.4.7. For its religious connotations, see *Ages.* 11.5, where it is opposed to ἀνόσιος, and *Cyn.* 12.16, where it is connected with θεοσεβής.

17. ὡς δὲ οὐ μάτην ἐπόνουν: Socrates praises φιλοπονία in *Comm.* I.2.1 & 56-57 (see too Pl. *Ap.* 22A). Chroust ([1957] 33-34), who detects a strong Antisthenian coloring in the preceding and following sections, defines Antisthenes' conception of πόνος (versus ἔργον, which denotes a more physical kind of toil) as involving the many strenuous tasks inherent in leading a virtuous life.[171] See the comment on Socrates' ἐγκράτεια in §18 below.

τῶν ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων[172]: The problem of imparting virtue is treated at great length by Plato's Socrates, who believes that, while virtue is knowledge, it cannot be instilled in any traditional manner (see *Men.* 91B-D).[173] The acquisition of knowledge/virtue is therefore to be understood simply as a recollection (ἀνάμνησις) of knowledge acquired in previous lifetimes, and the teacher's role consists in stimulating, not inculcating, a pre-existing virtue through the process of dialectic.[174] Ἀνάμνησις also plays some part in Xen. (see *Oec.* 15.1 ff.), but it is quite clear in the Socratic writings that his Socrates figure does in fact believe in the teachability of virtue and uses every opportunity to instill his values in his followers in a traditional manner. Very few of the short dialogues in the *Comm.*, with the possible exception of the dialogue in IV.2, could be described as aporetic.

In *Comm.* III.5.7 ff. Socrates' values are described as being rooted in the ἀρετή of his forefathers, a virtue which serves as the foundation for all well-run households and city-states (*ibid.* I.2.64); elsewhere (*ibid.* II.6.39) Socrates describes μάθησις and μελέτη as the bases for all ἀρεταί. Xen.'s notion of ἀρετή is difficult to distinguish from that of καλοκἀγαθία (see *Comm.* III.8.5), which, as induced from the relevant passages in the *Comm.*, has the following qualities: 1) self-reliance as the result of self-discipline, 2) specialized knowledge and a certain degree of education, 3) the ability to make good friends and to cooperate with people in general, 4) the ability to help friends and to harm enemies, 5) the ability to manage one's estate, 6) the ability to benefit and, if need be, manage one's country, and 7) traditional virtues such as wisdom, justice, self-control, and piety.[175] In general, Xen. tends to praise

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[171]Chroust (1957) 112. Chroust remarks elsewhere (*ibid.*, p. 153) that the Hesiodic line cited in *Comm.* I.2.56 later became a favorite of the Cynics because of their emphasis on πόνος, and that Xen. often uses this word in reference to Socrates.

[172]For similar formulations, cp. §34, *Comm.* IV.2.7, IV.8.11, and *Smp.* 8.41.

[173]The Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge has four immediate corollaries: 1) the unity of all virtue, 2) its capability of being imparted to others, 3) the belief that no one errs willingly, and 4) the paradoxical assertion that it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily (Adam [1894] xviii).

[174]See Taylor (1932) 146-50. Chroust ([1957] 119) notes that, according to Aristotle (ap. Stob. V.29[1].25 Hense), Socrates believed that virtuous parents bore virtuous children.

[175]Waterfield 60. The collocation καλοὶ κἀγαθοί is found as early as Herodotus (2.143) and Thucydides (IV.40.2 & VIII.48.6), and καλοκἀγαθία appears in Xen.'s Socratica all but synonymously

simple virtues such as trustworthiness (see *HG* 7.2.1 ff.), and there are certain passages which, though certainly consonant with Plato's characterization of Socrates, seem to reveal far more about Xen.'s own personality.[176]

πολλοὺς μὲν πολίτας..., πολλοὺς δὲ ξένων, ἐκ πάντων προαιρεῖσθαι ἐμοὶ ξυνεῖναι; Evidence for a Socratic circle appears in *Comm.* I.2.48, I.6.14, III.11.17, III.14.1 and *Phd.* 59B ff.[177] In the latter work these ἑταῖροι do not seem joined by any single philosophical doctrine, much less by a Theory of Ideas,[178] and Simmias and Cebes' ready assent to Socrates' line of argument probably has far more to do with recognizing affinities with Pythagoreanism than with sharing a common set of beliefs (Hackforth 162 ff.). Taylor[179] lists Socrates' friends and acquaintances as follows:

> *The Socratic "Circle"*: Those present at the deathbed included two Thebans, i.e. Simmias and Cebes, once students of the Pythagorean Philolaus (*Phd.* 59B-C: see too *Comm.* I.2.48), and two Megarian Eleatics, i.e. Euclides and Terpsion; Aristippus of Cyrene and Cleombrotus of Ambracia are mentioned as being absent.[180] The Athenian followers present included Apollodorus, Critobulus, his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Ctesippus, Menexenus, and "some others" (ἄλλοι τινές); Plato was absent because of

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with the word ἀρετή (see *Comm.* I.2.2, I.2.17, III.8.5, IV.8.11 and *Smp.* 8.27). Dover ([1974] 41 ff.) translates the expression as "both good to look at and manifesting goodness in action", whereby the purely aesthetic element is submerged in the usual moral application of the word (see *Comm.* II.6.30 and *HG* VI.1.2, for example). He adds that the widely used καλοὶ κἀγαθοί may have been used on occasion as a "class label" (see *Comm.* II.6.27, Pl. *R.* 569A, and Th. VIII.48.6), a common enough phenomenon among the upper classes in all ages and therefore of little social consequence. Glover (p. 174) expresses the concept nicely in the form of an analogy: The ideal of καλοκἀγαθία is to the individual what the ideal of σωφροσύνη is to the nation.

[176]See, for example, *Comm.* I.7, where ἀλαζόνεια is treated. Xen. reveals at times a surprising *naïveté* regarding human nature, particularly in the *An.* (see Higgins 92). In general, Xen.'s personality is characterized by his joy in a life led actively and especially by his will to resist unhappiness: As such, he can be considered a precursor of the Stoics (see, for example, his reaction to his son Gryllus' death as recorded in D.L. 2.54).

[177]Burnet ([1911] xviii) suggests that Xen.'s naming of the Socratic circle in *Comm.* I.2.48 seems to be borrowed from *Phd.* 59C, though Xen. spells Plato's "Phaedondes" in the Boeotian way. (Was he perhaps his personal acquaintance?) Note too that the followers listed are of all ages.

[178]Waterfield (p. 223) describes Socrates' relationship with his followers as a relationship between realized and potential goodness. To be sure, some were attracted to Socrates because they were entertained by the sometimes devastating results of his ἔλεγχος (Pl. *Ap.* 33C: cp. *R.* 539B), and according to Xen., Critias and Alcibiades associated with Socrates for all the wrong reasons (see *Comm.* I.2.15-17). For these and other reasons Lincke (p. 712) states that this section about Socrates' beneficial influence on his followers constitutes the main point of the entire work. On the question of Socrates' teaching, see the comment on §20; on Xen.'s conception of friendship, see the remarks on ὠφέλεια in the §34 comment.

[179]Taylor (1932) 75 ff. Gomperz ([1924] 166 n. 2) lists all of Socrates' *Gesprächspartner* as they appear in Xen. and Plato (see Delebecque 26 for the Xenophontic references only).

[180]Note that this acquaintance with men from enemy states presupposes his having met them before the outbreak of the war. On Socrates' acquaintance with Athenians and non-Athenians alike, Xen. states the following in *Comm.* I.2.60: ἐκεῖνος γὰρ πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητὰς καὶ ἀστοὺς καὶ ξένους λαβὼν οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας ἐπράξατο, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.

illness.[181] In addition to the ξένοι Simmias, Cebes, and Phaedondas, Xen. (*loc. cit.*) lists the Athenians Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, and Hermogenes as being Socrates' ὁμιληταί.

Other Friends and Acquaintances: Alcibiades; Plato's cousin Critias, his uncle Charmides, and his brothers Adimantus and Glaucon; the family of Cephalus of Syracuse, the father of Lysias; Aspasia (see *Mx.* and Aeschin.Socrat. *Asp.*); Callias (see Xen. *Smp.* passim); the circle of Cimon (see Aeschin.Socrat. *Milt.*); Nicias and the families of Thucydides and Aristides (see *La.* passim); and Damon of Oea, Pericles' teacher.[182]

If one bases one's opinion, as many have, on his complexity of thought, Xen. himself leaves the general impression of having stood at the periphery of, if not completely outside of, the group of Socrates' more intimate followers, and Xen.'s acquaintance with the philosopher would have been limited in any case by his youth as well as by his duties as a soldier.[183] Xen. was acquainted with Socrates from ca. 412 on and was possibly his follower from 404 to 401, the year of his departure to join the Cyreans.[184] Taylor ([1911] 194 n. 1) believes that Socrates did not take Xen. into his confidence because of the latter's youth and "the general superficiality of his character", a not uncommon assessment. Guthrie ([1978] 3:335) accounts for Xen.'s attraction to Socrates as follows: "Xen. honoured and respected intellectual ability, but all the more, we may suspect, when he saw it combined, as it was in Socrates, with high physical courage, a good war record and general contempt of danger."[185] Burnet ([1911] xvii-xviii) agrees that Socrates' military experience would have attracted Xen. and others in similar circumstances, and further remarks that his anti-democratic actions (e.g. in the trial of the admirals at Arginusae) would have also

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[181]Plato's family had long been acquainted with Socrates, and besides the reference in *Phd.* 59B, his name appears twice in Pl. *Ap.* (34A & 38B), where the priority of Plato's name and the contiguity of both his and Socrates' names seem to suggest a special intimacy (Hackforth 6-7: for a description of Socrates' relationship with Plato and his family, see Burnet [1911] xxvi ff). There is only a single mention of Plato in Xen. (*Comm.* III.6.1) and none of Xen. in Plato unless *Lg.* 694C ff. constitutes a criticism of the *Cyr.* (Anderson 29: see D.L. 3.34 for the supposed rivalry between the two Socratics).

[182]See *Alc. I* 118C and *La.* 180D. Agathon, Aristophanes, Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Alcibiades (already mentioned) appear as interlocutors in Pl. *Smp.*, and Diogenes Laertius (2.18 & 2.33) also makes Socrates and Euripides acquaintances. We can of course assume many other unattested acquaintances.

[183]See Derenne 73. Nickel (pp. 69-70) describes Socrates' influence on Xen. as being primarily orientational at this stage in his life.

[184]Pomeroy 21. Delebecque (p. 27) describes a seven-year "window" for Xen.'s relationship with Socrates (408-411), though these turbulent years were not favorable for participation in philosophical discussions. Compare the itinerant Xen. with Socrates, who steadfastly remained in his native polis. For the possible exclusion of Xen. from the Socratic circle, see Higgins 21 ff.

[185]In this respect Socrates shared much in common with Agesilaus, Xen.'s other hero (Higgins 82: cp. Xen.'s description of Cyrus in *An.* I.9 and *Oec.* 4.16 ff.). Xen. and Socrates could never have served together because of their age difference, however, and the accounts in Str. 403 and D.L. 2.22 of Socrates' rescuing Xen. at Delium are of course apocryphal.

appealed to them. Based on his general attitudes, it can be concluded that Xen. probably never considered Socrates to be a pure philosopher but rather an Athenian actively engaged in civic affairs (see Delebecque 207).

πάντας εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἥκιστ' ἂν ἔχοιμι χρήματα ἀντιδιδόναι: Pomeroy (p. 28) comments that the fact that Socrates qualified for hoplite service at Delium and Potidaea (Pl. *Smp.* 220E-221A) indicates that he was not impoverished all of his life, and she adds (apparently taking Aristophanes' characterization at face value) that by the composition of the second version of *Clouds* in 420-17 he was undoubtedly poor.[186] Libanius says that he inherited eighty minae and his father's trade as a mason or sculptor (*Ap.* 17: see D.L. 2.18-19), and it is possible that he gave up this trade to become a philosopher (see Pl. *Ap.* 31B).[187] In *Oec.* 2.3. he values his own property at five minae. He seems to have had later opportunities to enrich himself financially at the courts of various tyrants (see Arist. *Rh.* 1398A24 and D.L. 2.25), and we can assume that his dialectical/elenctic skills would have made his services quite marketable among the Athenian elite (*Comm.* I.2.60). The cause of Socrates' self-imposed poverty is given variously by Xen. and Plato: Where Plato's Socrates describes it as being an inevitable result of his complete devotion to his divine mission,[188] Xen.'s Socrates ascribes it to his refusal to accept fees for the many hours spent each day with his followers (*Comm.* I.6.1 ff. and *Smp.* 4.44).[189] Both accounts assume an unwillingness to curtail his philosophical activity. In defense of his condition Xen.'s Socrates focuses above all on the disadvantages of being wealthy (*Smp.* 4.29-33, *Oec.* 2.1 ff., and *Hier.* 4.8-9) and on the point that poverty is in fact only a superficial perception (*Comm.* IV.2.37 and *Smp.* 4.34-36). His opinion on the advantages of poverty can be best summed up as follows: τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἥκιστα μὲν ἐπίφθονον, ἥκιστα δὲ περιμάχητον, καὶ ἀφύλακτον ὂν σῴζεται καὶ ἀμελούμενον ἰσχυρότερον γίγνεται (Xen. *Smp.* 3.9).

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[186]See *Nu.* 103, 175 & 362 (see too *Oec.* 11.3, which refers to the Aristophanic portrayal). Socrates is ranked squarely among the δημόται and πένηται in *Comm.* I.2.58-60.

[187]Pomeroy (p. 28) also notes that contemporary sculptors could do quite well financially and refers, for example, to Davies on Praxiteles ([1971] pp. 286-90 no. 8334 Kephisodotos). Demetrius of Byzantium (ap. D.L. 2.20) says that Crito, who seems in some way to have filled the role of Socrates' benefactor (see, for example, *Cri.* 45B), took Socrates away from his workshop: Κρίτωνα δ' ἀναστῆσαι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαστηρίου καὶ παιδεῦσαι τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν χάριτος ἐρασθέντα. In any case, Xen.'s Socrates felt that he could at the very least rely on his friends to provide for his material needs (see *Oec.* 2.8).

[188]Pl. *Ap.* 31C (see too *Phd.* 68C). Edelstein (p. 152) provides the following list of Plato's references to Socrates' poverty: *Ap.* 23B, 30B, 31C, 33A-B, 36C, 37C, 38B, *Cra.* 384B, *Cri.* 45B, *La.* 186C, and *R.* 337D, 338B.

[189]In this respect, poverty can be considered to be true freedom, a quality which Antisthenes and the Cynics extolled beyond all others (Chroust [1957] 110: see too §16, where Socrates is described as a "free man").

ὅμως πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐμοί τι δωρεῖσθαι: For Socrates' teaching without accepting fees, see §16.

ἐμοὶ δὲ πολλοὺς ὁμολογεῖν χάριτας ὀφείλειν: For the Xenophontic notion of ὠφέλεια, see the comment on §34.

18. ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ: An apparent reference to the recent siege of Athens by the Spartans in 405-404 and perhaps implicitly to the travails suffered at the time by all Athenians alike, regardless of their individual differences.[190]

ἐμὲ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνευ δαπάνης [εὐπαθείας] ἡδίους ἐκείνων μηχανᾶσθαι: References to Socrates' frugal diet also appear in §19, *Comm.* I.3.5-7, I.6.4-8, IV.7.9, and D.L. 2.27 & 34 (see too Anderson 30-32). This passage is closely related in thought to the notions of ἐλευθεριώτερον and δικαιότερον in §16 as well as of σωφρονέστερον in §14, and represents a further expatiation on the oracle's meaning (see *Comm.* I.6.10, where τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι is described as θεῖον).[191] Socrates' simple habits are described at great length in *Comm.* I.3.5-15 (see too *ibid.* I.6.2, where they are ridiculed by Antiphon), and self-restraint in general is seen as being a necessary pre-condition for any serious spiritual pursuit (*Comm.* I.2.19-23 & IV.5.6: cp. *Phd.* 64D ff.), for any significant friendship (*Comm.* II.6.1 ff.), and for any important office or position of responsibility.[192] The notion of ἐγκράτεια, or self-restraint, is defined elsewhere (*ibid.* I.5.4 and *Smp.* 4.42) as the foundation of virtue and, implicitly, of καλοκἀγαθία.[193]

Xen.'s Antisthenes figure praises this concept at considerable length in *Smp.* 4.34-44, where §41 in particular is practically identical with the wording in the present passage, a fact which has caused many to suppose that Xen. used Antisthenes

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[190]See Vander Waerdt 31 and Ollier 106 n. 3. For other references to the hardships suffered under the conditions of war, see *Comm.* II.7 (especially §2), II.8.1, and II.10.4. Maier (p. 81 n. 1) remarks that the term μεγαλοψυχία as applied to Lysander and Socrates in Arist. *Ath.* 97B21 is defined as τὸ ἀδιάφοροι εἶναι εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ ἀτυχοῦντες.

[191]Wetzel (pp. 391-92) believes that *Comm.* I.2.1-8 is in fact based on *Ap.* 16 ff. and remarks further that these types of profligacy receive little or no attention from Plato.

[192]See *Comm.* I.5, II.1.2-7 and *Oec.* 9.11, 12.11-14 (see too Waterfield 277-78). The implication of the words in *Comm.* I.5.2, as in this section of Xen. *Ap.*, is that someone like Socrates himself is best qualified to educate the young (παῖδας ἄρρενας παιδεῦσαι).

[193]Other references include *Comm.* I.2.4-5, I.2.14, I.2.30, III.11.13-14, III.13.2, IV.5.11 and *Smp.* 2.3-4, and D.L. 2.25 deserves to be quoted for its relevance to *Ap.* 16: πολλάκις δ' ἀφορῶν εἰς τὰ πλήθη τῶν πιπρασκομένων ἔλεγε πρὸς ἑαυτόν, "πόσων ἐγὼ χρείαν οὐκ ἔχω." Jaeger ([1944] 2:53-54) believes that, since ἐγκράτεια first appeared in the writings of Xen., Isocrates, and Plato (see *R.* 430E, *Lg.* 840C, and *Def.* 412A-B), it is likely that it originated in the ethical thinking of Socrates at a time when the external authority of law had begun to break down. Note that for the Platonic Socrates the *motives* for temperate behavior are every bit as important as that behavior itself (see *Phd.* 68E-60C).

as a source.[194] In general, Xen.'s Antisthenes states that asceticism is the surest road to virtue and happiness and that self-sufficiency involves the suppression of all sensual desires.[195] Although the works of Antisthenes the Socratic are too fragmentary to allow for an extensive reconstruction of his ideas, it does in fact seem possible, as Chroust in particular suggests, to see a strong Antisthenian element in Xen.'s writing. Chroust's points are as follows:

> 1) The Xenophontic Socrates' ἐγκράτεια, or moral autarchy, was also one of Antisthenes' principal doctrines and a quality which Xen. emphasizes above all others ([1957] 108);
> 2) this doctrine receives little or no treatment in the writings of the other Socratics (p. 132);
> 3) the Cynic principle of living according to nature was understood to be the irreducible minimum necessary to sustain the simplest existence, a conspicuous quality of Xenophon's Socrates;[196]
> 4) according to Antisthenes, moral autarchy distinguishes the free man from the slave (see the comment on §9), and it also entails man's emancipation from all established laws, mores, and conventions (p. 109); and
> 5) with his πόνος/ἐγκράτεια doctrine, Antisthenes seems to have reduced Socrates to a practical and moralizing reformer, a description which certainly rings true of Xen.'s characterization.[197]

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[194]See Schanz 88-89, Joël 2:38-47, 2:561 ff., Busse 225, Marchant (1949) 963, Anderson 29-30, Breitenbach 1890, Ollier 59 n. 1, and Chroust (1957) 33-34 for their remarks on this passage. In general, Chroust ([1957] 106) believes that Xen. probably referred to the earliest Socratica, including Antisthenes' writings, and thinks that the references to Socrates' simple diet and physical hardiness, for example, derive ultimately from Antisthenian sources (*ibid.*, pp. 114-15 & 123, respectively). Guthrie ([1978] 3:347: see too Jaeger [1954] 27 and Gomperz [1924] 132 n. 1) thinks little of those who would ascribe to Antisthenes most of Xen.'s information concerning Socrates, and Vrijlandt's sobering comments on this issue certainly bear repeating:

> - *...non licet sine firmis argumentis perhibere Antisthenem a Xenophonte compilatum esse. Utrumque, et Antisthenem et Xenophontem, e Socrate hausisse magis credendum esse arbitror.* (p. 167)
> - *Pauciora de Antisthene, mea sententia, ad nos pervenerunt, quam ut ab hoc viro, tanquam ex fonte, Xenophon et Plato repeti possent.* (idem)
> - *Desinant viri docti pugnare ignotis dialogis. Desinant quoque omnia ex ignotis Antisthenis scriptis illustrare. Nimis lubrica illa via et incerta. Equidem expectandum esse arbitror dum plura innotuerint ex caecis illis scriptis.* (p. 134)

[195]See *Comm.* IV.5.9 and *Smp.* 4.37-38, where simple needs are said to lead to simple pleasures (see too Chroust [1957] 117 and the comment on §6). This is undoubtedly the best way to construe the paradoxical reference in this section to the pleasure to be gained by restraining the appetites.

[196]*Ibid.*, p. 144. See *Comm.* I.6.2: ζῇς γοῦν οὕτως ὡς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δεσπότῃ διαιτώμενος μείνειε. Chroust, who does not draw a sharp distinction between Antisthenes and the later Cynics, also notes (*ibid.* 109) that the latter considered Socrates to be a model of moral autarchy.

[197]*Ibid.*, p. 140. Joël (1:514 ff.) observes that *Comm.* I.2 & I.7 correspond to the Antisthenian pedagogical ideal that one should set an example for one's followers rather than discuss virtue in theory (cp. D.L. 6.1-19 *passim*).

It seems somewhat odd that Xen. the aristocrat should be so attracted to Antisthenes in constructing his description of Socrates, but Chroust (*ibid.* 131-32) plausibly holds that he was drawn mainly by the aspects of ἐγκράτεια, pro-Spartanism, anti-hedonism, φιλοπονία, and by the focus on the practical.

καὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων: A reference to both aspects of the indictment. Cp. *Comm.* I.2.61-64, where Socrates is described as deserving to be honored as a public benefactor. Wetzel (pp. 394-95: see too Vrijlandt 101-102) finds the influence of the Platonic Socrates' counter-proposal here (see Pl. *Ap.* 36D-37A).

19. ἀλλ' ὅμως σύ με φῇς, ὦ Μέλητε, τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύοντα τοὺς νέους διαφθείρειν; See the comment on §10 for a full treatment of the corruption-of-the-youth charge.

καίτοι ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν δήπου τίνες εἰσὶ νέων διαφθοραί κτλ.: This passage corresponds to the Platonic Socrates' challenge to Meletus to produce 'ruined youths' in Pl. *Ap.* 33C-34B.[198] Arnim (p. 91), who believes that nothing in Pl. *Ap.* contradicts Xen. *Ap.* 19-21, maintains conversely that the challenge to Meletus in Xen. *Ap.* 19 cannot be historical since we can conclude from Pl. *Ap.* 33A-B (in particular, from the words καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή) that the prosecution actually named examples of Socrates' ill-advised followers (e.g. Critias and Alcibiades), as did Polycrates in his later work: For this reason, the Platonic Socrates' challenge seems more accurate.

Note that the phrase ἐξ εὐσεβοῦς ἀνόσιον suggests that Socrates had also been accused, if only unofficially, of teaching his young followers to be impious (cp. Pl. *Ap.* 26B). While this refers back to the impiety charge in the indictment, the pairs of antonyms appearing in the remainder of the sentence refer directly both to the corruption charge and to the notions of σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, and similar virtues introduced earlier as elaborations of the oracle.[199] In *Comm.* II.6.17 ff. Socrates

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[198] According to Beyschlag (pp. 510-11), it is clear from this line that Xen. *Ap.* appeared after the *Euthphr.* (cp. §2C: τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς). Cp. too *Comm.* I.2.8: πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθείροι τοὺς νέους; εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστιν.

[199] Immisch (pp. 413-14) points out the particularly Xenophontic flavor of the rarely used adjectives εὐδίαιτος and οἰνόφλυξ, the latter of which foreshadows the description of Anytus' son in §31. For similar types of profligacy, cp. *Oec.* 1.22.

describes immoderate, self-serving behavior in general as being ultimately self-destructive,[200] and his views on σχολή are expressed in *ibid.* III.9.9.

20. σοὶ πείθεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς γειναμένοις[201] κτλ.: It seems at least plausible that Socrates is here responding to something which appeared in the original accusation (see Wetzel 71). The argument regarding the priority of expert opinion over that of one's parents shares much in common with Socrates' argument against the use of sortition to choose leaders in government[202] and with the general issue of filiopiety.[203] This subject is treated in *Comm.* I.2.49 ff., where Socrates compares a son's right to commit his deranged father to the right of the wiser to imprison the more ignorant[204] and again expresses the view (*ibid.* §53) that expert opinion should take precedence over the opinions of fathers and other relatives (cp. *Nu.* 1321 ff., where Phidippides challenges the right of his father to impose traditional values on him which have been rendered hopelessly old-fashioned by Socrates' teaching at the φροντιστήριον). The Socrates figures in both Xen. and Plato disavow any responsibility for the actions of their followers.[205]

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[200]However, he notes elsewhere (*Comm.* III.9.7) that what the public considers extreme behavior is only a question of degree.

[201]Γειναμένοις is a typically Xenophontic word which also appears in *Comm.* I.4.7 (Immisch 411).

[202]See *Comm.* I.2.9, *Plt.* 297E ff., and Arist. *Rh.* 1393B3 ff. (see too Gomperz [1924] 133). Note that Socrates refers in this section of Xen. *Ap.* to generals and speakers as well as to physicians (for the potential reference here to Anytus as a former general, see the comment on §29). Tejera (pp. 154-55) has described the authority-of-expertise argument as being sophistic, and Chroust ([1957] 58) observes that Socrates' anti-sortition stance is also in line with the sophistic position as set out in Δίσσοι Λόγοι 7. The topic of leadership is a common one in Xen.'s Socratic works, with the emphasis being placed above all on the importance of qualified leaders (*Comm.* III.5.5, III.5.15 ff., III.9.10-11, IV.2.2 ff. and *Oec.* 21), on the fact that there are few good leaders (*Comm.* III.5.21), and on the qualities of a good leader (*ibid.* III.1.6, III.2 & III.3.11). It should be noted in particular that Xen.'s Socrates figure (*ibid.* III.4.7-12) holds that the organizational skills of a good leader are transferrable to different types of leadership, and that no real distinction exists between leaders in the public and private spheres since those who are led consist of the same human material everywhere. From this perspective, Socrates could certainly be considered a leader in his own right.

[203]Cp. §§30-31 below. In spite of Derenne's observations to the contrary (p. 156), I do not see any remarks in Pl. *Ap.* which are directed expressly against an accusation that he taught the youth to disobey the law. The filiopiety theme certainly seems to be echoed, however, in the reference in *Cri.* 54B to the priority of the laws over one's own children, and in *Men.* 93A-95A Pericles and others are criticized, among other things, for their paternal failings (see too *Grg.* 515B-517C). For Platonic examples of the argument from expertise, see *Cri.* 46D-47D and *La.* 184D-E.

[204]Chroust ([1957] 63 & 149) again sees a Cynic/Antisthenic influence in this analogy (see D.L. 6.12). See too Arnim (p. 92), who believes that the entire argument is completely in line with Socrates' teachings.

[205]See *Comm.* I.2.24-28 and Pl. *Ap.* 33B. Socrates' influence seems evident in Alcibiades' verbal joust with Pericles in *Comm.* I.2.40 ff., and the philosopher's later reputation for having influenced Critias is demonstrated by Aeschin. *contra Timarch.* 173: ἔπειθ' ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην...τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκώς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν τὸν δῆμον καταλυσάντων.

Ὁμολογῶ...περί γε παιδείας· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσασιν ἐμοὶ μεμεληκός: Socrates' claim that he is an expert in education seems odd when one considers, for example, *Comm.* I.2.3 and Pl. *Ap.* 19D-20C, 23C-D, 33A-B, where he expressly denies it.[206] This problem can be resolved by interpreting Socrates' use of the word παιδεία to mean a type of longstanding συνουσία which eventually has a positive protreptic effect on his followers (see *Comm.* I.4); the word cannot be taken in a more formal pedagogical sense in light of Socrates' repeated protestations to the contrary.[207] For the Xenophontic Socrates' views on education in general, see *Comm.* I.1, IV.7 and below.[208] Xen. himself, though supportive of education, did not support institutionalized higher education, an element which is missing, for example, in the utopian picture of *Cyr.* I.2.6 (Charlton 89).

In what ways did Xen.'s Socrates hope that his followers would benefit from their association with him? or, less cautiously expressed, What did he hope to instill in them?[209] Εὐπραξία (*Comm.* III.9.14), the ability to maintain good health (*ibid.* IV.7.9), and the potential for becoming a good leader (*ibid.* III.7 and *Oec.* 13.3-5) are mentioned as important goals, and in general Xen. characteristically stresses the more

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[206]References to Socrates' teaching appear in *Comm.* I.2.17, I.2.31, I.6.13, IV.7.1-2 & *passim*. The non-didactic characterization in the passages from Pl. *Ap.* cited above (cp. *Men.* 84C-85B and *Tht.* 150C-151D: but see *Euthphr.* 3C-D) may have been motivated by Plato's antipathy towards the sophists (see Shero 109-10). D. Morrison ([1994] 205-207) remarks that the phenomenon of ἀνάμνησις in *Oec.* (e.g. 18.9-10) brings into question the whole issue of teaching: Can teaching actually occur if the pupil already possesses the information?

[207]As Reeve (pp. 163-66) notes, Socrates in essence denies that ἐλέγχειν is διδάσκειν. Joël (1:533) observes that Xen. intentionally avoids using language that would link Socrates with teaching (see, for example, his careful phrasing in *Comm.* IV.2.40), though this seemed to differ from later public opinion since, as Vrijlandt (p. 108) remarks, Socrates' followers are called μαθηταί, not ἑταῖροι, in Isoc. *Bus.* 5 (see too Aeschin. *contra Timarch.* 173). Wetzel (p. 393 n. 1), referring to *Comm.* IV.3.1, describes Socrates' teaching as involving *sowohl die Erziehung* (σώφρονας ποιεῖν) *als auch den Unterricht* (λεκτικοὺς καὶ πρακτικοὺς καὶ μηχανικοὺς ποιεῖν) (see too Vrijlandt 107, Beyschlag 501 and Gigon [1947] 170). In general, the Xenophontic Socrates' notion of παιδεία consists of investigating the practical aspects of life, while the Platonic Socrates' παιδεία has only one object: knowledge of the good.

[208]It is interesting to note that his ideas partly resemble those outlined in Plato's *Republic*, i.e.,

1) an enlightened self-interest which ultimately benefits the entire state (*Comm.* II.6.24-25 and *R.* 412D-E),
2) ongoing moral improvement as a pre-condition for holding positions of leadership (*Comm.* II.6.20 ff. and *R.* 519D-521B, 531D-534D, 540A-541B),
3) an emphasis on physical training (*Comm.* III.12 and *R.* 376E) and on training in the arts (*Cyr.* I.2.6 ff. and *R.* loc. cit.),
4) an emphasis on practical (*Comm.* I.1.11 ff., IV.7 and *R.* 519B-D) and military matters (*Comm.* III.5 and *R.* 521D-522E), and
5) no innovations in education once the system is in place (*Lac.* passim and *R.* 423D-425B).

[209]Caution is required, however. Although Xen. makes it clear that Socrates' followers profited from their association with him, it is by no means clear where Xen.'s Socrates stood on the teachability-of-virtue issue (see *Comm.* IV.4.5: εἰ μέν τις βούλοιτο σκυτέα διδάξασθαί τινα ἢ τέκτονα ἢ χαλκέα ἢ ἱππέα, μὴ ἀπορεῖν ὅποι ἂν πέμψας τούτου τύχοι, ἐὰν δέ τις βούληται ἢ αὐτὸς μαθεῖν τὸ δίκαιον ἢ υἱὸν ἢ οἰκέτην διδάξασθαι, μὴ εἰδέναι ὅποι ἂν ἐλθὼν τύχοι τούτου).

practical side of learning.[210] Above all, the aim of Socrates' association with his followers was for them to become good citizens (as defined in *Comm.* IV.6.14) and καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (*ibid.* I.2.48 & IV.7.1: see the comment on §9 and Jaeger [1944] 2:61). Fraudulence was absolutely unacceptable (*ibid.* I.7 and III.1), especially in the political sphere (*ibid.* III.6), and self-knowledge was the key to true political success (*ibid.* IV.2.26). In general, a distinct moralizing tone is typical of Xen.'s characterization of Socrates, while this remains largely implicit in the Platonica,[211] and we may conclude with Usher (p. 68) that, since Socrates was accused by two aristocrats and condemned by commoners, our Xenophontic Socratica contain only the more exoteric parts of his teaching.

Because of the controversial nature of the teaching issue, Socrates' methods deserve to be treated at some length. I believe that Jaeger ([1944] 2:62) is largely right in maintaining that Plato mostly shows the elenctic side of Socrates' teaching and Xen. the protreptic, though ἔλεγχος is certainly not lacking in the latter's writing: The encounter in *Comm.* IV.2.1 ff. between Socrates and Euthydemus represents by far the most detailed example in Xen. of Socrates' elenctic pedagogy, an approach which has been well summarized by D. Morrison[212] as follows:

1) an initial attempt to attract the addressee, followed by
2) a gentle teasing;
3) the repetition of the first stage with the addressee's growing interest;
4) finally, a one-on-one encounter and the beginning of the elenctic phase of the relationship;

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[210]See *Oec.* 15.6-9. Pomeroy (pp. 29-30) remarks that the portrayal of Socrates in the *Oec.* as a practical man has disturbed scholars, both modern and ancient (see Pomeroy 68 ff. for the assessment of the *Oec.* in antiquity). The sources for this portrayal lie in both the literary traditions of the Socratics and historical reality, but in any case everyday life in Athens and Socrates' own philosophical interests would have naturally caused him to investigate the nature of the οἶκος. Chroust ([1957] pp. 130-31) supposes that the Xenophontic Socrates' disdain for frivolous subjects (see too *Comm.* 1.1.11-16 & IV.7.1-10) must be Antisthenian in origin, and adds that this anti-intellectualism has no counterpart in Plato. In this respect, Socrates' sceptical attitude towards itinerant purveyors of special skills (see *Comm.* III.1) should also be noted.

[211]See D. Morrison ([1994] 191-94), who describes Socrates elsewhere (pp. 196-97) as a sort of moral "trainer" (in the Athenian sense). Aristotle (*Metaph.* 987B1-4) places the focus of Socrates' philosophical activity on ethics as well as on the importance of establishing definitions as the basis for dialogue.

[212]See Morrison (1994) 186 ff. for his treatment of this passage (see too *ibid.*, pp. 182-83 and Jaeger [1944] 2:63). Compare *Comm.* III.6, which differs from the Euthydemus passage only in that Socrates is mostly concerned with making Glaucon aware of his *ignorance* regarding politics, not so much of any false assumptions that he might bear. See too Dittmar's reconstruction of Aeschin.Socr. *Alc.* (pp. 125-28) for another perspective on Socrates' pedagogical techniques.

5) the addressee's recognition through ἀπορία of his ignorance, which makes him dependent on Socrates for a solution, yet Socrates intentionally continues to press the ἔλεγχος with the same results;[213]
6) further association with Socrates as the only means of becoming ἀξιόλογος;[214] and
7) final acceptance by Socrates into his "circle".

The basis of this approach was Socrates' belief that self-examination was the *sine qua non* of a philosophical life (see *Comm.* IV.2.24 ff.), even if it leads, as it does in the Euthydemus dialogue, to a disturbing awareness of the ambiguity inherent in such fundamental terms as ἀγαθός and κακός (see *Comm.* IV.2.31 ff.).[215] The exact method used to arrive at philosophical truths was of course dialectic.[216]

The passage in *Comm.* III.13.5, which presents Socrates as pointing out blatant inconsistencies in his interlocutor's reasoning in a nearly unbroken monologue, seems more typical of Socrates' didactic style in dealing with mere acquaintances (cp. the other scenes presented at the end of bk. III), while Socrates' encounter with Euthydemus seems more typical for those destined to become his followers. D. Morrison ([1994] 197-98) points out that there are only four "potential intimates" in Plato (Cleinias, Lysis, Menexenus, and Charmides), none of whom provides much to compare with Xen.'s Euthydemus character. On the basis of *Comm.* IV.1.1 ff., Morrison (pp. 183-84) lists the traits of "loveable" souls as follows: 1) the ability to learn quickly, 2) the ability to remember what has been learned, and 3) a desire for every kind of practical knowledge, and he notes further (see *Comm.* IV.1.3-5) that Socrates' "targets" fall into three classes: 1) those who think that nature has made them good, 2) those who believe that wealth will make them good, and 3) those

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[213]Morrison ([1994] 188) comments that the function of ἔλεγχος in Xen. is twofold: 1) to awaken a desire for wisdom and 2) to test the strength and durability of this desire by subjecting it to further ἔλεγχος. Note that Socrates himself avoids an elenctic trap set by Antiphon in *Comm.* III.8.1-3.
[214]See *Comm.* IV.4.6, where the importance of repetition as part of Socrates' didactic method is stressed, and *ibid.* III.1.6, where he states that a subject should be treated from every perspective.
[215]McPherran (p. 94) aptly comments that, "although it appears that Socrates wishes to preserve most of the *content* of popular morality, ...his methods threaten that very aim". We can safely imagine that such quasi-sophistic doctrines as the one expressed above and in *Comm.* IV.2.19-20 would not have been popular with the more conservative elements in Athenian politics.
[216]For the importance of dialectic in Socrates' intercourse with his followers, see *Comm.* III.2.4 and *Oec.* 19.14-15. Ribbing (p. 53) summarizes the process as follows: *Wie bekannt und einstimmig bezeugt ist, war Sokrates' Lehrweise ihrer Form nach induktorisch; er ging, wie Xenophon selbst sagt, von dem Allen Bekannten aus, und seine erste Aufgabe war immer, die einzelnen Fälle unter allgemeine Gesichtspunkte zu fassen, und dabei waren diese einzelnen Fälle gewöhnlich oder fast immer aus dem praktischen Leben geholt.* Morrison ([1994] 207) makes an additional distinction: "By calling dialectic teaching, Xenophon's Socrates acknowledges his superior position.... By denying that dialectic is teaching, Plato's Socrates emphasizes that the origin of the views arrived at is within the interlocutor himself, and he deflects responsibility for the outcome from himself onto the pupil." Jaeger ([1944] 2:31-32) believes that ancient medicine's liberation from cosmology parallels Socrates' own, and that his method of induction is akin to that of the matter-of-fact empiricist in medicine.

who believe that they have the finest education (e.g. Euthydemus).[217] The rigorous process described above is meant to show that Socrates did not by any means hand out his intellectual tools indiscriminately,[218] and it should be recalled that obviously no edification of any kind could occur without the follower's cooperation with his mentor (*Comm.* I.2.39): Socrates cannot promise to make anyone virtuous (*Comm.* I.2.3), and becoming virtuous is of necessity a cooperative process in which the follower learns by his mentor's example (*Comm.* I.2.3, III.3.9, IV.4.10 and *Oec.* 12.18). Whenever he was unable to provide help himself, Socrates encouraged friends to seek out professionals (*Comm.* II.7.1, IV.7.1-5 and *Oec.* 2.15-16; see too *La.* 180C-D), and he describes himself in this capacity as a μαστροπός (see Xen. *Smp.* 3.10 & 4.56-64: cp. *Tht.* 151B).

Socrates' civic beliefs largely coincided with those of the state, though he arrived at his own through a careful scrutiny of the established customs, not through the force of tradition, an approach that put him at odds with the hoi polloi; this antagonism is also true of his fundamental belief that a citizen must be sure of his own moral well-being before meddling in that of others.[219] A notable paradox presents itself, however, in Socrates' passionate interest in the welfare of the polis as an organism (see Pl. *Ap.* 30E) as opposed to his reluctance (or refusal) to participate in politics because of the risks involved for an honest man.[220] A specific reason for Socrates' *Apolitie* is given in *Comm.* 1.6.15 (see too Reeve 159), that is, that he would better serve the community by training others for public service, while quite practical (and convincing) reasons for staying out of politics are offered by Aristippus in *ibid.* II.1.8-9. Two popular views probably resulted from Socrates' political inactivity: 1) that he actively, not passively, abstained from politics, and 2) that he therefore represented a *graue Eminenz* in the polis, as Polycrates later insinuated.[221] It should

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[217]Morrison ([1994] 184-85) further states that, although Euthydemus represents only one type, we can assume that Socrates' approach was similar for all three types, a perhaps questionable assumption. For more on Socrates' attraction to his followers, see Guthrie (1978) 3:398-402.

[218]Morrison (1994) 189. In short, Socrates only took on those students who he thought would benefit from his association, and it is interesting to note how he treats them individually in the Platonic dialogues, e.g. Theaetetus kindly, Meno with some sarcasm, and Alcibiades rather harshly (Vrijlandt 108 n. 1, who cites an abundance of related passages on pp. 109-110).

[219]Zeller (1954) 95-96. See *Comm.* II.1 and also *Grg.* 521D ff., where Socrates claims to be the one true statesman. In this light, Socrates' refusal to flee Athens is not surprising since he had upheld the laws his entire life, an obedience to authority no doubt explained by his having grown up in the Periclean age (see Adam [1891] xx and Taylor [1932] 50 ff.).

[220]It is interesting to note that Socrates finds that he has no time for leisure because of his involvement in δημόσια (*Comm.* III.11.16: for other references to his political aloofness, see *Comm.* I.6.15, Pl. *Ap.* 31C-32E, *R.* 496A-E, *Ep.* 324B-326B, 330C-331D, and Ael. *VH* 2.11). The exceptions include his opposition to the Thirty and to the ἐκκλησία during the trial of the admirals at Arginusae, both of which incidents are brought up in Pl. *Ap.* 32B-C. One wonders if a dicast would have asked himself if Socrates was capable of cooperating with *any* government.

[221]Chroust (1957) 165-66. Hackforth (p. 125) points out that a contradiction apparently existed between Socrates' *Apolitie* and his fearlessness towards death, hence Plato's interpolation of his own attitude towards politics. For a general discussion of Socrates' abstention from politics, see Guthrie (1978) 4:91-93. The question of Socrates' attitude towards the Athenian democracy is difficult: His

be noted finally that the controversy over Socrates' teaching is foreshadowed by the restrictions imposed on his philosophizing under the Thirty (see *Comm.* I.2.31-38 and the comment on §10).

Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 113 n. 9) remark that forms of the verb μέλειν (cp. μεμεληκός in the present passage) appear frequently in the Meletus dialogue in Pl. *Ap.* and might be considered a wordplay on Meletus' name.

21. περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ ἀνθρώποις, περὶ παιδείας: See the comment on §20.

βέλτιστος εἶναι ὑπό τινων προκρίνομαι: That Socrates was singled out by some as being an excellent teacher would seem, in contrast to the denial of accepting fees in §16, to align him squarely with the sophists and to represent yet another example of μεγαληγορία.

Socrates' reputation as a public figure seems to have been firmly established by the time of the first production of *Clouds* in 423.[222] His characterization by Aristophanes presents many interesting problems, whose Socrates figure is distinguished by the following traits: 1) a complete unwillingness to participate in the life of the larger community, 2) an ineptitude in judging and dealing with other human beings, and 3) an anerotic personality, all elements of an asceticism which runs counter to the Socratic characterizations in Plato and Xen. and to the spirit of Attic comedy in general (Strauss [1966] 311-14 and Phillipson 191). MacDowell ([1995] 131) sets out the major differences from the other Socratica as follows: In Aristophanes Socrates is presented as an expert in rhetoric and as a scientist who

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appraisal of the assembly-men in *Comm.* III.7.5-6 is certainly not very flattering (cp. *Prt.* 319A ff.), yet it is stated quite clearly elsewhere (*Comm.* IV.4.11) that Socrates was never responsible for inciting civil strife of any kind. Indeed, Xen. portrays a Socrates who praises ὁμόνοια (*ibid.* IV.4.16: see too IV.4.19 ff. and *Oec.* 9.14), who through his very impoverishment can be identified with the δῆμος (*Comm.* IV.2.37), and whose actions belie an elitist attitude (*ibid.* I.2.58-61).

[222]See in particular *Nu.* 94 ff. With all due respect to Professor Halliwell, I still find it difficult to disagree with Taylor's observation that Aristophanes' caricature could not have succeeded unless it was founded on some (albeit slender) basis of fact, and that a conglomerate caricature of a type can never be as successful as that of an individual. (See Taylor [1932] 18 and [1911] 131-33 & 138-40: see too Hackforth 155. References to Aristophanes' attack on Socrates appear in *Oec.* 11.3 and *Smp.* 6.6.) McPherran's comments (p. 91) also support this position: "It is...hard to believe that [Aristophanes'] portrait is pure malicious invention, since he could not have reasonably hoped that his parody would succeed with his audience unless the stage-figure he presented bore a recognizable and substantial affinity to the Socrates they knew from the marketplace." McPherran remarks further that this view is supported by the many physical similarities, the shared idiosyncrasies and the amount of attention Xen. and Plato devote to dispelling Aristophanes' caricature (see, for example, Pl. *Ap.* 18B ff.). The problem consists, of course, in distinguishing fact from fiction, but in any case, Aristophanes' lampoon surely could not help but create or reinforce the public's prejudice against Socrates, a fact which makes his caricature all the more pointed (Phillipson 194).

disbelieves in the traditional gods and sets up a new religion; he also keeps a school, works as a teacher, charges fees, and claims to have expert knowledge.

Dover (*Clouds* xlvi-l) offers three possible explanations for the discrepancies among the Socratica:

> 1) Aristophanes is portraying the truth, while Xen. and Plato are writing fiction. Consideration of the sources, however, seems to tell somewhat against the hypothesis that, as Aristophanes would seem to indicate, Socrates professed to teach science and oratory and that he exacted fees for doing so.
> 2) Aristophanes caricatures Socrates as he was in 424/3, while Plato and Xen. portray him as he became in the last twenty years of his life.
> 3) Plato and Xen. are telling the truth, while Aristophanes attached to Socrates characteristics which rather belonged to the sophists, a view adopted by Plato in *Ap.* 23D [see below].

Since Aristophanes' ignorance of Socrates can almost certainly be eliminated, the last position seems the most tenable, and Aristophanes probably did not draw as fine a distinction as we do between Socrates and the sophists and, if anything, drew a distinction between the working man and the parasitic philosopher (*ibid.* l-liv).

Burnet ([1911] xxxviii-xxxix) and Taylor ([1911] 156 ff.) point out that none of the accounts in Xen., Plato, or Aristophanes runs counter to the notion that Socrates dabbled in natural science before turning to ethics.[223] Other points in common between *Clouds* and the other Socratica are as follows: Socrates could be considered an educator and undoubtedly received gifts, meals, and other gratuities from his friends and followers, and he did in fact make the worse argument the better by refuting statements which were apparently true (whereas Aristophanes' Socrates refutes those which are actually true).[224] To these Guthrie ([1978] 3:373) adds Socrates' general appearance (l. 362 ff.), poverty, Spartan habits, teaching by analogy, convincing others of their ignorance (l. 842), an inner circle of devotees and outer circle of young gentlemen, the undermining of respect for parents, and a "φροντιστήριον" (see *Grg.* 485D-E and *Comm.* I.6.14, III.14.1).[225]

There is little difference between accepting hospitality and accepting fees, and Socrates' description of himself in this section of Xen. *Ap.* as being a pedagogical

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[223]In particular, it is difficult to see in what way the caricature in *Clouds* contradicts the picture of Socrates in *Comm.*: In both cases Socrates' chief interest is in the practical sciences of ethics and politics, and it is made clear in both that he was acquainted with physics and mathematics and had at one time studied them. See Petrie (p. 518), whose article is meant to rebut Taylor's thesis in *Varia Socratica* that Aristophanes' and Xen.'s accounts are ultimately incompatible.

[224]MacDowell (1995) 132-33. References to τὸ τὸν λόγον ἥττω κρείττω ποιεῖν appear in *Oec.* 11.25 and Pl. *Ap.* 18B, 19B, 23D.

[225]For similarities between the Aristophanic and the "historical" Socrates, see Murray 92-94.

expert and sought out as such by a certain segment of the population would have evoked among the dicasts immediate associations with the sophists.[226] Yet these sophistic associations do not square with the more common image of Socrates as he appears in Plato and Xen. As Dover (*Clouds* xlv) notes:

> Nothing could be more alien from the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon than to teach young men how to achieve worldly success by exploitation of the arts to which the world yields. He professes total unfamiliarity with the lawcourts...and the machinery of public life..., and his hostility to rhetoric is outspoken... . So far from taking money for teaching..., he likens such a procedure to prostitution... .[227]

The Aristophanic Socrates' un-Socratic approach to teaching should also be considered: Aristophanes presents him as teaching for money, with forensic rhetoric as his specialty, the reason for Strepsiades' interest; metrics and grammar are propaedeutic, and the two methods of teaching expository and tutorial.[228] In sum, Dover sees nothing in the non-Aristophanic sources which could have caused him to be singled out for attack by Aristophanes as a sophist, and he concludes that the playwright "foisted onto Socrates practices and beliefs which he could fairly have attributed to other intellectuals" and probably decided to treat Socrates as a type of the entire sophist genus.[229] Similarities between the sophists and the composite Socrates are more general: a mastery of dialectic, an interest in natural science, an aversion to the old religion, attacks on traditional views, and the principle of man's own knowledge and judgment (see Phillipson 182-84 and Ehrenberg 276-77). Aristophanes did not distinguish between sophists and philosophers: This begins with Plato, who uses the word more narrowly (Dover *op. cit.* xxxv n. 1: see too MacDowell [1995] 131). It should be noted finally that the distinction between a band of friends and a philosophical school was a fine one, and the burning of the

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[226]As Glover (p. 164) observes, the new relative moralism might be convenient for conducting international relations, but it was far less easily tolerated at home in Athens.

[227]With respect to the Platonic Socrates, Dover (*idem*) notes the following: "Plato's Socrates absolutely denies that he has any interest in, or knowledge of, astronomy and geology... . Indeed, he professes ignorance of all technical and specialized subjects; the manner in which he expresses himself on the subject of metre..., referring uncertainly to words which he has heard from Damon, is noteworthy."

[228]Dover *op. cit.* xxxiv. Socrates' tutorial method could be taken as a caricature of his dialectical method (*ibid.*, pp. xliii-xliv and MacDowell [1995] 133).

[229]Dover (1972) 117-18 (see too Taylor [1911] 129-77, who represents the opposite camp in this debate). Guthrie ([1978] 3:371), on the other hand, feels that Socrates' rhetorical methods and atheism in *Clouds* make him a "replica" of Protagoras, and the description of Socrates in Ar. *Ra.* 1491-1500 certainly seems to portray him as the arch-sophist. Dover (*op. cit.* 118-19) adds that it was probably Socrates' association with Alcibiades which caused Aristophanes to choose him as a representative of the sophist genus, while Phillipson (pp. 190-91) believes that Aristophanes saw the greatest threat in the power of dialectic, something in which Socrates particularly excelled.

φροντιστήριον in *Clouds* must be taken as significant, not just as good-natured fun, since people were actually executed for alleged injury to the community.[230]

ἐμὲ δὲ...θανάτου ὑπὸ σοῦ διώκεσθαι: See the comment on §25 for the issue of capital punishment. I prefer the reading εἶναι εἰ in C to Stephanus' ὅτι.

22. Ἐρρήθη μὲν δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πλείω ὑπό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ:[231] This passage comes as quite a surprise on the first reading, and one would expect such asseverations as appear in *Comm.* IV.4.2-3, for example, to be included in Xen.'s account of Socrates' trial. The most obvious reason for the truncation seems to be one of two alternatives: 1) that Xen. feels that he has sufficiently demonstrated Socrates' innocence and his readiness for death (as evidenced by his use of μεγαληγορία) and therefore chooses to relate only certain parts of Hermogenes' report to his readers, or 2) that his source or sources were too inadequate for him to piece together a more complete account of the trial. Vander Waerdt (p. 27) remarks that, in composing the *Ap.*, Xen. probably intended "to highlight Socrates' justice rather than the considerations which would exonerate him from the charges stated in the formal indictment", while Arnim (p. 71) believes that Xen.'s cursory treatment of the remainder of the trial is due to the fact that he did not have a reliable record of what had actually transpired. Delebecque's suggestions (p. 221: see too Frick 81-82), i.e., that the *Ap.* might have had as its audience Xen.'s friends and family at Scillus or that, since the work is obviously addressed to converts, it was possibly used as the basis of a lecture or of a Socratic conference in the Peloponnese, hold some appeal.[232]

The word συναγορεύοντες seems to indicate that Xen. believed that actual speeches had been made on Socrates' behalf by συνήγοροι, a belief which conflicts with Plato's testimony in *Ap.* 21A, 32D-E, and 33D ff., where references are made to potential, not actual, witnesses (Shero 111 and Riddell xiv). Wetzel (p. 401: see too Menzel 6) tries to resolve the problem by equating Xen.'s συναγορεύοντες φίλοι with the *Entlastungszeugen* which appear in Pl. *Ap.* 33D ff., and Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] pp. 75-76) make some further observations regarding this issue:

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[230]Dover (1972) 119. The φροντιστήριον might have been intended to represent a ἑταιρία with its appropriate initiation rites (Chroust [1957] 193-94) or to recall the burning of the Pythagorean συνέδρια in Magna Graecia (Taylor [1911] 173-74).

[231]Russell (p. 194 n. 10) believes that Libanius might well have taken this sentence in Xen. *Ap.* as the starting-point for his own ἀπολογία.

[232]Delebecque suggests elsewhere (p. 216) that Xen.'s blast at the sophists in the *Cyn.* 13.1 ff. bespeaks his interest in staying involved in the current philosophical debate. For the possible reasons for Xen.'s brevity as opposed to Plato's longer treatment of the events of the trial, see Appendix B. Note that the general commonalities between the two authors' accounts up to this point have been Socrates' treatment of both indictment charges and a reference to the Delphic oracle.

1) Xen.'s report of συνήγοροι seems slightly supported by Justus of Tiberias' claim (ap. D.L. 2.41) that Plato tried to speak on Socrates' behalf (p. 75 n. 45: see too Chroust [1957] 36).
2) Pl. *Ap.* is so short that the additional time might have been taken up by συνήγοροι (p. 76 n. 48).[233]
3) Conspicuous omissions (e.g. those concerning political matters) might be due to the fact that Socrates relied on his συνήγοροι to fill in the gaps (p. 76).

In short, an Athenian litigant was in principle expected to plead his own case, but the use of συνήγοροι - character witnesses who were normally friends or relatives of the main litigants - was often seen as a way of circumventing this rule, a practice which was in fact quite widespread (Rubinstein 1-3) and which should certainly not be ruled out in this case simply because it is not specifically mentioned by Plato. As Maier (p. 481 n. 2) notes, the Platonic references could just as easily be taken to indicate the appearance of character witnesses during the actual court proceedings, and it seems equally probable from *Ap.* 24 that regular witnesses were also produced in accordance with standard legal procedure.[234]

Feddersen (pp. 29-31) brings up an interesting problem by interpreting the pronouns αὐτοῦ and αὐτῷ at the beginning of this section as referring to Hermogenes, not to Socrates, the immediate implication of which is that the second part of the *Ap.* relies on other, unknown witnesses, i.e. on οἱ συναγορεύοντες φίλοι αὐτῷ (= Ἑρμογένῃ). His argument can be outlined as follows:

1) It seems fitting that Hermogenes' narrative be introduced and concluded by Xen. in this section so that the correspondence to the *Comm.* can be maintained (see IV.8.10: τοιαῦτα μὲν πρὸς Ἑρμογένην τε διελέχθη καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους).
2) That Hermogenes is not mentioned by name is not surprising (cp. the use of ἔφη in §10).
3) The inclusion of the word Σωκράτης in this section seems superfluous if αὐτοῦ and αὐτῷ already refer to him.

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[233]Socrates twice mentions (19A & 37A) how short of time he is. According to Brickhouse and Smith (*idem*), the work as written takes approximately fifty-three minutes to deliver, whereas Socrates would have had about two hours and twelve minutes to present his defense.

[234]Derenne (p. 170 n. 2) is of course correct in stating that συναγορεύειν never means μαρτύρεσθαι. He is on softer ground, however, when he maintains that *Cri.* 45E (αἰσχύνομαι μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περί σε ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι...καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο) indicates that no one spoke on Socrates' behalf. The passages from Pl. *Ap.* already cited and the readiness on the part of Socrates' friends to offer an adequate amount of money as a counter-penalty surely offer a sufficient basis for the opposite argument.

4) Xen. would have written something like the following if he had had Socrates in mind: ῥηθῆναι ἔφη [sc. Ἑρμογένης] or ἐρρήθη μὲν...περί τε αὐτοῦ [sc. Σωκράτους].

Feddersen uses these observations to arrive at the following conclusion (p. 30):

> Συναγορεύοντες φίλοι *ergo neque aut deprecatores aut testes vel similes quidam aut ceteri scriptores Socratis Apologiarum, velut Lysias, Theodectes, alii sunt habendi, sed Xenophontis auctores nihil aliud quam Hermogenes referentes ob eamque causam cum eo consentientes, fortasse eidem, qui Mem. IV 8, 10 significantur verbis* πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, *quibus non ceteros quosdam velut Aristodemum vel Euthydemum significari...ponimus, sed sermonis arbitros nescio quos.*

Feddersen consequently takes συναγορεύειν to mean *consentire*, citing as supporting passages *Cyr.* II.2.20, Isoc. 4.139, and Th. VII.49.3, and comments that this verb is nowhere found in a forensic context, where συνηγορεῖν (from συνήγορος) is commonly used (see Ar. *Ach.* 685, 705, Pl. *Lg.* 937A, and S. *Tr.* 814). Feddersen feels that Socrates' post-conviction speech should also be referred to these sources, and he notes that Hermogenes' ἔφη is replaced by λέγεται in §§28-29. His last remark on the matter (pp. 30-31) is intuitive: *Ceterum nobis consentaneum videtur esse Socratem, ut cetera defensionis adiumenta, ita hoc quoque testium, prorsus repudiasse.*

Feddersen makes a good argument, but it falls short for the following reasons: 1) The word εἰπεῖν in §24 contradicts the supposed finality of ἐρρήθη...πλείω, that is, εἰπεῖν *must* continue the indirect discourse originally introduced by Hermogenes in §2. 2) The verb ἐρρήθη is also used of Socrates in §1. 3) Socrates is also referred to as αὐτόν in §4. 4) Socrates appears as the subject of the indirect discourse as recently as §21 (the *preceding* section), and the emphasis has long since rested on what Socrates has said, not on Hermogenes' report. This is reinforced by the hyperbatonic position of ἐρρήθη in §22. 5) Feddersen's point about συναγορεύειν is not entirely true: Although the verb seems to appear more frequently in a deliberative setting (see, for example, Th. VI.6.3, D. *in Aristocr.* 172, and D. *contra Polycl.* 6), it is in fact used forensically in D. *contra Timoth.* 10 and Aeschin. *in Timarch.* 87 in regard to character witnesses of the type described above.[235] For all of these reasons it is much more natural to interpret the two pronouns as referring to Socrates.

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[235]Lys. 12.25 could also be cited as an example if it were not for the extra-judicial nature of the proceedings, that is, Lysias and his brother Polemarchus were sentenced to death *in absentia* by the Thirty, an action against which Eratosthenes supposedly spoke out at the time.

ἀλλ' ἤρκεσέ μοι δηλῶσαι ὅτι Σωκράτης...ἐποιεῖτο[236]: Socrates again refers to both aspects of the indictment (μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἀσεβῆσαι μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄδικος φανῆναι),[237] and the two intentions expressed in this section, i.e. to prove Socrates' piety and his readiness to die, correspond to two fundamental beliefs of Xen., namely, a strong belief in the *di patrii* and the notion of utility.[238] His efforts to prove his innocence in no way rule out his use of μεγαληγορία to secure his conviction, and Vander Waerdt (p. 23 n. 69) quite justifiably takes the μέν-clause and the following δέ-clause in §23 as referring together to this aspect of Socrates' defense.

Scholars have proposed many different reasons to explain Xen.'s motivation in writing the *Ap.*: Nickel (p. 81) thinks that the the work is primarily meant to explain Socrates' μεγαληγορία and to supply a psychological complement to other accounts of the trial. Chroust ([1957] 15) believes that Xen. wrote all of his Socratica out of a sense of rivalry with other great writers of his age, and states elsewhere ([1957] 19 & 69) that both the *Ap.* and the *Schutzschrift* were written in reply to Polycrates and the anti-Socratic literature in general, with the *Schutzschrift* being more overtly antagonistic in this respect. Delebecque (p. 207) sees Xen.'s motives as being at least partly political: As Sparta's position weakened after the King's Peace, Xen. felt the need to reconcile himself with Athens through the writing of his Socratica, and this placed him in a difficult situation: Xen. was still an Athenian at heart, yet he was pro-Spartan and distrustful of a government which had executed Socrates, his former association with whom also entailed a number of risks. He nevertheless wanted to remain on good terms with all parties in Athens in case his situation at Scillus became too precarious, hence his Socratic writings, which Delebecque believes (p. 211) were also written for his own enjoyment and his sons' edification. Other scholars are rather negative in their appraisal of Xen.'s motives: Frick (p. 66) feels that we should see the main flaw of the *Ap.* as being Xen.'s inability to appreciate the noble motives behind Socrates' behavior in court, while Tejera (p. 156) believes that the *Ap.* is an ideological work, i.e., that Xen. intends "to confer upon Socrates the same chauvinistic and pedestrian educational ideas and functions that he imposes upon him in the *Memorabilia*, *Symposium*, and *Oeconomicus*".

Vander Waerdt comes closer to the mark, I believe, by focusing his attention on Xen.'s statement in §22 (ἐγὼ οὐ τὰ πάντα εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐκ τῆς δίκης ἐσπούδασα,

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[236]Ollier's emendation τότε τὸ seems to me to be well-founded (see apparatus *ad loc.*).

[237]As Vander Waerdt (p. 22) remarks: "Socrates' paramount aim was not simply refutation of the indictment, but rather preservation of piety and of his reputation for justice." Compare the emphatic negatives here with those appearing in similar contexts in §24 and *Comm.* I.1.11, I.1.20, and note Socrates' additional statement in *ibid.* IV.4.11 that he has never borne false witness or been guilty of sycophancy.

[238]*Nam quicumque eum vel mediocriter cognitum habet, hoc utique scit duas maxime res eius proprias esse: primum singulari quadam religione - ne dicam superstitione - deos patrios coluisse; iterum ad solam utilitatem...eum omnia revocavisse* (Frick 18). See the comments on §§10 and 34.

ἀλλ' ἤρκεσέ μοι δηλῶσαι ὅτι Σωκράτης τὸ μὲν μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἀσεβῆσαι μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄδικος φανῆναι περὶ παντὸς ἐποιεῖτο). From this he concludes that "Socrates' paramount aim was not simply refutation of the indictment, but rather preservation of piety and of his reputation for justice" (p. 22), and that "we may expect [Xenophon's] selection of details in composing the *Ap.* to highlight Socrates' justice rather than the considerations which would exonerate him from the charges stated in the formal indictment" (p. 27). In short, since Socrates as a critic of the democracy could not identify the just with the lawful, Xen. must show that Socrates is "exonerated by a higher understanding of justice".[239] Xen.'s Socrates understands justice to consist in benefaction, and this benefaction consists in turn in offering his polis an example of self-restraint, which is the basis of virtue (see *Comm.* 1.5.4) (pp. 43-48). This, according to Vander Waerdt, is the ultimate meaning of the oracle in §14, an interpretation which explains Socrates' behavior in court (and elsewhere) as depicted by Xen.

Although Vander Waerdt's well-considered views have much to recommend them, I feel that the purpose of this short comment would be better served by limiting the treatment of Xen.'s purpose to what appears in the text itself, where his intentions are expressed quite clearly: In §1 Xen. states that he would like to recall Socrates' feelings towards his defense and the end of his life, and that he intends to explain Socrates' arrogance in court, a topic treated by other writers who were unaware of his actual motives. In §22 Xen. states that his purpose is not to report everything said at the trial, but rather to show that Socrates did everything within his power to demonstrate his innocence. In §§33-34 Xen. expresses his admiration for Socrates, implying that, just as the philosopher has served as a useful role model for him throughout his life, so can he be of equal service to any other seeker of virtue, including the reader. All of these intentions are duly fulfilled in the course of the writing, and like Vander Waerdt, the reader is also left with the feeling that, although Xen.'s Socrates addresses the indictment charges in a direct effort to refute them, his personal (and transcendent) sense of piety and justice did not necessarily correspond to that of his peers, a set of personal values which he shares in common with his Platonic counterpart.

23. τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ᾤετο λιπαρητέον εἶναι κτλ.: Cp. Pl. *Ap.* 34C-35CD & 38D-39A.[240] Xen. states in *Comm.* IV.4.4 that such emotional appeals[241] were

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[239]Socrates' seemingly contradictory statement in *Comm.* IV.4.13, i.e., that the just is identical with the lawful, is therefore necessarily qualified by trans-legal considerations of justice (Vander Waerdt 45-46).

[240]Note that this statement in Plato comes *after* the conviction. Toole (p. 6) also compares Gorg. *Pal.* 33 (οὐ φίλων βοηθείαις οὐδὲ λιταῖς οὐδὲ οἴκτοις δεῖ πείθειν ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῷ σαφεστάτῳ δικαίῳ,

illegal, but Burnet ([1924] 144-45) cites evidence to the contrary. Socrates' refusal to prostrate himself before the dicasts goes hand-in-hand with his attitude towards servile behavior in general (see Pl. *Ap.* 38E and the comments on §§9 and 14), yet Xen. provides different reasons than Plato for Socrates' behavior regarding an emotional plea, i.e., that Socrates had done everything within his power to establish his innocence, and that he had *also* reached a convenient point at which to die (Xen.'s original thesis). Nevertheless, the fact that Socrates refused to propose a counter-penalty at this stage could in fact be considered an act of suicide since the dicasts could only choose one of two alternatives, unless, of course, he was counting on the prosecutors to propose a milder penalty.

οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο[242] **οὔτε τοὺς φίλους εἴασεν κτλ.:** For a general comparison of this with Plato's account of a threefold counter-penalty proposal, see Appendix B. In accordance with judicial procedure, both sides presented brief cases for their proposed penalties after the guilty vote was rendered (MacDowell [1978] 254).

In Plato's version, Socrates makes a proposal to be maintained at the πρυτανεῖον (*Ap.* 36B-37A), then offers to pay one mina as being all that he can afford (38B), and finally proposes to pay a thirty-mina fine, with Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus volunteering to serve as guarantors (*loc. cit.*).[243] Several things speak in favor of its historicity: Frick (p. 69: see too Phillipson 374-75) believes that Socrates must have proposed a counter-penalty of some kind since its inclusion in Pl. *Ap.* is, as it were, the *lectio difficilior*, and since Xen. would hardly have passed over such a brilliant example of μεγαληγορία, the πρυτανεῖον proposal must be fictive and the other two real, which Plato treats in an offhand way in order to diminish their effect on the reader.[244] Moreover, by tendering a serious proposal

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διδάξαντα τἀληθές), while Vrijlandt (p. 76) compares this passage with *Phd.* 117A (γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος) and *Cri.* 53E (ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν).

[241]These often involved the parading of family members and references to one's own patriotism (Chroust [1957] 22).

[242]According to Immisch (p. 414), ὑποτιμᾶσθαι is definitely not an Attic usage and demonstrates how Xen., who left home at an early age, had allowed himself to be influenced ...*von dem immer mehr anschwellenden Strome des östlichen Hellenismus.* Immisch (p. 411) also notes the Xenophontic flavor of the relatively rare verb λιπαρεῖν in the text above (cp. *Oec.* 2.16, *HG* III.5.12, and *Cyr.* I.4.6).

[243]In *Cri.* 52C the personified Laws also suggest that Socrates could have proposed banishment as a counter-penalty.

[244]See Reeve 171 and Maier (p. 483 n. 2), the latter of whom also finds a possible reference to the Platonic "σίτησις-fiction" in *Comm.* I.2.62 (cp. the unorthodox position of Vrijlandt [pp. 102-103], who believes that Plato in fact based his account on *Comm.* I.2.61-64). Arnim (pp. 75-76) plausibly dismisses the first two proposals as being ludicrous and considers the third to be historical, though he is incorrect in considering it to be as ridiculous as the first two, especially in light of Socrates' reduced financial circumstances (see Appendix B). Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 233) are quite correct when they observe that Socrates' knowing that the counter-penalty would not be accepted does not necessarily make it flippant, though Socrates certainly seems to expect such an interpretation from the dicasts (Pl. *Ap.* 37A: see too D.L. 2.42, where it is reported that Socrates proposed a fine, *then* public

Socrates would have been complying with the laws, his reverence for which is evident throughout the *Cri.* (*ibid.*, pp. 69-70). Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 216-19) agree with the latter point and add that a proposal was justified for three additional reasons, that is, Socrates' unwillingness 1) to disobey the Delphic god's directive to pursue his philosophical mission, 2) to consider death a necessarily evil thing, and 3) to allow the dicasts to harm their moral well-being by convicting him.[245] Busse (p. 227) prefers Plato's version because he was an eye-witness, while Xen.'s motives must lie in presenting his Socrates as thoroughly consistent, even in the face of pressure from his friends.[246] Shero (p. 110) believes that Xen. simply misunderstood Hermogenes, who said something similar to what appears in Pl. *Ap.* 37B ff. while saying that Socrates' friends had in fact made a proposal, or perhaps the ἀντιτίμησις could be accounted for if Xen. relied on hearsay or on reports which suppressed or remained silent on Socrates' counter-penalty proposal.[247] Arnim (p. 75) accounts for the difference in the two versions as being due to the difference between a sketchy and a fuller report, a view which implies a enormous degree of carelessness on Xen.'s part.

According to Xen., Socrates did not propose a counter-penalty, nor did he allow his friends to do so. Frick (p. 69) is quite dismissive in his explanation for this (*Xenophon autem pro sui ingenii facultate illam aestimationem omnino negat, disciso simpliciter nodo Gordio*), and the cause is surely elsewhere to be found. Oldfather (p. 209: see too Chroust [1957] 40) believes that Socrates did indeed make his state-pension proposal, which was followed by another uproar, during which, though monetary proposals were shouted out by Plato et al., the court clerk only recorded the first, which Xen. could not take seriously, a view supported by the allusions to a possibly early vote which appear in Lib. *Decl.* 2.5 and *Cri.* 45E. This explanation relies on too much speculation, and I would only conclude by pointing out a crucial point of agreement on this issue in both ἀπολογίαι: Both Xen. and Plato state that Socrates considered a counter-penalty proposal to be an admission of guilt, and Xen.'s

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maintenance at the πρυτανεῖον, a sequence of events which, if true, would make Socrates' attitude seem more openly defiant).

[245]An act which would have harmed Socrates as well (see *Cri.* 49B ff.).

[246]See too Wetzel (pp. 71-72), who maintains that Xen. must have relied on his own instincts rather than believe the testimony of those in the know. Wilamowitz ([1897] 105) also disagrees with the tradition that Socrates totally rejected proposing a counter-penalty.

[247]Hackforth 15-17. Hackforth elsewhere (pp. 135-36) favors the historicity of the πρυτανεῖον proposal for the following reasons: 1) The increase in the number of votes against Socrates after the second vote (see Pl. *Ap.* 35E-36A and D.L. 2.41), and 2) the fact that Diogenes Laertius obviously used an independent source since his account varies from Plato's. Hackforth's argument is not persuasive since 1) there are in fact many things that Socrates might have said that would have biased the dicasts against him and 2) Diogenes' account may simply represent a garbled version of the events as described in Pl. *Ap.*

version is certainly consistent with this attitude.[248] Another consideration is the following: Is it possible that Plato has his Socrates propose a counter-penalty, with Plato and other Socratics offering to stand surety, so that they will not lose face for not having interceded at a critical point in the judicial process?[249] This issue causes Crito, for example, considerable concern in *Cri.* 44B-C. To be sure, this suggestion runs directly counter to the Burnet/Taylor thesis (see too Fritz [1931] 42) that Plato's account must be essentially correct in its details because of the potential censure of contemporaries who were also present at the trial, but their contention is based on the assumption that Plato intended to render a largely historical account of the trial.

Maximus of Tyre (3.7: see too Lib. *Ap.* 23) believes that Socrates remained mute during the court proceedings, a controversial position taken up by Gomperz and to a large degree by Oldfather (see above). Gomperz ([1936] 32-33) also maintains that Socrates said nothing or very little in court, which accounts for the abundance and diversity of the subsequent ἀπολογίαι, and he offers unfamiliarity with forensic practices, outrage, or even disgust as reasons for Socrates' silence. Gomperz (pp. 33-34) supports his thesis with two passages from the *Grg.* (486A-B & 523C ff.) which apparently refer to Socrates' trial, and concludes that the publication of Pl. *Ap.* therefore must have followed that of the *Grg.*[250] Gomperz (p. 36) sums up his assessment of Pl. *Ap.* as follows: *Platons Wiedergabe der Verteidigungsrede hätte von der echten Rede ebenso weit entfernen können, wie die Reden eines Perikles oder Kleon bei Thukydides.* He turns next to Maximus' "silence" tradition (p. 39) with the following justification: *...je auffälliger diese Überlieferung dem allgemeinen Glauben des späteren Altertums widersprach, als desto verläßlicher muß sie dem Schriftsteller gegolten haben, der aus ihr das Thema einer Kunstrede schöpfte.* Gomperz (p. 41 n.

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[248]See E. Meyer 5:227, Feddersen 38, and Arnim 76; note too that Socrates' tone remains consistently defiant in both authors (see too §27). Fritz' comments ([1931] 41-42) are elucidating: *Was in der xenophontischen Apologie steht, entspricht dem Klischee des Weisen, der keinerlei noch so geringes Kompromiß mit der realen Welt eingehen darf,* while Plato's version shows Socrates struggling with his own personal values versus *die äußere Form* of the law in an effort not to compromise the former. Hackforth (pp. 136-37) believes that Xen. failed to mention the public-maintenance proposal because it seemed so incredible or because he was shocked by the misplaced levity of Socrates' words.

[249]See Joël 1:439. Schanz (p. 98) believes that, by including the surety offer, Plato intends to convey the following to posterity: *Ich und die übrigen gennanten Jünger des Sokrates hätten gern materielle Opfer gebracht, um uns den Meister zu erhalten. Allein es wäre vergeblich gewesen.* Vrijlandt (p. 105) finds it odd that Plato is mentioned before Socrates' wealthy friend Crito in Pl. *Ap.* 38B when Crito's name appears *before* Plato's in *ibid.* 33D and *Phd.* 59B, and he comments accordingly: *Utique Plato anxius fuisse videtur, ne Athenienses existimarent Platonem inter fideles Socratis amicos non esse numerandum.* Vrijlandt (p. 105) further remarks that Xen.'s words οὔτε τοὺς φίλους [ὑποτιμᾶσθαι] εἴασεν have often been taken to be directed specifically at Plato, who changed the facts so that he and his friends would appear in a better light, while Vrijlandt believes that the passage in Pl. *Ap.* 38B (ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτείσειν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην) is in fact directed at Xen.

[250]Gomperz (p. 36 ff.) also quotes *Tht.* 172C-175D to support his argument, which passage would be quite ineffectual if Socrates had in fact defended himself well in court (p. 38). The *Gorgias* passage refers clearly to Socrates, while the *Tht.* passage is more generalized (*idem*). Gomperz (pp. 35-36) also does not rule out the element of μεγαληγορία: *Sokrates hätte jedoch irgendwelche Sätze hervorgestossen, denen man 'Großsprecherei' (d.h. Megalegorie) nachsagen konnte.*

13) suggests Aeschines of Sphettus or even Polycrates as Maximus' sources and disputes the claim that Maximus based his assertion on Xen. *Ap.* 4 or *Comm.* IV.8.5.[251]

ἔπειτα τῶν ἑταίρων ἐκκλέψαι βουλομένων κτλ.: Cp. *Cri.* 44B ff., where Crito expresses his and his friends' willingness to help Socrates flee Athens.[252] Socrates' response, that death cannot be avoided anywhere (cp. Pl. *Ap.* 35A), also largely corresponds to the futility of languishing in exile as described by the Platonic Socrates in the *Cri.* and more directly to the awareness of his own mortality in Xen. *Ap.* passim. The sudden temporal leap forward in this particular passage seems rather jarring from a compositional point of view, but the mention of Socrates' subsequent refusal to escape fits in well with his general attitude towards the prospect of death (Ollier 88 and Vrijlandt 104).

Xen.'s Socratic apothegm is worthy of a Diogenes Laertius, and the reader should be reminded that Xen. himself was in no better position to judge the truth of the *bons mots* in §§23, 27, and 28 than we are. Beyschlag (pp. 515-16) believes that the appearance of this and other Socratic *loci* in Xen. *Ap.* can be attributed to the Greek literary practice of mimesis, i.e. *die Weiterbildung eines einmal geprägten literarischen Typus,* which would at least partially account for the discrepancies in setting between Xen. *Ap.* and the other Socratic writings. If this zeal for apothegms seems puerile, one should remember their popularity in antiquity (Wetzel 76).

24. Ὡς δὲ τέλος εἶχεν ἡ δίκη: In spite of Wilamowitz' opinion that a third speech was never held and that Plato included one simply to establish the moral superiority

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[251]See Gigon ([1946] 218) and Allen (p. 4), the latter of whom believes that Maximus' and Libanius' accounts derive from the *Grg.* passage cited above. In his "Socrates in Court", Oldfather writes to supplement Gomperz' and Maximus' contention that Socrates offered no defense (his expanded list of sources includes *Grg.* 486A-B, 521B-522C, 526E-527A, *Tht.* 172C-175D, and Lib. *Ap.* 23), and he creatively reconstructs the speech as follows (pp. 207-10): Socrates began with an "inappropriate locution" which amused the jurors and was followed by a general row. He referred to his integrity, Delphi, and the daimonic voice, then denied the truth of the accusations and pointed out the absurdity of being tried by men who, like Meletus, had never concerned themselves with ethical questions. This attitude was taken for μεγαληγορία. The disturbance grew, and Socrates now felt dazed and speechless. His friends, including Plato, tried to intervene without effect (see D.L. 2.41). Socrates made his state-pension proposal and was led away during the subsequent uproar.

[252]See too *Cri.* 45E (cp. Pl. *Ap.* 29C), where Crito suggests that it was unnecessary for Socrates to appear in court; 52B, where Socrates expresses his reluctance to flee; and 52C & 53D-E, where he states that he in fact prefers death to fleeing. Idomeneus (ap. D.L. 2.60 & 3.36) says that it was Aeschines, not Crito, who tried to persuade Socrates to flee. Vrijlandt (p. 114) indicates a possible inconsistency between *Cri.* 44B, where Crito urges Socrates to flee, and *Phd.* 115D, where it is indicated that he posted bail for him, though I think that this potential risk is implicit in Crito's willingness to undergo *any* risk for his friend (see *Cri.* 45A). Derenne (pp. 178-79) poses a related question: Did the dicasts over-vote, thinking that Socrates would take advantage of the subsequent opportunity to escape? This would explain Crito's concern at the public outcry that would arise at the negligence of his followers to secure his escape.

of his Socrates figure for all time,[253] there is surely nothing to have prevented Socrates from delivering a short speech to his supporters while the administrative business of the trial was being concluded by the authorities. Although there is no separate witness for this practice elsewhere, the testimonies of both Socratic writers seem to substantiate the fact that Socrates actually delivered another speech after the verdict was rendered,[254] and although the post-trial speeches seem dissimilar, they have the same underlying motives in common (see Appendix B). The point of Xen.'s speech is to compare Socrates' situation with that of the prosecutors and jury members who found him guilty: These have paradoxically condemned themselves, not Socrates, on the charges of godlessness and injustice.[255] This thought occurs in Pl. *Ap.* in Socrates' first and third speeches, and the argument returns to the Platonico-Socratic tenet that it is better to suffer than to do evil (see *Cri.* 49C), a thought which is also emphasized by Xen. in his reference to the Palamedes myth in §26.

ὦ ἄνδρες: For other examples of this appellation, see §§11 and 15. A distinction is made in Pl. *Ap.* between ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι (§17A et alibi) and ἄνδρες δικασταί (§40A) (see Burnet [1924] 68 and Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 211-12).

τοὺς μὲν διδάσκοντας τοὺς μάρτυρας ὡς χρὴ ἐπιορκοῦντας καταψευδομαρτυρεῖν ἐμοῦ...ἑαυτοῖς συνειδέναι ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν: In Pl. *Ap.* 35C Socrates enjoins the dicasts to abide by their oaths by not allowing themselves to be swayed by base emotional appeals made by defendants in order to win leniency from the court (see the comment on §23), and a similar tone of admonishment is apparent in Pl. *Ap.* 38C ff. (see Vrijlandt 117). Here the Xenophontic Socrates chastises the

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[253]Wilamowitz (1897) 104. He concludes from this that, since Socrates did not hold a third speech (including the reference to Palamedes), the writer of the Xenophontic *Ap.* must have borrowed this from Plato. One could attribute this error to Xen. himself, but he nowhere else shows such a slavish dependence on Plato (pp. 104-105). Fritz ([1931] 68) feels that this final speech is completely gratuitous, lacks Plato's subtle train of thought, and is to be considered a patchwork of various Socratic sources (see his remarks in Essay A).

[254]Derenne (pp. 169-70), who adduces no evidence to support his argument, is certain that a third speech was not held since it would have been shouted down by the very dicasts he had just condemned, nor would the court officials have allowed him any time for an additional speech. Toole (p. 7) refers to the passage in Arist. *Ath.* 67.3 about equal time allotments for both litigants in order to support the same claim, yet this is far from being solid evidence since the third speech can be considered extra-judicial. See Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 235), who cogently maintain that there is nothing to have prevented Socrates from making a third, post-trial speech.

[255]Zeller ([1954] 192) maintains that Socrates' mistake consisted in the fact that he attempted to reform his changing society on its own terms instead of harking back to the rose-colored morality that existed earlier in that century, so that, in punishing Socrates, the Athenians were actually condemning themselves. It is also worth recalling here that the Platonic Socrates considers himself to be the victim of men, not of the Laws (*Cri.* 54B-C). In general, Xen.'s return to the piety-and-justice theme seems to be at least partly due to the scantiness of his sources (Arnim 77-80).

dicasts who persuaded others, or allowed themselves to be persuaded by others, to vote for his conviction.[256]

A litigant could raise a charge of perjury (ἐπισκήπτεσθαί τινι τῶν ψευδομαρτυρίων) in a public or private trial against a witness presenting evidence that was either illegal or untrue. A δίκη ψευδομαρτυρίων had to be raised before the results of the the main issue of prosecution were determined or put to a vote, and in normal cases the penalty for the larger issue was not assessed until the the truth of the δίκη ψευδ. was determined. (Obviously, the execution of the penalty was suspended in the case of capital cases.) The penalty for proven perjury was a fine, and anyone who was shown to have perjured himself three times was automatically subjected to ἀτιμία. Unfortunately, it is unclear from the extant forensic speeches what the precise requirements were for using a δίκη ψευδ. to reopen the original case. The process of charging witnesses with perjury came into existence as a means of challenging the practice of διαμαρτυρία and was in place by the end of the fifth century.[257]

In Socrates' case, since the votes had already been cast in favor of the death penalty, his reference to perjury here would therefore appear to be a purely symbolic one motivated, it would seem, by the same considerations which caused him not to offer a counter-penalty (see §23 above). It is tempting to consider if the words τοὺς μὲν διδάσκοντας τοὺς μάρτυρας might contain a thinly veiled reference to the claim that Anytus was the first to bribe an Athenian jury (Arist. *Ath.* 27 et alibi: see the comment on Anytus in §29). The sheer number of jurors made bribery difficult, though not impossible (see Bonner and Smith 2:295 and Todd 84-85).

An εὐσεβής is defined in *Comm.* VI.6.4 simply as ὁ τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδώς; for the concept of ἀδικία, see the comment on §5.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀντὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἥρας...οὔτε ὀμνὺς οὔτε νομίζων ἄλλους θεοὺς ἀναπέφηνα: Wetzel (p. 393: see too Breitenbach 1890) comments that the subject of atheism, so prominent in Pl. *Ap.* (see §26C ff.), comes up here and in *Comm.* I.2.64,

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[256]This tone is continued in §26: οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἀλλὰ τοῖς καταγνοῦσι τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι (see Vrijlandt 117). Vrijlandt (p. 116: see too Breitenbach 1890) notes that the Xenophontic Socrates' reproach includes accusers, witnesses, and dicasts, and that he does not address the dicasts separately, whereas in Plato's version not only are the dicasts addressed separately, but the demonstrative οὗτοι in 39B seems to indicate that they are actually standing (or are fictively made to stand) separately. For the dicasts' susceptibility to superficial displays, see Pl. *Grg.* 523C-D; for an example of dicastic "persuasion", see Ar. *V.* 550 ff.

[257]See Lys. 23.13-14 and Isoc. 18.11; for the preceding information, see Lipsius 2:2:778-83, MacDowell (1978) 213, Harrison 2:192-97, and Bonner & Smith 2:261-70. Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 42-43) observe that the perjury law pertained only to witnesses, not to the litigants, hence the latter were free to mislead the jury as they wished. Socrates declares himself innocent of ever having committed perjury in *Comm.* IV.4.11.

while Plato's "old charges" (see Pl. *Ap.* 19B ff.) come up in *Comm.* I.1.11-15 but not directly in Xen. Ap. (see the comment on §29 below).

25. ἐφ' οἷς γε μὴν ἔργοις κεῖται θάνατος ἡ ζημία...οὐδ' αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀντίδικοι τούτων πρᾶξαί τι κατ' ἐμοῦ φασιν: For the various forms of capital punishment, see the relevant comment on §7. The death penalty was imposed for murder, high treason, temple robbery, various κακουργήματα cases (i.e., those involving κλεπταί, λωποδύται, ἀνδραποδισταί, τοιχωρύχοι, and βαλαντιοτόμοι), and certain offenses in connection with the grain supply; in the majority of cases the fixing of the punishment was left to the discretion of the court (see Lipsius 2:363 ff., Bonner & Smith 2:276, and Phillipson 223-25). The capital crimes specifically mentioned by Xen. in this section and *Comm.* I.2.62 include temple robbery, house-breaking, stealing in general and stealing clothes in particular, robbery (involving cutpurses), betrayal of the city, and enslavement;[258] in *Comm.* II.2.3 Socrates describes capital punishment as the worst form of punishment since it deprives the criminal of ὅσα [καλὰ] οἱ θεοὶ παρέχουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Schmid (p. 224 n. 1) explains the congruency between this section and the corresponding *Comm.* section as deriving from Socrates' actual speech in court, a point better supported by the curious omission in both cases of any mention of murder as a capital crime.[259] If Socrates' words to the hapless Aristarchus (*Comm.* II.7.13-14: cp. *ibid.* I.2.32 & II.3.9) concerning the value of sheepdogs can be applied to himself in the present situation, he actually deserves privileged treatment at the hands of his Athenian "masters" for the interest he has shown in their welfare (cp. the πρυτανεῖον proposal in Pl. *Ap.* 36B ff.).

Diogenes Laertius (2.20) states that Socrates was the first philosopher to be tried and put to death.

ὥστε θαυμαστὸν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι κτλ.: Stobaeus' paraphrase (III.7.58 Hense) begins here and ends with ...ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ὁ θάνατος in §27.

26. οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἀλλὰ τοῖς καταγνοῦσι τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι: For a similar tone of admonishment, cp. Pl. *Ap.* 38C-D.

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[258]See too the list of unofficial charges in Lib. *Ap.* 13. Hackforth (pp. 29-32) feels that the mention of capital crimes in the *Comm.* is inappropriate since its purpose is simply to rebut the charges, and that it seems incongruous and clumsy in general. I would add once again that it seems rather pointless that the argument against the death penalty occurs in the Xenophontic Socrates' defense speech *after* the sentence has already been passed.

[259]Xen. does in fact treat murder and sedition in his defense against the κατήγορος charge in *Comm.* I.2.9-11. Finley (p. 65) observes that, if the death of Socrates was indeed due to a political backlash, it is curious that this is not mentioned by either Xen. or Plato.

παραμυθεῖται δ' ἔτι με καὶ Παλαμήδης ὁ παραπλησίως ἐμοὶ τελευτήσας: Palamedes[260] was a Euboean or Argive chieftain who participated in the Greek expedition to Troy. Although he is not mentioned in Homer, a fact which leads Strabo (8.368), among others, to doubt his Homeric origins, he nevertheless appears in the *Cypria* and, in particular, in conjunction with the enlistment of Odysseus.[261] Palamedes' name became a byword for ingenuity and cleverness (Ar. *Ra.* 1452 and *Phdr.* 261D), and he ranks with Prometheus, Orpheus, and Daedalus as one of the great Greek inventors. Along with Cadmus, he is credited with the invention of letters (E. *Pal.* fr. 578 Nauck) and is also associated with dice, numbers and counting, weights and measures, innovations in warfare, etc. The three major tragedians apparently adapted the Palamedes myth for their own purposes,[262] and the story line takes its final form in their hands as follows: Palamedes was dispatched to help muster the Greek army, a mission which also took him to Ithaca to enlist the services of Odysseus, who attempted to avoid serving by feigning madness.[263] By intentionally endangering the life of Telemachus, Palamedes revealed the deception through Odysseus' reaction and thereby earned his undying enmity. At Troy Palamedes' services were indispensable, and his growing popularity among the troops, combined with Odysseus' hostility, finally caused the latter to take revenge.[264] This occurred in collaboration with Diomedes in some versions, for example, in the *Cypria* (fr. 21 Allen), where Odysseus and Diomedes attack and strangle Palamedes while he is fishing. In other versions, Odysseus enlisted the aid of a Phrygian captive to help him forge a letter from Priam to Palamedes in which a large amount of gold was promised if he would betray the Greeks. When the letter was brought to the attention of the army and gold was discovered in Palamedes' tent, he was turned over to the troops and executed by stoning.[265]

The unjustified deaths of Palamedes and Ajax appear throughout Greek literature as examples *par excellence* of judicial murder, the example most immediately relevant to Socrates' trial being the reference in Pl. *Ap.* 41B to both figures, with whom Socrates hopes to share his own unfortunate experience: ὁπότε

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[260]The name is derived by some scholars from παλάμη + μήδη, meaning "the handy or clever one", or, on the basis of the Etruscan form "Talmithe", from Ταλαμήδης (see Wüst 2500 and Woodford 145).
[261]See T. Allen *Hom. Op.* 5:103. The allusion in this section to a popular myth from the epic cycle may be related to the Polycratean abuse-of-poets charge brought up in *Comm.* I.2.56-61.
[262]See Cic. *Off.* 3.97 and Str. *loc. cit.* It will also be noted in what follows that Palamedes' death in the later, tragic sources results from being judged guilty of treason, not from an act of private vengeance, as in the earlier versions (Gantz 606).
[263]Odysseus' resourcefulness is also mentioned in *Comm.* I.3.7.
[264]Since Odysseus envied Palamedes for his wisdom, Socrates' identification with him could therefore be interpreted as another example of μεγαληγορία (see Strauss [1972] 135).
[265]For more information on Palamedes, see Gantz 603-608, Woodford, Rose & March, Wüst, and Lewy.

ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων.[266] Besides the author of the *Cypria* and the tragedians, Gorgias treats the myth in his defense speech Παλαμήδους Ἀπολογία,[267] Pseudo-Alcidamas in his speech against Palamedes Ὀδυσσεὺς κατὰ Παλαμήδους προδοσίας, and the younger Astydamas in a tragedy entitled Παλαμήδης.

A fragment from E. *Pal.* (fr. 588 Nauck) - ἐκάνετ', ἐκάνετε τὰν/πάνσοφον, ὦ Δαναοί,/τὰν οὐδέν' ἀλγύνουσαν ἀηδόνα Μουσᾶν - has been interpreted by Welcker (pp. 469-70) as a criticism directed at the Athenian democracy for persecuting its noblest citizens, and although Philochorus' statement that Euripides in this play is referring specifically to Socrates' execution cannot be true for chronological reasons,[268] the similarities between the deaths of Socrates and Palamedes bear immediate comparison. Besides the obvious, more general similarity that each figure was tried on a trumped-up charge (in the present passage: οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ μαρτυρήσεται...ὅτι ἠδίκησα μέν οὐδένα πώποτε οὐδὲ πονηρότερον ἐποίησα) and consequently executed by a group of his peers, there are many other points in common as well: wisdom in general (see *Comm.* IV.2.33 and *Cyn.* I.11) and cleverness in particular; the role as a public benefactor (as here: εὐηργέτουν δὲ τοὺς

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[266]Wilamowitz ([1897] 104) believes that the origin of the Palamedes parallel in Xen. *Ap.* is to be found in the Platonic passage, a conclusion which Ollier (p. 93) disputes: The Palamedes myth was a current literary theme, and since they treat the same subject, it is only natural that the two ἀπολογίαι should share some similarities. Vrijlandt (p. 118) finds Socrates' light-hearted mention of Palamedes unsuitable for a man who has just been sentenced to death, and finds the reference to Ajax far less comparable to Socrates' immediate situation. He also interprets the use of the word πάθη in Pl. *Ap.* 41B (cp. its use in reference to Palamedes in *Comm.* IV.2.33) as being mock-tragic (p. 119) and concludes (p. 120) that it is another example of Socratic irony.

[267]Guthrie ([1978] 4:77) believes that it is possible that Socrates himself might have been aware of Gorg. *Pal.* when he made his speech in court, but Guthrie rejects the thesis that the reminiscences of the *Pal.* in Pl. *Ap.* imply latent approval of Gorgias' rhetorical practices. Others (e.g. Chroust [1957] 216-18) have suggested a specific influence of the *Pal.* on Xen. *Ap.*, a position which Wilamowitz ([1897] 104 n. 1) strongly rejects as follows: 1) Xen. *Ap.* cannot really be described as a ὕμνος, 2) the *Pal.* could not have exerted such an influence since it was written decades earlier, 3) Gorgias goes out of his way to avoid parallels with Odysseus, and 4) that Gorgias in ch. 1 uses an expression similar to that in Xen. *Ap.* 27 proves nothing other than it was a phrase in common usage (see D.L. 2.13 & 2.35 for similar expressions). Radermacher (pp. 149-50) takes issue with Wilamowitz' remark concerning the word ὕμνος, which seems to be based on the latter's belief that it can only refer to songs. According to Radermacher, who cites numerous examples, the noun is rare in early prose, appearing mostly in Plato, while the verb ὑμνεῖν is much more common and can be commonly translated as "to speak of someone in a complimentary way" (*loben, preisen*) or even simply as "to speak" (*reden*). In general, Wilamowitz' four remarks can certainly be disputed. Morr (p. 469), for example, compares the mention of Palamedes in *Comm.* IV.2.33 with Gorg. *Pal.* 25 and also notes (p. 468) that Xen. praises Gorgias in *An.* II.6.16 and *Smp.* I.5 while poking fun at Gorgianic figures in *ibid.* 2.26. To rule out Gorgianic influence in Xen. *Ap.* is therefore unjustified.

[268]Philochorus ap. D.L. 2.44 (see too the hypothesis to Isoc. *Bus.* for the audience's supposed remorse on hearing the quotation). For the possible influence of E. *Pal.* on this particular passage, see Wilamowitz *ibid.* 103-104, Wetzel 398-99, and Morr 468. Some have wanted to resolve the chronological problem by positing a later performance of the play, but as Wilamowitz ([1897] 104 n. 1) points out, there is no reason to read into Euripides' words anything other than a direct reference to Palamedes. Beyschlag (p. 516: see too Toole 7) agrees, remarking that *...die literarische Erörterung der Leiden des Palamedes ist seit Gorgias typisch geworden.* Phillipson (p. 220) believes that Euripides is alluding to Protagoras in the fragment in question.

ἐμοὶ διαλεγομένους προῖκα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν) and as a detector of falsehoods; the reputation for being popular among a certain segment of the community, a circumstance which earns each figure the ill will of his leaders; the use of an accomplice in order to accomplish the plot at hand (i.e. Meletus and the Phrygian slave, respectively); the negative aftermath of the executions, evidenced by Athens' remorse (D.L. 2.43-44) and by the wrecking of the Greek fleet off Euboea by Nauplius, Palamedes' father; and the popular posthumous cult of each figure (here: ἔτι γὰρ καὶ νῦν πολὺ καλλίους ὕμνους παρέχεται Ὀδυσσέως τοῦ ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντος αὐτόν: see also *Comm.* IV.8.10 and *Cyn.* loc. cit.). In general, any allusion to the Palamedes myth would have been rich in overtones to a fourth-century reader of either ἀπολογία.[269]

οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἐμοὶ μαρτυρήσεται ὑπό τε τοῦ ἐπιόντος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου: Cp. Pl. *Ap.* 38C ff., where Socrates warns the dicasts of the likely repercussions of their decision to have him executed. Consider too the allegory of Arete in *Comm.* II.1.33, where the death of one who has lived under her guidance is described as follows: ὅταν δ' ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος, οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἄτιμοι κεῖνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι.

προῖκα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν: See the comments on §§16 and 20. As Tejera (p. 155) remarks, this Socrates is decidedly unaware of his own Socratic ignorance.

27. ἀπῄει καὶ ὄμμασι καὶ σχήματι καὶ βαδίσματι φαιδρός: By all accounts Socrates remained not merely resigned to the prospect of dying but in fact quite cheerful, as here.[270] This attitude is foreshadowed by his many statements in §§3-9 and best summarized, perhaps, by his question to Antiphon in *Comm.* I.6.9: οἴει οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι;[271]

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[269]This is well demonstrated by the question put to Socrates' interlocutor in *Comm.* IV.2.33: τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθη; Rutherford (p. 54) remarks that Xen.'s Socrates rarely uses mythological allusions, a major exception being the lengthy parable of Heracles in *Comm.* II.1.21 ff. (drawn from Prodicus). For an example of Homeric influence on Xen., see *Smp.* 4.6-7.

[270]See, for example, *Comm.* IV.8.1-3, Pl. *Ap.* 40C-41C, *Cri.* 43B, and *Phd.* 58E, 84E-85B, 114D, 117B.

[271]See too *Comm.* IV.8.3 (καὶ πῶς ἄν τις κάλλιον ἢ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι; ἢ ποῖος ἂν εἴη θάνατος καλλίων ἢ ὃν κάλλιστά τις ἀποθάνοι; ποῖος δ' ἂν γένοιτο θάνατος εὐδαιμονέστερος τοῦ καλλίστου; ἢ ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου;) and *Comm.* III.10.4 ([οἵ τε φροντίζοντες καὶ οἱ μὴ] ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς [τῶν φίλων] ἀγαθοῖς φαιδροί, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς σκυθρωποὶ γίγνονται). The point of the latter quotation is that one's character is revealed in one's expressions (ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι), and in *ibid.* III.10.8 Socrates adds that certain expressions of character are suitable to certain types (e.g. a victor). We can therefore imagine Socrates' deportment here as being appropriately

For his refusal to ingratiate himself with the dicasts, cp. §23, *Comm.* IV.4.4 and Pl. *Ap.* 34B-35B, 38D-39D. Guthrie ([1978] 4:72) observes that Socrates' refusal to stoop to base appeals seems to have been a forensic commonplace (see Gorg. *Pal.* 30).

Note that the narrative both leaves and returns to *oratio obliqua* in this section (cp. §20). It is tempting to suggest that Xen. switches to direct discourse (as in §§22-23, for example) when he is using a source other than Hermogenes and becomes, in essence, the other source's mouthpiece temporarily, but the fact that indirect discourse is not used uniformly throughout Hermogenes' report (see §20) makes this supposition untenable. In fact, the entire account up to the appearance of λέγεται in §28 might very well be based on Hermogenes' testimony.

οὐ γὰρ πάλαι ἴστε ὅτι ἐξ ὅτουπερ ἐγενόμην κατεψηφισμένος ἦν μου ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως θάνατος; This view, i.e., that all mortals are condemned by nature to die, is strangely reminiscent of Xen.'s words on learning of his son Gryllus' death in battle (see D.L. 2.54-55: ἔνιοι δὲ οὐδὲ δακρῦσαί φασιν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰπεῖν, "ᾔδειν θνητὸν γεγεννηκώς") and may in fact have influenced the later tradition.[272] Socrates' admonishment of his followers to stop weeping is similar to the words of Plato's Socrates in *Phd.* 117C-E where, although he provides a different, explicit reason for his irritation at their tears (καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν), there also seems to be an implicit reproval of their apparent unwillingness to be persuaded by his arguments for the immortality of the soul (and, conversely, for the mortality of the body, a line of thought which relates it more closely to the Xenophontic passage under consideration). Note additionally that none of the three post-trial anecdotes in §§27-31 contributes towards establishing Socrates' piety (Strauss [1972] 140).

A number of scholars have pointed out the similarity between the words οὐ γὰρ πάλαι ἴστε κτλ. in this section and a passage in Gorg. *Pal.* 1: θάνατον μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις φανερᾷ τῇ ψήφῳ πάντων κατεψηφίσατο τῶν θνητῶν, ἥπερ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο.[273]

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subdued, as would behoove a philosopher who, though triumphant in the knowledge that his entire life has served as ample proof of his innocence, would nevertheless remain controlled and undemonstrative in his behavior, especially in light of his views on self-restraint (see Sittl 8-9 for ancient attitudes towards overly demonstrative oratory). Socrates' radiant self-satisfaction on leaving court finds a parallel, perhaps, in the Platonic Socrates' concluding sense of conviction that the daimonic's silence can be interpreted as its tacit approval of his actions (Pl. *Ap.* 40A-C: cp. *Ages.* 1.13, where Agesilaus notifies the Persian envoys φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ that the gods are on clearly his side in his dealings with the perfidious Tissaphernes). Gray (p. 139) believes that Socrates' lighthearted demeanor here is intended by Xen. to serve as a counterweight to the predominantly megalegorical tone of the preceding (see Appendix D).

[272]Tejera (p. 155) in fact calls this statement Pythagorizing, Sophistic, and Stoic. See too D.L. 2.35: [ὁ Σωκράτης] πρὸς τὸν εἰποντα, "θάνατόν σου κατέγνωσαν Ἀθηναῖοι," "κἀκείνων," εἶπεν, "ἡ φύσις." Diogenes immediately adds that this remark has been attributed by some to Anaxagoras, and in fact the dicta in D.L. 2.35 & 2.54-55 appear combined in *ibid.* 2.13 (on Anaxagoras).

[273]Geffcken (1934) 2:42 n. 80, Wilamowitz (1897) 104 n. 1, Busse 226, Fritz (1931) 68, Toole 7, Marchant (1949) 963, and Morr 467. Cp. D.L. 2.35.

Morr (pp. 467-68) believes that, since the Gorgias passage is general and the Xen. more specific, it is likely that the latter is borrowed from the former. That a specific passage from Gorg. *Pal.* actually occurred to Xen. (or even Socrates) seems just as plausible as an actual allusion made by Socrates to Palamedes himself in the course of the trial (see §26).

εἰ δὲ χαλεπῶν προσδοκωμένων καταλύω τὸν βίον κτλ.: A recapitulation of Socrates' argument in §§6-8.

28. παρὼν δέ τις Ἀπολλόδωρος κτλ.: Apollodorus the Athenian (*PA* 1453) was the brother of Aeantodorus (Pl. *Ap.* 34A) and is characterized in the sources as being simple-minded (*loc. cit.*) and passionately devoted to his friends (Pl. *Smp.* 173D), especially Socrates (*loc. cit.*: see too *Comm.* III.11.17, Pl. *Smp.* 172C, Pl. *Ap.* 34A-B & *Phd.* 59A-B, 117D).[274]

Apollodorus' outburst in this section resembles that in *Phd.* 117D: Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους, and this, combined with the similar references to the stroking of Apollodorus' hair in this section and of Phaedo's in *Phd.* 89B, has caused Wilamowitz 1) to speak out strongly in favor of Platonic influence, 2) to use this supposed influence, since such clumsy borrowing could not be attributed to Xen., in support of his larger argument for the inauthenticity of Xen. *Ap.*, and 3) to use this conclusion to establish the *Phd.*'s priority of publication.[275] This opinion has since been considered to be unjustified, and I reproduce Wetzel's short assessment of the matter (p. 401) because of his well-founded incredulity: *Aber ich sehe wirklich nicht ein, warum nicht Sokrates außer dem Phädon auch noch einem anderen Schüler über das Haar gestrichen haben kann.*[276] Both Ollier (p. 93) and Arnim (p. 24) also observe that the collocation καταψᾶν τινος τὴν κεφαλήν is not such a rare usage (see

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[274]Additional references include *Comm.* III.11.17, D.L. 2.35, Ael. *VH* 1.16, and Ath. 507A-B; for general information, see Kirchner (1894) *passim.*

[275]Wilamowitz (1897) 101-102: see too Fritz (1931) 67 and Beyschlag 515. Rutherford's argument (p. 48 n. 24), i.e., that Xen. must be borrowing from the *Phd.* passage since Socrates is sitting in that scene, not walking as in the *Ap.*, and that the hair-stroking in the former is therefore a more natural gesture, does not convince me. Scholars have been generally quick to accuse Xen. of plagiarism because of similarities between both authors' *Symposia* (Hackforth 21-22).

[276]See too Hackforth 21-22, Ollier 93, and Arnim 24-25. Arnim, who believes that Socrates perhaps habitually stroked the heads of his followers in a gesture of consolation, strikes a more strident tone (p. 24): *Der von Xenophon und der von Platon erzählte Vorgang haben nichts mit einander gemeinsam als daß Sokrates einem seiner Schüler den Kopf streichelt, nicht Ort, nicht Zeit, nicht Person, nicht Sinn und Bedeutung des Kopfstreichelns.* As Ollier (p. 93) notes, it is only natural that the two ἀπολογίαι should share some similarities since they treat the same subject, and there is therefore no justification in saying that Xen. *necessarily* plagiarized Plato here or elsewhere (see Essay C and Appendix B).

Hdt. 6.61), and Sittl (pp. 33-34) cites other examples of this gentle gesture, which applies not only to teacher and pupil, but also to parent and child, master and slave, master and animal, etc. Breitenbach (coll. 1890-91: see too Busse 226 and Beyschlag 515-16) argues from a different perspective, stating that Ollier and Arnim's remarks ignore the literary aspect of the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί in general, a position which would make the consolation of Apollodorus more of a literary motif.

Note that the narrative in this section is first introduced by the finite verb εἶπεν and then by the impersonal verb λέγεται. One wonders, in fact, if all of the infinitive constructions in §24 ff. can be understood to depend on an implicit λέγεται, especially since Hermogenes has not been mentioned since the very beginning of the work and since there is no parallel to this post-trial account in the *Comm.* Certainly, the impersonal verb now moves the narrative into the realm of mere hearsay (see Chroust [1957] 3).

μᾶλλον ἐβούλου με ὁρᾶν δικαίως ἢ ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκοντα; Cp. Socrates' remark to Xanthippe in D.L. 2.35: τῆς γυναικὸς εἰπούσης, "ἀδικῶς ἀποθνήσκεις," "σὺ δέ," ἔφη, "δικαίως ἐβούλου;" See too Socrates' comment on death in the previous section, the setting for which Diogenes seems also to have confused.

29. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἄνυτον παριόντα ἰδὼν εἰπεῖν κτλ.: Anytus (*PA* 1324),[277] a leading democratic politician at the end of the fifth century (Isoc. 18.23, Xen. *HG* II.3.42 ff., and And. 1.150) and one of Socrates' prosecutors, was born ca. 450 as the son of Anthemion of the deme Euonymon.[278] Anytus made his fortune as a tannery owner (Xen. *Ap.* 29, D.Chr. 55.22, and Schol. ad Pl. *Ap.* 18B) and as a shoemaker (*idem*), both of which occupations made it financially possible for him to gain access to the highest Athenian social circles[279] and to cultivate the friendship of such foreign aristocrats as Meno the Thessalian (*Men.* 90B) as well as relationships with such notable Athenians as Alcibiades, his supposed lover (Plu. *Alc.* 4.4-5, *Mor.* 762C,

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[277]The following summary of Anytus' life has been drawn from Davies (1971) 40-41 and Judeich.

[278]It is possible that the father was identical to the Anthemion mentioned by Aristotle in *Ath.* 7.4 and by Pollux (8.131), though a positive identification cannot be made because the name is known from other demes. There is at least some possibility that there is a relationship to an Anytus of the same deme (*PA* 1325) who served as a syntrierarch in 323, and that the Anytus (*PA* 1321) who proposed an honorarium for Herodotus (Diyllus ap. Plu. *de Herod. mal.* 26) was an older relative of Socrates' accuser, perhaps even his grandfather. In particular, this passage refers to a gift of ten talents made to Herodotus by a certain Anytus (lacking a patronymic), an act which causes Derenne (pp. 127-28) to suggest that, since Herodotus held traditional religious beliefs, Anytus' part in moving that he be so rewarded seems a reflection of his own.

[279]Anthemion had himself amassed a considerable fortune (*Men.* 90A), and his son Anytus is described as τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως...ἀξιούμενον in Xen. *Ap.* 29 (cp. *Men.* 90B: αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν [οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι] ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς). See Derenne (p. 130): *Tel devait être Anytos, un "homo novus", que la richesse avait fait entrer dans une société intellectuellement supérieure à celle qui'il avait connue dans son enfance.*

Satyrus ap. Ath. 534E-F, and Schol. ad Pl. *Ap.* 18B: see too Zeller [1885] 207 n. 2). As a general, he was ordered ca. 409 to rescue Pylos and, after storms had thwarted the mission, was accused of being a traitor, a charge which he supposedly escaped through bribery (D.S. XIII.64.6, Plu. *Cor.* 14.4, and Arist. *Ath.* 27.5: see too Rhodes 344 for problems in dating).[280] After the defeat by Sparta, Anytus sided with Theramenes as a moderate democrat (Arist. *Ath.* 34.3: see Derenne 130), then participated in the rebellion against the Thirty (Lys. 13.78, 13.82 and Xen. *HG* II.3.42, II.3.44), losing a considerable amount of money as a result (Isoc. 18.23), an event which probably occurred during his exile and shortly before his associate Theramenes' downfall (Arist. *Ath.* 34.3); in spite of this, he refused to seek compensation for his losses and was instrumental in restoring the democracy (*idem* and Isoc. 18.23). Although he seems to have had some prior associations with Socrates' followers (e.g. Alcibiades) and possibly even with Socrates himself (see the short dialogue in *Men.* 89E ff.), he eventually fell out with him and later played a prominent role as a member of the prosecution during his trial.[281]

It is interesting to find Anytus in the same year as Socrates' trial involved in a defense of Andocides against a charge of impiety (And. 1.150),[282] a curious *volte-face* due perhaps to the fact that the latter's revelations "had been of service to the democratic party" (Burnet [1968] 153). One tradition holds that Anytus was eventually banished from Athens because of his role in the trial of Socrates and that he traveled to Pontic Heracleia, where he was stoned by the residents (Them. 239C and D.L. 2.43).[283] An Anytus is mentioned in Lysias (22.8-9) as working in the Piraeus as a σιτοφύλαξ, and the family line becomes obscure after Anytus' second exile and death.[284]

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[280]Derenne (p. 128) believes that the bribery story was created as part of the hostile tradition (see note below). See too §20 above, where Feddersen (p. 37) construes the reference to generals as a potential barb directed against Anytus for his failed career as a general during the Peloponnesian War. Feddersen consequently interprets Meletus' following remark (οὕτω γὰρ κτλ.) as an interruption meant to silence Socrates on this point.

[281]Plato's Socrates indicates that he is not so much the victim of Anytus' or Meletus' animosity *per se* (*Ap.* 28A, 22E & 23C) but rather of the general ill will created by Socrates' critical nature (see Zeller [1885] 206-207). This makes the vindictiveness of Xen.'s Socrates seem even more uncharacteristic and more indicative, perhaps, of Xen.'s own acceptance of the eye-for-an-eye ethics appropriate to a καλὸς κἀγαθός (see *Comm.* II.3.14 & II.6.35). Breitenbach (col. 1890) points out that it is only here that Xen. deals with the personality of one of the accusers, and that Anytus is not mentioned elsewhere in his Socratica.

[282]See Rhodes 432, MacDowell (1962) 166, Derenne 129, and Burnet (1968) 153; Brickhouse & Smith ([1989] 28-29) dispute the identification. For the dating of the Andocides trial, see MacDowell ([1962] 204-205), who favors 400 over 399.

[283]Diogenes says elsewhere (6.10) that Antisthenes was responsible for his exile.

[284]Davies [1971] 41. The magistracy is dated variously to before 409 by Judeich, to 388/7 by Wilamowitz ([1893] 375) and also Davies ([1971] 41), who suggests that this refers to his son, to 386 by Arnim (p. 22), and to 385/4 by Chroust ([1957] 17). The Lysias passage has frequently been used to establish a *terminus post quem* for Xen. *Ap.* (see Essay B), though Ollier (pp. 89-90) points out quite rightly that Kirchner ([1901] 1:91-92) lists no fewer than six men named Anytus living between 445 and 323, a fact which makes any identifications problematical (see too Vrijlandt 150-51: Vander Waerdt's arguments for identifying Anytus with the grain official [p. 13 n. 39] are not persuasive).

In order to avoid turning the trial into a political affair, Anytus apparently had Meletus render the indictment and file the affidavit against Socrates (see Pl. *Ap.* 18B, 19AB and D.L. 2.38 & 2.40), using him, in effect, as his mouthpiece; the crucial words τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον in Pl. *Ap.* 18B, however, seem to show that Socrates was well aware of who was behind the accusation.[285] Regardless of Anytus' direct role in events, there is some literary evidence for his possible presence during the trial:

1) There seems to be some reference in Xen. *Ap.* 20-21 to Anytus' failed relationship with his son, a statement which could be interpreted as a direct swipe at Anytus himself;[286]
2) Diogenes Laertius (2.38) states that Anytus possibly wrote the prosecution's speech and, if we accept the emendation suggested for this passage (q.v.), actually delivered it; and
3) the passage in Pl. *Ap.* 29C seems to be a quotation from this speech.[287]

According to Diogenes Laertius (2.38) and Quintilian (*Inst.* II.17.4 & III.1.11), it was actually Polycrates' Κατηγορία that was delivered at the trial, and it has been suggested by Phillipson (pp. 270-71) that the κατήγορος in the *Schutzschrift* may actually refer to the prosecutor, not to Polycrates. It is in fact possible that all three prosecutors spoke in turn against Socrates (see Pl. *Ap.* 23E-24A and D.L. 2.38) and that, because of time constraints, the latter was forced to limit his response to Meletus' arguments only. Because of Anytus' public stature, the prosecution would undoubtedly have been more effective if he had spoken last (Phillipson 268).

Fritz ([1931] 43-44) considers Xen. *Ap.* 29-31 to be an interpolation and disputes the identification with the σιτοφύλαξ on the grounds that it would have been odd for Lysias to bring in Socrates' prosecutor as a supporting witness if he had already attacked him in his own ἀπολογία, and Fritz explains the omission of the patronymic as resulting from the fact that the Anytus in question appeared in court in person. Bluck (p. 119 n. 7) accepts the identification, implying that one of the μέγισται ἀρχαί mentioned in *Men.* 90B might be the σιτοφύλαξ office. Derenne (pp. 129-30 & 178), who also accepts the identification, admits that finding Anytus holding an important magistracy after the trial of Socrates obviously conflicts with the supposed unpopularity of the prosecutors after the trial, but that the negative tradition is very late, and that any change of heart in Athens would have occurred after several generations, after the Socratic literature had had time to exert an influence.

[285]Anytus' influence on the prosecution's brief can be seen by comparing Meletus' remark in Pl. *Ap.* 25A (i.e., that any Athenian would be a better teacher than Socrates) with Anytus' similar opinion on the sophists in *Men.* 92E. For further mentions of Anytus, see Pl. *Ap.* 23E, 25B, 28A, 29B-C, 30B-D, 31A, 34A-B & 36A (see too D.L. 2.38, where some anonymous sources report that Anytus himself wrote the prosecution's speech). One wonders to what extent he can be cast in the role of Odysseus as a foil to Socrates' Palamedes role (see §26). Certainly, the behind-the-scenes manipulation of events bears some comparison to the mythical figure.

[286]Gigon ([1946] 226 ff.) also takes this view. See the comment on §20 and my further remarks below (see too Essay C for an interpretation of this passage as a possible reply to Polycrates).

[287][Ἄνυτος] ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμε δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἤ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην ἤδη ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται. See Wilamowitz [1919] 2:51, Derenne 152, and Chroust [1957] 171.

It would seem, then, that Anytus' political influence at the time was such that his personal animosity towards Socrates and his direct involvement in the trial might have tipped the scales in favor of a guilty-verdict. The motives for Anytus' enmity towards Socrates have been explained in various ways:

1) In the portrayal of him in *Men.* 89E-95A and 99E-100C, Plato indicates that Anytus, who is introduced as currently holding office as a democratic politician (90B), harbored considerable resentment towards Socrates for the latter's allegedly anti-democratic sentiments[288] and identified him at least indirectly with the sophists. (The many references in *Men.* 93A-94E to failed father/son relationships will be considered below.) Irony is evident in Socrates' references to Themistocles and Pericles, who are also disparaged in the *Grg.*,[289] and also in the fact that Anytus was to become one of Socrates' accusers: Indeed, if ἀρετή existed in any of these men, it had to be the result, as the argument of this dialogue maintains, of divine dispensation (Crombie 198-99). Note too Anytus' hypocrisy: He admires past aristocratic leaders yet is a self-avowed democrat, and he condemns sophists yet knows nothing about them (Sharples 19 and Connor 165-66); on the other hand, Socrates' association with philosophers from formerly hostile cities would only have served to strengthen Anytus' position on both counts (Burnet [1924] 184 and Taylor [1911] 17). It is possible that Anytus was still alive when Plato wrote the *Men.*, and this seems to have affected the tone he uses in referring to him: The injunction which Anytus is to receive from Meno (see 100B-C) seems to be a veiled criticism of his fervor in stirring the Athenians against Socrates (seen here in his attitude to the sophists and in his oversensitivity to Socrates' remarks concerning former statesmen), while the treatment of him in Pl. *Ap.*, if not conciliatory, is certainly restrained.[290] While writing the *Men.*, Plato perhaps would have been acquainted with Polycrates' characterization of Anytus in his Κατηγορία, and the *Men.* (see especially §93A5-6) might also have been written at least partly as a response to it.[291] As regards Xen. *Ap.*,

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[288]See especially §95A (see too *Grg.* 521A ff., where Callicles also seems to hint at a potential threat from Anytus). Fritz ([1931] 47) believes that the Anytus presented in the *Men.* becomes annoyed *...weil er glaubt, selbst ein vortrefflicher Politiker zu sein (S. 95A) und außerdem fähig, andere das Gleiche zu lehren.* This, of course, does not correspond to the relationship with his son presented in Xen. *Ap.* 29.

[289]See too *Comm.* IV.2.2, where the nature-vs.-nurture question is applied to Themistocles' behavior as a public figure.

[290]Wilamowitz [1919] 2:147. Chroust ([1957] 202) suggests that Plato was perhaps compensating for the over-abuse of him in the writings of other Socratics.

[291]Wilamowitz [1919] 147 and Sharples 3 & 174. Sharples (p. 169) and J. Morrison (pp. 58 & 76-78) want to identify the Polycrates mentioned in *Men.* 90A with the rhetorician, though the phrase "the wealth of Polycrates" (i.e. the Samian tyrant) might well have been proverbial. For Delebecque's dating of Xen. *Ap.* based on the *Men.*, see Essay B: In general, Delebecque (pp. 217-18) believes that Xen. intended in his *Ap.* to correct Plato's characterization of Anytus in the *Men.*, where the

Wilamowitz ([1919] 2:147) holds that the relevant passage in the *Men.* would alone suffice as an adequate source for the Anytus section, while Vrijlandt (pp. 130-33) takes the opposite position, asserting that the *Men.* passage in question refers directly to Xen. *Ap.* 29-31.

2) Riddell (p. xii) suggests that Anytus bore a lover's grudge against Socrates because the latter, not he, was the true focus of Alcibiades' affection.

3) According to Libanius (*Ap.* 26 & 30-31), Anytus was annoyed by Socrates' constant references to tanners and cobblers and was in fact willing to drop charges if he would desist. Xen. may be referring to this when he mentions the son of Anytus the tanner in his ἀπολογία, and it is more than likely that Libanius' explanation has its origin in Socrates' association with craftsmen (Wilamowitz [1919] 2:146) as well as in his analogies based on the various crafts.[292] It is possible too that, as a *nouveau riche*, Anytus would have been offended by Socrates' remarks concerning the menial sources of his wealth.

4) In the passage under consideration (*Ap.* 29-31), Xen. describes Anytus' hostility as having resulted specifically from Socrates' concern for, and implicitly his potential influence over, the future of Anytus' son, a tanner's son with an interest in philosophy who by Xen.'s account (§31) turned into a drunkard and ne'er-do-well after Socrates' death.[293] As this passage shows, the cause of Socrates' conviction seems to have originated primarily in his teaching of the *artes philosophiae*, not in his politics.[294]

5) On the other hand, it has been proposed by Dittmar (pp. 94-97) that *all* references to the quarrel between Socrates and Anytus, including those appearing in comic writers (see Breitenbach 1891), go back to a seminal λόγος Σωκρατικός. This would essentially remove any genuinely personal element from the Anytus episode and render it a stock theme to be included perfunctorily as part of the growing number of Socratic writings.[295]

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description is not sufficiently disparaging, and points to a precedent in Xen.'s correction in *An.* II.6.21-29 of Plato's flattering portrayal of Meno in the *Men.* (who, one should recall, was also Anytus' friend). In short, it was important that Xen. attack Anytus in his own person in the *Ap.* since he meant to correct Plato's account of him and wanted to address the question of Anytus' son's education directly (see his treatments of education in the *Cyn.* and *Lac.* passim).

[292]For particular references in Xen., see *Comm.* I.2.37 and especially IV.4.5, which might also contain a veiled allusion to Anytus' son (ἐὰν δέ τις βούληται ἢ αὐτὸς μαθεῖν τὸ δίκαιον ἢ υἱὸν ἢ οἰκέτην διδάξασθαι, μὴ εἰδέναι ὅποι ἂν ἐλθὼν τύχοι τούτου). For a creative treatment of the tanner issue, see Dittmar 91 ff.

[293]E. Schwartz (*Fünf Vorträge über den griechischen Roman,* Berlin, 1896, p. 57) seems to have been the first to draw a comparison between the fate of Socrates and that of Tigranes' tutor in *Cyr.* III.1.38, who was executed by his father for supposedly exerting an adverse influence on his charge.

[294]Feddersen 37. Derenne (pp. 136-37) also comments that the reconstruction period after the Peloponnesian War would have placed special demands on the young, who under the circumstances should not have had time for philosophy, yet another possible reason for Anytus' irritation.

[295]Vrijlandt (pp. 133-34) lists various scholars' conjectures (see too Fritz [1931] 48-49, Derenne 133, and Maier 468).

What, then, were Xen.'s motives in appending a relatively lengthy attack on Anytus to Socrates' defense speech? I believe that his motivation was twofold: He wanted 1) to show how Anytus had fallen out of public favor after the execution of Socrates and 2) to point out his failings as a father. The extent to which the first prediction held true can only be gathered from the confusing testimony cited above. It remains, then, to speak briefly of his failings as a father. There are, perhaps, several general clues to be found in the *Men.*: The fact that Socrates goes into great length about Anthemion and says little about Anytus himself (89E-90A) hints at a disparity between father and son and foreshadows the later failure of Themistocles et al. to impart excellence to their sons (Klein 224-25), and the rather prolonged treatment of these relationships would seem to be sufficient to establish at least an indirect reference to Anytus' own paternal shortcomings.[296] It is possible that Xen. also intends here to counter the Aristophanic portrayal of Socrates in which Phidippides, though he acquiesces to Strepsiades' desire that he be indoctrinated at the φροντιστήριον, is ruined by Socrates and ultimately does not live up to his father's expectations of him.[297] It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the attack on Anytus in *Ap.* 29-31, Xen. in *Smp.* 9.1 has Lyco[298] commend Socrates for his beneficial influence on Callias and, indirectly, on Lyco's son Autolycus, while the *Comm.* naturally include many similar instances. In focusing on Anytus in this

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[296]See Schanz 83 & 90-91 and Toole 8. A number of more specific references to this have been detected by various scholars in Plato, namely, by Arnim (p. 22) and Hackforth (p. 76 n. 1) in *Men.* 95A (Ἄνυτος μέν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω· οἴεται γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἷς τούτων), by Wilamowitz ([1897] 100-101) in the Theognis quotation in *Men.* 95D (ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν/συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον), by Vrijlandt (p. 130) in *Men.* 92B (οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα κτλ.), and by Sharples (p. 171) in *Ap.* 24B (the indictment). To this I would add Anytus' abrupt and inexplicably strong reaction to Socrates' statement in *Men.* 94E concerning the inability of Thucydides to impart virtue to his son.

[297]Note that Lamprocles' filial ingratitude is roundly censured by Xen.'s Socrates as an εἰλικρινὴς ἀδικία in *Comm.* II.2.3, and in IV.4.17 he states that sons can best be entrusted to a νόμιμος. For a reference to the inability of fathers, even excellent ones, to instill virtue in their sons, see Pl. *La.* 179C-D. The other father/son relationships in the Socratica which directly involve Socrates show considerable diversity: As mentioned, Lamprocles is eventually won over to his father's point of view in the passage cited. Lyco shows an almost idealized form of paternal devotion towards his son Autolycus in Xen. *Smp.*, as does Demodocus towards Theages in (Ps.-)Plato's dialogue of the same name. In both cases their affection towards their sons is reciprocated (see especially *Smp.* 3.12-13), and both fathers warmly acknowledge Socrates' good intentions. However, in spite of Diogenes Laertius' report to the contrary (2.29), the results of the philosopher's influence on Euthyphro's subsequent behavior towards his father remain unclear, and Aristophanes' Phidippides character is completely corrupted by Socrates' influence. In this respect, provided that Anytus saw the performance of *Clouds* and given the troubled relationship with his own son, the deleterious influence of Aristophanes' Socrates on Phidippides surely must have had some effect, however slight, on his attitude towards the philosopher. With all due respect to Professor Halliwell, and in due consideration of the nature of Attic comedy, I nevertheless maintain, like Plato's Socrates (see *Ap.* 18B ff.), that such images, no matter how preposterous, remain involuntarily embedded in our memories (see n. 222 above).

[298]This Lyco may or may not be identical with the prosecutor of the same name (see Waterfield 221 n. 1).

section of the *Ap.*, then, Xen. seems above all to be intent on providing an example by contrast.[299]

εἰ ἀπέκτονέ με: See *Comm.* III.9.12-13 for the inevitable consequences for leaders who ignore or execute οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες.

οὐκ ἔφην χρῆναι τὸν υἱὸν περὶ βύρσας παιδεύειν: Cp. the phrase ἐπὶ τῇ δουλοπρεπεῖ διατριβῇ in §30 below. The reasons for Socrates' anti-banausic attitude are detailed in *Oec.* 4.2-3.[300] Xen.'s Socrates here expresses the nobleman's conventional disdain for any occupation which would distract him from the serious pursuit of politics and the military (see Pomeroy 235-37), an attitude more appropriate to Xen. himself.[301] Note that this section supports Anytus' accusation in §20.

Fritz ([1931] 46) translates the preceding αὐτόν as a sort of anticipatory pronoun referring to Anytus' son, not to Anytus himself. I see no justification for this (see, for example, H. W. Smyth's *Greek Grammar* §§990 & 1121).

ὡς μοχθηρὸς οὗτος: For other examples of similarly acerbic language from Socrates, see Appendix D.[302] If the appearance of the word μοχθηρός in Pl. *Ap.* can be used as a basis of comparison, Socrates appears to be ranking Anytus among those who voted against him (cp. Pl. *Ap.* 39B: ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν), and it is also possible that Xen. through the use of this word is referring to various Platonic passages concerning the negative effects of associating with the sophists,[303] or perhaps to *Grg.* 521C, where Callicles discusses the prospect of Socrates' being haled before court ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου. Note that the word μοχθηρία appears in Socrates' prophecy concerning Anytus' son in §30 below,

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[299]Ollier, who questions the authenticity of the Anytus section in general (p. 95 n. 1), notes elsewhere (p. 88) that it nevertheless does not constitute a serious digression but continues the previous themes of the *Ap.*: Socrates remains superior to those who have condemned him, and his beneficial effect on the youth is supported by the implication that Anytus' son would in fact have improved under his tutelage. Wilamowitz ([1897] 100), who questions the authenticity of the work as a whole, points out that the introductory verb λέγεται brings the historicity of the Anytus section into even further doubt than the previous Hermogenes device.

[300]See too *Oec.* 6.5, *Comm.* III.7.5-8, IV.2.22, Pl. *Smp.* 203A, *R.* 495D-E, 522B, 590C, *Alc. I* 131A-B, *Tht.* 175E, 176C, and *Lg.* 848A, 919B-C. His arrogance towards artisans and menial labour in general is also evident in Ael. *VH* 2.1, which seems to have been influenced by *Comm.* I.2.9 or a similar passage from Xen. (see above). Fritz ([1931] 47) comments that βυρσοδεψική does not appear among the τέχναι mentioned by Socrates in *Men.* 90C ff.

[301]I agree with Fritz ([1931] 46-47) that it seems uncharacteristic that Socrates, *...der immer mit den* τέχναι *als einem Beispiel festen Wissens exemplifiziert, das Gerberhandwerk als solches zur* δουλοπρεπὴς διατρίβη *gestempelt hätte.*

[302]Delebecque (p. 36) remarks that Xen. treats Anytus neutrally in *HG* II.3.42 since the event occurs earlier historically.

[303]See Pl. *Ap.* 25E and *Men.* 91E & 92D. This would be a sharp riposte indeed when one considers Anytus' strong opinions against them as expressed in the latter work.

emphasizing the direct connection between cause and effect. It is certainly plausible that Socrates addressed some some such remark to Anytus at some point during or after the proceedings, a remark which Vrijlandt (p. 7) reconstructs in a gentler tone as follows: *"Admoneo te ut cautus sis. Magis ingenuus magisque liberalis filius tuus quam ut ex eo coriarius fiat."*

ὁπότερος ἡμῶν καὶ συμφορώτερα καὶ καλλίω εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διαπέπρακται: Cp. the related prediction in §26.

30. ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔστιν οἷς τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου προγιγνώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα: Schanz (pp. 88-89: see too Chroust [1957] 127) remarks that the Cynics' particularly strong predilection for Homer, combined with the reference in D.L. 6.9-10 to Antisthenes' hostility towards Anytus, makes it at least possible that the prophecy concerning Anytus originates in an Antisthenic source of some kind.

Socrates' clairvoyance picks up themes already introduced earlier in the *Ap.*, i.e. his explanation of the daimonic voice (§12-13),[304] his references to the Delphic oracle (§§12 & 14-15), and his prediction concerning the future appraisals of him and Anytus (§26), all of which lend a decidedly mystical aspect to the proceedings[305] and further underscore his seemingly super-human status among men (see Appendix D). Wetzel (pp. 399-400) believes that Socrates' prophecy concerning Anytus' son is to be taken far more figuratively than literally: *Ähnlicher 'Prophezeiungen' hat sich vielleicht mancher von uns auch schon schuldig gemacht*, while Fritz ([1931] 46) is far more sceptical:*Wenn man hier nicht die plumpe Vergröberung von Motiven aus der Socratikerliteratur erkennen kann, so ist dies in den plumpsten der pseudoplatonischen Dialoge auch nicht möglich.*

The description of Socrates' Homeric gift of prophecy as reported in this section seems to be based on two passages in the *Iliad* (16.851-55 & 22.355-63: see

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[304]The opening words of §13 are particularly important in this respect: ἀλλὰ μέντοι καὶ τὸ προειδέναι γε τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ προσημαίνειν ᾧ βούλεται, καὶ τοῦτο, ὥσπερ ἐγώ φημι, οὕτω πάντες καὶ λέγουσι καὶ νομίζουσιν.

[305]This is indeed an issue of great controversy, but if the *Phd.* is at all reliable as a historical source, Socrates seems to have been influenced at least to some extent by Orphism and Pythagoreanism (see Burnet [1911] *passim*). The phrase ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου in particular has a distinctly Orphic resonance (see Burnet [1911] 75) and recalls many of the ideas brought up in the *Phd.* (see §79C ff., for example: see too Burnet [1924] 164 on the belief that temporary clairvoyance becomes possible as the life force is about to rid itself of the body). It is interesting to note that Xen. makes no mention of Socrates' ecstatic spells (see Pl. *Smp.* 220C-D), a mental state which Phillipson (p. 87) explains as involving prolonged periods of contemplation during which Socrates applied his dialectical method to himself, with the daimonic voice acting as a probable stimulus: In short, Phillipson describes the phenomenon as an intellectual process accompanied by ecstatic fervor, and Socrates' *ante mortem* clairvoyance here can best be considered another facet of his visionary nature.

Ollier 119) and resembles Socrates' words in *Ap.* 39C (καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι); both passages in turn are similar in thought to the notion of a "swan-song" as described in *Phd.* 84E-85B.[306] Two questions remain: Is the prophecy spoken in court or to his followers? And is it directed at Anytus or at the court in general? It seems more likely that Socrates, as Plato reports, directed these words in court against those who had condemned him. Note too that Xen. introduces this story (as well as the one about Apollodorus) with λέγεται, which would seem to indicate that Xen. is less willing to vouch for its reliability, and that it is more likely that Xen.'s version would have been distorted by word of mouth, whereas Plato was an eye-witness. In short, these words about future shame would have had far more pathos if actually spoken before the court and would therefore be more appropriate in that setting (Arnim 81-83).

διὰ δὲ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν σπουδαῖον ἐπιμελητὴν προσπεσεῖσθαί τινι αἰσχρᾷ ἐπιθυμίᾳ κτλ.: A close parallel is offered by the example of Alcibiades, whose profligate behavior after his association with Socrates had ended is well documented in contemporary and later sources (see *Comm.* I.2.24, Pl. *Smp.* 216A-C and Plu. *Alc.* 194B-D). *Comm.* I.2.20, I.2.27, and I.2.49-55 defend Socrates directly or indirectly against his allegedly detrimental effect on father/son relationships,[307] and this issue obviously shares much in common with the corruption-of-the-youth charge (see the comment on §10).

We move with this passage out of the realm of the prophetic and are introduced to a more persuasive argument, namely, that Socrates was a good judge of character. In *Comm.* III.1.9 Socrates says that a well-educated man should be expected to know how to distinguish good character from bad, and Vrijlandt (p. 138) finds an excellent parallel to Xen. Ap. 30-31 in *Tht.* 142C-D (on Socrates' quasi-prophecy concerning Theaetetus' future, a prediction based on his actual association with him: καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν).

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[306]See Burnet's notes *ad loc. cit.* For more references to mutual influence between Plato and Xen. concerning Socrates' ability to prophesy, see Breitenbach 1891, Schmid 224-25, Arnim 81 ff., and Busse 226 (see too Vrijlandt [pp.135-36], who draws attention to problems in Plato's version of events). Wilamowitz ([1897] 105) interprets the similarity as evidence that Xen. borrowed freely from the Platonic passage in question and points out elsewhere (p. 103 n. 2) that the description of Socrates as being clairvoyant seems to contradict his inability to advise Xen. on his best course of action regarding the Cyrean expedition (*An.* III.1.5). Wilamowitz' assertion seems contradicted in §13, where Socrates all but states that he has prophetic powers (see Vrijlandt 137, who stresses the usage of ἐξαγγείλας), and Hackforth (p. 17) also counters this with the argument that Xen.'s language is not similar to Plato's and that the contents of the two passages are entirely different: Word of Socrates' prophecy in court was probably a fact or common report, and Xen. and Plato might have recorded it independently of each other.

[307]See too *Cri.* 50E-51A, where the father is said to hold a superior and unassailable position in respect to his offspring.

31. ἀλλ' ὁ νεανίσκος ἡσθεὶς οἴνῳ οὔτε νυκτὸς οὔτε ἡμέρας ἐπαύετο πίνων κτλ.: This contrasts markedly with Socrates' own self-controlled behavior as described in §18 and with his protestations in §19 that he has never been responsible for instilling incontinence and, more particularly, a propensity for dipsomania in his followers.[308] Xen.'s Socrates considers ἐγκράτεια to be a distinguishing characteristic of human beings (see *Comm.* II.1.4, where human vices are compared to the behavior of wild animals), and the failure of Anytus' son to function within the different spheres of human activity mentioned in this section of the *Ap.* (οὔτε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει οὔτε τοῖς φίλοις οὔτε αὐτῷ ἄξιος οὐδενὸς ἐγένετο) corresponds to various passages in the *Comm.*, in particular, to those dealing with the individual's relationship

> 1) to his polis (*Comm.* I.5.1): ἆρ' ὄντινα αἰσθανοίμεθα ἥττω γαστρὸς ἢ οἴνου ἢ ἀφροδισίων ἢ πόνου ἢ ὕπνου, τοῦτον ἂν [στρατηγὸν] αἱροίμεθα;
> 2) to his friends (*ibid.* II.6.1): εἰ δεοίμεθα φίλου ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς ἂν ἐπιχειροίημεν σκοπεῖν; ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν ζητητέον, ὅστις ἄρχει γαστρός τε καὶ φιλοποσίας καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἀργίας; and
> 3) to himself (*ibid.* I.5.3): καὶ γὰρ...ὁ ἀκρατὴς...κακοῦργος μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πολὺ κακουργότερος εἴ γε κακουργότατόν ἐστι μὴ μόνον τὸν οἶκον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φθείρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. (Cp. *ibid.* II.6.1: ὁ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατούμενος οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ δύναιτ' ἂν οὔτε φίλῳ τὰ δέοντα πράττειν.)

It is interesting that, although all three aspects of the secular realm are set out in this sentence, Xen. surprisingly fails to mention the effect of alcohol on Anytus' son's ability to perform his proper duties to the gods, a point which would have further supported Socrates' defense against the impiety charge. Socrates' feelings towards ἀργία and ἀμέλεια come out clearly in *Comm.* I.2.57 and II.7.7, in the latter of which passages these shortcomings of Aristarchus' family are ironically contrasted with the industry demonstrated by another Athenian's slaves, and the uselessness of Anytus' son to those around him would have been considered behavior ill-becoming an ἐλεύθερος ἀνήρ. This section should also be closely compared with §34, where the example of Socrates as ὠφέλιμος offers a direct contrast to that of Anytus' son.

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[308]The results of incontinence are treated generally in *Comm.* I.5, of dipsomania in *ibid.* I.2.22 and *Smp.* 2.24-26 (see too *Comm.* IV.1.3-5, which deals with the problems in educating the young and spirited). Wilamowitz ([1897] 100-101) feels that the fate of Anytus' son is adumbrated in *Men.* 95D, which would make the version in §31 all the more understandable as the result of its influence and allow the work as a whole to be dated to the first half of the 4th century.

καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀγνωμοσύνην ἔτι καὶ τετελευτηκὼς τυγχάνει κακοδοξίας: For traces of a negative post-trial literary tradition concerning Anytus, see the accounts in Arist. *Ath.* 17.5, D.S. 13.64, 14.37, Schol. ad Pl. *Ap.* 18B, Lib. *Ap.* 10, 24-31, *Socratic. Ep.* 14.2, Plu. *Mor.* 538A, 762D, Max.Tyr. 18.6, Them. 239C, and D.L. 2.43, 6.10. Menzel (pp. 41-47 & 60: see too Stone *passim*) may well be correct in saying that posterity has been too harsh on the prosecutors and their motives and that it has fallen prey to the hostile tradition directed against them.[309] Note that Isocrates (18.23) expressly states that Anytus, like Thrasybulus, did not abuse his power to satisfy personal grudges, and it is not unlikely that Anytus truly believed that he was protecting the democracy (Derenne 133-39 and Maier 473).

Wetzel (p. 400: see too Vrijlandt 150) would prefer to omit the second sentence of this section because of its incongruity: The μέν...δέ construction which straddles §§31 and 32 offers no apparent contrast, and Wetzel believes that Xen., *der Feind der athenischen Demokraten,* perhaps later inserted the sentence for personal reasons. The omission of this reference to Anytus' death would allow an earlier dating of the *Ap.* (see Essay B). Beyschlag (p. 507) believes that, contrary to Immisch's opinion, the last sentence in §31 can be retained since a contrast does in fact exist when one looks at the larger context (i.e. καὶ τετελευτηκὼς τυγχάνει κακοδοξίας versus θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι). This is unconvincing, however, since θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι is itself part of a new μέν...δέ construction, and this leaves the previous δέ-clause dangling. Fritz ([1931] 45) holds that Wetzel's omission in this section does not provide a smoother reading, and that the *Ap.* is in fact full of similar inconcinnities. Feddersen (p. 32) also takes issue with Wetzel, commenting that, just as the first part of §31 confirms Socrates' prophetic ability, so the second part confirms what was said in §29 (ὡς μόχθηρος κτλ.).

I feel that the text stands as it is but for reasons other than the aforementioned, namely, that the adversative effect of the μέν...δέ construction consists in the fact that, while Anytus has been condemned by posterity, Socrates in effect condemned *himself* (ἐαυτόν and ἑαυτοῦ) by his megalegorical behavior in court, a reading also supported by the inclusion of μᾶλλον. I see no inconcinnity or incongruity here.

32. Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ τὸ μεγαλύνειν κτλ.: Xen. recapitulates the main theme (see Appendix D) and signals the close of his writing. Note the persuasive effect created by the return to Xen.'s personal narrative voice in this and the preceding sections (ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν οὐκ ἐψεύσατο): The verb μεγαλύνειν is used by the narrator himself and definitively sets forth his final judgment on the proceedings (Tejera 156). Shero

[309] As Maier (p. 468) observes, *die Sokratesjünger hatten an Anytos...grausame Rache genommen,* a predictable development suggested as early as Pl. *Ap.* 39C-D.

(p. 109) believes that Socrates' statement in this section does not necessarily suggest a deliberate provocation of the jury, and that the notion of a suicide inflicted through judicial process is unjustified.[310]

ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι: Busse (p. 226: see too Toole 7 and Beyschlag 515) notes a similarity of this passage with *Phd.* 58E:

> εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ...ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος.

The consolatory tone of this section seems to be directed at least partly towards Xen. himself (Arnim 28), and Hackforth (pp. 40-41) concludes from this that Xen.'s motives for including the μεγαληγορία and willingness-to-die issues in general were obviously personal; additional motives lie in his desire 1) to praise Socrates' bravery in the face of death (§33) as well as his overall σοφία and γενναιότης (§34), and 2) to demonstrate that he was innocent of both indictment charges (§22). This passage in §32, especially the word θεοφιλοῦς, seems to encapsulate Xen.'s own sense of divine justice.[311]

33. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔγνω τοῦ ἔτι ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι αὐτῷ κρεῖττον εἶναι κτλ.: The ambiguity concerning Socrates' motives behind his behavior in court continues here, though these motives can be elucidated, perhaps, by reviewing the pertinent points in his various speeches, namely,

1) that he considered a life well led to be his best defense (§3),
2) that he interpreted the dissuasive influence of the daimonic voice before the trial to mean that he had reached a suitable point in his life at which to die (§4),
3) that he justified this interpretation by considering the fact that he was at the height of his philosophical powers and that he would soon have to face the onset of decrepitude (§§5-8),
4) that he did not rule out the possibility that he would be acquitted but was nevertheless determined to speak frankly (§9),

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[310]Cp. too the defensive tone of *Comm.* IV.4.4, where Socrates' efforts to conform to judicial procedure are emphasized. See the comment on §33 for a final treatment of the suicide question.
[311]See Frick 19: *Simulque hoc ex loco totum libellum etiam, si hoc verbo uti licet, theodiceam quandam esse cognoscis Xenophonti si cui alii profecto convenientem.* What is dear to the gods is discussed at great length in *Cri.* 6E ff. and is defined as εὐπραξία in *Comm.* III.9.15. For the notion of a timely death, see the comment on §7; for a possible reference to Xen.'s belief in an after-life, see *Cyr.* VIII.7.19 ff.

5) that he did in fact do his best to prove his innocence regarding the indictment charges but was unwilling to beg for his life since he felt that his death would be opportune, an attitude borne out by his refusal to propose a counter-penalty (§§22-23),
6) that he continued to protest against the injustice of the sentence even after the ruling had been made and seemed to find some solace in the fact that he would be remembered favorably by posterity (§§24-26),
7) that he consoled his followers by pointing out that every mortal is destined to die and that he would die opportunely (§27),
8) that he consoled Apollodorus in particular by indicating that he was at least not guilty of any criminal behavior, i.e., that he had led a virtuous life (§28), and
9) that Anytus and his son would ultimately suffer the consequences of the court's ruling (§§29-31).

The evidence seems to indicate, then, that Socrates was all but certain that his sentencing and execution were inevitable because of his refusal to compromise his principles in front of the dicasts, and that he was nevertheless determined to convince them of his innocence, an attitude which seemed to spring from his desire to conform to the laws of his city (see *Comm.* IV.4.4). The contradiction apparent in Socrates' adherence to human laws in the *Cri.* and to a higher law in Pl. *Ap.* is explained in the former work, where the personified laws of Athens describe their relationship to the laws in the next world as being one of actual kinship (54C: οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι) and where any corruption of the laws is attributed to human failings (54C-D: νῦν μὲν ἠδικημένος ἄπει...οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων).[312] The divine and human spheres also merge in the two ἀπολογίαι, with each Socrates figure interpreting the presence (or absence) of the daimonic voice to mean that the gods sanction his decision to go through with the legal process in spite of its futility.[313]

οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἐμαλακίσατο κτλ.: Cp. Socrates' composure in *Phd.* 116E ff.; for his refusal to kowtow to the authorities, see §§23 and 27. Several of the words in this section (ῥώμη, μαλακίζειν and, to a lesser extent, προσδέχεσθαι) have a decidedly military flavor to them,[314] indicating that Xen., a soldier himself, wants to

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[312]Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 138-40) find Socrates' strongest statement against civil disobedience in *Cri.* 51B-C and cite the relevant passages in Pl. *Ap.* as follows: 28D, 29B, 19A, 25D, 31E, 32B-C & 35B-C.

[313]The Xenophontic Socrates' refusal to propose a counter-penalty seems exceptional in this regard (see the comment on §23).

[314]There are many examples in Xen. of military contexts for ῥώμη (e.g. *HG* III.4.19, VI.1.15, VII.5.23, *Comm.* IV.2.32, *Oec.* 11.11-13, 11.19, *An.* III.3.14, *Cyr.* I.6.12, IV.2.21, *Ages.* 1.28, 6.8, and *Eq.Mag.* 2.5), while μαλακίζειν often appears in similar contexts in compound forms of the verb (*Oec.* 11.12,

call attention to the fact that Socrates faced death like the good soldier that he once was. For Socrates' fearless attitude towards death, see *Phd.* 58E & 116E ff.

34. οὔτε μὴ μεμνῆσθαι δύναμαι αὐτοῦ οὔτε μεμνημένος μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν: Note the use of μεμνῆσθαι and the related participle, both of which may indicate an intention eventually to write Socratic ἀπομνημονεύματα.[315]

εἰ δέ τις τῶν ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων ὠφελιμωτέρῳ τινὶ Σωκράτους συνεγένετο, ἐκεῖνον ἐγὼ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀξιομακαριστότατον[316] νομίζω: Cp. this last sentence of Xen. *Ap.* with Plato's literary epitaph in *Phd.* 118A:

> ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

The two nouns and single adjective describing Socrates in this final section of Xen. *Ap.* (σοφία, γενναιότης, and ὠφελιμώτερος, the adjective being in essence a superlative) can be compared with Plato's threefold description of his master above as being ἄριστος, φρονιμώτατος, and δικαιότατος.[317] There are indeed some other verbal similarities between §§33-34 and *Phd.* 118A (ἐπετελέσατο ---> τελευτή, ἀρετῆς ---> ἄριστος, and συνεγένετο ---> ἐπειράθημεν), though none seems to justify a claim for direct influence in either direction.[318] Feddersen's rhetorical analysis of the last sentence (p. 33) reveals *duae periodi quaternorum colorum*, a result which he uses to support his thesis that Xen. *Ap.* was an oration meant to be recited (see Essay C for possible rhetorical influences on the work).

Xen.'s choice of the adjective ὠφέλιμος is revealing of his relationship with Socrates and deserves some consideration.[319] A problem for me as a modern

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An. II.1.14, V.8.14, and *Cyr.* II.3.3, III.3.41); the verb προσδέχεσθαι appears in collocations with στρατιά (*Cyr.* III.2.29) and πολέμιοι (*ibid.* IV.2.26 & IV.5.22). Note that Xen. defines ἀνδρεῖοι in *Comm.* IV.6.11 as οἱ...ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι, a concept with special significance for Xen.'s Socrates, who is well aware of the risks involved in his behavior (see §9) and yet manages to use the situation to his ultimate advantage (§32).

[315]See Appendix A and also compare *Phd.* 58D: καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.

[316]Feddersen (p. 19) notes Xen.'s fondness for forming compounds (cp. μετριοπότης and εὐδίαιτος in §19 and προσεθίζειν in §25).

[317]One would expect Xen. to make a more direct reference to the indictment charges (§10) or to the oracle's judgment of Socrates (§14). For Xen., however, σοφία transcends all virtues (see *Comm.* III.9.5), while the qualities of γενναιότης and ὠφέλεια would seem to apply to Socrates' noble bearing at the time of death and to his posthumous appraisal of him by his followers, respectively. As Breitenbach (col. 1892: see too Ollier 111 n. 2) notes, the tone of this final section is encomiastic and the concluding remark an ἀδυνατόν.

[318]This holds in general, a fact which even Vrijlandt (pp. 141-42) is willing to admit.

[319]Cp. Xen.'s use of ὠφελεῖν and related forms in *Comm.* I.3.1 and IV.1.1 to describe his motives in writing his memoirs.

American reader lies in my (admittedly idealized) conception of friendship and marriage as individual relationships originating in such abstractions as affection and love, not as community-based ones founded on such practical considerations as mutual interest and advantage.[320] As a result, Xen.'s views on friendship often seem quite utilitarian. This comes out in the objectives of Socrates' teaching (§§20 & 25) and particularly in his concern in §7 for causing his friends a troublesome death (see Frick 20-21), an attitude which seems all of a piece with the *do-ut-des,* tit-for-tat mentality associated with καλοκἀγαθία.[321] This utilitarian aspect of human relationships comes up quite frequently in the *Comm.*,[322] and it is somewhat tempting to use the brief reference to ὠφέλεια in *Ap.* 34 in support of the latter work's priority over the former, where the subject is treated in greater depth. For Xen., every object is good only inasmuch as it fulfills its purpose; this also holds for traits and abilities.[323] The equating of the good with the useful (see *Comm.* III.8 & IV.6) is understandable when one considers the nature of Xen.'s life, which was literally apolitical and concerned with personal relationships: This makes the good more realizable by bringing it into the personal realm, thereby making it the individual's own responsibility to realize the good for his own benefit.[324]

As opposed to Maier (p. 306 ff.), who strongly criticizes Xen.'s emphasis on ὠφέλεια and compares it with Aristippus' hedonism and the libertinism of Critias and Alcibiades,[325] to Montuori (p. 10), who believes that Xen. pictured Socrates as "a

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[320]My own feelings are no doubt due to being oversaturated by Hollywood pabulum, and I certainly admit that a self-serving element exists in any friendship, at the very least to the extent that we enjoy another's company. According to Xen., love of praise and honor (see *Comm.* III.3.13-14) was the driving social force among the Athenians, as it is in ours.

[321]See the comment on §9. Retaliation against one's enemies follows naturally from this concept. (For examples of its endorsement by Xen.'s Socrates, see *Comm.* II.1.19, II.3.14 & II.6.35; for the Platonic Socrates' rejection of retaliation, see D. Morrison [1987] 16-18 and Vlastos ch. 7 & pp. 297-300).)

[322]*Comm.* II.3 & II.6 are particularly illustrative on this point (see too I.1.16, I.2.15, II.2.5 ff., II.9-10, III.10, III.11.2 ff., IV.2.11, IV.2.25, IV.4.24 and *Oec.* 12.5-8, 20.29). For the usefulness of particular talents, see *Smp.* 3-4; for that of knowledge, see *Comm.* IV.7. The usefulness of the gods is discussed in *Comm.* IV.3.17, and the teleological argument for the existence of a deity is based on the notion of ὠφέλεια as applied to the things provided for mankind's benefit (*ibid.* IV.3.7).

[323]See Nickel 34: *Je besser ein Gegenstand im richtigen Gebrauch seinen Zweck erfüllt, desto wertvoller, nützlicher und schöner ist er.* See *Oec.* 1.1-15, where οἰκονομία is defined as knowledge of the ὀρθὴ χρῆσις of one's property; for a discussion of εὐχρηστία, see *Comm.* III.10.9-15. Even the courageous are described as οἱ...ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι (*ibid.* IV.6.11), while the incompetent man is called οὔτε χρήσιμος οὐδὲν...οὔτε θεοφιλής (*ibid.* III.9.15: cp. *Phdr.* 268A-269B).

[324]For a general treatment of the concept, see Guthrie (1978) 3:462-67 (see too Nickel 34: *...für Xen. gibt es keinen Nutzen ohne Vernunft und Wissen, d.h. Wissen vom rechten Gebrauch der Dinge*). In *Comm.* IV.2.25 ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη χρεία is described as the object of philosophical self-examination, and Nietzsche (pp. 103-104) observes that the Platonic Socrates' no-one-does-wrong-intentionally tenet is ultimately utilitarian (see too *Hp.Ma.* 296B-E for the Platonic equivalence of τὸ ὠφέλιμον with τὸ καλόν).

[325]In comparing the hedonistic attitudes of Critias and Alcibiades with that of Xen.'s Socrates, Maier (p. 308) sees in the latter *...nur eine Verschiedenheit der Lebensklugheit, nicht der sittlichen Lebensanschauung.* Chroust ([1957] 120 & 150-52) is of the opinion that Xen.'s notions of φιλία and ὠφέλεια could ultimately be Antisthenic in nature. Joël (vol. 2 p. 1014) takes exception to this and on

primitive matter-of-fact utilitarian, measuring the good life in terms of expediency and usefulness", and to Joël (vol. 1 p. 437), who speaks of an *Anarchie der Werte*, Nickel (p. 34) feels that Xen.'s philosophy does not represent such a stark utilitarianism. In fact, Xen.'s conception of friendship, though clearly based to a large extent on the notion of "usefulness" (see especially *Comm.* I.2.52-53), is not entirely so: Friendship and intercourse with like-minded souls contribute to the realization of ἐγκράτεια,[326] while Hiero, for example, who as a tyrant does not know genuine friendship, values φιλία more than anything else (*Hier.* 3). Certainly, the prurient aspects of a friendship are not to be overemphasized (*Comm.* IV.1.2 and *Smp.* 8.7-43), and Xen. strikes a rather Hesiodic note in maintaining that sound relationships are based on a sense of mutually beneficial competition (*Oec.* 7.42-43). In general, the criterion for approaching friendships and family relationships should be τὸ ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι (*Comm.* 1.2.55), and Xen. concludes his vindication of Socrates on this particular point (*ibid.* I.2.59-61) by emphasizing the latter's more general belief that every citizen, rich or poor, should be helpful to his polis in every capacity.

Xen.'s concept of human relationships was therefore not quite as rigid as some have supposed, and this growing emphasis on the less utilitarian elements of friendship in particular was a natural development of the times, with a new focus on human values over the more exploitative value of friendships.[327] Nevertheless, some aspects of Xenophontic friendship remain rather jarring, for example, the notion that friends can be considered possessions (*Comm.* II.4 and *Oec.* 1.14) and that prices can be set on the value of various friendships (*Comm.* II.5). In Xen.'s view (*ibid.* I.6.14)

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the basis of *Comm.* II.4 ff. remarks that Antisthenes' concept of friendship is based on φιλανθρωπία, while *...Xenophon...versteht und schätzt am Kynismus den derb praktischen Zug. So findet sich hier in den Lobreden auf die Freundschaft kein lyrischer, geschweige sentimentaler Hauch, nichts von dem Glück der Sympathie, Teilnahme, der Aussprache, des Vertrauens.* He remarks further that *...nichts als der rohe Nutzen ist hier Argument, und der* φίλος, *von dem hier geredet wird, ist im Grunde gar nicht der Freund, sondern vielleicht der Genosse, richtiger aber der Helfer, dessen Nützlichkeit abgeschätzt wird.* In particular, *Comm.* I.2.53-55 has been considered to be Antisthenic in origin, but Busse (p. 219) sees rather an influence from the Academy (see *Phd.* 115E-116A and Arist. *EE* 1235A35 ff.: for considerations of utilitarianism in Plato, see too *Men.* 87E ff., *Ly.* 207D-210D, *Prt.* 356D ff., *Grg.* 474D, *R.* 336C-D, 339B, and *Hp.Ma.* 296B-E).

[326] *Comm.* II.6.5 (see too IV.5.10). Nickel (p. 28) comments that it is surely intentional that the Aristippus section in *Comm.* II is followed by dialogues concerning the value of friendship, and he traces a direct line of development leading from Socrates' *Apolitie* to his ἐγκράτεια to his notion of φιλία. Note too that Xen.'s Socrates (*Comm.* II.6.14) considers one's own goodness to be a pre-condition for winning the friendship of others.

[327] See Jaeger ([1944] 2:108), who notes elsewhere (vol. 2 p. 57) that a whole literature concerning friendship arose in the post-Socratic schools of philosophy. For a lengthy discussion of utilitarian φιλία in Xen., see Joël (vol. 2 pp. 1030-53), who defines it generally (vol. 2 p. 1030) as *die Kunst des* ἀρέσκειν. Ribbing (p. 107) strikes a nice balance on the issue: *Wenigstens bei mehreren unter den Sophisten war dieser nämlich ein sozusagen offenbarer und direkter, auf die gröberen sinnlichen Genüsse des einzelnen Subjektes gerichteter [Eudaemonismus], wohingegen der xenophontische Sokrates uns einen, durch die Richtung auf das Wohl Anderer und der Gesellschaft als Mittel für feinere Genüsse, gleichsam verborgenen und so durch einen Umweg zu seinem Ziel gelangenden Eudaemonismus zeigt, welcher eben damit was die äußeren Wirkungen des Handelns betrifft, wirkliche Tugend nachahmt.*

making friends was never to be driven by purely mercenary motives,[328] however, and more sympathetic aspects of friendship are in fact occasionally revealed in his writings, as for example in Socrates' words of concern for a friend in *Comm.* II.7.1:

> Ἀρίσταρχον γάρ ποτε ὁρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα, Ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίσταρχε, βαρέως φέρειν τι. χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.

Note that, since Socrates is in no position to compensate his friends materially for their favors (see §17), it is clear that the basis for his relationships with his followers cannot be a purely utilitarian one. Konstan, drawing largely from Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, offers a number of general observations that confirm this. In general, he notes (p. 13) that the fact that there are practical advantages to friendship "does not necessarily reduce it to a set of transactions based on interest and obligation rather than selfless affection", and more specifically that "ancient treatments of friendship also regularly subordinate its instrumental value to more disinterested motives" (*idem*: see Arist. *EN* 1155B31 ff.). In short, even though the ancients did not act according to the modern concept of the individual, they nevertheless recognized "a domain of human sympathy uncontaminated by the desire for personal advantage or gain" (pp. 13-14).[329]

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[328]Recall that Xen. nevertheless accepted Proxenus' offer partly in order to become Cyrus' friend and that he chose Agesilaus' friendship over allegiance to his own fatherland (Nickel 28-29).

[329]For a fuller discussion of ancient vs. modern friendship, see Konstan 14-18. Konstan (p. 72), citing Arist. *EN* 1156A10-22, notes that the origin of φιλία can in fact be utility, but that "the affection is not reducible to the mutual appreciation of one's serviceability". Aristotle elsewhere (*EN* 1162B5-21) distinguishes the types of φιλία based on virtue and pleasure from that based solely on utility and observes that the latter type of relationship is inherently problematical (see Konstan 78).

Appendix A: A Comparison with Xenophon's Ἀπομνημονεύματα

Parts of the *Ap.* are practically identical to a number of passages in the *Comm.*, a fact which has been used in various attempts 1) to establish a sequence of publication for the two works and/or 2) to prove that the former is simply a patchwork forgery based on the latter. General similarities between the *Ap.* and *Comm.* are as follows: 1) The material presented is based on Xen.'s own recollections, and each work is written in opposition to other opinions on the same topic, 2) an air of objectivity and preciseness is created by alluding to a source or sources, 3) Xen. sums up his opinion of Socrates in each conclusion, and 4) both conclusions have a defensive, challenging tone.[1] In comparing the two works, it is important to bear in mind the purpose of each: The *Ap.* will be more overtly defensive than the *Comm.* since it supposedly refers to events at the trial and is placed in the mouth of Socrates himself, while the issue of μεγαλῃγορία, so crucial to the *Ap.*, is not even considered in the *Comm.* (see Appendix D). In any case, the *Comm.* represent a more expansive version of the topics brought up in the *Ap.*, and I would here anticipate the issue of authenticity treated below and in Essay A by asserting that, on the basis of common thematic elements alone, the works are so closely related that the *Ap.* can only be attributed to Xen.

The corresponding portions of the *Comm.* are I.1-2 (the so-called *Schutzschrift*)[2] and IV.8.[3] In what follows I have juxtaposed the relevant passages from both works as the basis for each set of comments:

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[1]For the notion that the *Ap.* was at one time literally connected to the *Comm.* in some published form, see the comment on *Title*. (Richards seems to be alluding to this when he states that the *Ap.* is "not strictly a chapter or integral part [of the *Comm.*], but rather a closely connected pendant".) For an exhaustive treatment of the correspondences between the two works, see Frick 21-33 & 39-51. P. Meyer (col. 720) accounts for the general differences as follows: *Aus [dem Bericht des Hermogenes] nahm Xenophon zweimal seinen Stoff, einmal als er zeigen wollte, daß es dem Sokrates bei seiner Verteidigung nur darauf angekommen sei zu zeigen, daß ihn keine subjektive Schuld treffe und daß Sokrates zum Tode entschlossen gewesen, das andere Mal, al er zeigen wollte, daß Sokrates selbst seinen Tod als Glück für sich betrachtet habe.*

[2]So called because of the belief that it was originally published separately (see, for example, Maier 22 and also 25 n. 1, where he notes that the ἀπομνημονεύματα proper seem actually to begin at *Comm.* I.3.1). Busse (pp. 215-21) divides the *Schutzschrift* into three parts arranged sequentially as follows: Part One (I.1.1-I.2.8), a defense against the indictment which shows no indication of Polycrates' influence, Part Two (I.2.9-16 & I.2.49-64), a defense against Polycrates' charges [see Essay C], and Part Three (I.2.17-48), a defense against Socrates' negative influence on Alcibiades and Critias which shows the influence of Antisthenes and Aeschines. [The sequence of Socratic or other quotations in the *Comm.* does not, of course, contribute to any conclusions about the publication sequence of any of its parts or of the entire work vs. the *Ap.*] Busse adds (pp. 228-29) that the characterization of Socrates in the *Ap.* is totally inconsistent with that in the *Schutzschrift* and can be explained by Xen.'s outrage over the verdict.

[3]Arnim (p. 48) holds that *Comm.* IV.8 in general is surely genuine since a forger could have finished the speech without plundering the *Ap.* for material, while Xen. would have been more likely to plunder the *Ap.* himself once he had recognized, and felt compelled to vie with, the superior quality of Pl. *Ap.*, which probably exerted some influence on him in his revision of the original material. Edelstein (p. 134) distinguishes between the two pertinent sections of the *Comm.* as follows: *Während aber dort [d.h. in Comm. I.1-2] nach den Argumenten gefragt wurde, die die Richter überzeugt haben könnten,*

Ap. §§2-6: [2] Ἑρμογένης μέντοι ὁ Ἱππονίκου ἑταῖρός τε ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξήγγειλε περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα ὥστε πρέπουσαν φαίνεσθαι τὴν μεγαληγορίαν αὐτοῦ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἔφη ὁρῶν αὐτὸν περὶ πάντων μᾶλλον διαλεγόμενον ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης εἰπεῖν· [3] Οὐκ ἐχρῆν μέντοι σκοπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ὅ τι ἀπολογήσῃ; τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνασθαι· Οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι ἀπολογεῖσθαι μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτὸν ἐρέσθαι· Πῶς; Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄδικον διαγεγένημαι ποιῶν· ἥνπερ νομίζω μελέτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀπολογίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν πάλιν λέγειν· [4] Οὐχ ὁρᾷς τὰ Ἀθηναίων δικαστήρια ὡς πολλάκις μὲν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλάκις δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οἰκτίσαντες ἢ ἐπιχαρίτως εἰπόντας ἀπέλυσαν; Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, φάναι αὐτὸν, καὶ δὶς ἤδη ἐπιχειρήσαντός μου σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον. ὡς δὲ αὐτόν εἰπεῖν· [5] Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις, τὸν δ' αὖ ἀποκρίνασθαι· Ἢ θαυμαστὸν νομίζεις εἰ καὶ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ ἐμὲ βέλτιον εἶναι ἤδη τελευτᾶν; οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην <ἂν> βέλτιον ἐμοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ὅπερ γὰρ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν, ἡδειν ὁσίως μοι καὶ δικαίως ἅπαντα τὸν βίον βεβιωμένον· ὥστε ἰσχυρῶς ἀγάμενος ἐμαυτόν ταὐτὰ ηὕρισκον καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὶ συγγιγνομένους γιγνώσκοντας περὶ ἐμοῦ. [6] νῦν δὲ εἰ ἔτι προβήσεται ἡ ἡλικία, οἶδ' ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἔσται τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν τε χεῖρον καὶ ἀκούειν ἧττον καὶ δυσμαθέστερον εἶναι καὶ ὧν ἔμαθον ἐπιλησμονέστερον. ἂν δὲ αἰσθάνωμαι χείρων γιγνόμενος καὶ καταμέμφωμαι ἐμαυτόν, πῶς ἄν, εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ἔτι ἂν ἡδέως βιοτεύοιμι;

Comm. IV.8.4-8: [4] λέξω δὲ καὶ ἃ Ἑρμογένης τοῦ Ἱππονίκου ἤκουσα περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἔφη γάρ, ἤδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γραφήν, αὐτὸς ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης διαλεγομένου λέγειν αὐτῷ ὡς χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἀπολογήσεται. τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν· Οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι τοῦτο μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὅπως, εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιῶν διαγεγένηται ἢ διασκοπῶν μὲν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος, ἥνπερ νομίζοι καλλίστην μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι. [5] αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν εἰπεῖν· Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέλυσαν; Ἀλλὰ νὴ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. [6] καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν· Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δέ, Θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἤδη; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἐγὼ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἂν οὔτε βέλτιον οὔθ' ἥδιον ἐμαυτοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ἄριστα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ζῆν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθαναμένους ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται. [7] ἃ ἐγὼ μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἠσθανόμην ἐμαυτῷ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους παραθεωρῶν ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω διατετέλεκα περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ γιγνώσκων· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐμοὶ φίλοι οὕτως ἔχοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ διατελοῦσιν, οὐ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐμέ, καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοῦντες οὕτως ἂν εἶχον πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φίλους, ἀλλὰ διόπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἂν οἴονται ἐμοὶ συνόντες βέλτιστοι γίγνεσθαι. [8] εἰ δὲ βιώσομαι πλείω χρόνον, ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν ἧττον καὶ διανοεῖσθαι χεῖρον καὶ δυσμαθέστερον ἀποβαίνειν καὶ ἐπιλησμονέστερον, καὶ ὧν πρότερον βελτίων ἦν, τούτων χείρω γίγνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ταῦτά γε μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ μὲν ἀβίωτος ἂν εἴη ὁ βίος, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη χεῖρόν τε καὶ ἀηδέστερον ζῆν;

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und deren Nichtigkeit dargetan wurde, wird jetzt [d.h. in Comm. *IV.8] nach den inneren Gründen gefragt, die den Tod des Sokrates bestimmten.* Feddersen (p. 34: see too Fritz [1931] 54) considers it worthwhile to mention Richter's thesis, i.e., that the *Comm.* were recitations which were originally collected posthumously, a thesis that would account for the inconsistencies within the *Comm.* itself and for the similarities between the *Comm.* and the *Ap.*

In terms of language alone, these two passages correspond to each other to a remarkable degree, with any immediate differences being due to their respective settings, an obvious example of which is the omission of the words ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οἰκτίσαντες ἢ ἐπιχαρίτως εἰπόντας in the *Comm.* version, words more appropriate to a forensic milieu.[4] A more puzzling difference lies in the omission in the *Comm.* of the word δὶς in reference to Socrates' divinely thwarted efforts to prepare a formal defense before the trial, and in the use in this context of the the aorist tense instead of the present (μου ἐπιχειροῦντος...ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον versus δὶς ἤδη ἐπιχειρήσαντός μου...ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον in the *Ap.*).[5] This difference might be explained by Xen.'s desire to stress the continuing presence of the daimonic throughout the period leading up to the trial and consequently to offer this as a stronger refutation of the impiety charge; the words διασκοπῶν μὲν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος in *Comm.* IV.4.4 seem to have been written with the same intention. The formulation οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταί in the following section is also more damning that the neutral τὰ Ἀθηναίων δικαστήρια in *Ap.* 4. In *Comm.* IV.8.6 ἥδιον appears in addition to βέλτιον in anticipation of the subsequent (and somewhat mitigating) explanation of the astonishingly immodest view set forth by Socrates in the *Ap.* (οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην <ἂν> βέλτιον ἐμοῦ βεβιωκέναι;).[6] In *Ap.* 6

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[4]It should be added that the prooemium of the *Ap.* is more elaborate since it functions as an introduction, whereas the corresponding *Comm.* passage has more of a connecting function (Delebecque 219).

[5]For the use of δὶς, see Busse 225. In comparing *Ap.* 3-4 with *Comm.* IV.8.5, Arnim (pp. 33-34) notes that the nature of Socrates' defense is not germane to the *Comm.*, hence any mention of οἶκτος and χάρις is dropped, and that the durative quality of the passage has perhaps been changed because Xen. saw as a shortcoming Socrates' hesitation to obey τὸ δαιμόνιον. Note that the tense changes to the imperfect in §8 (ὀρθῶς δὲ οἱ θεοὶ τότε μου ἠναντιοῦντο κτλ.), a change which simply indicates a different perspective regarding the commencement of the trial (see Fritz [1931] 51-52).

[6]Busse (p. 224) sees this as one of several expansions of what originally appeared in the *Ap.* and accordingly decides for the latter's priority. Arnim (p. 34 ff.) has the following remarks to make on these corresponding passages:

> 1) Καί is omitted before τῷ θεῷ in the *Comm.* to lay emphasis on the divine role in events and to remove the notion of deliberation, a revision which causes Socrates to equate the best life with the most pleasant and which can only be seen as a morally questionable and limiting conclusion.
> 2) Xen. was influenced by Pl. *Ap.* 29D-30B & 36C (cp. the similar wording), where Plato emphasizes the difference between the virtuous life and the pleasant.
> 3) The *Ap.* lacks a succinct statement of Socrates' activity as a teacher, hence its inclusion in the revision.
> 4) Xen. applies Socrates' protreptic injunction to Socrates' own claim that he has lived the best life possible.
> 5) Neither the ability for nor the awareness of self-improvement will survive the degeneration of the body, hence the fuller and more consistent version in the *Comm.*
> 6) Οἱ συνόντες also refers to friends and acquaintances.
> 7) The *Comm.* passage has to do not only with Socrates' ethos but also with his primacy in striving for self-improvement.
> 8) His followers' affection as a motivation does not appear in *Comm.* I.2.3.

the emphasis is on Socrates' advancing age (νῦν δὲ εἰ ἔτι προβήσεται ἡ ἡλικία), not only on living (cp. εἰ δὲ βιώσομαι πλείω χρόνον in *Comm.* IV.8.8), while in the same section of the *Comm.* the adverb ἴσως places equal emphasis on all of the various aspects of senescence, a condition accentuated by the further inclusion of διανοεῖσθαι χεῖρον and ἀποβαίνειν.[7] The opening clause in *Ap.* 6, with its βελτίων/χείρω antithesis and the quasi-Platonic ἀβίωτος ἂν εἴη ὁ βίος,[8] appears in a considerably longer form in *Comm.* IV.8.8. The corresponding question concluding both passages appears in an altered form in the *Comm.* inasmuch as χεῖρον is added and the adverb ἡδέως of the *Ap.* passage appears as the negative ἀηδέστερον.

Ap. §10: ...ἐπειδὴ κατηγόρησαν αὐτοῦ οἱ ἀντίδικοι ὡς οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζοι, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέροι καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείροι, παρελθόντα εἰπεῖν κτλ.

Comm. I.1.1: ...Ἀθηναίους ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην ὡς ἄξιος εἴη θανάτου τῇ πόλει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφὴ κατ' αὐτοῦ τοιάδε τις ἦν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

See my remarks on the indictment *ad loc.* My purpose here is simply to compare the way in which each version is presented. In the *Ap.*, Socrates has just elaborated on his reasons for not preparing a formal defense and, after an abrupt transition,[9] appears in court disposed as previously described (οὕτως δὲ γνόντα). The versions of the indictment itself are practically identical, with the principal difference being the fact that the impiety and corruption-of-the-youth charges are closely joined in the *Ap.*,

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9) The inclusion of the self-improvement element supports the argument for the priority of the *Ap.* over the *Comm.* and seems influenced by Pl. *Ap.*, where Socrates compares himself with others and always comes out as the wisest (in that he is aware of his own ignorance).

[7]The addition of ὧν ἔμαθον in *Ap.* 6 points forward to the words μανθάνων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν in §16.

[8]Hackforth (pp. 24-26) accounts for the antithesis by maintaining that Xen. has apparently misunderstood his own model (i.e. *Ap.* 6), though this does not necessarily mean that the result is nonsense: Xen. has imported into the *Comm.* the possibility of moral deterioration, hence Hackforth's contention that this development in Xen.'s thinking presupposes the priority of the *Ap.* Arnim (pp. 45-46) believes that the influence of Plato's unexamined life is evident in the *Comm.* passage, though Xen. limits this to the physical plane only.

[9]Fritz ([1931] 52-54), who denies the Xenophontic authorship of the *Ap.* and believes that the work is a patchwork made up of different elements drawn from the *Comm.*, uses the abrupt transition from §9 to §10 to support this thesis, arguing as follows: The sudden transition shows that the initial speech was held right before the trial. The version in *Comm.* IV.8.4 presents a more convincing scenario than a conversation held right before the trial, since Socrates' dilatory behavior would have been more conspicuous to followers like Hermogenes over a longer period of time. Moreover, it seems forced for Socrates to consider such a question right before the trial, and the fact that Socrates is discussing another subject would not necessarily cause Hermogenes to reach the conclusion he does. This narrative maladroitness can be explained by the writer's desire to have an excerpt from Socrates' speech follow the Hermogenes conversation, which could only be accomplished by juxtaposing the two elements temporally. Since, according to Fritz, it is unlikely that an interpolator would have inserted an improved version of this conversation into *Comm.* IV.8, the priority issue seems to be resolved.

while they are quite distinctly separated in the *Comm.* through the repetition of the verb ἀδικεῖ.[10] In general, the *Ap.* focuses primarily on the accusation (κατηγόρησαν, ἀντίδικοι), while the *Comm.* is more concerned with the arraignment (γραψάμενοι, γραφή), the capital nature of the charge (θανάτου), and the responsibility of the prosecutors and the Athenians for their role in the trial ('Αθηναίους ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι κτλ.). Gigon (p. 231) is no doubt correct in saying that the *Ap.* has no connection with *Comm.* I.2.9-61 since the latter concerns itself more broadly with the two indictment charges, and the effect is one of an account written with far less immediacy and at a greater distance from the actual events than the *Ap.*, an effect considerably enhanced by the somewhat tentative citation of the charges in the former (ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφὴ κατ' αὐτοῦ **τοιάδε** τις ἦν).

Ap. §§11-13: [11] 'Αλλ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοῦτο μὲν πρῶτον θαυμάζω Μελήτου, ὅτῳ ποτὲ γνοὺς λέγει ὡς ἐγὼ οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω· ἐπεὶ θύοντά γέ με ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων βωμῶν καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες ἑώρων καὶ αὐτὸς Μέλητος, εἰ ἐβούλετο. [12] καινά γε μὴν δαιμόνια πῶς ἂν ἐγὼ εἰσφέροιμι λέγων ὅτι θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται σημαίνουσα ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν; καὶ γὰρ οἱ φθόγγοις οἰωνῶν καὶ οἱ φήμαις ἀνθρώπων χρώμενοι φωναῖς δήπου τεκμαίρονται. βροντὰς δὲ ἀμφιλέξει τις ἢ μὴ φωνεῖν ἢ μὴ μέγιστον οἰωνιστήριον εἶναι; ἡ δὲ Πυθοῖ ἐν τῷ τρίποδι ἱέρεια οὐ καὶ αὐτὴ φωνῇ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ διαγγέλλει; [13] ἀλλὰ μέντοι καὶ τὸ προειδέναι γε τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ προσημαίνειν ᾧ βούλεται, καὶ τοῦτο, ὥσπερ ἐγώ φημι, οὕτω πάντες καὶ λέγουσι καὶ νομίζουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν οἰωνούς τε καὶ φήμας καὶ συμβόλους τε καὶ μάντεις ὀνομάζουσι τοὺς προσημαίνοντας εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο δαιμόνιον καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι οὕτως ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀληθέστερα καὶ ὁσιώτερα λέγειν τῶν τοῖς ὄρνισιν ἀνατιθέντων τὴν τῶν θεῶν δύναμιν. ὥς γε μὴν οὐ ψεύδομαι κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχω τεκμήριον· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φίλων πολλοῖς δὴ ἐξαγγείλας τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβουλεύματα οὐδεπώποτε ψευσάμενος ἐφάνην.

Comm. I.1.2-4: [2] Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς, ποίῳ ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν. διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. [3] ὁ δ' οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κἀκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. [4] ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοί φασιν ὑπό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντώντων ἀποτρέπεσθαί τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι· Σωκράτης δ' ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

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[10]The *Ap.* version would support the view that the two charges were in fact related (see the comment on §10). Note that the refutation of the impiety charge is twice as long as that of the corruption charge in the *Ap.* and vice versa in the *Comm.* (Strauss [1972] 133-34). If the *Comm.* were in fact written after the *Ap.*, this might be explained by the increasing salience of the corruption-of-the-youth charge in the years following the trial (see Aeschin. *contra Timarch.* 173).

In both passages four items appear in the same order: Socrates' adherence to the state cult, a comparison of his daimonic voice with other forms of divination, a justification for Socrates' use of the formulation τὸ δαιμόνιον, and a proof of its efficacy.[11] Delebecque (p. 220) notes Xen.'s more direct role in the narrative of the *Comm.* and the fact that, whereas Socrates interrupts his plea in the *Ap.*, Xen. lengthens it in the *Comm.* while adding some considerations of his own. If Hermogenes is in fact a Xenophontic persona (see the comment on §2), this might well be reflected in Xen.'s more conspicuous presence here.

Again, the setting of each passage plays a key role in how each is presented. Socrates addresses his words regarding the issue of the state cult to Meletus directly, expressing his incredulity at the nature of the charge and pointing out that his orthodoxy was apparent to everyone, including the prosecutor, if he had ever bothered to look.[12] The *Comm.* passage is more emphatic, laying more stress on the conspicuousness of Socrates' religious practices (φανερὸς ἦν)[13] and on their frequency (πολλάκις...πολλάκις); the phrase ταῖς κοιναῖς ἑορταῖς in the first passage does not appear in the second, which refers to the fact that Socrates performed sacrifices at home (οἴκοι) as well as in public (ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων βωμῶν and ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, respectively). The issue of divination is introduced in the *Ap.* passage with a rhetorical question leading to various examples of religious practices comparable with τὸ δαιμόνιον, while Xen. presents the issue more deductively in the *Comm.* 1) by averring that Socrates did indeed practice a form of ἡ μαντική and 2) by expressly stating the μαντική/δαιμόνιον equivalence at the outset and using examples in support of his conclusion, adducing more examples in the *Ap.* passage.[14] The distinction between the various media (φθόγγοι οἰωνῶν, φῆμαι ἀνθρώπων κτλ.) and the ultimate source of his inspiration (τὸ δαιμόνιον) is made

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[11]Feddersen (pp. 35-36) focuses in particular on the daimonic in comparing the *Ap.* with the *Comm.*: *...ut aliud sit Apologiae Xenophonteae* δαιμόνιον, *aliud Memorabilium, cum illo divinum omnino quiddam, hoc ipse deus significetur.* According to Feddersen, the true nature of the daimonic is somewhat concealed in the *Comm.*, which are more concerned with defending Socrates against the charge of not participating in the public cult, and which also focus more on refuting the charges of impiety and "scientism" in addition to being more concerned with the issues of education and service (*opera*).

[12]Arnim (pp. 55-56) notes that in *Comm.* I.1.2 Xen. uses these words to defend Socrates with no indication of any quotation (i.e. as if they are his own), while in *Ap.* 11 Socrates uses them himself: This would consequently place the *Ap.* in an unfavorable light, hence its priority over the *Comm.* In general, Arnim (p. 56 ff.) finds the *Ap.* section to be better organized than the corresponding *Comm.* passage, a fact due, according to his argument, to a lack of accuracy caused by the long interval between the writing of each work.

[13]Cp. *Comm.* I.1.10 & I.1.17. Plato makes no mention of public sacrifices (see Wetzel 390).

[14]See Appendix C. No mention is made of a private cult in the *Ap.*, and the daimonic is dismissed as being nothing new, whereas in the *Comm.* both are connected with soothsaying (note too the reference to the Pythian priestess, which anticipates the allusions to Delphi in §§14-15). According to Gigon (pp. 221-22), the *Ap.* offers a tighter defense in this respect than the *Comm.*, and he notes further that more emphasis is placed on Socrates' piety in the former than in the latter.

clear in both passages,[15] but whereas the focus in the *Ap.* passage remains on the clairvoyant aspect of Socrates' inner voice (προειδέναι...προσημαίνειν....προσημαίνοντας), the *Comm.* emphasize the apo- and protreptic sides of the phenomenon.[16] The δαιμόνιον label is justified in the *Ap.* as being used ἀληθέστερα καὶ ὁσιώτερα than other designations inasmuch as it more accurately expresses "the divine force" (ἡ τῶν θεῶν δύναμις).[17] Finally, the distinction made in the two passages between clairvoyance and the apo-/protreptic quality of the daimonic voice is sustained in the proofs of its existence, which respectively stress those qualities of the daimonic.[18]

Ap. §17: ὡς δὲ οὐ μάτην ἐπόνουν οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν καὶ τάδε τεκμήρια εἶναι, τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν πολίτας τῶν ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων, πολλοὺς δὲ ξένων, ἐκ πάντων προαιρεῖσθαι ἐμοὶ ξυνεῖναι;

Comm. IV.8.11: τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν.

This comparison is admittedly more tenuous than the others, but besides the identical phrases τῶν ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων and οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι, the sense of both passages is also quite similar, i.e., Socrates' influence on the community was obvious in the manifest interest of virtue-seekers in associating with him. The *Comm.* refer to

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[15]In the *Comm.* passage Xen. makes it clear to the reader that soothsayers were well aware of the distinction. As Fritz ([1931] 62) observes: *Ist das wörtlich und in dem Sinne gemeint, als ob die Leute glaubten, es sei wirklich der Vogel usw., der aus eigenem Wissen und Willen den Menschen die Zukunft anzeige, so ist die Behauptung einfach absurd,* and Socrates' reasons for calling these phenomena τὸ δαιμόνιον seem strangely ambiguous.

[16]See Busse (p. 216), who observes that the daimonic is described as a φωνή in the *Ap.*, while this is not the case in the corresponding *Comm.* passage. Arnim (p. 61) points out that, if there was in fact nothing unusual about the daimonic voice, and if it is truly a φωνή, then any Athenian could have perceived it, hence its altered version in the *Comm.*, where the contradictions are diminished or removed altogether; in this view, the inclusion of the word φωνή in the *Ap.* must be based on insufficient information. Frick (p. 68) remarks that, since Xen.'s more Platonic account of the daimonic in *Comm.* I.1.3-4 diverges considerably from that in Xen. *Ap.*, the latter account must be fictional. Gigon ([1946] 221-22) thinks that the shift in emphasis from σημαίνειν in the *Comm.* to φωνή and τὸ δαιμόνιον in the *Ap.* reflects the influence of one of the Socratics, not necessarily Plato. For Fritz ([1931] 57-61), the crucial words in the *Comm.* passage are Σωκράτης δ' ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν, by which Xen. means to say that the manifestation of the daimonic was something other than an audible voice. Fritz (p. 63) accounts for the inconsistencies between the corresponding passages by suggesting the existence of a forger: *Was in der Apologie steht, ist überhaupt nur aus einem Mißverständnis der entsprechenden Stelle der Memorabilien zu erklären. Dann aber kann der Verfasser der Apologie nicht Xenophon sein.* On this point Richards (p. 108) comments, however, that a copyist "would probably have varied less or very much more". For the nature of the daimonic in general, see Appendix C; for the question of authenticity, see Essay A.

[17]Wetzel (pp. 390-91) believes that Socrates originally said, in accordance with Plato's version, *"Etwas Göttliches zeigt mir die Zukunft an",* which becomes *"die Gottheit"* in *Ap.* 12 and *Comm.* I.1.3 ff. Wetzel (pp. 395-97) accounts for the differences between the two passages by maintaining that Xen. considered the Platonic version to be credible, and further maintains that Xen. adopted Plato's use of the daimonic simply to disprove Socrates' atheism.

[18]See Pl. *Thg.* 128D and *Phdr.* 242D (see too Arnim 63-64 and Wetzel 391 for their treatments of this distinction). That the daimonic voice did not advise any of Socrates' friends seems confirmed by the lack of a single example in either Xen. or Plato (see Appendix C).

πάντες, while the *Ap.* refers specifically to foreigners, a puzzling reference if in fact a xenophobic atmosphere prevailed in Athens after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War. The *Comm.* lay particular stress on the utilitarian benefits of any association with Socrates, an important topic of the *Comm.* in general (see *Ap.* 34 and my comment *ad loc.*).

Ap. §19: ....σὺ δὲ εἰπὲ εἴ τινα οἶσθα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γεγενημένον ἢ ἐξ εὐσεβοῦς ἀνόσιον ἢ ἐκ σώφρονος ὑβριστὴν ἢ ἐξ εὐδιαίτου πολυδάπανον ἢ [ὡς] ἐκ μετριοπότου οἰνόφλυγα ἢ ἐκ φιλοπόνου μαλακὸν ἢ ἄλλης πονηρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἡττημένον.

Comm. I.2.2: πῶς οὖν αὐτὸς ὢν τοιοῦτος ἄλλους ἂν ἢ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ παρανόμους ἢ λίχνους ἢ ἀφροδισίων ἀκρατεῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν μαλακοὺς ἐποίησεν;

The enumeration of opposite traits also appears in *Comm.* I.1.16, where they are represented as being the objects of Socrates' philosophical investigations (cp. *Ap.* 16: ἐξ ὅτουπερ ξυνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα ἠρξάμην οὐπώποτε διέλειπον καὶ ζητῶν καὶ μανθάνων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν). Xen. elsewhere disputes the claim of "self-avowed philosophers" that moral decline is impossible, asserting that morality, like the maintenance of the body, is in fact a matter of ἄσκησις (see *Comm.* I.2.19 & I.2.24). The use of the singular in the *Ap.* passage probably refers indirectly to the profligate behavior of Anytus' son in *Ap.* 29, whose inebriate condition was in fact the result of his dissociation from Socrates, and seems in any case to suit the imperative εἰπέ ("Name one example!"). The pairs of opposites in this setting and the absolute corruption they imply tend towards forensic hyperbole. The adjectives in each passage roughly correspond to each other, with ἐκ φιλοπόνου μαλακόν corresponding both in meaning and position to πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν μαλακούς, and ἀνόσιον to ἀσεβεῖς. The remaining qualities represent a mixture of the general with the specific (ὑβριστής and ἡδονῆς ἡττόμενος versus πολυδάπανος and οἰνόφλυξ in the *Ap.*, and παράνομοι versus λίχνοι and ἀκρατεῖς ἀφροδισίων in the *Comm.*). All of these qualities, with the exception of παράνομοι, explained in *Comm.* I.2.9 as referring to Socrates' disdain for appointment by lot, center around the theme of ἐγκράτεια vs. ἀκράτεια. This, combined with the reference to Alcibiades in *Comm.* I.2.12 as ἀκρατέστατός τε καὶ ὑβριστότατος and with the parallel σώφρων/ὑβριστής juxtaposition in I.2.19, would seem to support the position that Xen. is alluding in both passages to Socrates' association with the famous maverick.

Ap. §20: Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Μέλητος, ἐκείνους οἶδα οὓς σὺ πέπεικας σοὶ πείθεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς γειναμένοις. Ὁμολογῶ, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, περί γε παιδείας· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσασιν ἐμοὶ μεμεληκός. περὶ δὲ ὑγιείας τοῖς ἰατροῖς μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι πείθονται ἢ τοῖς γονεῦσι· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις γε πάντες δήπου οἱ

'Αθηναῖοι τοῖς φρονιμώτατα λέγουσι πείθονται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς προσήκουσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ στρατηγοὺς αἱρεῖσθε καὶ πρὸ πατέρων καὶ πρὸ ἀδελφῶν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία γε ὑμεῖς πρὸ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, οὓς ἂν ἡγῆσθε περὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν φρονιμωτάτους εἶναι; Οὕτω γάρ, φάναι τὸν Μέλητον, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ συμφέρει καὶ νομίζεται.

Comm. I.2.49-55: [49] 'Αλλὰ Σωκράτης γ', ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε, πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας ἑλόντι καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος, ὡς τὸν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἴη δεδέσθαι. [50] Σωκράτης δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀμαθίας ἕνεκα δεσμεύοντα δικαίως ἂν καὶ αὐτὸν ᾤετο δεδέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισταμένων ἃ μὴ αὐτὸς ἐπίσταται· καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα πολλάκις ἐσκόπει, τί διαφέρει μανίας ἀμαθία.... [51] ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε, ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, οὐ μόνον τοὺς πατέρας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὔτε τοὺς κάμνοντας οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἰατροί, τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι. [52] ἔφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὔνους εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται· μόνους δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους· ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτόν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἴη σοφώτατός τε καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφοὺς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. [53] ἐγὼ δ' αὐτὸν οἶδα μὲν καὶ περὶ πατέρων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν [τε] καὶ περὶ φίλων ταῦτα λέγοντα· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε δή, ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθούσης, ἐν ᾗ μόνῃ γίγνεται φρόνησις, τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οἰκειοτάτου ἀνθρώπου τὴν ταχίστην ἐξενέγκαντες ἀφανίζουσιν. [54] .... [55] ταῦτ' οὖν ἔλεγεν οὐ τὸν μὲν πατέρα ζῶντα κατορύττειν διδάσκων, ἑαυτὸν δὲ κατατέμνειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύων ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐάν τε ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἐάν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἐάν τε ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελῇ, ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται, ὑφ' ὧν ἂν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.

Xen. seems to avoid using the word διδάσκειν in the first passage, whereas it appears frequently in the second, a fact which again seems to be tied to the more immediately forensic nature of the *Ap.*, where the emphasis is on proper παιδεία in general, not on education motivated by the more mercenary interests of the sophists (see the comment on §20). Those affected by Socrates' teaching in the *Ap.* passage are his followers' γεινάμενοι, γόνεις, προσήκοντες, πατέρες, and ἀδελφοί; in addition to πατέρες and ἀδελφοί, the *Comm.* passage mentions συγγενεῖς and φίλοι. The emphasis in the former rests first and foremost on one's family, while the second passage includes friendships, comprising, in effect, all human relationships. Both passages refer to Socrates' familiar argument from expertise (cp. *Comm.* I.2.9), which he uses to address the allegation that he has in some way influenced the Athenian youth, a charge to which he readily concedes in both instances. This charge takes on a more specific cast in the *Comm.* passage: According to the κατήγορος, Socrates believes that ignorant fathers should be locked up by their sons, that he alone can make his followers σοφώτεροι than their fathers, that all relationships should be based strictly on the notion of utility, and that Socrates has inculcated these beliefs in his followers. As experts, Socrates mentions physicians, politicians, and generals in the *Ap.*, and physicians and οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι in the *Comm.* (the latter being a possible

reference to οἱ συναγορεύοντες in *Ap.* 22). The additional allegations are countered rather weakly in the *Comm.*: An allusion is made to Socrates' professed ignorance, a short digression is made into the distinction between ignorance and lunacy, and the utilitarianism issue is dismissed with the claim that Socrates was simply encouraging his followers and their relatives alike to become as mutually useful to each other as possible. The use of hyperbole in I.2.55 (ταῦτ' οὖν ἔλεγεν οὐ τὸν μὲν πατέρα ζῶντα κατορύττειν διδάσκων κτλ.) does little to strengthen this argument. In both passages, the focus remains on being or becoming φρόνιμος, with an additional emphasis in the *Comm.* on the consideration of τιμή as a motivation for appropriate behavior (summed up nicely in I.2.55 with the words τὸ ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι).

Chroust ([1957] 17 & 35) believes that *Ap.* 20 is probably a summary of *Comm.* I.2.49-55 and that both passages were written as a rebuttal to Polycrates' Κατηγορία (see Essay C). Busse (p. 223) agrees and adds that both Xen. and Polycrates probably used Antisthenes as a source, a familiar and apparently convenient recourse for Xenophon scholars.

Ap. §22: Ἐρρήθη μὲν δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πλείω ὑπό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ.

Comm. IV.8.10: ....τοιαῦτα μὲν πρὸς Ἑρμογένην τε διελέχθη καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

The *Ap.* passage is controversial (see my comments *ad loc.*), and this particular juxtaposition of passages requires that the words αὐτοῦ and αὐτῷ in the *Ap.* passage be taken as referring to Hermogenes, not to Socrates. If this interpretation is valid, there could be at least a partial identification between the τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ in the *Ap.* and the τοὺς ἄλλους in the *Comm.* If not, then Xen. is introducing other, unnamed witnesses for reasons not so easily divined: Is he referring to the followers who accompany Socrates after the conclusion of the trial in the *Ap.* or even to the other Socratic writers mentioned in *Ap.* 1? Has he included extra witnesses (genuine or fictional) to lend the account a greater degree of credibility? Can this additional information be seen as another correction which could establish the priority of the *Ap.* over the *Comm.*?[19]

Ap. §25: τούς γε μὴν νέους πῶς ἂν διαφθείροιμι καρτερίαν καὶ εὐτέλειαν προσεθίζων; ἐφ' οἷς γε μὴν ἔργοις κεῖται θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ἱεροσυλία, τοιχωρυχία, ἀνδραποδίσει, πόλεως προδοσίᾳ, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀντίδικοι τούτων πρᾶξαί τι κατ' ἐμοῦ φασιν. ὥστε θαυμαστὸν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι ὅπως ποτὲ ἐφάνη ὑμῖν τοῦ θανάτου ἔργον ἄξιον ἐμοὶ εἰργασμένον.

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[19]Delebecque (p. 219) suggests as reasons for the confusion Xen.'s poor memory, fictionalizing, or the possibility that few witnesses were left to contradict it.

Comm. I.2.62-64: [62] Ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ Σωκράτης τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐδόκει τιμῆς ἄξιος εἶναι τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ θανάτου. καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δὲ σκοπῶν ἄν τις τοῦθ' εὕροι. Κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους, ἐάν τις φανερὸς γένηται κλέπτων ἢ λωποδυτῶν ἢ βαλλαντιοτομῶν ἢ τοιχωρυχῶν ἢ ἀνδραποδιζόμενος ἢ ἱεροσυλῶν, τούτοις θάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ζημία· ὧν ἐκεῖνος πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλεῖστον ἀπεῖχεν. [63] ἀλλὰ μὴν τῇ πόλει γε οὔτε πολέμου κακῶς συμβάντος οὔτε στάσεως οὔτε προδοσίας οὔτε ἄλλου κακοῦ οὐδενὸς πώποτε αἴτιος ἐγένετο· οὐδὲ μὴν ἰδίᾳ γε οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀπεστέρησεν οὔτε κακοῖς περιέβαλεν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αἰτίαν τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἔσχε. [64] πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔνοχος εἴη τῇ γραφῇ; ὃς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεούς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐγέγραπτο, φανερὸς ἦν θεραπεύων τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους, ὃ δὴ ὁ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν ᾐτιᾶτο, φανερὸς ἦν τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πονηρὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας τούτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς, ᾗ πόλεις τε καὶ οἶκοι εὖ οἰκοῦσι, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμεῖν· ταῦτα δὲ πράττων πῶς οὐ μεγάλης ἄξιος ἦν τιμῆς τῇ πόλει;

The *Ap.* passage is significantly shorter than its counterpart in the *Comm.*, and besides the possibility of later editing (see Busse 223), one should also consider the possibility that Xen. included information in the *Comm.* which he chose to exclude in the *Ap.* since it fell outside the scope of his intended subject (see *Ap.* 22). Besides the references to additional capital crimes in the *Comm.*, Xen. mentions Socrates' irreproachable and lawful (κατὰ τοὺς νόμους) behavior, both political and private, during the years following the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War. Xen. extends his defense of Socrates against the indictment charges by again presenting the reader with a series of opposites and with Socrates' efforts actually to turn his followers away from the very attitudes of which he was accused, an approach which lends the writing a greater sense of vehemence and indignation. This is enhanced by the question of Socrates' right to acknowledgment for his acts of public service, a question which frames the passage and lends it more cohesiveness, whereas the *Ap.* passage simply expresses Socrates' incredulity at the prosecutors' insistence on the ultimate penalty when his activities did not correspond to any of the official capital crimes.[20]

Ap. §26: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέντοι ὅτι ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκω, διὰ τοῦτο μεῖον φρονητέον· οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἀλλὰ τοῖς καταγνοῦσι τοῦτο αἰσχρόν [γάρ] ἐστι. παραμυθεῖται δ' ἔτι με καὶ Παλαμήδης ὁ παραπλησίως ἐμοὶ τελευτήσας· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ νῦν πολὺ καλλίους ὕμνους παρέχεται Ὀδυσσέως τοῦ ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντος αὐτόν· οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἐμοὶ μαρτυρήσεται ὑπό τε τοῦ ἐπιόντος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου ὅτι ἠδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πώποτε οὐδὲ πονηρότερον ἐποίησα, εὐηργέτουν δὲ τοὺς ἐμοὶ διαλεγομένους προῖκα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν.

Comm. IV.8.9-10: [9] ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀδίκως ἀποθανοῦμαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀδίκως ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνασιν αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη τοῦτο· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρόν ἐστι, πῶς οὐκ

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[20]Cp. *Comm.* I.1.1: Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τίσι ποτὲ λόγοις Ἀθηναίους ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην ὡς ἄξιος εἴη θανάτου τῇ πόλει. Chroust ([1957] 65-66) notes a discrepancy in the apparent distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary criminal proceedings (ἀγῶνες τίμητοι καὶ ἀτίμητοι) in the *Comm.* passage under consideration.

αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀδίκως ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν; ἐμοὶ δὲ τί αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἑτέρους μὴ δύνασθαι περὶ ἐμοῦ τὰ δίκαια μήτε γνῶναι μήτε ποιῆσαι; [10] ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις οὐχ ὁμοίαν καταλειπομένην τῶν τε ἀδικησάντων καὶ τῶν ἀδικηθέντων. οἶδα δ' ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιμελείας τεύξομαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἐὰν νῦν ἀποθάνω, οὐχ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνασιν· οἶδα γὰρ ἀεὶ μαρτυρήσεσθαί μοι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἠδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ χείρω ἐποίησα, βελτίους δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπειρώμην ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐμοὶ συνόντας.

The *Comm.* passage, through the repetition of the word αἰσχρόν, seems more vituperative than the corresponding *Ap.* passage: It would seem that Xen. is taking pains here to reproach his Athenian readership even more pointedly for its role in the execution of Socrates, an approach reflected in the substitution (and virtual omission) of the short Palamedes digression with the impersonal ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῶν προγεγονότων κτλ.[21] and in the emphasis in the *Comm.* on Socrates' future reputation. The most obvious difference between the two passages is the fact that in the *Ap.* this speech occurs *after* the sentence has been pronounced, while in the *Comm.* Socrates is made to say these things *during* his pre-trial conversation with Hermogenes, something which gives it a far more speculative quality than its counterpart (cp. the phrase ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέντοι ὅτι ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκω with ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀδίκως ἀποθανοῦμαι).[22] The *Ap.* passage seems to refer more directly to Anytus' instrumental role in the trial as described in *Ap.* 29,[23] and the issue of Socrates' reputation, mentioned in both passages, is also taken up in *Ap.* 29. In both versions Socrates again employs contrasting qualities to assert his innocence (cp. *Ap.* 19): In the case of the *Ap.* passage, he denies ever having wronged anyone or having caused anyone to become more worthless, and states further that he has in fact benefited his followers by teaching them without charge (see *Ap.* 16 and Pl. *Ap.* 33A) and to the best of his ability.[24] In the *Comm.* passage, Socrates repeats his claim that he has never wronged anyone, but the approach is somewhat different in the remainder of the passage, i.e., he states that he has never made anyone worse (χείρω) and that he has always endeavored to make his associates better (βελτίους). Socrates'

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[21]According to Arnim (p. 51: see too Busse 224), the Palamedes reference in the *Ap.* shows that it precedes the *Comm.* passage, which generalizes the thought.

[22]Beyschlag (pp. 515-16) attributes the discrepancy in settings to the use of a discrete Socratic τόπος (i.e. *die Weiterbildung eines einmal geprägten literarischen Typus*), while P. Meyer (col. 720) explains it as follows: *Die Abweichung...ist nicht der Rede wert: Xenophon wollte in den Memorabilien* kurz *sein, außerdem hält er ja auch, was er dort verspricht: er "sagt, was er von Hermogenes gehört".*

[23]Ὁ μὲν ἀνὴρ ὅδε κυδρός, ὡς μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν διαπεπραγμένος, εἰ ἀπέκτονέ με. In the juxtaposed passages, compare the phrases τοῦ ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντος αὐτόν and τοῖς μὲν ἀδίκως ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνασιν, the latter of which appears twice in the *Comm.* passage.

[24]As Arnim (pp. 49-50) points out, the thought that to do wrong is worse than being wronged is echoed in Pl. *Ap.* 29B & 30D, with Plato's κακόν being replaced by Xen.'s αἰσχρόν. Busse (pp. 216 & 221) maintains to the contrary that, while the *Schutzschrift* shows some familiarity with Pl. *Ap.*, Xen. *Ap.* does not.

statement in the *Ap.* is noticeably stronger, reflecting the more specific nature of the work.[25]

Ap. §32: ....ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίου τὸ χαλεπώτατον ἀπέλιπε, τῶν δὲ θανάτων τοῦ ῥᾴστου ἔτυχεν.

Comm. IV.8.3: καὶ πῶς ἄν τις κάλλιον ἢ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι; ἢ ποῖος ἂν εἴη θάνατος καλλίων ἢ ὃν κάλλιστά τις ἀποθάνοι; ποῖος δ' ἂν γένοιτο θάνατος εὐδαιμονέστερος τοῦ καλλίστου; ἢ ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου;

The calm concinnity of the Greek in the *Ap.* passage, with its succinct contrasts and carefully balanced phrasing, is distinctly different in nature from its counterpart in the last section of the *Comm*, which consists of four rhetorical questions, three of which are introduced with the anaphoric ποῖος, culminating through a series of comparisons in the superlative εὐδαιμονεστάτου, which defines θεοφιλής. The notion of facing an easy death and leaving behind a difficult life has been replaced in the second passage with a simple equation: ὁ θεοφιλὴς θάνατος εὐδαίμων ἐστί. Both passages represent Xen.'s own thoughts on Socrates' death and make up part of the encomium in each work, facts which invite an even more direct comparison than elsewhere. If in fact the *Comm.* follow the *Ap.*, it would be tempting to say that Xen. dropped his former view of Socrates' motives since it did not agree with the Socrates' steadfast attitude towards duty (see, for example, Pl. *Ap.* 28E & 30B); if the opposite is true, it would seem that Xen. has abandoned the vague copula in favor of a statement that more expressly reflects his thesis concerning Socrates' readiness to die and the μεγαληγορία which resulted from it.[26]

Ap. §34: ....εἰ δέ τις τῶν ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων ὠφελιμωτέρῳ τινὶ Σωκράτους συνεγένετο, ἐκεῖνον ἐγὼ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀξιομακαριστότατον νομίζω.

Comm. IV.8.11: τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δή, τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷον ἐγὼ διήγημαι, ...δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα, ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ...ἐδόκει....

For a fuller treatment of the ὠφέλεια issue, see the comment on *Ap.* 34. This receives more emphasis in the *Comm.* passage above (ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν and ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ) and is presented in

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[25]Arnim (p. 46) believes that Xen. avoids using *Ap.* 7-9 in the *Comm.* because of its emphasis on his willingness to die: In the *Comm.* Xen. wants rather to stress the fact that Socrates' behavior, which was motivated by his daimonic voice, was ultimately to his benefit.

[26]Arnim (pp. 29-30 with examples) believes that *Ap.* 32-33 is the core from which *Comm.* IV.8.1-3 derives.

both passages as the reward for οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες who chose to associate with Socrates (cp. *Comm.* I.2.7-8). A sense of longing is brought out in both passages through the adjective ἀξιομακαριστότατον and the participle ποθοῦντες, respectively, and this more personal element returns at the end of *Comm.* IV.8.11 (εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἦθος πρὸς ταῦτα οὕτω κρινέτω: cp. the *Ap.* quotation above),[27] which is preceded by a long series of adjectival expressions which find many correspondences in the *Ap.*, i.e. εὐσεβής (cp. *Ap.* 19), δίκαιος (cp. *Ap.* 5, 14, 16, 18 & 20), ἐγκρατής (cp. *Ap.* 16, 19 & 25), φρόνιμος (cp. *Ap.* 20), αὐταρκής (cp. *Ap.* 16 & 18), ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα (cp. *Ap.* passim), and ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως δοκιμάσαι τε καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἐλέγξαι καὶ προτρέψασθαι ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκἀγαθίαν (cp. *Ap.* 17, 21, 25-26 & 34 for the protreptic effects of Socrates' teaching).

In supposing that the *Ap.* was written before the longer Socratic writing, it becomes possible to consider the former as an embryonic biographical work from which the latter derives, that is, as a sort of memoirs-in-the-making. Two seminal themes introduced in the *Ap.* are taken up and extensively developed by Xen. in the *Comm.*, namely, Socrates' beliefs and their often protreptic effect on his followers, and his deeply religious nature, both of which are treated at length in order to refute the indictment charges as quoted in *Ap.* 10 and *Comm.* I.1.1. Both themes are treated together in the *Schutzschrift* and to a lesser extent in *Comm.* IV.8, the two sections of the work most closely related to the *Ap.*; the rest of the work can be seen as dealing with particular aspects of the above (e.g. self-discipline, education, filiopiety, worship, etc.). Note that at least twelve of the interlocutors mentioned in the *Comm.* are young men, and that a sizeable portion of the *Schutzschrift* is devoted to a response to the specific corruption-of-the-youth charges made by Polycrates, i.e., that Socrates harbored anti-democratic sentiments, that his teaching created such political monsters as Critias and Alcibiades, that he encouraged his charges to question the authority of their male relatives, and that he manipulated the words of famous poets for his own purposes. The religion theme is treated individually in §§I.4 and IV.3. Other points in common between the *Ap.* and the *Comm.* include the appearance of Hermogenes, who serves as the final interlocutor in *Comm.* IV.8 and whose role is essentially identical with his role in the *Ap.*, the daimonic voice, which receives a

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[27]Arnim (p. 30) holds that the final sentence in the *Ap.* is originally that of the *Comm.*, which was later dropped and replaced. Arnim (p. 30), who believes that *Ap.* 34 is originally the source for IV.8.11, notes that the sense of condolence of the former is replaced with that of *Seligpreisung* in the latter (p. 28: see too Edelstein 135-36 for her remarks concerning the concluding tone of each work). Delebecque (pp. 219-20) observes that in the *Comm.* it is Xen. who says that Socrates has been missed, while Socrates himself mentions this idea of grieving in the *Ap.*: In the latter Socrates does not say who should grieve, while in the former Xen. says that he is missed by all those who aspire to virtue, a thought which motivates all of *Comm.* IV.

somewhat fuller defense in *Comm.* I.1 (see Appendix C), and Socrates' readiness to die, an attitude which motivates the *Ap.* and which is reiterated, with additional stress laid on the nobility of his death, in *Comm.* IV.8.[28]

In comparing the two works, the following can be observed and suggested about Xen.'s approach to writing the memoirs: 1) He chose to omit any mention of Socrates' μεγαληγορία, presumably because he felt that the subject had been treated adequately in the *Ap.* 2) He retained the Hermogenes figure as a source for Socrates' pre-trial remarks; the trial events themselves are not recounted. 3) The entire *Comm.* can be seen as an extended justification of Socrates' life, the basis for which is to be found in *Ap.* 3 (οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι ἀπολογεῖσθαι μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι;). 4) The important role of the daimonic voice and Socrates' attitude towards death are retained essentially unaltered. 5) The two major themes connected in various ways to the indictment are treated at greater length in the *Comm.*, while the vituperative and confrontational tone of the narration is noticeably softened, undoubtedly to make its content more palatable to Xen.'s readership, especially to his Athenian readers. The style of Xen.'s presentation is essentially the same in the *Comm.* as in the *Ap*: Xen.'s narrative voice is present in the defense sections, in his appearance as an interlocutor in §I.3, and in his introduction of several dialogues with such formulae as οἶδά ποτε αὐτὸν τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα (*Comm.* III.3.1).[29] The use of dialogue, though less prominent in the defense sections, is nevertheless similar to the short dialogues in the *Ap.* (i.e. with Hermogenes, Meletus, Apollodorus, and Socrates' followers in general), all of which contribute to the characterization of the Socrates figure in general. The lack of dialogue in the more expository sections of the *Ap.* corresponds to the lack of emphasis placed on dialogue in the defense sections of the *Comm.* and to the narrative or direct monologues in §§I.5, I.7, II.4, III.9, IV.1, and IV.7. Each work closes with a short eulogy reminiscent of the *Ages.*

Finally, there remains the problem of establishing a sequence of publication. With the exception of Maier, Beyschlag, and Menzel, there is no one who is willing to date any part of the *Comm.* prior to the *Ap.*[30] Far more common are such views as

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[28]Socrates' μεγαληγορία is altogether missing in the two relevant sections of the *Comm.*, where the tone is much gentler and where the θόρυβος-inducing statement from the *Ap.* regarding the oracle is omitted (see Appendices B and D).

[29]See Gigon ([1946] 211-12), who describes Xen.'s narrative presence as a typical, formulaic component of his Socratica.

[30]Maier (p. 16 n. 1: see too Feddersen 36) places the publication of the *Ap.* between the *Schutzschrift* and IV.8, Beyschlag (pp. 511-12) bases his argument on a number of inconsistencies between the texts (e.g. that between *Ap.* 26 and *Comm.* IV.8.9-10), and Menzel (p. 7) points out the inconsistency of Xen.'s expressions of surprise at the outcome of the trial in the *Comm.* with his μεγαληγορία thesis in the *Ap.* Mahaffy (*A History of Classical Greek Literature,* Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1880, vol. 2 p. 271) was apparently the first to suggest that it was Xen. himself who appended the *Ap.* to the *Comm.* (see note 1 above). Wetzel (p. 389) is quite representative of most scholars in assuming that, if the *Ap.* appeared afterwards, it must in fact be a forgery. *Comm.* IV.8.1, which is a strong statement against the assertion that Socrates was obviously lying about his daimonic voice, would, however, provide an additional motive for writing the *Ap.*

those of Wetzel (p. 392), who holds that the *Schutzschrift* was written after the *Ap.* under the influence of Pl. *Ap.* (see *Comm.* I.2.61, for example) and that any deviations from the original can be explained as resulting from Platonic influence. There are many, however, who, like Maier, feel that *Comm.* IV.8 represents an actual incorporation of excerpts from the *Ap.* (specifically §§2-10): Schanz,[31] for example, bases this conclusion on Xen.'s original motives for writing the *Ap.* (i.e. μεγαληγορία as his principal theme as well as his intention to offer a suitable response to Pl. *Ap.*) and on the differences in the texts themselves, e.g. between *Ap.* 26 and *Comm.* IV.8.9.[32]

Delebecque's observations (pp. 219-21) offer a balanced solution to the problem of priority: He believes 1) that the *Ap.* precedes the *Comm.*, with the last chapter borrowing from the beginning of the *Ap.* and with the first part borrowing from the rest, 2) that *Comm.* IV.8 contains the first seven chapters of the *Ap.*, and 3) that there are no essential differences between the two works. In the *Ap.* Xen. has the confidence to attack Anytus and his son but for precision's sake does not dare to wander far from the account gathered from Hermogenes; on the other hand, he has more confidence in writing the *Comm.*, speaks in his own name, and no longer hesitates to affirm that he has heard Hermogenes in person. The *Ap.* therefore predates the *Comm.*, and we are witnessing the development of the Socratic legend, that is, Xen. has gradually persuaded himself that he is more of a witness than he actually was. In *Comm.* I.2 Xen. responds to the corruption-of-the-youth charge, and although there are some traces of influence from the *Ap.*, the elements are not systematically derivative. The former seems to be able to sustain itself until its conclusion, when the influence of the *Ap.* becomes evident again. As noted above, the conclusion of the *Comm.* issues directly from the beginning of the *Ap.*

According to Delebecque, then, the cannibalizing of the *Ap.* proves its priority over the *Comm.*: The latter encompasses a larger theme, not just the trial, hence the dispensability of the former. It seems that the *Ap.* was simply a tentative attempt at writing Socratic memoirs, and it is likely that it remained unpublished, which would explain why Xen. was able to incorporate its material so freely into the *Comm.*, his definitive work on the subject of Socrates.[33]

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[31]Schanz 84-87 (see too Frick 33-39 and Wetzel 389). See below for other views on the priority question.

[32]As opposed to Beyschlag (see above), who uses the same passages to arrive at the opposite conclusion.

[33]Edelstein (p. 150) states this last point well: *Jedenfalls wäre es verständlicher, daß die Apologie, die nur eine Einzelheit im Verhalten des Sokrates zu einer bestimmten Zeit erklären will, früher geschrieben ist als die Memorabilien, die die gesamte Persönlichkeit in der Auffassung des Xenophon schildern sollen; daß der Aufbau der Verteidigungsrede, wie Xenophon ihn in der Apologie wiedergab, das Gerüst bildete zu seiner Gesamtdarstellung des Sokrates, nicht aber umgekehrt.* Frick's similar argument (p. 81: see too Essay C), namely, that Xen. came to write the *Comm.* as he became better

Delebecque's conclusions are certainly attractive, and unless the *Ap.* is a forgery, a conclusion which I am loth to accept because of the many stylistic, linguistic, and thematic similarities it shares with the *Comm.*, I am most inclined to consider the relevant sections in the latter to be an extensive revision of the former (with or without the influence of Pl. *Ap.*) and to assume the priority of the *Ap.*, which, as Delebecque remarks, might never have been intended for publication. On the issue of priority, I find Ollier's point (p. 90) particularly cogent: If Xen. in fact wrote the *Comm.* before the *Ap.*, why would he say in the latter (§1) that no previous writer had sufficiently treated the motives for Socrates' behavior during the trial? Frick (p. 51) also thinks that the *Ap.* precedes the *Comm.* (including I.1-2 & IV.8), a conclusion reached by a dizzyingly thorough examination of shared elements. Wetzel (p. 390) bases his observations on the premiss that the *Ap.* is more precise and therefore earlier, while mistakes occur in the *Comm.*, a fact which can only be explained as misunderstandings of Socrates' speech caused by the lengthy interval between the two periods of composition. Arnim (pp. 50-53), who also subscribes to the cannibalization theory, observes some stylistic improvements in the *Comm.* and also an emphasis on the ethical purpose of Socrates' activity. In his view, the *Comm.* passage contains its original conclusion, which the added recapitulation drawn from the *Ap.* only weakens, and the conclusion of the *Comm.* is nothing more than an edited excerpt from the *Ap.* This radical editing indicates in what low regard Xen. held the *Ap.* at this point in his writing career.[34]

More general similarities between the *Ap.* and *Comm.* are treated in the individual comments on each section.

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acquainted with Socratic doctrine and borrowed the *Ap.* more or less wholesale for his purposes, is equally appealing in its simplicity.

[34]Xen.'s style in general is not, however, characterized by its cohesiveness, and the sketchy, discursive quality of bk. IV of the *Comm.* easily matches that of the *Ap.* Yet stylistic considerations all point towards an expansion of the latter, not to a condensation of the former.

Appendix B: A Comparison with Plato's Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους

Waterfield[1] lists the following points of coincidence between Xen.'s and Plato's accounts of the events surrounding Socrates' trial:

1) The state charges are identical (Xen. *Ap.* 10 and Pl. *Ap.* 24B-C),
2) Socrates has not prepared a speech (Xen. *Ap.* 2 and Pl. *Ap.* 17B-18A),
3) The daimonic indicates that he will ultimately benefit from the trial (Xen. *Ap.* 4 ff. and Pl. *Ap.* 40A-C, 41D),
4) Socrates attributes part of the indictment to the fact that the daimonic communicates directly with him (Xen. *Ap.* 12 ff. and Pl. *Ap.* 31C-D),
5) Socrates thinks that he has reached an opportune point in his life at which to die (Xen. *Ap.* 5 ff. and Pl. *Ap.* 38C, 41C-D),
6) Socrates refers to Chaerephon's consultation of the Delphic oracle (Xen. *Ap.* 14 and Pl. *Ap.* 20E-21A),
7) Socrates engages in a dialogue with Meletus in the course of the trial (Xen. *Ap.* 11 ff. and Pl. *Ap.* 24C-28A),
8) Socrates refuses, or all but refuses, to propose a counter-penalty (Xen. *Ap.* 23 and Pl. *Ap.* 36B-37A),
9) Socrates refuses to escape from prison (Xen. *Ap.* 23 and *Cri.* passim),
10) Socrates insists that he has never wronged anyone (Xen. *Ap.* 26 and Pl. *Ap.* 37A *et alibi*),
11) Socrates makes some reference to the view that those about to die gain prophetic powers (Xen. *Ap.* 30 and Pl. *Ap.* 39C), and
12) Socrates compares himself to the legendary hero Palamedes (Xen. *Ap.* 26 and Pl. *Ap.* 41B).

To this can be added the tripartite structure of the defense speeches *per se* (see below), the animated reaction of the dicasts to parts of Socrates' speech (Xen. *Ap.* 14-15 and Pl. *Ap.* 30C), and Socrates' refusal to kowtow to the jury (Xen. *Ap.* 23 and Pl. *Ap.* 34B-35D, 38D-39B).

It would be possible to apply Burnet and Taylor's argument for the historicity of Pl. *Ap.*[2] to *both* ἀπολογίαι and say that neither author would have written anything other than what actually happened at the trial because of a potential critical backlash from contemporary eye-witnesses. This position ultimately stands or falls on the relationship of both ἀπολογίαι to other λόγοι Σωκρατικοί and on the very nature of

[1]See Waterfield 30-31, who provides the Platonic references given above (see too Guthrie [1978] 3:339-40, Breitenbach 1892-93 ff., Toole 6-7, P. Meyer 755-57, and Kennedy 151). Pl. *Ap.* is also treated at some length in the three prefatory essays.
[2]See Burnet (1924) p. 63 ff. and Taylor (1949) pp. 156-57 (see too Arnim 7 and Shero 107).

that genre in general (see Essay C). With this in mind, one could venture to say that, with all inconsistencies aside, the information presented in both works may represent a more complete picture when combined, with each author having suppressed some of the events described for his own literary, philosophical, or even personal reasons.[3] Guthrie's perspective ([1978] 3:329) is appealing:

> If then the accounts of, say, Plato and Xenophon seem to present a different type of man, the chances are that each by itself is not so much wrong as incomplete, that it tends to exaggerate certain genuine traits and minimize others equally genuine, and that to get an idea of the whole man we must regard them as complementary.

Briefly, the contents of Xen. *Ap.* can be described as follows: 1) Socrates' thoughts before the trial, 2) abbreviated versions of his speeches at the trial, and 3) his behavior after the trial. This larger threefold structure is reflected in Xen.'s presentation in the middle portion of the three speeches delivered in the court itself, a form which approximates the tripartite structure of Pl. *Ap.* and no doubt the actual court proceedings.[4] Certainly, in a more technical sense the title Ἀπολογία can be considered a misnomer,[5] though the work as a whole conforms to a general rhetorical structure: According to Feddersen's analysis (pp. 28-31), it begins with an *exordium* (§1) which explains why the work came to be written (the *propositio*) and how the writing will be organized (the *partitio*);[6] the *tractatio* stretches from §2 to §32, where evidence is adduced to prove the *propositio*;[7] and §§33-34 make up an *epilogus*,

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[3]Wetzel (pp. 398-99), for example, believes that three major similarities (i.e. the tripartite structure, the reference to Palamedes, and the prophetic powers of a doomed man) can be referred to the trial itself, and Arnim moves from saying that the coinciding points are potentially worthless since they could very well derive from each other (pp. 5-6) to saying that they are undoubtedly historical since neither work influenced the other (pp. 74-75: see too Ollier 95 and Oldfather 206). I feel that it is in fact possible to consider all of similarities listed above to be potentially historical. (In general, the Xenophon-as-better-source movement began with Hegel and was sustained by Zeller and others before it finally lost momentum in this century [see Vlastos 99 n. 72]. Frick [p. 68] notes that scholars have been accustomed to consider Xenophon *...quasi pro quodam Synoptico...res gestas simpliciter narrante, Platonem quasi Johannem ingeniose fabulantem numerare.*) Perhaps the very fact that Xen. *Ap.* has always seemed more problematical to scholars, making it as it were a sort of *lectio difficilior* in a larger sense, should lend it more weight, a point also made by Arnim (p. 11: see too Schmid 225 n. 4 on the omission of any reference to Critias and Alcibiades). For an excellent summary of similarities and differences between the characterizations of Socrates in Xen. and Plato, see Rutherford 53 ff.

[4]A tidy summary of the *Ap.* appears in Edelstein 139 ff.; for a detailed structural comparison of Xen. *Ap.* with Pl. *Ap.*, see the outline below. Breitenbach (col. 1892) sees a different tripartite structure consisting of the defense proper, the consolation of Socrates' followers, and the prophecy concerning Anytus and his son. Arnim (p. 83) comments that the first speech can also be further sub-divided into three parts, with the first part (§§11-13) concerning impiety, the second (§§14-18) the oracle, and the third (§§19-21) the corruption of the youth.

[5]See the comment on *Title*. The conclusion, for example, has nothing to do with Socrates' defense speech *per se*.

[6]In this case περί τε τῆς ἀπολογίας καὶ περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τοῦ βίου, a structuring element repeated in §22. Xen. tries to summarize the main points after this section, a difficult task without a reliable record of what actually transpired at the trial (see Arnim 71).

[7]Note that the *refutatio* and *probatio* in this portion are not distinguished as they normally are in forensic speeches (Feddersen 28-29) and that §§11-21 and 24-26 are supposedly based on Hermogenes'

which includes the appropriate εἶδος παθητικόν. As for the ἀπολογία proper, there is no προοίμιον to speak of, and its content can be outlined as follows:

First Charge: Impiety
    Διήγησις: The Nature of Socrates' Daimonic Sign (§§11-13)
    Πίστις (§§13-18)
Second Charge: Corruption of the Youth
    Διήγησις: The Argument from Expertise (§19)
    Πίστις (§§20-21)
Ἐπίλογος (§§24-26)

Scholars who criticize the *Ap.* for its apparent disjointedness should bear in mind Xen.'s professed purpose in writing the work (see §22) as well as the possibly disjointed quality of Socrates' actual speech.

Plato's Socrates uses rhetorical commonplaces, and his speech generally observes standard oratorical structure, though the cross-examination of Meletus is striking. Kennedy (pp. 150-51) outlines its structure as follows: the prooemium (to 18A6); the statement of the case and a refutation of charges, i.e. the narration (18A7 ff.); a section demonstrating Socrates' character (28A2 ff.); and the peroration (34B6 ff.).[8] In general, both ἀπολογίαι are similar in structure but vastly different in detail, a fact which Guthrie ([1978] 4:78 n. 4) attributes to Xen.'s second-hand information and his inability to rise to Socratic heights.

Ollier (p. 94) cites as the differences between the two ἀπολογίαι the indictment,[9] the role of the daimonic, the response to Chaerephon's question, Socrates' prophetic powers, the question of a counter-penalty, and Socrates' willingness to die. Vrijlandt (pp. 96-97) slights Plato for not having provided a suitable defense and in fact attacks him personally as follows:

> *Defensionem autem nobis non exhibes, Plato.*
> *Socrates tuus non demonstravit se deos patrios colere.*
> *Socrates tuus non defendit daemonium suum.*
> *Socrates tuus hoc quidem loco crimen corruptelae non refellit.*
> *Socrates tuus adversarium aggreditur, ludibrio habet, semet ipsum autem non purgat.*

Chroust ([1957] 41) observes that, in general, Xen. tries to absolve Socrates of all guilt, while Plato presents him as a man motivated by the highest principles, an

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report, which comprises a significant portion of the entire work. For another analysis of Xen. *Ap.*, see Stock (pp. 24-26).

[8]This also corresponds to the outline in Phillipson (p. 355); for a more elaborate analysis, see the section headings in Burnet's commentary ([1924] 63-171).

[9]For specific differences, see the comment on §10.

uncompromising apostle of truth and virtue. Opinions of course vary regarding the significance of these differences: Gomperz ([1924] 169-70: see too Arnim 6) observes that, since Xen. specifically vouches for the authenticity of his ἀπολογία, the charges against Socrates, though perhaps malicious and exaggerated, nevertheless have some basis in fact; Plato's work, on the hand, is unreliable as a historical source and can be considered rather as an idealization and a *Denkmal platonischer Kunst.*[10] Derenne (pp. 160-61), apparently ignoring the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί issue and giving priority of sequence to Pl. *Ap.*, maintains that there would not be so many differences between the two ἀπολογίαι if Plato's work had been considered a faithful witness. Again, I feel that the most sensible approach to the problem is simply to consider any commonalities between the two works as being potentially historical, and I completely agree with Pangle (pp. 18-19) when he states that Plato's and Xen.'s works concerning the trial deal ultimately with the conflict between philosophy and civil society, and that in this light any questions about a historical Socrates become secondary.

Vander Waerdt aptly observes that, because of the potentially fictional quality of both ἀπολογίαι, "we should...see the divergences between these accounts as valuable guides in assessing authorial intention" (p. 8) instead of focusing our attention on the more dubious question of historicity. But to what extent can each author's intentions be divined?[11] There are many who, considering the opening statement in Xen. *Ap.*, see the work primarily as a corrective to Pl. *Ap.*, and Vander Waerdt's statement is quite typical of this view: "My thesis is that Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates* is written directly in reply to Plato in an attempt to reconfigure discussion about Socrates' trial in accordance with his own understanding of Socratic ethics."[12] In short, Vander Waerdt (pp. 18-19) believes that Xen. is targeting Pl. *Ap.* because it does not offer a forensically effective defense speech and at the same time fails to explain why Socrates provoked the jury, a very attractive view indeed if the sequence-of-publication issue could be convincingly resolved (see Essay B). In this case, speculation might be somewhat more fruitful if confined to a consideration of the authors' intended readers: Kennedy (p. 150) quite plausibly believes that Plato wrote his work for a larger and different readership, and P. Meyer (coll. 757-58) maintains that any significant differences between the two ἀπολογίαι can be

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[10]Arnim (p. 5) performs an interesting logical contortion by stating that, if the events described in Pl. *Ap.* were historical, they would have the greatest claim to consideration.

[11]For further comments, see the three prefatory essays as well as the comments on §§1 and 22.

[12]Vander Waerdt 13 (see too *ibid.*, p. 29 & *passim*, Chroust [1957] 39, and Kennedy 149-50). Arnim (p. 20) feels that Xen. *Ap.* should by no means be regarded as a complement to the Platonic work and that the fact that Socrates' motives for condemnation are less than noble confirms this. All of these views of course pre-suppose that Plato influenced Xen. in some way (see, for example, Vander Waerdt 5-6), a presumption based on no conclusive evidence whatsoever and ostensibly on Plato's more obvious strengths as a writer.

explained by differences in purpose - that is, to reach a larger readership, Plato focused solely on the actual defense as being more compelling.[13] Meyer (col. 713) feels that it is in fact wrong to see Xen. *Ap.* as a corrective to the Platonic work and finds its purpose to be *...daß Sokrates entschlossen gewesen zu sterben und daß er bei seiner Verteidigung nur Gewicht darauf gelegt habe zu zeigen, wie er subjektiv sich keiner Schuld bewußt sei* (col. 716), a purpose which it in fact shares with Pl. *Ap.* (col. 753 ff.). The issue of Socrates' willingness to die is a difficult one (see the comment on §5), and although the Platonic Socrates does in fact profess a desire to be acquitted,[14] he nevertheless takes pains to point out to the dicasts that he was nearing the end of his life (38C), and in his final speech (40C ff.) he seems in fact quite resigned to the prospect of an eminent death.[15]

There are three possible conclusions: 1) Plato influenced Xen., 2) Platonic influence on Xen. cannot be determined, or 3) Xen. influenced Plato. Since specific points of comparison are treated below, I will reproduce a few of the more general arguments:

1) *Platonic Influence on Xen.*: This is a popular position which frequently reveals some degree of literary bias against Xen. (see Essay C). Breitenbach (col. 1893) remarks that the discrepancies between the two works, e.g. the counter-penalty and statement that Socrates' friends spoke in his behalf, are no proof that Xen. did not consider Plato: He simply improvises on the Platonic material. Many scholars[16] believe that Xen. intended to correct Plato's inadequate treatment of Socrates' μεγαληγορία (see Xen. *Ap.* 1), an interpretation bolstered by the view that Xen. had a similar corrective purpose in writing his *Smp.*[17] Delebecque (pp. 208-209: see too Mosley 1142) suggests that Xen. came into contact with the

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[13]*Nicht "Rechtfertigung des Meisters vor dem gebildeten Publikum" also ist der Zweck der Apologie Platons, sondern Erschließung des Verständnisses für das Wesen des Meisters in den weitesten Kreisen* (idem).

[14]See Pl. *Ap.* 18E-19A. Xen.'s Socrates is more equivocal: καὶ ἣν δόξαν ἔχω περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, ταύτην ἀναφαίνων εἰ βαρυνῶ τοὺς δικαστάς, αἱρήσομαι τελευτᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνελευθέρως τὸ ζῆν ἔτι προσαιτῶν κερδᾶναι τὸν πολὺ χείρω βίον ἀντὶ θανάτου (§9).

[15]Note however, that these statements occur *after* the death sentence has been pronounced, a fact which makes Socrates' readiness to die a matter of philosophical conviction, not a matter of convenience as in Xen. *Ap* (see Busse 228 and Navia [1984] 57). It is interesting that Breitenbach (col. 1893) sees no trace of Socrates' willingness to die in Pl. *Ap.*

[16]See Delebecque 217 and Gomperz [1924] 171. Breitenbach (coll. 1892-93), Toole (pp. 5-6), Chroust ([1957] 39), Geffcken (p. 400), and Schanz (pp. 81-82) provide numerous and quite precise examples of Xen.'s corrections, though I must confess that the distinction between corrections of and differences from Plato remains unclear to me. Kahn (pp. 76-79 & 393-401) believes that Plato had a considerable influence on Xen.'s writing, yet although he cites Xen. *Ap.* along with the rest of Xen.'s Socratica (p. 29), he never considers it elsewhere. Kahn concludes in general (p. 393) that "[Xen.'s] use of Platonic texts is essentially superficial, almost cosmetic in nature", and that he "seems to have had no real sympathy with Plato's portrayal of Socrates".

[17]See Schmid 225 n. 1 and Lincke 712 ff. (see too Waterfield [p. 220], who finds Platonic influence).

Platonic works through possible links with the various philosophical schools in the Peloponnese, a not implausible suggestion.

2) *Indeterminate Influence*: The argument for this position is the possibility that Xen. based his account on information acquired independently of Plato (for example, from Hermogenes, as he states himself in §2).[18] Wetzel (p. 70) finds the many discrepancies between the two works to be proof that Xen. did not read Plato. For Gigon ([1945] 245) and Vrijlandt (pp. 144-45), the differences in purpose rule out any Platonic influence on Xen., and Vrijlandt (p. 146: see too Ollier 94) adds that the corrective intention expressed in Xen. *Ap.* 1 is directed towards more than one writer and that Plato by no means presents an unmegalegorical Socrates (*ibid.*, pp. 146-47). Frick (p. 43 ff.) believes that the prosecution was attempting to brand Socrates as a sophist, and that the two parts of the indictment represent symptoms of the main problem, i.e. sophism. Therefore, since Xen. misses the main motive behind the accusation, it is clear that he did not read any written accounts of the trial in which this motive would have been clear (*ibid.*, p. 81 n. 1). Arnim (p. 69) simply finds no trace of Pl. *Ap.* in the Xenophontic ἀπολογία.[19]

3) *Xenophontic Influence on Plato*: Few have dared to place Xen. *Ap.* before Pl. *Ap.* chronologically, with Vrijlandt (*passim*) being the most fervent champion of this position.[20]

I would prefer to reduce the three options above to two simple alternatives based on Xen.'s remark in *Ap.* 1: 1) Xen. wrote the work independently of Plato's influence while being influenced by other writers of ἀπολογίαι, or 2) Xen. was influenced by other writers of ἀπολογίαι, including Plato. These alternatives do not necessarily imply a sequence of publication since it is possible that Xen. might have published his work without ever having consulted Plato's existing version of the events surrounding the trial. However, in what follows I intend to consider item-by-item the possible motives for the two authors' different descriptions of the trial and, wherever it is not entirely obvious, any potential influence on Xen. from Plato and other writers of ἀπολογίαι.[21]

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[18]See Menzel 6-7. The reader should be reminded once again that the tone of the *Ap.* might well be based on Xen.'s recollections of Socrates himself, allowing, of course, for a strong Xenophontic cast to the narration.

[19]E. Klement (see bibl.) reacts to Vrijlandt's Xen. *Ap.*/Pl. *Ap.* priority thesis and concludes that the two works developed independently of each other. Unfortunately, since Klement's handwritten thesis is illegible, I have been forced to gather this information from his prefatory abstract.

[20]See Essay B. Pomeroy (p. 26) also tests some very troubled waters with her tentative statement that there is no need to assume that Xen. was copying Plato and that the opposite might in fact be true. Kahn (p. 29) believes that Xen. had no influence whatsoever on Plato, but see the latter's supposed criticism of Xen. *Cyr.* in *Lg.* 694C ff.

[21]Many or all of these points are also treated in the commentary itself.

1. *Xenophon's work is much shorter than Plato's.*

Xen.: Xen.'s professed intention (see §§22-23) is not to relate everything that occurred at the trial. Perhaps his ἀπολογία was never meant for publication and represents instead a collection of notes, a rough draft, or a letter. If influenced by Plato's *Ap.*, perhaps he felt dismayed by its superior literary quality and chose to approach the trial with a narrower focus.

Plato: Plato's work purports to give a factual account of everything said at Socrates' trial, hence its greater length.

2. *Xen. frames (and interrupts) Hermogenes' report with his own narration, while the events themselves are related through another's testimony; Plato's narrative voice never intrudes, and the events and speeches are related as if they are historically accurate and the result of first-hand testimony.*

Xen.: By presenting his narrative in this way, Xen. is able to lend his account an air of authenticity while distancing himself from any responsibility for an accurate description of the events related.[22] In general, Xen. includes his own voice in order to state his purpose in writing, to recapitulate his main points, and to append a short tribute to Socrates at the conclusion of the work. Xen.'s voice also appears at the beginning and end of the *Comm.* to offer similar observations on Socrates' life, while the two remaining Socratica, the *Oec.* and *Smp.*, offer brief introductions followed by dialogues in which the narrative voice recedes or disappears altogether. In general, Xen. emphasizes the personal element in his relationship with Socrates, while Plato, though presumably closer to Socrates, de-emphasizes this aspect to an extreme.

Plato: By Plato's own account he was an eye-witness of events at the trial, and the fact that he does not intrude makes his report seem all the more objective. The only framing device used by him in his writings concerning the trial appears in the *Phd.*

3. *Xen.'s work contains two distinct speeches delivered in court, Plato's three.*

Xen.: Xen. places additional emphasis on Socrates' speeches to his followers both before and after the trial and none whatsoever on the counter-penalty, the proposal of which his Socrates figure says would be tantamount to an admission of guilt. Perhaps Xen. wanted to present Socrates in conversation with his followers in a way reminiscent of the *Comm.* The Socrates figure in each author is given an extra-procedural speech after the penalty is rendered.

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[22]Consider, too, his use of the impersonal verb λέγεται in §§27-31. If Xen. really adopted this approach, did he possibly seek out Hermogenes as an eye-witness simply to legitimize what he had already gathered from other sources? And why would Xen. have turned to Plato's potentially fictive work when he apparently already had personal access to an eye-witness in Hermogenes? (See Menzel 6-7.)

Plato: With the exception of the additional speech, Plato's account is in keeping with the established judicial practice of the day. The additional speech in each author serves as a vehicle by which to chastise the dicasts responsible for his death and to address posterity, while Plato's Socrates, by addressing the dicasts who voted for his acquittal, re-establishes the bond with his supporters (cp. Xen.) and discusses the after-life in a way which anticipates his discussion of the soul in the *Phd.*

4. *Some scholars (e.g. Wilamowitz and Breitenbach) consider Xen.'s title to be inappropriate because of its impreciseness.*

Xen.: There are a limited number of possibilities: Either the title is Xen.'s own, in which case he 1) thought that it was a perfectly appropriate title, 2) used the given title automatically under the influence of the ἀπολογίαι already in existence, or 3) consciously, though inaccurately, entitled it the Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους so that his work would receive attention equal to that given to the already existing ἀπολογίαι; or the title is not his own, in which case 1) the work was originally untitled and received a title only on its later publication (see Item 1 above), or 2) its title was altered at a later date. The title Ἀπολογία, if not Xen.'s own, would have been influenced by the fact that there were already a number of similarly named ἀπολογίαι in existence.

Plato: Pl. *Ap.* focuses entirely on what Socrates said in his defense and is therefore appropriately named.

5. *Xen. begins his work by explaining his purpose in writing it and punctuates Hermogenes' narrative on three occasions with a description of Socrates' intentions, while Plato plunges* in medias res.

(See Item 2 above.)

6. *Xen. cites his source and mentions other authors of* ἀπολογίαι; *Plato is ostensibly his own source.*

Xen.: Since Xen. was not present at the trial, he needs to authenticate his account by naming a direct source, and he mentions other ἀπολογίαι (including Plato's?) in order to point out their inadequate treatment of Socrates' μεγαληγορία. With the exception of Hermogenes, Meletus, and Anytus, Xen. mentions no other eye-witnesses.[23]

Plato: Plato obviously does not need to cite any sources for his own personal account, but he does include the names of many people who were present at the trial and who could have served as independent authorities for the historicity of the events as related by him, a point used by Taylor and Burnet, among others, in support of the

[23]Though mentioned, Chaerephon, at least according to Plato's testimony, was dead at the time of the trial.

reliability of Plato's account (see above). It is difficult to determine what effect, if any, other ἀπολογίαι had on Plato's work, if indeed they already existed at the time of its publication.

7. *Reasons are given for Socrates' unpreparedness: in Xen., a life virtuously lived and the dissuasive influence of his daimonic sign; in Plato, his inexperience in forensic speaking.*

Xen.: Xen. seems more intent on directly rebutting the impiety charge than Plato (see Item 12 below), and this section only foreshadows his treatment of the same issue in §12 ff. In general, Socrates' unpreparedness underscores his conviction that he has led a virtuous life that needs no further justification.

Plato: The Platonic Socrates' hesitation is a rhetorical commonplace which provides ample room for irony, a characteristic much in evidence during the first part of his defense (a superb example of which occurs in §21B).

8. *Xen. introduces a pre-trial Socratic "speech" to Hermogenes; Plato begins with the* ἀπολογία *proper.*

Xen.: This speech sets the tone (see §10) and introduces the major themes: Socrates' virtuous life, his innocence, the importance of the daimonic, the fickleness of the Athenian courts, and the opportuneness of death at this point in Socrates' life. His relationship and conversation with Hermogenes hearken back to similar encounters in the *Comm.* (see Item 3 above) and lend the Socrates figure more rhetorical ἦθος.

Plato: Perhaps Plato felt that the events of the trial were so well known that he could easily dispense with an introduction, and Socrates' ἦθος is more than well established through his interaction with the dicasts. The *Euthphr.* and *Cri.* also lack framing devices (see Item 2 above).

9. *Xen.'s first in-trial speech is directed at Meletus; Plato's is addressed to the dicasts* en masse, *and the interrogation of Meletus occurs in the middle of the work.*

Xen.: Xen.'s Socrates is concerned with rebutting the charges in the indictment one by one, an approach which also forms the basis of the *Schutzschrift* in the *Comm.*

Plato: Plato's Socrates begins with a short prooemium followed by a long treatment of the old accusers' charges as summarized in 19B. According to him, it is these very charges, if any, that will lead to his conviction (28A), hence their placement in his speech before the less significant rebuttal to the official indictment, which he treats almost nonchalantly.

10. *Xen.'s Meletus speech is proportionately longer as compared with Plato's treatment.*

(See Item 9 above.)

11. *In Xen. Meletus' charges appear in reverse order to those of the Meletus figure in Plato.*

Since it would seem that Xen. *Ap.* contains a nearly literal version of the indictment (see comment on §10), Plato must have reversed the order of the charges for literary reasons, a supposition supported by the off-hand manner in which Socrates recapitulates the charges in 24B-C. Since Plato's Socrates has just finished expatiating on the religious motives behind his interminable questioning of his fellow citizens, temporarily switching to a more secular theme perhaps provides a bit of variation before the subject returns once again to the question of Socrates' impiety.[24]

12. *Xen. rebuts the impiety charge with references to Socrates' public sacrifices and a defense of his daimonic sign while referring to the Delphic oracle as the ultimate authority for his wisdom; Plato deals exclusively (and briefly) with the* δαιμόνια καινά *charge by forcing Meletus to admit that at least part (and an inadmissible part, as evidenced in his reference to Anaxagoras) of his charge rests on the public's longstanding identification of Socrates with the atheistic physicists.*

Xen.: Xen. goes out of his way here to identify Socrates' daimonic voice with other forms of divination while calling on the jury and Meletus as witnesses to the fact that he has participated publicly in the state cults. This directly answers both parts of the impiety charge. If influenced by Plato's *Ap.*, it would be difficult to explain why Xen. would leave the association of Socrates with the physicists out of his own account unless he intended to treat the matter elsewhere (*Comm.* I.1.14 and IV.7.3-5) or felt that it deserved no further mention.[25]

Plato: Plato reduces both parts of the impiety charge to one, namely, to a charge of atheism, a simplification justified by Socrates' interpretation of the ambiguous word νομίζειν as it appears in his own summary of the indictment in 24B (see the comment on §10). In short, it becomes a question of whether or not Socrates believes in the supernatural. His religious convictions have already been established through his divinely inspired mission, however, and by interpreting the indictment in this particular way he is able to address the question not of his participation in public worship but of his belief in gods in general. The words δαιμόνια καινά are thus

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[24]Vrijlandt (pp. 94-95) sees the reversal of charges as a literary manipulation motivated by Plato's intention of subjecting Meletus to Socrates' scorn.

[25]See Item 28 below. As Fritz correctly notes ([1931] 58-59), the much-cited passage concerning Socrates' religious beliefs (*Comm.* I.1.4 ff.) has nothing to do with atheism and shows no Platonic influence.

generalized to mean the supernatural in all its aspects, whether "novel" or not, and in any case, Meletus appears to drop this part of his charge when Socrates forces him to narrow his accusation to one of atheism only.[26]

13. *In Xen. the Delphic oracle serves as a proof of Socrates' piety and wisdom, and the dicasts are challenged to test him as to the truth of its pronouncement; in Plato the oracle fulfills the same function while also serving as the impetus for Socrates' mission.*

Xen.: Socrates' humility, not to mention his wit and irony, is altogether missing in Xen.'s account, and his connection with the oracle seems to serve both as another proof of his piety and as a transition to, and a basis for, his argument that no one of his demonstrated character could possibly corrupt the young. The challenge to the dicasts may be considered yet another example of μεγαληγορία, especially since Socrates spends so little time (i.e. only one section in the text) dealing with the oracle's response directly. Xen.'s intention, unlike Plato's, is to establish the literal truth of the oracular response, not the fact that Socrates was wise through being aware of his own ignorance, a distinction perhaps attributable, if the event is historical, to Xen.'s lack of philosophical sophistication.[27]

Plato: Here the Socrates figure can not only call upon Apollo as the ultimate witness to his wisdom, but he can also use the oracle as a means of justifying his unceasing examination of his fellow Athenians: In effect, to stop his questioning would be to disobey the god (see 29A, 33C & 37E). On the other hand, Socrates confesses in 33C that his elenctic encounters with pompous public figures are a source of pleasure for him, an admission which somewhat undermines the professed seriousness of his mission. There are in fact some scholars (e.g. Riddell) who would like to treat Socrates' entire reference to the Delphic authority as yet another example of Socratic irony.[28]

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[26]The daimonic is first mentioned only later (31C-D), and although it is clear from this passage that it appeared in some respect in the indictment, it receives no attention from Socrates when he is dealing with the impiety charge *per se*. This is due, I believe, to its being implicitly included as one particular manifestation of the δαιμόνια καινά mentioned in 24B. According to Wilamowitz ([1919] 1:158), who cites this passage and what follows, Plato wished to suggest here that Socrates treated the gods as non-existent.

[27]Gomperz ([1924] 163) finds few or no traces of a Socratic mission in Xen., while Vander Waerdt (pp. 35-37) sees *Oec.* 6.12-17 as being a parody of the mission, with the emphasis lying above all on the notion of καλοκάγαθία (see too *Oec.* 2.16-18). Vander Waerdt (p. 37 n. 101) remarks that, although Xen.'s Socrates is represented as instilling καλοκάγαθία in his associates, he nowhere concerns himself with philosophical instruction more narrowly construed, a fact which perhaps reflects Xen.'s hesitation to treat Socrates' deeper pursuits.

[28]However, Vrijlandt (pp. 83-85), though he considers Socrates' mission a fiction, fails to find any traces of irony in it. Daniel (pp. 84-85) thinks that the Socratic mission is contrived by Plato in order to conceal the actual beginnings of his philosophicizing, since an exhaustive and more philosophical account would have only confused the dicasts.

14. *The oracle's response is different in each author, as is its interpretation by the respective Socrates figure.*

Xen.: The response to his question which Chaerephon brings back to Athens from Delphi is threefold, i.e., that Socrates has been declared by Apollo to be freer, more just, and more temperate than all other men (see Item 19 below). Xen.'s Socrates does not doubt the truth of the pronouncement and proceeds in court to prove by specific examples that the oracle is indeed correct in its characterization of him. This leads immediately to a more general treatment of his wisdom (§§17-18), which leads in turn to a proof by probability that no one of his character could possibly corrupt the youth (§19).[29] While defendants in Athenian courts were not necessarily expected to be humble, Socrates does not make any serious effort to diminish the sense of divine favor inherent in the oracular response or to soften the self-aggrandizement inherent in his treatment of it.

Plato: Plato's Socrates is well aware of the risk of seeming megalegorical as he prepares to bring up Chaerephon's report in 20E: καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν. He has simply learned from Chaerephon that the god has declared that no one is wiser than he, a report which he doubts immediately and uses as the basis for his lifelong inquiry into the nature of wisdom (21B-22E) while taking pains to distance himself from the fact that Apollo has singled him out as being entirely distinct from other men (23B). Plato's purpose in representing Socrates in this light seems to be to establish the fact 1) that he was a deeply religious man, 2) that, on the basis of his religious convictions, he was prepared to obey, at any price, what he interpreted to be a divine injunction, and 3) that his humility would not allow him to accept the claim that he was in any sense wiser than anyone else. Admittedly, a more sophisticated view of Socrates' apparent *naïveté* in this section might easily lead one to conclude that he is speaking ironically here (see Item 13 above), but in either case, Socrates' unique position as a philosopher remains, that is, he is still the only one among the Athenians who is aware of his own mortal ignorance (see Items 13 and 21).

15. *In Xen. Socrates rebuts the corruption-of-the-youth charge by establishing his wisdom and challenging Meletus to produce living proof of this charge, although his*

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[29]As Vander Waerdt (pp. 40-41) comments, the Xenophontic Socrates' wisdom rests not on his professed ignorance but on more positive traits such as καλακάγαθία and σωφροσύνη. Vander Waerdt, who finds evidence of Platonic influence in Xen. *Ap.*, believes that Xen. rejects the Platonic Socrates' profession of ignorance as being forensically disadvantageous: Besides failing to identify ignorance with wisdom, Xen.'s Socrates often gives his associates moral advice and admits in Xen. *Ap.* 20 to a special concern with the art of education. Montuori (pp. 69-70) lists the four main differences between the two accounts as follows: In Xen. *Ap.* 1) the oracle was uttered in the presence of many people, 2) Socrates does not call upon Chaerecrates to corroborate his account, 3) the report elicits a thorubic reaction from the dicasts, and 4) the response itself is threefold. Montuori concludes from this that Xen. and Plato were in fact describing two separate incidents or fictions (p. 73).

position seems weakened at least temporarily by his response to Meletus' question concerning education; in Plato Socrates forces Meletus by a series of leading questions into a reductio ad absurdum[30] *and asserts his qualifications as an educator by comparing himself to publicly acknowledged experts in other areas.*

Xen.: Xen.'s Socrates was well known for his criticism of the democracy and in particular of its practice of choosing certain public officials by sortition instead of considering their individual qualifications (see *Comm.* I.2.9 and Arist. *Rh.* 1393B3 ff.). As regards education in particular, this criticism mirrors that of Socrates in Pl. *Ap.* 25A-B. The confession of Xen.'s Socrates that he does indeed believe that one should follow the advice of qualified experts over that of one's parents and kinsmen, though well founded on logical principles, would only cause the dicasts to consider Socrates a persistent threat to the conservative post-*junta* democracy. In keeping with the prevalent tone of his speech Socrates professes to be such an expert, another factor which could only contribute to his final condemnation. Xen.'s approach here is again less sophisticated than Plato's (see Item 13 above) and avoids, as is true of his Socratica in general, an elenctic exchange leading to a contradiction on the part of the interlocutor.

Plato: Whereas Xen.'s examples of experts include doctors, public speakers, and generals, Plato's Socrates refers to horse-training only, a fitting example since Plato is here concerned with the education of the young, not, as in Xen.'s case, with obedience to one's close relatives. Conversely, horses are not humans, and Socrates' relentless baiting of Meletus, his questionable argument that no one would intentionally ruin his own community by corrupting the youth (as if there were no other reasons for imparting counter-cultural doctrines), and the cursory treatment of the impiety charge in general are all indicative of the supreme disdain with which Plato's Socrates responds throughout to the official indictment. Meletus' accusation that Socrates teaches atheism to the young seems once again to allude indirectly to Socrates' pre-amnesty association with the physicists.

16. *Socrates in both works challenges Meletus to produce living proof of his charges.*

Xen.: This challenge appears directly in response to Meletus' corruption-of-the-youth charge and is followed by the latter's reply that he does in fact know of some people whom Socrates has persuaded to heed his advice over that of their parents and kinsmen. The specific examples of vice cited in this section are treated at length in the *Comm.*, and the mention of dipsomania here anticipates Socrates' prophecy

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[30]Phillipson (p. 306 ff.) is one of the few who do not believe that Meletus was ensnared during the cross-examination. Vrijlandt (p. 94) remarks that Xen.'s Soc. gives the reader a clear answer to the corruption question, while Plato's figure says nothing of substance about education, merges both charges, and fails to address the issue of the δαιμόνια καινά.

concerning Anytus' son in §30. In Xen. *Ap.* Socrates' challenge is weakened considerably by the fact that Meletus is in a position to produce victims of Socrates' corrupting influence (see Item 14 above).

Plato: Plato's Socrates offers this challenge to Meletus in a later part of his speech (33CD) and not in the context of his rebuttal to the official indictment. While he does not address the particular nature of the corruption, he does lend his challenge more forcefulness by pointing out individuals in the audience, both the "victims" of his influence and their relatives who, if anyone, would have more than sufficient cause to blame Socrates. Meletus does not reply, and Socrates takes his silence to be a tacit admission of the groundlessness of the accusation.

17. *Xen.'s Socrates twice states that the capital charge is unjustified.*

Xen.: By twice referring to the statutory capital offenses, Xen.'s Socrates is obviously emphasizing the injustice of the proposed penalty and bringing the accusers' motives (that is, whether they originate in personal hostility or in an interest for the public's welfare) into question. However, since it was possible to propose a milder penalty after the verdict, the accusers no doubt wished initially to seek the harshest penalty possible in an effort either to cow Socrates or, if he remained intractable, to force him after the verdict to propose a relatively harsher counter-penalty (such as banishment: see Pl. *Ap.* 37B-C) which the jury would accept.

Plato: Plato's Socrates alludes to the inappropriateness of the proposed death penalty (25E-26A) by reducing the possible options to two, i.e., that he had not been responsible for corrupting the youth or that he had done so unintentionally, in which case the proper course of action for Meletus would have been to speak with him in private instead of pressing charges.

18. *Meletus speaks only once in Xen.; he continues to respond reluctantly to Socrates' questioning in Plato.*

Xen.: Xen.'s Meletus is first referred to in §11, and his speech continues to be directed towards the dicasts until §19, where Meletus is addressed directly, who speaks for the first and last time, charging Socrates with causing his followers to disobey their parents. It is quite possible that this dialogue actually continued during the trial (see §22), but if, as Xen. says in the same section, his purpose was simply to show that Socrates did everything within his power to prove his innocence, no purpose would have been served by prolonging the exchange, especially if it resembled the one-sided exchange described by Plato (see immediately below). If, however, the ἀπολογία genre already included many fictional elements, there would have been much to be gained by enhancing the potential rhetorical and dramatic

qualities of any forensic ἀγών between the two antagonists. This is altogether missing in Xen.'s account.

Plato: Meletus appears in the middle of Plato's work (24C-27D) as the reluctant victim of Socrates' ἔλεγχος.[31] His responses resemble those of other Platonic interlocutors in that he is compelled to choose one of several alternatives offered by Socrates, and the fact that the prosecution has warned the dicasts to beware of Socrates' speaking skills (17A) more than explains Meletus' reluctance to engage Socrates in a public dialogue. On the single occasion on which Meletus does take the initiative by indirectly associating Socrates with the teachings of Anaxagoras (26D), he simply reveals that he is completely defenseless against Socrates' dialectical skills. Plato's Socrates makes short work of him by invariably leading him to self-contradictions, a fact which does not so much show that Socrates is innocent of the recorded charges as that Meletus is a hapless fool who is not qualified to render judgment in such matters. Socrates' approach to his defense reflects the current rhetorical trend towards *ad hominem* attacks and an approach based more on arguments of probability than on concrete evidence, as in Socrates' reference to the improbability of his intentionally trying to ruin his own community (and ultimately himself) by corrupting its youth (25D-E).

19. *The dicasts interrupt Socrates' address twice in Xen. and once in Plato.*

Xen.: The dicasts respond emotionally on two occasions in Xen.: when Socrates claims in §13 that he is privy to an unerring source of inspiration from the gods and when he discloses in §15 that the Delphic oracle has proclaimed that no one is freer (ἐλευθερώτερον), more just (δικαιότερον), or more temperate (σωφρονέστερον) than he. Both examples of θόρυβος occur in response to Socrates' revelations, a mood which Socrates attempts to dispel by referring to the oracle's response to Lycurgus, a reference which, however, could only have had the opposite effect. (It should be observed in general that Socrates' μεγαληγορία does not at all imply any sense of falsehood in what he says to the court, but rather the way in which he chooses to respond to the charges brought against him.)

Plato: In 21A Socrates anticipates an emotional outburst in reaction to the oracle's response by asking the dicasts to remain calm. Although the verb θορυβεῖν is also applied to Meletus in 27B, it refers here to the dicasts only inasmuch as they are asked by Socrates not to allow Meletus to interrupt his interrogation with irrelevant answers. The only actual interruption occurs in 30C (μὴ θορυβήσητε κ.τ.λ.), where Socrates

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[31]Riddell (pp. xxiv-xxv) comments that the two most important points, the argument against the general prejudice and the more personal justification of Socrates' activities, straddle the less important confrontation with Meletus, which receives less attention because it is comparatively immaterial to the larger issues.

expresses his refusal to comply with any sentence passed by the court whereby his philosophical activities would be in any way limited. His readiness to die is the ultimate proof of his conviction that he is innocent of his accusers' charges and that the philosophical way of life is fully justified. That this interruption occurs at the emotional climax of his speech is therefore quite appropriate.

20. *The two accounts of the daimonic vary.*

See Appendix C. Let it be observed in the meantime that Xen.'s account of the daimonic differs mainly from Plato's in that he describes it as being both pro- and apotreptic. Xen. goes to great lengths in the *Ap.* (§§12-13) to compare it to other forms of divination, while Plato's Socrates mentions its influence in keeping him out of politics and its silence during the court proceedings, the absence of which he interprets in a positive way. It is clear from both authors (see Xen. *Ap.* 12 , *Comm.* I.1.2-5, and Pl. *Ap.* 31C-D) that Socrates' accusers included a reference to the daimonic in their deposition submitted to the King Archon.

21. *Both Socrates figures examine the claims of the oracle differently, with Plato's Socrates turning his examination into a life-long mission.*

Xen.: For Xen.'s Socrates, the oracle's pronouncement seems to provide him with an opportunity to review his life and his relationship with his fellow citizens, while relating Chaerephon's report to the dicasts serves structurally as a starting point from which to enumerate his many virtues; the report itself could generally be considered an affirmation of, or justification for, Socrates' philosophical activities. Considering the Delphic oracle's pro-Persian and -Spartan history, I find it difficult, however, to believe that the announcement of Apollo's response would alone be sufficient to win over an Athenian jury, and this might account for Socrates' immediate offer to interpret the words of the oracle secularly, i.e. in a way which is divorced from any connection with the Delphic god (§15: ὅμως δὲ ὑμεῖς μηδὲ ταῦτ' εἰκῇ πιστεύσητε τῷ θεῷ). Socrates' lengthy, self-aggrandizing examination of the oracular response can be described as an example of μεγαληγορία.[32]

Plato: The most conspicuous problem in considering the Platonic Socrates' examination of the oracle is the discrepancy between Socrates' belief in the oracle and his desire to test its validity; a second problem concerns his determination to continue his mission long after his wisdom (i.e. the awareness of his own ignorance) has been

[32]Vander Waerdt (p. 34) believes that the Platonic Socrates' mission is replaced in Xen. *Ap.* 16 by the description of a life-long search intended to suppress any reference to Socrates' philosophical development and to his past career as a natural philosopher, and to avoid any questions about Socrates' heterodoxy. See Edelstein 138-50 for a more general discussion.

established.[33] Yet other questions arise at this point: Are we really to believe that Socrates only began to test his fellow citizens *after* learning of the cryptic words from Delphi? If so, does this mark a clear break with his background as the madcap physicist depicted in the *Clouds* or soberly described in *Phd.* 96A-100A and *Comm.* I.1.14, IV.7.3-5? Is Socrates speaking ironically when he says that he has continued his mission out of "obedience to the god" (37E-38A: ἐάντε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ)? Or are we to assume that he has acted in a genuine attempt, in a way reminiscent of his exetactic successor Diogenes the Cynic and motivated perhaps by a deep sense of disillusionment, to find a truly wise man?[34]

22. *Xen. includes a reference to Lycurgus.*

Surely, this could only have been taken to be an offensive remark, since Socrates is in effect saying to his peers the dicasts, "Indeed, I've been ranked among the sages, gentlemen, but at least I'm not god-like." Combined with the reference to a pro-Spartan oracle (see Item 21), any mention of the Spartan law-giver Lycurgus would have been particularly maladroit on Socrates' part and not consistent with any serious effort to win an acquittal from the democrats. On the other hand, it might have been better received by any pro-Spartans sitting among the jurors, and the possible allusion to Lycurgus' role as a νομοθέτης might have been intended to appeal to a society traditionally riven by factional strife.

23. *Both accounts include references to Socrates' acquaintances as potential (or actual) witnesses to his innocence and character in general.*

Xen.: These references in Xen. include Xen. himself, Hermogenes, anonymous friends who would be prepared to attest to the existence of the daimonic sign, the late Chaerephon (see Pl. *Ap.* 21A), Socrates' acquaintances and followers in general, Apollodorus and Socrates' more immediate followers in particular, and by implication those who are unwilling to step forward and testify in support of the corruption-of-

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[33]Taylor ([1932] 139-40) describes the goals of Socrates' mission as a knowledge of existence as it really is and an ability to distinguish between good and evil, that is, δόξα must be replaced with knowledge. For Socrates, immortality is equivalent to divinity, and his mission to tend to the soul, which is divine, can therefore be seen as an attempt to gain a sort of immortality (*ibid.* 138-39). In general, in Pl. *Ap.* the oracle could be considered a starting-point for living life well, in Xen. *Ap.* an acknowledgment of a life well lived.

[34]See the comments on §§14-15. If an identification of the voice of Apollo with the daimonic voice were possible, it would perhaps be easier to explain Socrates' motives for continuing his mission, though the daimonic's purely apotreptic role would have to be explained more adequately. Note that the divine mission of the Platonic Socrates is based not on the daimonic sign but on the oracle's response to Chaerephon's query (see Gomperz [1924] 163). Vrijlandt (p. 85) offers a possible explanation, i.e., that Plato was fully aware that Socrates' life was directed by the daimonic and that he exaggerated this and conflated it with the oracle to offer an embellished image to his fellow citizens: *inde igitur Socratis divinitatem originem traxisse.*

the-youth charge. In general, Xen. seems to be laying emphasis on Socrates' relationship with various individuals, e.g. with Xen. himself as his acquaintance and admirer, with Hermogenes and Apollodorus as members of his circle, and with Chaerephon, an apparently well-known figure in Athens (Pl. *Ap.* 20E). In this way Xen. again seems to be attempting to preserve the anecdotal, conversational quality characteristic of the *Comm.*, whereas Plato's approach seems to consist in stressing the fact that Socrates commanded the respect and affection of entire portions of the Athenian citizenry, a fact emphasized all the more by their actual presence at his trial (see immediately below).

Plato: Plato does not use Xen.'s personal framing device, but the fact that he includes his own name in two significant passages (34A & 38B) is at least some indication of the intimacy felt by him towards his mentor. Although the Xenophontic Socrates' acquaintances are mentioned more frequently throughout the narrative, the Platonic Socrates' exhaustive citation of names *in court* (33D-34A) and the address to his supporters after the trial have a decidedly dramatic, even poignant effect and, if historically accurate, were presumably directed quite specifically towards winning an acquittal.

24. *Xen.'s reference to Socrates' self-restraint (§§16-18) can be compared with Plato's to his poverty (23B-C).*

Xen.: In Xen. Socrates' pursuit of philosophy has led to self-restraint and an ability to rely on the pleasures of his soul, the material manifestation of which is the type of poverty described more explicitly in *Comm.* IV.2.37 and *Oec.* 2.1 ff.[35] Socrates' poverty does not come up directly in Xen. *Ap.*: Its existence is simply implied in his inability to pay back his friends (§17: ἐγὼ ἥκιστ' ἂν ἔχοιμι χρήματα ἀντιδιδόναι).

Plato: Socrates' poverty and the accusation of having accepted fees are each mentioned at least twice in Plato and once in connection with each other (31B-C). It should be borne in mind that in both works Socrates' poverty is a physical proof of an adherence to principles, not of his actual innocence with respect to the prosecutors' charges, though Plato's Socrates elevates both his poverty and his disobedience to a higher plane by invoking the notion of a divine mission.

25. *Xen.'s Socrates refers to disobeying one's parents, and Plato's to challenging authority in general.*

Xen.: Xen. not only brings up disobedience but has his Socrates figure defend it strongly on the grounds that education is one of his particular interests and that an

[35]Gigon ([1946] 245) notes Xen.'s more positive perception of Socrates' poverty.

expert's opinion should override that of any family member. Xen.'s approach in conceding this point to the prosecution is similar to that of the *Schutzschrift,* where he in essence admits that Polycrates' claims are at least partially justified while doing his best to explain Socrates' real motives in acting as he did.[36]

Plato: Plato's Socrates not only directly challenges the heliastic authority by saying that he would not obey any restriction on his philosophical activities if so imposed as a sentence, but he also concludes his speech by making a thinly veiled threat to the court in which he speaks of his young successors as potential malcontents. In addition, Socrates accounts for his unpopularity by pointing out the effect that his methods have had on the sons of wealthy fathers (23C). Yet he vehemently denies ever having taught anyone anything (33A: ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτε ἐγενόμην), much less any esoteric doctrine (33B: εἰ δὲ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει), and he refuses to take any responsibility for the actions of his followers (*loc. cit.*), an apparent reference to such notorious figures as Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides. I maintain that Plato's account differs from Xen.'s in emphasis, not in substance, and that the dramatically personal invitation of the Platonic Socrates to the relatives of his followers to come forward and denounce him agrees in essence with the justification of Socrates' influence on the young which appears in Xen. *Ap.*

26. *Both accounts agree on Socrates' reasons for refusing to propose a counter-penalty, though Plato's version differs in other respects. Plato's Socrates is given a short speech here; Xen.'s is not.*

Xen.: Xen. provides two reasons for Socrates' refusal to propose a counter-penalty: 1) he considers it to be an opportune time to bring his life to an end, and 2) to propose a counter-penalty would be equivalent to admitting guilt for his actions. It is possible to draw the simple conclusion that the two reasons given are in fact related and that Socrates was held in contempt of court for refusing to suggest a counter-penalty, which in turn led to the court's decision to have him executed because of the lack of any alternative. Socrates refuses to allow his friends to stand surety for him, nor does he allow himself to be persuaded to flee Athens. Xen. *Ap.* is generally characterized by its brevity, but it seems quite appropriate in this case: According to this version, counter-penalty was proposed, and Socrates' principles were such that there was no need for further discussion of the matter. Xen.'s description of Socrates'

[36]Unlike Xen., Plato nowhere seems to concern himself with Polycrates in his writings, perhaps because he did not want to be associated with the views of the Antisthenians, or perhaps he felt that Polycrates did not merit a response or, conversely, that most of Polycrates' accusations were true and could not be denied (Chroust [1957] 214-15). See Essay C for a lengthy treatment of Polycrates.

behavior at this point in the proceedings is fully consistent within itself, while Plato's contradictory account is indeed difficult to explain (see immediately below).

Plato: According to Plato's Socrates, the proposal of a counter-penalty would be equally self-incriminating (37B: πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἄξιός εἰμι τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ), a statement which *follows* his σίτησις proposal and makes it clear that the latter is to be understood ironically. (The absence of this first proposal in Xen. *Ap.* is particularly puzzling since it would supply such an excellent example of μεγαληγορία.) But how does one explain the subsequent proposals? Socrates' total property was valued at very little (see *Oec.* 2.3, where it is assessed at five minae), and he obviously could not be expected to liquidate all of his assets and leave his wife and three children without any means whatsoever. Are the fines, then, to be considered another example of Socratic levity? Perhaps the first fine of one mina (valued at approximately $4,000+ when based on the American minimum wage of $5.00 per hour and the fact that fifth-century Athenian stoneworkers were paid one drachma per day for their work on the Erechtheum) could be so interpreted, but the second fine of thirty minae (approximately $120,000+ by the same standard) was a considerable amount of money.[37] At the moment, I see no way of reconciling this last, obviously serious proposal with Socrates' earlier statement unless he had given up his case as being already lost and yielded to his friends' importunity out of respect for their feelings. Unfortunately, the vague explanation in 38B (εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτείσειν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην) offers no help towards explaining the contradiction.[38]

27. *Both authors mention Socrates' refusal to live elsewhere but with different reasons attributed to the respective Socrates figures: In Xen., the prospect of an imminent death dissuades him from escaping; in Plato, banishment would entail not being able to continue his divine mission.*

Xen.: Xen. mentions escape in §23, where he humorously refers to the unlikelihood of his escaping death in another country. The daimonic is mentioned as

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[37]For the seriousness of the Platonic Socrates' final counter-penalty offer, see Riddell xix, Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 225-30, and also Reeve 172-73, who observes that Socrates is explicit in saying that he is paying as much as he can afford (see Pl. *Ap.* 38A-B). In Pl. *Ep.* 361E thirty minae is mentioned as being a good-sized dowry.

[38]See the comment on §23. There have been various unconvincing attempts to explain this discrepancy between the two accounts: According to Chroust ([1957] 40: see too Oldfather 209), it is possible that the clerk only noted the Prytaneum proposal and failed to note the counter-penalty during all of the uproar that ensued: This would account for its omission in Xen. Edelstein (p. 145 n. 13) believes that Plato's Socrates agreed to propose the counter-penalty because he knew that it would not be taken seriously by the dicasts. Ollier (pp. 94-95) offers a similar conjecture: Socrates' first proposal was ironic, and the second was presented so off-handedly that it could not have been taken seriously. In this light, Xen.'s account therefore remains true to the spirit, if not the letter, of Socrates' actual words. For other views on this matter, see the comment on §23.

discouraging him from preparing a formal defense, and this, combined with considerations of his advanced age, leads him to conclude that he has come upon an appropriate occasion for ending his life. There are of course some general similarities with the *Cri.* (see, for example, 53D-E), but even if Xen. was influenced here by Plato, any closer comparison would be necessarily tenuous unless Plato's personified Laws could be compared somehow with the apotreptic influence of the Xenophontic Socrates' daimonic sign.

Plato: Continuing his philosophical mission is the principal concern of Plato's Socrates and rules out any thought of accepting a sentence of banishment. The only point in common between the two authors is the fact that Socrates' actions in both cases are motivated and sanctioned by religious considerations, in the one case by the daimonic sign and in the other by Socrates' interpretation of the Delphic oracle. Both positions can only result in the death penalty.

28. *In Xen. Socrates does not address the charges of the earlier accusers.*

Xen.: To resolve this problem, it is necessary first to look at Xen.'s own statements concerning the purpose of his work, i.e., that he intends to explain Socrates' μεγαληγορία (§1) and that Socrates did everything within his power to prove his innocence (§22). It is quite possible that the additional statement which appears in §22, i.e., that Xen. does not feel compelled to relate everything that occurred at the trial, refers implicitly to such omissions as this one, though it is noteworthy that this disclaimer appears *after* the Meletus dialogue and not before it so as to correspond to Plato's sequence of events. As it stands, it would more obviously apply to an omission of the lengthy self-vindication section in Pl. *Ap.* (see next item). There is in fact no hint (except perhaps for the references to "free instruction" in §26 and to the positive influence on Anytus' son in §29) of Socrates' physicist/sophist background in Xen. *Ap.*, and this can only be accounted for by reasoning 1) that it did not seem immediately relevant to Xen. because it was not explicitly megalegorical, 2) that it was never actually discussed in court and is therefore a Platonic invention, or 3) that he had an inadequate account of the trial as his source.[39]

Plato: Plato's Socrates makes short work of the physicist/sophist charges and moves quickly to a broader treatment of the ill will that his activities have engendered

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[39]Wetzel (pp. 73-75) suggests that Xen. was simply too young at the time to be aware of Aristophanes and the cases of Anaxagoras and Protagoras; by the time he was older, the city was at war, and he was occupied with other matters. Posterity preserves the anti-sophistic nature of the trial in Aeschin. *contra Timarch.* 173 and Plu. *Cat.Ma.* 23, and according to Wetzel, the fact that Xen. was unaware of this anti-sophistic aspect of the trial further invalidates the historicity of Xen. *Ap.* 10-26. Vander Waerdt (pp. 32-33) believes that Xen. was well aware of the charges of the "old accusers" (see *Oec.* 6.12-17, *Smp.* 6.6-8, and *Comm.* I.1.11-16: see too Delebecque 208) but omitted them from Xen. *Ap.* to avoid calling Socrates' piety into question. The emphasis on καλοκἀγαθία in the *Oec.*, on the other hand, can be seen as a definite response to Aristophanes' earlier charges (*ibid.*, p. 38).

in the community. He deals with these prejudices at some length since, as he says in 28A, it is precisely these accusations and the prevailing opinion against him, if anything, which will lead to his being convicted. In general, Socrates chooses to concentrate more positively on his divine mission and the vindication of his life's work rather than on the more negative charges represented by the specific accusations, both past and present.

29. *In Xen. Socrates' self-vindication speech appears as part of his treatment of the Delphic oracle and during his dialogue with Meletus; in Plato it appears after the Meletus dialogue.*

Xen.: In Xen. Socrates' self-vindication (§§17-21) appears directly in response to the Delphic pronouncement, a fact which, though not corresponding to a divine mission, nevertheless lends his activities the quality of being sanctioned by a god. Again, the Xenophontic Socrates' much shorter justification of his actions (a few strands of which also occur in his response to the jury after the final verdict in §§24-26) may perhaps be accounted for by the disclaimer in §22, though a fuller treatment would have lent more support to the statement that Socrates did everything within his power to prove his innocence.

Plato: The brief allusion to the oracle in Pl. *Ap.* 28E links, as it does in Xen. *Ap.*, Socrates' self-vindication in 28D-35D directly to his divine mission. Generally, the impression left by Socrates in Pl. *Ap.* is that the prosecution's charges are trivial and that after quickly dismissing them he can move to the more important work of justifying his life as a philosopher, which is far more extensive than Xen.'s treatment of the same subject. Plato's account, if true, seems to correspond more directly to his Socrates' professed desire to win an acquittal (37A-B).

30. *In Xen. Socrates rebukes the dicasts after the penalty is rendered and consoles his followers after the trial; in Plato Socrates does both while waiting to be led away. In general, there are a considerable number of similarities between the relevant sections in both authors.*

Xen.: Xen.'s Socrates does not himself provide a reason for the verdict, though Xen. ascribes it solely to his μεγαληγορία. Socrates addresses the two indictment charges again briefly while asserting that his self-esteem has in no way been diminished by the conviction; he further adds for the second time that the decision to execute him is unprecedented if one compares his alleged wrong-doing with the statutory capital offenses in Athens. This section is similar to its Platonic counterpart in its rebuke of the jury and in the reference to posterity, and in spite of its purely negative tone, this speech seems to be addressed to the entire jury, not to one part of it as in Plato. Xen.'s Socrates refers to Palamedes to emphasize the injustice of the

conviction and the opinion of generations to come, while Plato mentions him more briefly as being someone with whom he will be able to compare experiences in the after-life, provided that such an after-life exists. Xen.'s reflections on Anytus outside the court seem to represent a more individualized continuation of his more general rebuke in §§24-26, and the same holds true for his Homeric prophecy concerning Anytus' son. Socrates' tone here could only be described as vindictive, while Plato's Socrates eventually softens his tone, saying that he bears no ill will towards any of the dicasts, although their own motives in convicting him were certainly less than well intentioned. Xen. consoles his followers after the trial by focusing on the mortality of all humans and on the timeliness of his own death; he also tries to lift their spirits with the jest he makes to Apollodorus. There is no mention of the daimonic sign, though the prophecy concerning Anytus' son serves a similar purpose (see too §32: ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι). Socrates is described on leaving the court as καὶ ὄμμασι καὶ σχήματι καὶ βαδίσματι φαιδρός (§27), a description of confidence similar in tone to the Platonic Socrates' closing words to his supporters among the dicasts. Xen.'s narrative voice appears at the conclusion of Xen. *Ap.* to confirm Socrates' prophecy concerning Anytus and to reiterate his assertion that Socrates' μεγαληγορία can be explained by his readiness to die. Finally, Xen.'s remarks on Socrates' consistent fortitude under duress can be compared with the Platonic Socrates' assertion that no good man can be harmed.

Plato: The post-conviction speech in Plato is much longer than Xen.'s, and the fact that Socrates no longer treats any of the indictment charges gives it a distinct tone of resignation, albeit optimistic resignation, to his fate. The overall effect of the Platonic Socrates' speech is one of addressing Athens (and its succeeding generations) in general, including for the moment its constituent groups of enemies and admirers. It is interesting that Socrates deals at some length with what he considers to be the real reason for his conviction, i.e. his refusal to resort to a demonstrative appeal for mercy, a point treated at some length earlier (34B ff.); it is also noteworthy that Plato's Socrates admits that the conviction is pointless since his life is almost over (38C), a remark reminiscent of Xen.'s general thesis. The rebuke concludes with a Homeric prophecy (cp. the Anytus prophecy in Xen. *Ap.* 30) about the possible retribution of his followers and with an admonishment of the government for putting innocent people to death, a remark intended, perhaps, to be a stinging comparison with such practices under the recent *junta.* Socrates then turns to address those who voted for his acquittal, a section which corresponds roughly to Xen. *Ap.* 27-28 and which some scholars consider to be a Platonic fiction. However, there are enough similarities between the relevant sections to support the view that Socrates addressed his

supporters in some capacity after the proceedings, whether in court or not.[40] He discusses the nature of death at length in a way reminiscent of the *Phd.* and adds a note of levity (cp. Socrates' quip in Xen. *Ap.* 28) by saying that he intends to subject the great figures in the after-life to his ἔλεγχος, knowing that there will be no danger there of the death penalty. The reference to his daimonic sign, missing in Xen., supports his previous claim that his actions have been sanctioned by the gods. Finally, his reference to his sons adds a personal touch reminiscent of the conclusion of Xen. *Ap.* and surely meant by Plato to be contrasted with Socrates' earlier refusal to drag his children before the court to win the pity of the dicasts.

Outlines of both ἀπολογίαι appear in juxtaposition on the following pages.

[40]Moreover, the argument that the historical Socrates could not have delivered a speech similar to the speech placed in his mouth by Plato because it did not conform to judicial procedure is invalid for the simple reason that the trial was already over and that Socrates explicitly states in 39E that he is waiting for the officials to complete their business: οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι.

I. Introduction (§§1-2)
- A. Xenophon explains the purpose of his work (§1) and cites Hermogenes as the source of his report on Socrates' trial (§2). (Hermogenes' report appears in §§3-27.)

II. Before and During the Trial (§§3-26)
- A. Pre-trial conversation between Hermogenes and Socrates (§§3-9)
  1. Socrates holds a virtuous life to be a sufficient defense (§3).
  2. The daimonic has dissuaded him from preparing a formal speech (§4).
  3. Death is the preferable alternative for the following reasons:
     a. he has led an exemplary life up to this point (§5),
     b. he will soon face the infirmities of old age (§6),
     c. a death of this kind will be an easy one (§7), and
     d. the gods have also made their wishes known by dissuading him from seeking acquittal by any means (§8).
  4. In short, Socrates has reached a suitable point at which to die (§9).

I. Exordium (17A-18A)
- A. Socrates' initial reaction to the prosecutors' arguments
- B. His unfamiliarity with the language of the courts
- C. His intention to address two sets of charges, i.e. those of his earliest and those of his most recent accusers

II. Rebuttal (18B-28A)
- A. Response to earliest accusers (18B-20C)
  1. The accusers' "charges" are re-stated, i.e., that Socrates
     a. inquires into the causes of natural phenomena,
     b. makes the weaker argument seem the stronger, and
     c. teaches others to do so.
  2. There is no truth to these charges, nor that he formally educates others and collects fees for his services.
- B. Socrates' divine mission (20D-24C)
  1. The cause of Socrates' notoriety is based on a type of wisdom attested by the Delphic oracle.
  2. The oracle's response to Chaerephon's question: "No one is wiser than Socrates."
  3. Socrates' reaction to the pronouncement:
     a. He desired to test its veracity by examining Athenians who had a reputation for being wise, namely,
        i. a politician, who obviously was not wise at all (hence Socrates' conclusion that he himself could only be considered wise by virtue of the fact that he was aware of his own ignorance); then
        ii. poets, whose knowledge (not wisdom) consists in inspiration; and finally

B. Socrates addresses Meletus (§§10-21)
1. Socrates appears before court disposed as above (§10).
2. He replies to the impiety charge (§§11-13)
a. by addressing Meletus directly and offering proof of his belief in the state gods (§11),
b. by describing the daimonic as being simply another form of divination (§§12-13), and
c. by being prepared to prove the daimonic's authenticity through the testimony of his friends (§13).
[The proceedings are interrupted by the reaction of the dicasts (§14).]
3. Attestation of the Delphic oracle (§§14-16)
a. Socrates relates Chaerephon's report on the Delphic oracle (§14).
[The proceedings are interrupted again by the reaction of the dicasts (§15).]
b. Socrates refers to the story of Lycurgus (§15).
c. He addresses the oracle's response to Chaerephon point by point (§16).
4. Socrates' denial that his activities lead to the corruption of the youth (§§17-21)
a. Socrates offers as proofs of his wisdom the desire of citizens and non-citizens to associate with him, his self-discipline, and his ability to rely on the pleasures of his own soul (§§17-18).
b. He challenges Meletus to produce examples of corrupted youths (§19).
c. Meletus replies that Socrates causes disobedience to parents (§20).
iii. craftsmen, whose technical expertise causes them, like the poets, to believe that they are experts in all other areas as well, hence their reputation for being "wise".
4. Results of the mission
a. Public hostility and an undeserved reputation for being himself wise,
b. a clear-cut mission to continue exposing the ignorance of others,
c. extreme poverty, and
d. a following of young, wealthy men who also use his methods to expose the ignorance of others, a situation which has created even more public hostility.
e. In short, it is Socrates' candor which has caused him to be unpopular.
C. Response to immediate charges and dialogue with Meletus (24C-28A)
1. The prosecution's charges are re-stated, i.e., that Socrates is guilty
a. of corrupting the youth and
b. of impiety, i.e.
i. of not believing in the state gods, and
ii. of introducing new gods in their place.
2. The first charge: Corruption of the youth
a. First argument: In replying to Socrates' question "Who makes the young good?" Meletus is reduced to saying that everyone else but Socrates is qualified to do so, an obvious absurdity.
b. Second argument: Socrates, by comparing education with horse-training, forces Meletus to admit that education is equally a matter for experts.
c. Intermediate conclusion: Meletus has not considered these matters seriously.
d. Third argument: No one would intentionally ruin his own community by corrupting its youth.
e. Final conclusion: Either Socrates is innocent of the charge, or he corrupts the young unintentionally, in which case Meletus could have dealt with the matter privately.
3. The second charge: Impiety
a. Socrates maneuvers Meletus into accusing him of atheism and indirectly comparing him with Anaxagoras.
b. Socrates' belief in δαιμόνια implies a belief in δαίμονες: therefore Meletus' charge is unfounded.
D. Conclusion (28A-B)
1. Meletus' charges have been satisfactorily answered, but it is the charges of the earlier accusers, if any, that will lead to a conviction.

d. Socrates concedes this point and justifies his influence by comparing it with publicly acknowledged expertise in other areas (§20).
e. He questions the appropriateness of the capital charge in such a case (§21).

III. Self-Vindication (28B-35D)
- A. Right action (28A-D)
  - 1. All of Socrates' actions have been motivated by one consideration, i.e., whether he is acting rightly or wrongly.
    - a. He alludes to the behavior of the Trojan heroes, especially to that of Achilles.
- B. Station in life (28D-29A)
  - 1. One should not desert one's given station.
    - a. In this respect he refers to his participation in Athenian military campaigns.
  - 2. Abandoning the philosophical life would be equivalent to disobeying the oracle.
- C. Fear of death as an unjustified motivation (29A-B)
  - 1. The fear of death is based on an unfounded assumption; death may in fact be a blessing, while to act wrongly is certainly dishonorable.
- D. Allegiance to the divine (29B-30C)
  - 1. Socrates' mission must be continued at any cost, even death.
- E. Socrates' role as a public benefactor (30C-31A)
  - 1. He serves the polis as an irreplaceable stimulus.
- F. Poverty (31A-C)
  - 1. That Socrates has been driven to poverty and has neglected his family is proof that his mission is divinely inspired.
  - 2. His poverty also proves that he has never accepted a fee.
- G. Reasons for his non-participation in civic affairs (31C-32E)
  - 1. His daimonic sign has advised him to remain aloof.
  - 2. Public life is dangerous for an honest man.
    - a. Socrates here relates as proofs that he is unwilling to bow to unlawful authority the incidents concerning Leon of Salamis and the admirals at Arginusae.
- H. His relationship to his followers (33A-34B)
  - 1. Socrates has consistently refused to tolerate unjust behavior in any of his followers.
  - 2. He is not a professional educator, although he has never excluded anyone from listening to what he has to say.
  - 3. He has never accepted a fee.
  - 4. He disavows any reponsibility for his followers' actions.
  - 5. He has never imparted a particular doctrine.

C. Interruption by the author (§§22-23)
1. Xenophon's intention is merely to relate that Socrates did everything within his power to prove his innocence (§22).
2. Socrates' intention to die was evident in his refusal to propose a counter-penalty (§23).

III. Socrates' Response to the Final Verdict (§§24-26)
A. He rebukes the jury: the charge has not been proven (§24).
B. The capital charge has no legal precedent (§25).
C. Shame rests not on him but on those who have voted to convict him.
D. A parallel is drawn with the Palamedes myth: the opinion of posterity will prevail (§26).

IV. After the Trial (§§27-31)
A. Departure of Socrates and consolation of his followers (§§27-28)
1. Death is inevitable, and their grief is unsuitable under the circumstances (§27). (Hermogenes' report ends.)
2. Socrates consoles Apollodorus (§28).
B. Reflections on Anytus (§§29-31)
1. Socrates criticizes Anytus (§29).
2. He prophesies the fate of Anytus' son (§30).
3. The outcome of the prophecy is confirmed by Xenophon (§31).

V. Recapitulation and Encomium (§§32-34)
A. Recapitulation (§32)
1. Μεγαληγορία was the principal cause of Socrates' conviction.
2. He died opportunely.
B. Encomium (§§33-34)
1. His fortitude did not fail him at the prospect of death (§33).
2. Xenophon closes with an acknowledgment of his own personal debt to Socrates (§34).

6. Some followers are attracted to him because his interrogations are admittedly entertaining.
7. He challenges Meletus to produce living proof that he has corrupted his followers.
I. Conclusion (34B-35D)
1. Socrates steadfastly refuses to stoop to base emotional appeals in order to secure an acquittal.

IV. Intermediate Verdict and Counter-Penalty (35E-38B)
A. Socrates proposes as a counter-penalty free maintenance at the state's expense.
B. He considers other alternatives, including banishment.
C. He refuses to limit his philosophical activities.
D. He finally proposes a fine.

V. Final Verdict and Peroration (38C-42A)
A. Socrates addresses the dicasts who voted for his conviction:
1. It is they who will be condemned by posterity.
a. Reference to the Palamedes myth
B. Socrates addresses those who voted for his acquittal:
1. He informs them that his δαιμόνιον did not intervene even once during the proceedings.
2. He reflects on the nature of death.
3. He requests that his listeners chide his sons if they notice them living by the wrong priorities.
4. He bids them farewell and departs.

Appendix C: Socrates' Daimonic Sign and Its Relevance to the Charge of Impiety

1) *On the Daimonic*

Τὸ δαιμόνιον is an abstract neuter substantive formed from the adjective δαιμόνιος,-α,-ον, formed in turn from the noun δαίμων, which applies either to a θεός or to an inferior spiritual being and refers in particular to its dealings with humans;[1] this meaning obtains from Homer to Plato (Riddell 109). Throughout the following discussion it will be important to bear in mind the abstract, adjectival quality of the term τὸ δαιμόνιον and the fact that, though Plutarch and the Neoplatonist commentators come to make an explicit connection between τὸ δαιμόνιον and δαίμονες in their discourses, neither Xen. nor Plato treats the former as a truly distinct entity.[2] Since the adjective δαιμόνιος has no direct equivalent in English, I have chosen to render τὸ δαιμόνιον as "the daimonic" 1) to preserve its original meaning, 2) to retain the important abstract quality of the articular construction, and 3) through an alternative spelling, to rid the term of the unwelcome connotations inherent in the derivative English word "demonic".[3]

2) *Its Use in Xen.*

The passages relevant to an explanation of τὸ δαιμόνιον in Xen. are as follows: *Ap.* 4-5, 12-15, *Comm.* I.1.2-5, I.1.9, I.1.12, I.1.15, I.2.58, I.3.4-5, I.4.2, I.4.10, I.4.15, I.4.18, IV.3.12-15, IV.7.10, IV.8.1, IV.8.5-6, IV.8.11, *Smp.* 8.5, *Ages.* 5.4, *Eq.* 11.13, and *HG* VI.4.3, VII.4.3. These include all nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs deriving from the noun δαίμων (with the exception of the words καινὰ δαιμόνια as quoted in the indictment, which will be treated below) and also any

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[1] See, for example, Pl. *Smp.* 202D-203A, where the daimonic realm is described as occupying an intermediate position between the realms of gods and men.

[2] Τὸ δαιμόνιον as a substantive appears in the Septuagint, for example, where it seems to be used as a diminutive of δαίμων (see Burnet [1924] 16). Beckman (p. 77) explains the vagueness of the term τὸ δαιμόνιον as being due to Socrates' philosophical agnosticism: In this sense it becomes a hunch or intuition, but one originating not in Socrates' own psyche but in the transcendent "beyond", and its vagueness corresponds to his professed ignorance about "higher" matters. Joyal (p. 42) refers the vagueness of the term to Socrates himself: "The inference [regarding the various terms used in the early Socratic works to describe Socrates' sign] presents us with a Socrates who, because he knows only that his sign is *not* a δαίμων but does not know what it actually *is*, relies unswervingly upon a set of vague phrases and circumlocutions - a pattern of linguistic behaviour appropriate for the sceptical Socrates whom we recognize from numerous Platonic dialogues and from early sources as well." Maier's remark (p. 462) also bears some consideration: *...offenbar spricht sich in der Wahl der Bezeichnung "Dämonisches" etwas von der Ironie aus, mit der der Meister den Nimbus des Wundermannes von sich fernzuhalten wußte.* Maier adds (p. 463) that Socrates' devotion to philosophy was surely in large part due to his unwavering faith in the daimonic.

[3] Δαίμονες tended to be personified less clearly than θεοί, hence the former's later negative development (see More 43). I notice that Reeve also uses the term "daimonic"; for the articular construction, see Friedländer 1:33.

usages which generally contribute towards an understanding of the phenomenon in question. In Xen. words deriving from δαίμων appear in various forms as follows: δαιμόνιον as a neuter (*Ages.* 5.4 and *Comm.* I.1.9) and δαιμόνιος as a masculine adjective (*Comm.* I.2.58), δαιμονιώτατα as an adverb (*HG* VII.4.3), and the infinitive δαιμονᾶν (*Comm.* I.1.9); τὸ δαιμόνιον as such appears in *HG* VI.4.3, *Smp.* 8.5, *Ap.* 4, 13, and *Comm.* I.1.2, I.1.4, I.4.2, I.4.10, IV.3.14, IV.8.1, IV.8.5. Synonyms or near equivalents are τι δαιμόνιον (*Eq.* 11.13 and *Comm.* I.3.5), δαιμόνια (*Comm.* I.1.12 and *Ap.* 12), δαίμονες (*Ap.* 14), τὸ θεῖον (*Comm.* I.4.18, IV.3.14), τὰ θεῖα (*Comm.* I.1.15), θεός (*Comm.* I.1.5), οἱ θεοί (*Comm.* I.1.15, IV.3.13, IV.8.11), θεοῦ φωνή (*Ap.* 12), τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβουλεύματα (*Ap.* 13), ἡ τῶν θεῶν γνώμη (*Comm.* IV.8.11), ὑπὸ θεοῦ φαινόμενα (*Comm.* I.1.5), τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν σημαινόμενα (*Comm.* I.3.4), ἡ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλία (*Comm.* I.3.4), σύμβουλοι (*Comm.* I.4.15), and μαντική (*Comm.* I.1.2, IV.7.10). Finally, examples of verbs which appear in conjunction with τὸ δαιμόνιον and related constructions include ἄγειν (*HG* 6.4.3), κωλύειν (*Eq.* 11.13), ἐναντιοῦσθαι (*Ap.* 4), σημαίνειν (*Ap.* 12), and προσημαίνειν (*Ap.* 13).

Δαιμόνιον and its derivatives are used generically in *Comm.* 1.1.9 and 1.1.12 as well as in Socrates' dialogue with Aristodemus (*Comm.* I.4.2, I.4.10),[4] while the precise nature of this broader conception of the divine is treated at length in Socrates' dialogue with Euthydemus in *Comm.* IV.3.12-15, a discussion which describes 1) the gods' unsolicited influence on Socrates' actions (§12: εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ [οἱ θεοὶ] προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή), 2) the fact that the gods should be worshipped on the basis of their works, not on any expectation of witnessing an actual epiphany (§13: ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σεβέσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς), 3) the gods' invisibility (§13), 4) the belief that the soul partakes of the divine and rules in us invisibly (§14: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἥ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὁρᾶται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτή),[5] and 5) the corollary belief that one should not disdain the invisible but honor τὸ δαιμόνιον on the basis of its manifest power

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[4]Gomperz ([1924] 151) divides the religious views of the divine as expressed by the Xenophontic Socrates into three categories: *die oberste Gottheit* (*Comm.* I.4.2, IV.3.14-15 and *HG* VI.4.3), *die Gottheit* (*Comm.* I.4.17-18, II.3.18-19 and *Oec.* 7.22-31), and *die Götter* (*Comm.* I.4.11, I.4.14, I.4.16, I.4.18, IV.3.3, IV.3.12-13 & IV.3.15-17).

[5]See *Phd.* 79E-80A. It is characteristic of Xen. (*Comm.* IV.3.14) that he describes the single godhead in domestic terms (τάδε δὲ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκονομῶν). Note too that, if the human soul is to the body what this all-encompassing principle is to the cosmos, and if the soul does in fact partake of the divine principle (both of which ideas are expressed in the same passage), it is a small step indeed from Xen.'s Greek conception of the divine to the Vedic unification of the Atman with Brahman, a view which first emerges in occidental thought in the writings of Plotinus (see H. Störig, *Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie* [2nd ed.], Frankfurt, 1990, p. 205).

(§§14-15: ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον).

One meaning of δαιμόνιον and related words in Xen. seems to refer to the intervention of an external, supernatural force to account for inexplicable actions or incidents. Examples of this usage include the following: 1) The reaction of the Spartan assembly to Prothous' strange and unaccountable proposal that Cleombrotus disband the army is explained by the fact that events were being influenced by τὸ δαιμόνιον (*HG* VI.4.3: ἡ δ' ἐκκλησία ἀκούσασα ταῦτα ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο· ἤδη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν). 2) Lycomedes' unforeseen death caused by disembarking where the enemy happened to be standing guard is described adverbially as δαιμονιώτατα (*HG* VII.4.3: καὶ Λυκομήδης ταῦτα πράττων, ἀπιὼν Ἀθήνηθεν δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει κτλ.). 3) The reader's success in horsemanship is guaranteed unless τι δαιμόνιον intervenes (*Eq.* 11.13: τί ἔτι ἐμποδὼν τούτῳ μὴ οὐχὶ...εὐδοκιμεῖν δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἱππικῇ, ἢν μή τι δαιμόνιον κωλύῃ;).[6] 4) A similar example explains how any failure resulting from the adoption of Socrates' exemplary lifestyle could only be due to the intervention of the daimonic (*Comm.* I.3.5: χρώμενος ἄν τις [τῇ διαίτῃ ταύτῃ], εἰ μή τι δαιμόνιον εἴη, θαρραλέως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διάγοι). 5) In a related passage Xen. puns on this usage by having his Socrates figure say that anyone who does not recognize the daimonic influence on human affairs is "jinxed", i.e., is paradoxically the victim of such an influence (*Comm.* I.1.9: τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾶν ἔφη). 6) This usage is also represented in the controversial *Il.* passage (quoted in *Comm.* I.2.58) which Socrates allegedly used as a justification for class distinctions. Here Odysseus addresses individual leaders and troops of the Greek army with the vocative δαιμόνι' as they race towards the ships after Agamemnon's ill-advised attempt to test his men by suggesting that they sail home. In all of these examples, the sense of τὸ δαιμόνιον perhaps most closely approximates that of the Old-English word *wierd* (with an added element of τύχη).

Examples of the specifically beneficial influence of the daimonic include the following: 1) Xen. describes Agesilaus' common sense as δαιμόνιον and contrasts δαιμόνιον with ἀνθρώπινον (*Ages.* 5.4). 2) The intervention of τὸ δαιμόνιον in Socrates' life is described as a type of divination, and its advice always proves to be true (*Ap.* 13: καὶ γὰρ τῶν φίλων πολλοῖς δὴ ἐξαγγείλας τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ

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[6]Cp. *Oec.* 2.18 (on Critobulus' potential success): εἴ σοι ὁ θεὸς μὴ ἐναντιοῖτο.

συμβουλεύματα οὐδεπώποτε ψευσάμενος ἐφάνην). 3) For this reason, Socrates always put complete faith in δαιμόνια as opposed to ἀνθρώπινα (*Comm.* I.3.4: πάντα τἀνθρώπινα ὑπερεώρα πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλίαν) and never acted without the approval of the gods (*Comm.* IV.8.11: εὐσεβὴς μὲν οὕτως [ἦν] ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν). 4) Socrates considered the divine (τὸ θεῖον) to be ubiquitous in its influence on human affairs, and this ubiquity encouraged moral behavior on the part of his followers (*Comm.* I.4.18-19: γνώσει τὸ θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥσθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων...[Σωκράτης] τοὺς συνόντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν...ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν).

The influence of the daimonic on Socrates is specifically linked by Xen. with divination (ἡ μαντική): 1) His Socrates figure makes this claim himself, and Xen. links this personal form of divination directly to the indictment (*Comm.* I.1.2: διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν). 2) Xen. adds in a related passage (*Comm.* IV.8.1) that the fact that Socrates was convicted does not in any way disprove the effect of the daimonic on his life. 3) In general, Socrates advised others to take up divination, by means of which they would always be able to divine the intentions of the gods through omens (*Comm.* IV.7.10). 4) The gods who communicate these signs are omnipresent, even in our thoughts (*Comm.* I.1.19: Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα), and such media as birds, voices, etc. simply serve as means of communication between the daimonic and human realms (*Ap.* 13 and *Smp.* 4.48).[7] Socrates' obedience to these signs has already been noted (*Comm.* 4.8.11), and the uniqueness of his daimonic sign is stressed elsewhere (*Comm.* IV.3.12). Socrates referred others to divination only in areas beyond human understanding (*Comm.* I.1.6-9), though he was also known occasionally to give them the benefit of his own divine intimations (*Comm.* I.1.4). All in all, τὸ δαιμόνιον in Xen. can best be considered a type of private oracle.[8]

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[7]In *Comm.* IV.3.14 thunder and other natural phenomena are called ὑπηρέται τῶν θεῶν.

[8]See Taylor (1932) 43. For Gomperz ([1924] 157-58) the daimonic is *eine neue Art der Mantik, ein von jeder heiligen Stätte, von aller priesterlichen Vermittlung, allen allgemein anerkannten Vorzeichen Privatorakel.* Maximus of Tyre (8.1 ff.) compares τὸ δαιμόνιον with oracular divination and maintains that Socrates' virtuous character made him particularly susceptible to divination in general. See too Plu. *De genio Soc.* 588D-E.

The influence of the daimonic on the Xenophontic Socrates can be described as being both apo- and protreptic (see, for example, *Comm.* I.4.15: ὅταν πέμπωσιν [οἱ θεοί], ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν), and in his associations with other people this can result in his offering supernaturally influenced advice to his friends in some cases (*Comm.* I.1.4: καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος: cp. *Ap.* 13)[9] and also cause him to remain aloof in others (*Comm.* II.6.8: πρῶτον μέν, ἔφη, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ συμβουλεύουσιν αὐτὸν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι: cp. *Smp.* 8.5, where Antisthenes chides Socrates for ignoring him: τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι).[10] Despite the repeated statement that τὸ δαιμόνιον also has a protreptic effect on Socrates' judgment, Xen. describes no *specific* incident in which a directly protreptic influence either on Socrates or his associates is in evidence, something which brings Xen.'s account much closer to Plato's purely apotreptic description. In general, the daimonic's function in Xen. is to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, either in the interest of Socrates or of his friends, and upon the expediency, not necessarily the morality, of such decisions.[11]

The voice of the daimonic during the events leading up to his trial is decidedly apotreptic: After first stating that having led a virtuous life is his best defense (*Ap.* 3), Socrates then goes on to tell Hermogenes that the daimonic has opposed him twice while preparing to organize a formal speech (*Ap.* 4: καὶ δὶς ἤδη ἐπιχειρήσαντός μου σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον: cp. *Comm.* IV.8.5-6), and that he interprets this intervention in a positive way (*Ap.* 5: ἆ θαυμαστὸν νομίζεις εἰ καὶ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ ἐμὲ βέλτιον εἶναι ἤδη τελευτᾶν;).[12] The indictment is quoted (*Ap.* 10: cp. *Comm.* I.1.1), and Socrates then proceeds to rebut the specific impiety charge by referring to his public worship of the state gods and by equating the individualized voice he perceives (which, as he says, he more accurately calls τὸ δαιμόνιον) with other forms of divination relying on the interpretation of sounds, in

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[9]See *An.* III.1.4-6 and *Comm.* I.1.6 for its presumed effect on Socrates in encouraging Xen. to join the expedition of Cyrus (see too *Smp.* 4.5, where Socrates states that seers often cannot foretell what will happen to themselves, though they can do so for others). In considering Socrates' advice to Xen., Cicero (*Div.* 1.54) seems obliquely to connect τὸ δαιμόνιον with the Delphic Apollo. Cicero's source seems to have been Antipater of Tarsus, an ascription which would indicate a Stoic interest in Socrates' sign (see Maier 453 n. 4).

[10]Plato, while not denying the effect of Socrates' voice on the lives of his associates (with the pseudo-Platonic exception of *Thg.* 128D ff.), offers nothing to support this idea (see Gomperz [1924] 160 n. 1).

[11]Riddell 111-12 (see too Gundert 520 & 525, McPherran 190, and Burnet [1924] 127).

[12]Oldfather (pp. 205-206) notes that Xen.'s and Plato's accounts of the apotreptic role of the daimonic in Socrates' approach to the trial essentially agree and therefore support the argument, first suggested by Maximus of Tyre (3.5-8), for Socrates' silence during the proceedings.

particular, of those made by birds,[13] humans, thunder, and the Delphic god (*Ap.* 12-13). As conclusive evidence he offers the fact that any advice given to friends that was inspired by the daimonic has always proved to be true (*Ap.* 13), and after the dicasts' interruption he continues by saying that Chaerephon's report concerning the Delphic oracle is yet further evidence that he is honored by δαίμονες (*Ap.* 14).[14] Xen. argues elsewhere (*Comm.* I.1.5) for the authenticity of Socrates' daimonic voice by demonstrating that his reputation would have suffered if it had proved false.

3) *Its Use in Plato*

The passages relevant to an explanation of the concept τὸ δαιμόνιον as it appears in Plato are as follows: *Ap.* 27C, 31C-D, 40A-C, 41D, *Euthphr.* 3B, *Euthd.* 272E, *R.* 382E, 496C, *Phdr.* 242B-C, *Smp.* 202D-203A, *Tht.* 151A, *Alc. I* 103A-B, and *Thg.* 128D-131A.[15] The formulation τὸ δαιμόνιον *per se* appears in *Ap.* 40A, *R.* 382E, *Euthphr.* 3B, *Smp.* 202D, and *Tht.* 151A, and the adjective δαιμόνιος in any form can be taken generally, as in Xen., to mean "daimonic".[16] Synonyms or near equivalents of τὸ δαιμόνιον are represented by the following examples: ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις (*Alc. I* 103A and *Thg.* 129E), τὸ σημεῖον (*Ap.* 41D and *Thg.* 129D), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον (*Ap.* 40C), τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον (*R.* 496C), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον (*Euthd.* 272E, *Phdr.* 242B, and *Thg.* 129B), φωνή (*Phdr.* 242C and *Thg.* 128D ff.), ἡ φωνὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου (*Thg.* 128D), τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα (*Alc. I* 103A), δαιμόνια...πράγματα (*Ap.* 27C), ὁ θεός (*Thg.* 130E), τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον (*Ap.* 40A), τι θεία μοίρα παρεπόμενον...δαιμόνιον (*Thg.* 128D), τὸ θεῖον (*Thg.* 130E), θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον (*Ap.* 31C-D), τὰ θεῖα (*Euthphr.* 3B), and ἡ...εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου...πυκνή (*Ap.* 40A). Examples of verbs associated with these designations include γίγνεσθαι (*R.* 496C), ἐπίσχειν (*Phdr.* 242C), ἀκούειν (as applied to Socrates' perception of τινα φωνήν in *Phdr.* 242C),

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[13]Fritz ([1931] 57) paraphrases as follows: *Wie die andern Leute zwar sagen: 'ein Vogel hat mich gewarnt', so sagte auch Sokrates zwar: 'das* δαιμόνιον *hat mich gewarnt', meinte aber: 'ein Gott hat mich durch das* δαιμόνιον *gewarnt'.* Compare the English usage: "A little birdie told me."

[14]In Plu. *De genio Soc.* 589E-F Simmias reports that an oracle once told Socrates' father Sophroniscus to give his son little guidance while he was growing up, from which Simmias concludes that Socrates had his own internal guide.

[15]The *Thg.* and *Alc.* should, of course, be approached with caution because of their possibly spurious nature, though their supposed origins in the Academy make them worth at least some consideration. Joyal (p. 56) believes that these two dialogues were instrumental in the eventual transformation of Socrates' divine sign into a tutelary δαίμων, and that any untraditional elements can be considered misinterpretations of the relevant Platonic passages.

[16]See Gomperz (1924) 158-60. Δαιμόνιος can be explained as denoting a connection with a divine agency and τὸ δαιμόνιον as denoting sometimes the agency and sometimes the agent itself. Plato's use of δαιμόνιον is sometimes adjectival, sometimes elliptically substantival, while Xen. restricts himself to a substantival usage only (see Riddell 109-110 and Vlastos 280-81).

ἐᾶν (*Phdr.* 242C), θράττειν (*Phdr.* 242C), ἀποτρέπειν (*Ap.* 41C), ἀποκωλύειν (*Tht.* 151A), ἐναντιοῦσθαι (*Alc. I* 103B), θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παρέπεσθαι (*Thg.* 128D: also cited above), σημαίνειν (*Thg.* 128D), διακωλύειν (*Thg.* 129D), συλλαμβάνεσθαι (*Thg.* 129D), ἅπτεσθαι (*Thg.* 129E), and ἐκρεῖν (*Thg.* 130E).

Plato's Socrates describes his inner voice as having originated during his childhood (*Ap.* 31D: ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη),[17] and he mentions its uniqueness elsewhere (*R.* 496C: ἢ γάρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονεν).[18] It affects both action and speech (see *Ap.* 40B) and is further described as occurring to him frequently (*Euthphr.* 3B: ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῂς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι), even with respect to quite trivial matters (*Ap.* 40A: ἡ...μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου...πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη: cp. *Comm.* IV.8.11, where Socrates is said never to have acted without the approval of the gods); this seems to account for the more trivial occurrences presented in *Euthd.* 272E (preceding the arrival of Euthydemus et al.) and in *Phdr.* 242B-C (where the daimonic compels Socrates to recant his earlier speech on Love).[19] As in Xen., τὸ δαιμόνιον is directly related to divination (*Phdr.* 242C: εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις μέν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος κτλ.: see too *Ap.* 40A), and the author of the *Thg.* takes this relationship one step further by having Theages finally suggest an attempt to conciliate Socrates' sign (σημεῖον) by traditional means of worship (e.g. sacrifices), a suggestion to which Socrates surprisingly assents (*Thg.* 130E-131A).[20] Plato uses the word δαίμων in the sense of the Latin *genius,* or personal attendant, in *Lg.* 730A, *Phd.* 107D ff., and *Ti.* 90A but never confuses it with δαιμόνιον (see Riddell 109-110 and Apul. *Soc.* 15), and it is clear from other passages (e.g. *Ap.* 31C, *Phdr.* 242B, *Euthd.* 272E, and *Tht.* 151A) that δαιμόνιον does not describe a distinct entity.

In Plato τὸ δαιμόνιον is strictly apo-, not protreptic, and the daimonic in this respect seems to involve itself frequently in Socrates' educational mission,[21]

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[17]See too *Thg.* 128D. Joyal (pp. 43-44) believes that this passage contributed to the later transformation of Socrates' sign into a tutelary δαίμων (see note 15 above).

[18]Riddell (p. 111) observes that the Xenophontic Socrates also appears to believe that, whereas he is unique in possessing this gift, the gods' ἔργα are manifest to all (see *Comm.* IV.3.12-13).

[19]There are no counterparts to these passages in Xen., and I agree with Burnet's observation ([1924] 16) that Plato on the whole treats the daimonic "quite lightly, and even ironically" in comparison with Xen. See Phillipson (p. 91) and Maier (p. 457) for further comments on differences in tone.

[20]Note the similar idea inherent in the facetious use of ἀφοσιώσωμαι in *Phdr.* 242B: καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξεν αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι.

[21]Friedländer 36. Guthrie ([1978] 3:404) sums up his explanation of the phenomenon by saying that Socrates was aware of a special, direct relationship existing between himself and divine forces, and that an important function of the daimonic was that it made Socrates' educational activities a matter of genuine vocation.

especially in determining his associations with particular pupils (*Tht.* 151A: ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ: see too *Alc. I* 103A-B for its role in keeping Socrates from forming a relationship with the young Alcibiades[22]). This aspect of the daimonic receives a great deal of attention in Pseudo-Plato's *Thg.* 129E, where Socrates describes τὸ δαιμόνιον as being averse to some associations, neutral towards others, and encouraging (i.e. protreptic) towards still others. Of those who associate with him, some improve permanently, while others improve only temporarily, including a certain Aristides, whose progress was in fact directly proportional to his actual physical proximity to Socrates, whose influence on his followers here verges on the mystical or thaumaturgical (*Thg.* 129E-130E: cp. *Tht.* 151A: καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασι). The author's account in the *Thg.* resembles Xen.'s in that the daimonic is also described as exerting a dissuasive influence on Socrates' followers (128D).[23] Socrates' *Apolitie* is also explained in *Ap.* 31C-D by the apotreptic intervention of his inner voice: δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν...ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται.[24] The guiding voice of the daimonic is conspicuously silent during Socrates' trial, a fact which he interprets to mean that his conviction has been sanctioned by the divine will (*Ap.* 40A-C & 41D),[25] and we may also infer the apotreptic influence of the daimonic in such passages as *Cri.* 54E (Adam [1891] xxiii).

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[22]Among others, Taylor ([1926] 522-23) considers *Alc. I* to be spurious and the role of τὸ δαιμόνιον in 103A to be decidedly un-Platonic (see note 15 above).

[23]Although it seems to partake more of the later magical "demon" idea (note, for example, its near-personification through the author's choice of verbs), τὸ δαιμόνιον as described in *Thg.* 128D ff. comes closest, on the whole, to Xen.'s account (Gomperz [1924] 158 n. 3). The author of the *Thg.* goes on to mention specific examples of Socrates' failed efforts to influence others, including his attempts to discourage an athlete from participating in the Nemean Games (128D-129A) and to detain an acquaintance about to commit a murder (129A-C), and of his predictions about the disasters resulting from the military campaigns in Sicily (129C-D) and Ionia (129D) (see Plu. *De genio Soc.* 581D-E). Cicero (*Div.* 1.54), apparently using Antipater and various unnamed *libri Socraticorum* as sources (see note 9 above), also discusses the role of Socrates' apotreptic voice in his warning Crito about an eye injury which the latter suffered soon afterwards and in Socrates' refusal to turn down a particular road because of the threat of danger while accompanying Laches after the defeat at Delium. Plutarch (*De genio Soc.* 580D-F) mentions an incident in which Socrates' voice prevented him from getting knocked down by a group of muddy pigs. Gigon ([1947] 165-66) comments that Socrates' sign might in fact have concerned itself with such ludicrous events as these, and that Plato downplayed it because he found it antithetical to his own philosophy.

[24]See *R.* 496C ff. and the practically identical wording in *Thg.* 128D. The daimonic sign's warning was of course amply justified by the Arginusae and Leon affairs.

[25]Vrijlandt (p. 68) has a considerable number of misgivings concerning the role of the daimonic sign in Pl. *Ap.*, including the following concerning its absence throughout the trial: *Deos enim tum monere homines cum monendo eos adiuvare non iam possunt, credibile non est.* Gundert (p. 527) offers the following explanation: *...nur weil [Sokrates das Göttliche] in der Wahrheit seines Fragens so gegenwärtig ist, daß es ihn in keiner Aporie verläßt, hört er seine Stimme auch da, wo der eigene*

4) *Its Nature*

By comparing the descriptions of τὸ δαιμόνιον as they appear in Xen. and Plato, the following general conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the daimonic's influence on Socrates: It is associated with the divine and with divination,[26] and it uniquely signals its intimations to Socrates alone by means of a voice which either dissuades him (as in Plato)[27] or advises him both apo- and protreptically (as in Xen.), which advice he follows without exception.[28] In short, the daimonic voice could be explained as a sudden sense, before carrying a purpose into effect, of the benefit of abandoning it or, according to Xen., of the expediency of abandoning it or following through with it, as the case may be;[29] the action is then subjected to an independent justification on the basis of the intervention. Τὸ δαιμόνιον could be described in a general sense as a spiritual guide (Guthrie [1978] 3:402), under the influence of which death no longer seemed to be a great adversity to Socrates as he faced his final crisis (see *Comm.* IV.8.6, Xen. *Ap.* 4-5, and Pl. *Ap.* 40B-C).

Logos versagt, und kann er sich auf sie so verlassen, daß ihm sogar ihr Schweigen die göttliche Führung bezeugt (see too Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 237 ff. for their comments). In *Comm.* IV.8.1 Xen. quite vehemently defends the daimonic's role in events at the trial, and this prompts Gigon ([1946] 234) to see the entire *Ap.* as being a reaction to the following assertion: *Wenn das Daimonion eine göttliche Realität gewesen wäre, so hätte es Sokrates vor diesem Tode bewahrt.*

[26]Riddell (p. 111) notes, however, that Socrates' experience differs from divination in that the daimonic's intimations occur to him spontaneously, that is, without his actively seeking them.

[27]In keeping with Plato's account, Cicero (*Div.* 1.54) defines it as a *signum...mali alicuius inpendentis,* and Apuleius (*Soc.* 19) observes that τὸ δαιμόνιον could not have been a true omen since Socrates also would have received positive encouragement from it. Burnet ([1924] 16-17) remarks that in Plato dreams, as opposed to the daimonic phenomenon, sometimes give Socrates positive advice (see *Phd.* 60E), an important function of dreams which appears as early as Homer. Proclus (*in Alc.* 81) explains the apotreptic nature of Socrates' sign as being peculiar to Socrates, and the fact that it appears to him only (see Xen. *Ap.* 13, *Comm.* IV.3.12, and *R.* 496C) can be taken as a sign of divine favor (Gomperz [1924] 161-62).

[28]See *Comm.* 1.3.4 and Pl. *Ap.* 29b. Riddell (pp. 115-16) has attempted to resolve the discrepancy between Plato and Xen. by pointing out that the apotreptic function of the daimonic, equivalent to an act of judgment, would be its most conspicuous feature, while any protreptic quality would coincide with Socrates' existing intention and be little noticeable; Gomperz ([1924] 160 n. 1) suggests that the apotreptic sign might have been expressed by Socrates in a protreptic way (see *Comm.* I.1.4). I feel that any contradiction between the two accounts quickly disappears if, like Socrates in Pl. *Ap.* 40A ff., one interprets the *silence* of the daimonic voice to be a protreptic sign. (This would also explain the problematical use of ἐᾷ in *Tht.* 151A.) Moreover, since there is in fact no example in either author of the sign's protreptic influence, each Socrates figure must be considered in any given situation involving daimonic influence to bear full responsibility for the results of his actions.

[29]See Riddell 113. In describing the mantic aspect of Socrates' voice, Plutarch compares the daimonic influence on Socrates to a sympathetic vibration and the tipping of a balanced beam (*De genio Soc.* 580F-581A & 589C-D, respectively).

Xen.'s and Plato's accounts of the daimonic agree in that they both describe a divine sign, a voice[30] that dissuades Socrates from speaking or acting in a certain way (see Pl. *Ap.* 40B), and a phenomenon closely related to divination. The precise nature of the daimonic is unclear in both authors, but from Xen. *Ap.* 14, *Comm.* I.4.14, IV.3.12, *R.* 496C, *Ap.* 31C, and *Phdr.* 242B it seems clear (in spite of such words as ἀκοῦσαι in the *Phdr.* passage) that it is not so much a particular sound as an individual phenomenon which only Socrates experiences.[31] Apuleius (*Soc.* 19) points out that Socrates could not have based his actions on a human voice since he heard the voice in remote areas (as in *Phdr.* 242B) and since he never attaches a particular person's name to it. Plutarch (*De genio Soc.* 581A-B) perhaps whimsically suggests through his character Polymnis (and on the supposed authority of Terpsion of Megara) that τὸ δαιμόνιον was a sneeze. Xen.'s and Plato's testimonies belie this, and if it was in fact a sneeze, there clearly never would have been any question as to its nature (Gomperz [1924] 160 n. 1). In 588C-D of the same dialogue, Plutarch has Simmias the Theban say that Socrates discounted visual revelations altogether,[32] and that the daimonic influence on him must therefore be considered a mental perception or a voice to which Socrates was especially susceptible because of his general detachment from the corporeal side of his nature.[33] This entirely corresponds with the accounts in Xen. and Plato, neither of whom, despite the appearance of σημεῖον and similar words, describes it in a specifically visual way.

Brickhouse and Smith ([1994] 189-94: see too McPherran 175 ff.) point out the apparent contradiction between Socrates' belief in divination (manifested by his inner voice) and the strict rationalism which he expresses in such passages as *Cri.* 46B.[34] The authors' position is that Socrates considered divination to be an independent sphere, and that he would always follow divination in preference to ratiocination in cases of conflict, a practice supported by his religious beliefs in general. They note that τὸ δαιμόνιον opposes him only when he is about to *take*

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[30]Professor Halliwell has kindly pointed out to me the related importance of the verb ἀκούειν (*Cri.* 54D) in reference to Socrates' perception of the personified Laws. References to an actual voice appear in *Phdr.* 242C, *Thg.* 128D ff., and Xen. *Ap.* 12-13, a phenomenon which Phillipson (p. 97) describes as an auditory hallucination.

[31]See Arnim (p. 56 ff.) who also believes that the concept of a silent, inner voice would have seemed contradictory to the Greeks at that time since the term φωνή by its very nature referred to something literally audible.

[32]See *Comm.* IV.3.13 ff., where Socrates insists on the invisibility of the divine.

[33]Plutarch's Simmias character describes this sound as a deity's voiceless message (588E), and he elaborates on this by saying that a sound is to the sense of hearing what a higher being's intellect is to the human mind (588E-589A). See below for the similar views of the Neoplatonists.

[34]See Hackforth 94. Lincke (p. 709) feels that the Socratic concept of ἀνθρωπίνη γνώμη (*die Denkfreiheit*) is in fact *complemented* by Socrates' belief in the influence of the daimonic.

action, not while he is simply considering it.[35] The voice does not necessarily intervene when Socrates is acting without forethought but often seems to manifest itself after due deliberation (so-called "trumping"). Socrates invariably obeys the voice but sometimes attempts subsequently to determine why its opposition was beneficial. In general, Socrates' certainty about his voice's beneficial guidance may be partly a product of reason, but the voice itself remains beyond the realm of reason: It simply says "Stop".[36] Vlastos (pp. 283-87) takes issue with Brickhouse and Smith's notion of "trumping", stating that Socrates would have been unwilling to accept any daimonic prompting "if it had offered counsel obnoxious to his moral reason". In short, Socrates' faith never trumped his reason. If my conclusions below about the daimonic sign are true, however, any trumping quality could be ascribed to the subconscious considerations surrounding any given decision (processes which, though subconscious, are by their very nature of a rationalizing quality) which would suddenly override other considerations at the critical moment of decision. Deriving ultimately from his own personal values as developed by that particular point in time, such intuitive promptings would therefore *necessarily* conform to Socrates' moral reason, whether he consciously attempted to rationalize them afterwards or not. Vlastos also notes quite appropriately that the issue, raised by Brickhouse and Smith, of the extent to which Socrates was actually committed to any given decision before the sign intervened is a very sticky one indeed.

Later ancient authors, in particular the Neoplatonists, equated τὸ δαιμόνιον, as depicted in the earlier Socratica, with a δαίμων, transforming it, in effect, from an abstraction into a concrete entity.[37] It is important to remember in considering these commentators that, although δαίμονες indeed appear in the Platonic dialogues, Plato

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[35]In other words, the daimonic does not contribute to form a purpose but pronounces judgment on a purpose already formed, that is, it acts as a reflexive judgment on purposed actions but does not motivate them (Riddell 116). Vlastos (pp. 282-83) points out quite rightly that the daimonic sign is not to be taken as a "revelation", since this term implies an *immediate* understanding of the reasons behind its intervention.

[36]In general, see Galaxidorus' similar observation about this contradiction in Socrates' nature in Plu. *De genio Soc.* 580A-B; in a later passage (581B-C) Polymnis remarks that the daimonic influence on Socrates was not in keeping with his otherwise determined, unspontaneous personality. See too Apuleius (*Soc.* 17-18), who represents divination and wisdom as distinct spheres through examples drawn from Homer.

[37]See, for example, Max.Tyr. 9 *passim.* In the treatise *De deo Socratis,* which concerns itself primarily with the nature of δαίμονες and applies this to Socrates' case specifically, Apuleius describes the daimonic influence in such a way that it resembles one of the guardian δαίμονες as they appear in the *Phd.*, although they serve not merely as psychopomps but as true guardians of individual human souls (§15: cp. Plu. *De genio Soc.* 589F-592E & 593D-294A). Gigon ([1947] 164) and Joyal (pp. 55-56) believe that the Academy began to associate Socrates' daimonic sign with δαίμονες as early as Xenocrates. For specific references in later authors to the identification of Socrates' daimonic sign with a δαίμων, see Joyal (pp. 39-40).

himself never makes such an explicit connection with τὸ δαιμόνιον.[38] Xen., on the other hand, connects the daimonic influence on Socrates directly with δαίμονες on one occasion by having his Socrates figure point out to the dicasts in *Ap.* 14 (immediately after the explanation of his daimonic phenomenon) that the oracle's pronouncement shows that he is further honored by δαίμονες (ἄγε δὴ ἀκούσατε καὶ ἄλλα, ἵνα ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῶν ἀπιστῶσι τῷ ἐμὲ τετιμῆσθαι ὑπὸ δαιμόνων), an interesting remark which may indicate at least some connection between the Delphic Apollo and Socrates' inner voice.[39] The later writers conceived of the human soul as occupying an intermediate position between the mundane realm (as represented by the body) and the supernal (as represented by the gods), and as a result the human soul is especially susceptible to the intervention of δαίμονες, which occupy a similarly intermediate position in the cosmic hierarchy.[40] Proclus and others attribute any daimonic influence to an indwelling spiritual presence that was not perceived by the senses, but by the conscience.[41]

A partial explanation of τὸ δαιμόνιον is possibly suggested by reference to the work of Julian Jaynes, whose theory of bicamerality is based *inter alia* on the mental processes of the Homeric heroes (primarily of those in the *Il.*). According to Jaynes,[42] mankind's intellectual development as represented by the figures in Homer was at that time in a "bicameral" stage when the individual was still egoless and the

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[38]Although τὸ δαιμόνιον is never referred to as a δαίμων in the early sources, Joyal (p. 55) maintains that "it is exactly as a personal, tutelary, allotted, and active δαίμων that it was conceived at an early date" and finds this conception in a nascent form even in the writings of Plato and Xen. (Note too that, if F. Solmsen [*RE*^{2} 5 col. 1734] is correct in saying that Arist. *Rh.* 1398A incorporates part of Theodectes' Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, then the latter seems also to have treated the daimonic in some capacity.) That δαίμονες were long considered to have some influence on individual lives is clear from such adjectives as εὐδαίμων and κακοδαίμων.

[39]Xen.'s Socrates is undoubtedly attempting here to personify the δαιμόνια cited in the indictment in order to make the association with Delphi. Gomperz ([1924] 167 n. 1) identifies the voice of the oracle directly with τὸ δαιμόνιον (see too Phillipson 290 and McPherran 138), while Gundert (p. 517) remarks that the Platonic Socrates reacts in the same way to both the daimonic sign and the Delphic pronouncement, that is, he subjects each to some form of interpretation and then acts accordingly. It is also worth noting that Heraclitus (fr. 14 Marcovich) uses the verb σημαίνειν in referring to the Delphic Apollo. See note 11 above.

[40]See Cic. *Div.* 1.54, Apul. *Soc.* 6, Plu. *De genio Soc.* 593A, Max.Tyr. 8.8 ff., and Procl. *in Alc.* 83-84. Proclus (§84) speaks of a tripartite division of the universe into οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια (corresponding to gods, δαίμονες, and humans, respectively), making the δύναμις the sphere of daimonic intervention. A hierarchical conception of δαίμονες is suggested as early as Heraclitus (fr. 92 Marcovich): ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος/ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός.

[41]See Procl. *In Alc.* 80. Olympiodorus (*in Alc.* 23 Creuzer) speaks of this conscience as influencing the human soul, hence its existence as something distinct from it.

[42]Jaynes 72. Jaynes' ideas, though independently formed (p. 71 n. 1), are quite similar to those of Snell (chh. 1-2). This topic has been treated more recently by C. Gill (*Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy,* Oxford, 1996, ch. 1) in the context of the relationship between Homeric deliberation and Greek philosophical thinking.

gods were objectifications or projections of human consciousness: "Volition, planning, initiative is [*sic*] organized with no consciousness whatever and then 'told' to the individual," so that the Mycenaean heroes become, according to this theory, "noble automatons".[43] In short, bicameral societies existed at a time "when every kingdom was in essence a theocracy and every man the slave of voices heard whenever novel situations occurred" (p. 83). Jaynes further traces the developing use in Greek literature of certain words (e.g. θυμός[44]) which in Homer are thought of as relating to objective parts of the environment or of the body, not as pertaining to the mind and its functions, and the increasingly abstract nature of these words as they develop indicates the breakdown of the bicameral mind as the individual begins to project the stress resulting from some decision or conflict onto a particular emotion and/or part of the body affected by such stress (p. 257 ff.). In later Greek literature the gods consequently recede into the background, and abstractions of every kind, e.g. time and justice, move into the foreground as the non-conscious bicameral mind continues to break down.[45] Jaynes observes that seers and omens are the hallmarks of this process (p. 273) and states elsewhere that "a more primitive solution [to the breakdown], and one that antedates consciousness as well as paralleling it through history, is that complex of behaviors called divination," which he defines as an attempt "to divine the speech of the now silent gods" (p. 236). In a related passage Jaynes describes "spontaneous" divination, which "differs from the...preceding types only by being unconstrained and free from any particular medium....The outcomes of the undertaking or the intentions of a god are thus read out from whatever object the diviner happens to see or hear."[46] Jaynes also makes some interesting remarks concerning schizophrenia, which he defines as a sort of vestigial bicamerality (p. 404). Auditory hallucinations are described as occurring both to psychotics and to normal people under stress as follows: "If we are correct in assuming that

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[43]Jaynes 75. See Snell (p. 40): *Vor allem echte, eigene Entscheidungen des Menschen kennt Homer noch nicht, auch in den Überlegungsszenen spielt deshalb das Eingreifen der Götter solche Rolle* (see p. 50 ff. for specific examples from Homer). Snell (pp. 11-12) adopts a somewhat different approach to the issue of non-consciousness in the Mycenaeans: *Wenn im Folgenden etwa behauptet wird, die homerischen Menschen hätten keinen Geist, keine Seele und infolgedessen auch sehr viel anderes noch nicht gekannt, ist also nicht gemeint, die homerischen Menschen hätten sich noch nicht freuen oder nicht an etwas denken können und so fort, was absurd wäre.*

[44]See Snell (pp. 25-42) for his treatment of the words ψυχή, θυμός, and νόος in Homer.

[45]Jaynes 272 ff. Jaynes (pp. 288-92) explains the invention of soul (and therefore of dualism), for example, as progressing from 1) the Homeric concept of ψυχή as "livingness" to 2) the concept of an after-life to 3) the notion of soul (νοῦς) as distinct from body (see Snell 35-36). Gundert (p. 521 ff.) finds the origin of the daimonic sign in the Platonic Socrates' perception of the soul.

[46]Jaynes 244. Cp. the distinction made between professional and natural divination in Plu. *De genio Soc.* 593C-D and Cic. *Div.* 1.14 ff.

schizophrenic hallucinations are similar to the guidance of gods in antiquity, then there should be some common physiological instigation in both instances. This, I suggest, is simply stress....During the eras of the bicameral mind, we may suppose that the stress threshold for hallucinations was much, much lower than in either normal people or schizophrenics today....It has now been clearly established that decision-making...is precisely what stress is" (p. 93). Schizophrenics are also prone to hear inner voices: "Sometimes [the schizophrenic] feels he has been honored by this gift, singled out by divine forces, elected and glorified, and this even when the voice reproaches him bitterly, even when it is leading him to death" (p. 95). Finally, Jaynes remarks that, if his theory holds true, then there should be no evidence of individuals being negatively labeled as "insane" prior to the complete breakdown of the bicameral mind in that particular society, and he supports this by citing *Phdr.* 244A, where Plato calls insanity a divine gift.[47]

Whatever the value of the bicamerality theory, much of what has been said accords nicely with the descriptions of Socrates' daimonic phenomenon.[48] Without going into any extensive psychological speculations about its nature,[49] I think that it is safe to draw the following conclusion based on Jaynes' ideas: Socrates' inner voice is described in *Euthphr.* 3B and *Ap.* 40A as occurring to him very frequently, even when the matter at hand is quite trivial, and its occurrence is always linked with some sort of conscious (or subconscious, as I take it to be in *Euthd.* 272E and *Phdr.* 242B-C) decision-making process. I consider it to be at least plausible, therefore, that Socrates lived during a period in history when certain mental phenomena were still attributed to an external spiritual source and, in this particular case, to an individualized source which Socrates chose to designate carefully with the abstract formulation τὸ δαιμόνιον to distinguish it from other, more specific (and to him less credible) types of public divination (see Xen. *Ap.* 12-13). Moreover, since the voice

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[47]Jaynes 405-406. Jaynes also refers here to the original meaning of the Greek word παράνοια, which he interprets as meaning literally "of two minds" and generally "insanity" in a neutral sense.

[48]It is interesting to note that Jaynes never once alludes to Socrates in support of his arguments. Interesting too is the fact that Plutarch (*De genio Soc.* 580C), Apuleius (*Soc.* 1, 17-18, 20, 24), and Maximus of Tyre (8.5-6) do in fact compare Socrates' sign with the Homeric gods. Maximus (8.6) qualifies his comparison by pointing out that, whereas the Homeric gods are manifold, Socrates' δαιμόνιον is ἓν καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἰδιωτικὸν καὶ δημοτικόν.

[49]Gomperz ([1924] 163), for example, no doubt quite appropriately describes τὸ δαιμόνιον as a *Bewußtseinsspaltung*. Taylor ([1932] 44 ff.) is of the opinion that Socrates' daimonic sign and his moments of self-absorption are characteristics of a visionary, and it is tempting to compare his sign with his trances (see Pl. *Smp.* 175A-B, 220b-d) and with other similar, non-specific forms of temporary "possession" represented by poetico-religious inspiration (see, for example, Pl. *Ap.* 22B-C, *Ion* passim, *Men.* 99C, *Ti.* 71E-72A, and *Phdr.* 244A ff.) and by temporary loss of judgment (*HG* VI.4.3 and *Comm.* I.1.9).

is so closely associated with decision-making, it seems likely that it would correspond to what we would call a "voice of conscience" or, to rid it of any moral implications, a "voice of judgment". Beckman (p. 76) observes that the daimonic voice would seem to resemble our voice of conscience but for the fact that it is confined to future contingencies, nor does it always have to do with judgments of moral value.[50] Riddell (pp. 113-17) calls the voice an act of judgment of a highly trained mind while raising the following difficulties: 1) Socrates first became aware of the voice in childhood, and 2) the accounts in the *Phdr.* and *Euthd.* have nothing to do with judgment. He adds, however, that in all other cases the results of Socrates' daimonically based decisions lead to good results by a chain of means, not of accidents, and chooses Xen.'s more consistent account of τὸ δαιμόνιον while attributing the inconsistencies in Plato to artistic license. Riddell further explains its associations with divination and the divine by saying that the voice was the result of a rational mind[51] and is to be considered as Socrates' designation for the unanalyzed processes of thought and judgment: In short, Socrates spoke of his "mental processes as human up to the point where he could still follow them,--beyond that as divine."

These seemingly conflicting views, which do not take the subconscious sufficiently into account, can be resolved and simplified as follows: I consider Socrates' daimonic voice to encompass the functions of both judgment and conscience, depending on the circumstances of its occurrence. This objectified "voice" becomes apparent to all human beings as soon as they have mastered language to the extent that they are aware of their own thoughts, i.e., during childhood.[52] The anomalous incidents in the *Phdr.* and *Euthd.* can be explained as sudden acts of judgment by comparing them to similar mental phenomena such as the so-called "Eureka phenomenon" (the Germans' *Aha-Erlebnis*), which occurs as the result of a sudden synthesis of subconscious thought processes.[53] Similarly, Beckman's objection to considering Socrates' voice as a voice of conscience seems irrelevant if one considers that Socrates might well have been considering future contingencies while rapidly (and subconsciously) weighing the moral implications of

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[50]Recall that the Neoplatonist writers relate the daimonic voice to conscience (see above).

[51]Maximus of Tyre (8.3) calls Socrates' daimonic sign μόνον οὐ τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ ἀνακεκραμένον.

[52]See Xen. *Ap.* 16 and Pl. *Ap.* 31d. I am not afraid to make a bold generalization and say that we have all experienced an "inner voice" at one time or another, especially during the process of making decisions large or small: Among recent religious figures, Gandhi comes to mind (see L. Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* [New York 1950] 264, 284, 302-303), and a number of people have suggested to me the well-known example of Joan of Arc.

[53]Noted too by Snell (pp. 51-52): *Auch uns verschwindet das Bewußtsein, selbst etwas getan zu haben, wenn wir an Vergangenes zurückdenken, und wir fragen uns etwa: wie kam mir nur der Plan, der Gedanke dazu?*

a particular decision to be made in the immediate present. I feel that these general conclusions, combined with that drawn from Jaynes' bicamerality theory above, provide a workable interpretation of τὸ δαιμόνιον and similar usages as applied to Socrates in Xen. and Plato.

5) *Its Relevance to the Charge of Impiety*

The impiety charge against Socrates as it appears in the versions given by Xen. (*Comm.* 1.1.1) and Diogenes Laertius (2.40) reads as follows: ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων.[54] It is beyond question that the καινὰ δαιμόνια mentioned in the indictment refer specifically to τὸ δαιμόνιον as used by the Socrates figure in each author,[55] and the question ultimately becomes one of determining the prosecutors' motives in phrasing their charge in such a way.[56] I maintain that the answer to this question hinges on the intentional vagueness of the accusation, which depends not only on the nebulous formulation καινὰ δαιμόνια,[57] but also on the lack of any clear distinction in contemporary Greek between the uses of the nouns θεός and δαίμων and between the

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[54]Diogenes' version differs from Xen.'s only in its use of the verb εἰσηγεῖσθαι instead of εἰσφέρειν. The indictment is cited elsewhere in Pl. *Ap.* 24B-C and Xen. *Ap.* 10-11 (see too Socrates' allusion to the indictment in *Euthphr.* 3B: φησὶ γὰρ [Μέλητός] με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεοὺς τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν).

[55]See Wilamowitz (1919) 2:51, E. Derenne 153-54, Friedländer 33; Riddell 109; and Arnim 56 ff. The relevant passages are Pl. *Ap.* 31C-D (μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο), *Euthphr.* 3B (ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς), and *Comm* I.1.2 (διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν). With these passages in mind, it seems all the more surprising that Plato's Socrates would speak so casually in court about his daimonic sign (see Vrijlandt 66).

[56]In his *Varia Socratica* Taylor offers three counter-arguments regarding the supposed importance of the daimonic voice to the prosecution: 1) Plato's Socrates says nothing about the daimonic during the part of the *Ap.* dealing with impiety but brings it up incidentally in 31C. This would seem to refute Xen.'s claim that it made up part of the prosecution's brief (p. 11). 2) Socrates seeks to justify his abstention from politics by attributing it to his sign, which proves that the jurors would not have seen anything offensive in it: If it had in fact played any part in Meletus' accusation, the language of Plato's Socrates would be ridiculous (p. 13). 3) The fact that Aristophanes does not burlesque Socrates' sign would seem to indicate that it had nothing to do with the imputation of impiety (p. 157).

[57]It is irrelevant whether the form is singular or plural. Socrates admits to hearing and acting on the advice of a unique δαιμόνιον, which the prosecution quite naturally turns into the plural in its γραφή by stating that "Socrates is guilty of introducing novel δαιμόνια [into the polis]". Reeve (p. 76) believes that the plural is used in the indictment because it refers specifically to καινὰ δαιμόνια πράγματα (see Pl. *Ap.* 27C), that is, "to the doings of a daimon, to its utterances, visitations, and pronouncements". Hackforth (pp. 69-70) suggests that the prosecution perhaps merged τὸ δαιμόνιον with the gods of the Ionian physicists (see Reeve 76), and it is also tempting to consider whether or not the "other gods" mentioned in *Phd.* 63B are somehow related to the indictment. According to two late sources (J. *Ap.* 2.267 and Serv. *A.* 8.187), kainotheism was proscribed by law (see Parker 214-15 & ch. 9 *passim*); on the ambiguity of the term καινὰ δαιμόνια, see Parker 203, Derenne 154-55, and McPherran 135.

uses of any neuter substantives formed from the derivative adjectives θεῖος and δαιμόνιος. The word θεός had already been used abstractly by some of the Presocratics (e.g. Diogenes of Apollonia) to describe certain cosmic principles,[58] while τὸ θεῖον in a similar sense appears as early as Anaximander.[59] Forms of, and derivatives from, θεός and δαίμων are used interchangeably in the Xen. and Plato passages concerned with Socrates' sign,[60] and even the distinction between each noun and its corresponding neuter substantive often becomes unclear.[61] The use of the phrase καινὰ δαιμόνια therefore allowed the prosecution to exploit the rich ambiguity of the word δαιμόνιον, which to a dicast's ear would have ranged in meaning from an abstract concept of the Divine (as in Socrates' philosophical sense of the word) to the notion of a definite, though unnamed, entity.[62] On the other hand, the vague adjectival quality of the word would have been of equal value to Socrates in his defense against the accusation that it represented a new god,[63] and a more specific

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[58]See the parody of his and others' ideas in *Nu.* 223 ff.

[59]Jaeger (1947) 31. Τὸ θεῖον also appears in Hdt. 1.32 and 3.108, and τὸ δαιμόνιον in a similar sense in 5.87. Gomperz ([1924] 151) translates τὸ θεῖον (as it appears, for example, in *Phd.* 81A, *R.* 611E, *Phdr.* 242C, and *Ep.* 315C) as *die Gottheit* and remarks that Plato in this sense rarely calls it τὸ δαιμόνιον (but see *R.* 382E: Πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον.

[60]Dover ([1974] 138) translates θεός as "god", δαίμων as "deity", and δαιμόνιος as "supernatural". To Proclus (*in Alc.* 78-79) and other Neoplatonists, the difference between a δαίμων and a θεός was of course simply one of degree.

[61]For examples, see the passages cited immediately after headings II and III above, e.g. Pl. *Ap.* 27C ff. (δαιμόνια ---> δαίμονες), *Euthphr.* 3B (δαιμόνια ---> θεοί), *Euthyd.* 272D-E (θεός ---> δαιμόνιον), *Comm.* IV.3.14-15 (θεῖον ---> δαιμόνιον), Xen. *Ap.* 4-5 (δαιμόνιον ---> θεός), etc. Gomperz ([1924] 160) partly secularizes the daimonic as it appears in Plato as follows: *Aus diesen Stellen erhellt nicht nur, daß in Platons echten Schriften der Ausdruck 'das Daimonion' nicht die Gottheit, vielmehr das dem Sokrates 'widerfahrende' göttliche Zeichen, die wunderbare Stimme, bedeutet, vielmehr auch, daß hier dieses göttliche Zeichen zu keiner bestimmten Gottheit in Beziehung gesetzt wird: insbesondere heißt die wunderbare Stimme nirgends, wie bei Xenophon, die Stimme Gottes, und nur ganz vereinzelt findet sich Ap. 40a die Wendung 'Gottes Zeichen'.* In the case of Xen., Gomperz (pp. 154-57) demonstrates the predominantly Xenophontic conception of τὸ δαιμόνιον as "God" by considering the following passages: *Comm.* I.1.2 ff., IV.3.12, IV.3.14-15, IV.8.1, *Ap.* 4 ff., 12 ff., *Oec.* 2.18, *Smp.* 8.5, and Pl. *Ap.* 21B, 21E. From an opposite perspective, Riddell (p. 111) states that, with the exception of *Ap.* 12, all of Xen.'s uses indicate that it was simply a medium of communication. All of this appears to me to be a matter of degree, however, and the fact that both Xen. and Plato frequently connect the influence of τὸ δαιμόνιον with divination in general renders both arguments academic.

[62]See Phillipson 289 and Vlastos 280-81 (see too *Euthphr.* 3B, where this ambiguity is acknowledged). The prosecution's at least partial interpretation of Socrates' sign as an entity was not revived until later (see note 37 above). McPherran (p. 138) believes that the fact that there could be no outside check on Socrates' daimonic sign might have caused some dicasts to associate it with black magic. Note too that Xen. himself seems to equate καινὰ δαιμόνια with καινοὶ δαίμονες in *Ap.* 24.

[63]Guthrie (1978) 3:402 n. 1. A. Ferguson (pp. 174-75) believes that Socrates' daimonic sign was an object of attack for the following reasons: 1) It could be represented as a private and unique means of access to a private deity; 2) it thereby set aside the normal means of access to, and indeed consideration of, the regular deities; 3) it could be represented as the initiator of measures against the democracy, which accounts for Socrates' explanation of his *Apolitie* in Pl. *Ap.* 31D; and 4) it consequently afforded Anytus and his colleagues excellent legal grounds for an action intended to drive Socrates out of the city. Ferguson further notes (p. 174) that the arguments of Xen. concerning τὸ δαιμόνιον attempt to

charge would have been impossible for the prosecution to prove in light of Socrates' public observance of the state cults (see *Comm.* I.1.2 and Xen. *Ap.* 11, 24).[64]

And yet, if we translate καινὰ δαιμόνια as "religious novelties or innovations", the accusation, because or in spite of its inherent vagueness, seems fully justified, especially in consideration of such passages as *R.* 496C, where its uniqueness to Socrates is emphasized. This vagueness would perhaps help to explain his seeming elusiveness in playing on the ambiguity of νομίζειν[65] and in relating the charge to Anaxagoras and atheism (Pl. *Ap.* 26D ff.) in his efforts to reveal Meletus' obfuscating tactics (or simply to arrive at a more precise understanding of the accusation against him). Paradoxically, in disproving an irrelevant atheism charge, Socrates was in fact confirming the existing prejudice against him inasmuch as he was no closer to a precise explanation of τὸ δαιμόνιον at the end of his speech than he was at the beginning.[66] Xen.'s Socrates presents a more cogent argument by directly comparing it to standard and well-accepted forms of divination, and Gigon[67] nicely sums up the case in Socrates' favor by saying that the daimonic phenomenon simply represented *eine reine göttliche Kraft* with no name and no cult which could have competed with others. As such, it is inconceivable that it could have represented anything genuinely criminal.

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show 1) that, since it was a mantic sign, there was no private deity involved, and 2) that Socrates' information was intended for public, not private, purposes. Taylor ([1911] 22-23) believes that the daimonic sign might have been associated with the Pythagorean Ἀπόλλων Ὑπερβόρειος, in which case it would have taken on a sinister significance if it was able to be connected with a foreign cult (see too McPherran 135).

[64]Gomperz ([1924] 152) ventures the opinion that, although Socrates (at least according to Xen.) did in fact sacrifice publicly, this might have been his indirect way of honoring τὸ δαιμόνιον (see *Comm.* I.3.1, IV.3.16, IV.6.4); this would also apply to his perception of the Delphic god. Gigon ([1924] 25) comments that, although "the introduction of new gods" can only mean the institution of all new cults to the detriment of the state religion, we are not to imagine Socrates establishing a cult for his daimonic sign and sacrificing to it on an altar at home, and Parker (p. 216) notes that Plato (*Lg.* 909D-910D) disapproved of the establishment of private shrines. Mikalson (p. 65) comments that, since δαίμονες normally did not have cults, it is unlikely that the dicasts would necessarily have made such an association.

[65]Pl. *Ap.* 27B ff.; note too that δαιμόνια in 27C clearly means δαιμόνια πράγματα (see Burnet [1924] 114 and note 57 above). The interpretation of the phrase θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων in the indictment has a long history, and I follow Parker (p. 201 n. 8) here in finding its meaning "poised between a reference to 'custom'...and 'belief'". According to Xen., the best way of showing reverence towards the divine principle, or τὸ δαιμόνιον, is to respect the νόμος of each polis (see *Comm.* IV.3.15-17).

[66]Gomperz ([1924] 168-69) believes that Plato's Socrates brings up the oracle in his defense speech for the purpose of suppressing the negative implications of τὸ δαιμόνιον, and that the changing uses of the word θεός in reference to the oracle support this.

[67]Gigon (1947) 25-26. K. Joël (vol. 1 p. 74) nicely sums up the thought as follows: *[Sokrates] entthronte nicht die göttliche Schicksalsmacht, er fand sie nur in der eigenen Brust wieder und hing ihr dort mit intensiver Gläubigkeit an.*

Appendix D: The Problem of Μεγαληγορία

> γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ πάντες ἔτυχον τῆς μεγαληγορίας αὐτοῦ· ᾧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἐρρήθη ὑπὸ Σωκράτους. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἤδη ἑαυτῷ ἡγεῖτο αἱρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ βίου θάνατον, τοῦτο οὐ διεσαφήνισαν· ὥστε ἀφρονεστέρα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ μεγαληγορία. (*Ap.* 1)

Thus Xen. accounts for Socrates' behavior in court as described in the *Ap.*, according to which there cannot have been any doubt in Xen.'s mind that the dicasts were fully justified in sentencing Socrates to death.[1] The word μεγαληγορία has been translated in many ways: as "proud tone" by Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 6), as "intrepidity" and "proud and inflexible conduct" by Chroust ([1957] 18), as *Socratis vera animi magnitudo* and *superbia* by Vrijlandt (pp. 23 & 26), as "arrogant tone" by Waterfield (p. 41), as "high-mindedness" by Gray (p. 136), and so forth. The word itself derives from the roots μεγαλη- and ἀγορ- and refers literally to "talking big" at a public gathering, and in §32 Xen. uses the verb μεγαλύνειν reflexively as being synonymous in meaning.[2]

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[1]Stone (p. 181 ff.) implies that Socrates was surprised at the close first vote in Pl. *Ap.* because he could not help but acknowledge his own arrogance.

[2]Examples of the word μεγαληγορία and related forms as they appear in Xen. are given below.

As connected with the possibility of a divine motivation:

- *An.* VI.3.18: καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἴσως ἄγει οὕτως, ὃς τοὺς μεγαληγορήσαντας ὡς πλέον φρονοῦντας ταπεινῶσαι βούλεται, ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀρχομένους ἐντιμοτέρους ἐκείνων καταστῆσαι.

As connected with boasting in general:

- *Cyr.* IV.4.2: οἱ δὲ [αἰχμάλωτοι] διηγοῦντο ἅ τ' ἐποίησαν καὶ ὡς ἀνδρείως ἕκαστα ...ἐμεγαληγόρουν.
- *Ibid.* VII.1.17: τοιαῦτα δ' ἐμεγαληγόρει [ὁ Κῦρος], μελλούσης τῆς μάχης γίγνεσθαι· ἄλλως δ' οὐ μάλα μεγαλήγορος ἦν.
- *Ages.* 8.2: ἥκιστα δ' ὢν οἷος μεγαληγορεῖν ὅμως τῶν ἐπαινούντων αὐτοὺς οὐ βαρέως ἤκουεν ['Αγεσίλαος], ἡγούμενος βλάπτειν οὐδὲν αὐτούς, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι δὲ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι.

Μεγαλύνεσθαι in the sense of "to demonstrate self-aggrandizing behavior" (cp. ἑαυτὸν μεγαλύνειν in *Ap.* 32) appears in *Comm.* III.6.3, *Oec.* 21.4 (to be contrasted with μεγαλογνώμονες in *ibid.* 21.8), *HG* VII.1.24, *Hier.* 2.17, *Ages.* 10.2, and *Lac.* 8.2, where it has distinctly negative connotations, while the more common μέγα φρονεῖν has a more ambiguous meaning (see *Smp.* 3.8 ff., for example).

None of these forms appears in Plato, who uses the phrase μέγα λέγειν to express the related idea of making a claim that cannot be so easily corroborated:

Pl. *Ap.* 20E: μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν.

Other examples from Plato follow:

Phd. 95B: Ὠγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. (Cp. *An.* VI.3.18 above.)
Phdr. 260D (as placed in the mouth of Rhetoric personified): τόδε δ' οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὡς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τὰ ὄντα εἰδότι οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνῃ.
Lg. 653A: ΑΘ. Τούτου γάρ, ὥς γε ἐγὼ τοπάζω τὰ νῦν, ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τούτῳ καλῶς κατορθουμένῳ σωτηρία. ΚΛ. Μέγα λέγεις.

A problem arises from the motives which Xen. ascribes to his Socrates figure. In effect, Xen. is saying that Socrates treated the prospect of a death sentence lightly since he was all too aware of his own senescence and of the fact that he had reached the height of his reputation: In this light his μεγαληγορία becomes, if not purposeful, then at least a manifestation of his attitude at the time of his trial.[3] The problem is compounded by the characterizations of Socrates in the other Socratica (most notably in the *Comm.* and in Plato *passim*), which generally present a less self-aggrandizing Socrates than the one who appears in the *Ap.*[4] As Navia remarks ([1984] 61 & 52), it

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Other instances of its usage appearing within a century prior or subsequent to Xen. *Ap.* include the following:

A. *Th.* 565-67 (the chorus describing the enemy):
μεγάλα μεγαληγόρων κλύοντες
ἀνοσίων ἀνδρῶν, εἰ θεοὶ θεοί,
τούσδ' ὀλέσειαν ἐν γᾷ.

E. *HF* 353-56 (the chorus speaking to Iolaus):
εἰ σὺ μέγ' αὐχεῖς, ἕτεροι
σοῦ πλέον οὐ μέλονται
ξεῖν' <ἀπ'> Ἀργόθεν ἐλθών,
μεγαληγορίαισι δ' ἐμὰς φρένας οὐ φοβήσεις.

E. *Ph.* 182-184:
Νέμεσι καὶ Διὸς βαρύβρομοι βρονταὶ
καραύνιόν τε φῶς αἰθαλόεν, σύ τοι
μεγαλαγορίαν ὑπεράνορα κοιμίζεις.

Chrysipp.Stoic. ap. Plu. *De Stoic. repugn.* 1038C: ὥσπερ τῷ Διὶ προσήκει σεμνύνεσθαι ἐφ' αὑτῷ τε καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν καί, εἰ δεῖ οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὑψαυχενεῖν καὶ κομᾶν καὶ μεγαληγορεῖν, ἀξίως βιοῦντι μεγαληγορίας, οὕτω τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσι ταῦτα προσήκει, κατ' οὐδὲν προεχομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός.

Forms of the word μεγαληγορία appear in such later authors as Appian, Cassius Dio, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Lucian, Plutarch, and the Christian writers, and the term gradually acquires the less negative notion of "magniloquence" as a secondary meaning.

[3]Derenne (p. 184) sums up Socrates' role in his conviction as follows: *Socrate fut condamné à mort, mais il est incontestable que la responsabilité du verdict retombe en grande partie sur sa conduite provocante devant le tribunal.* Croiset (vol. 4 p. 364) connects Xen.'s μεγαληγορία thesis with the Xenophontic concept of ὠφέλεια (see too the comment on §34): *Cette idée générale est bien celle qu'on pouvait attendre de Xénophon, et elle est développée tout à fait selon son esprit, avec cette préoccupation (parfois mesquine) de l'utilité, qui est souvent sa marque dans les choses morales.*

[4]Vrijlandt (p. 22) attempts to reconcile any inconsistencies with such general assertions as *...Ultro elicere damnationem et lacessere iudices in animo [Socratis] non erat* and *...Apologia fiebat carmen quo suas ipse laudes cecinit.* Kaibel (p. 581 n. 1: see too Schmitz 226) sees no similiarities whatsoever among the relevant Socratica, while Nickel (p. 81) sees the *Ap.* as supplying a specifically psychological complement to other accounts of the trial. Pangle (p. 32 ff.) maintains that at least some of the statements in the *Ap.* can be seen as exaggerations of those made in Xen.'s other Socratic writings. Derenne (p. 167) poses a rhetorical question: *Mais est-ce une raison pour prétendre que Socrate, devant le tribunal, n'a pu se comporter d'une façon moins polie que d'ordinaire?* and Sandbach (p. 478) represents a similar view: "This bragging hardly rings true, put in the mouth of one who was a by-word for self-deprecation; it is what Xenophon, convinced of Socrates' piety and goodness, would have said on his behalf; perhaps he even persuaded himself that this is how his hero must have spoken." Chroust ([1957] 182: see too Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 207) quite rightly notes that the expected response of any brave man to trumped-up charges would be irony and condescension, and one can assume that, even in seeking an acquittal, Socrates undoubtedly would have angered at least some of the dicasts. As Chroust remarks elsewhere ([1957] 4), the problem with the extremes in characterization brings Xen.'s objectivity into question, and Guthrie ([1978] 3:339) criticizes Xen. for having contributed to the prevailing feelings against Socrates in later ages by depicting him as self-

is in any case unjustified to dismiss Xen.'s explanation of Socrates' μεγαληγορία simply because it does not make him an ideal martyr, and since Socrates is generally portrayed as being respectful of Athens and its institutions, Xen.'s version of his behavior needs to be examined carefully.

The passages in the *Ap.* in which Socrates' μεγαληγορία is apparent are as follows: §5 (Socrates as a nonpareil of virtue), §13 (Socrates' special access to the divine will), §14 (Chaerephon's report of the Delphic pronouncement), §15 (the comparison with Lycurgus), §§16-18 (an enumeration of Socrates' virtues in proof of the oracle), §§20-21 (Socrates' pre-eminent position as an instiller of virtue), §23 (his refusal to grovel or to propose a counter-penalty), §24 (his reproval of those who voted against him), §27 (his lighthearted bearing immediately after the trial), §29 (the certainty of his future reputation), §30 (his prophetic ability *vis-à-vis* Anytus' son),[5] and §32 (Xen.'s re-statement of his μεγαληγορία argument). It can be seen, then, that Socrates' arrogance does indeed provide a major structuring element in the *Ap.*, a fact which leads Schmitz to conclude that it is a patchwork forgery consisting of a foundation of components gathered from the *Comm.* and roughly held together by the general theme of μεγαληγορία, which plays no role in the latter work.[6] There are many explanations given for Socrates' behavior: Ollier (p. 98) feels that Xen.'s own indignation, expressed with a soldier's frankness, manifests itself in an exaggerated form (namely, as μεγαληγορία) in his account of the trial. Another position (see Oldfather 208) is that Socrates could not have helped but point out the absurdity of being tried by men who, like Meletus, had never concerned themselves with ethical matters: This attitude was mistaken for arrogance. Pangle[7] finds the cause of Socrates' behavior in his intention to appear neither impious nor unjust (see §§22-23), i.e., Socrates intended to appear in a favorable light by "talking big". Vrijlandt (p. 22)

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righteous and smug. He certainly affected Maier in this way, who with obvious irritation describes Xen.'s Socrates figure (p. 6) as *dieser aufdringliche Pedant, dieser philisterhafte Schulmeister, dieser langweilige Tugendspiegel und unerträgliche Tugendschwätzer.*

[5]Breitenbach (col. 1891), who holds that the Anytus section has nothing to do with μεγαληγορία but with the personal reasons for his attack on Socrates, nevertheless does not take into account Socrates' ability to predict the future, a quality which heightens his superhuman characterization and gives him a sort of Pythian quality foreshadowed in §12.

[6]Schmitz 227-28 (see too Appendix A). Schmitz believes that all that is truly important in the *Ap.* derives from the *Comm.*, with the overlay having been added by a later archaizing writer who had mastered the relevant style (cp. Quintus Curtius and Dio Chrysostom); such imitators betray themselves through rhetorical exaggeration, represented in the *Ap.* by the theme of μεγαληγορία. Gray (pp. 137-38), who believes in the work's authenticity, also believes that Xen.'s interest in presenting Socrates' arrogance as appropriate was driven by contemporary rhetorical theory (see Arist. *Rh.* 1408A and Isoc. 13.16-17), while Vander Waerdt (p. 21) believes that the omission of any mention of μεγαληγορία in *Comm.* IV.8 indicates that it was was *not* in fact an integral part of Xen.'s rhetorical approach to composing the *Ap.* Pangle (p. 21) thinks that, since μεγαληγορία receives no mention there, his willingness to die does not in itself seem to provide a sufficient motive for his arrogance towards the dicasts.

[7]See Pangle (p. 23), who also comments (*ibid.* 20) that Socrates' motives are not entirely selfish in the *Ap.* (consider, for example, his concern for his friends in §§7 & 27-28).

accounts for Socrates' arrogance and magniloquence by surmising that, since he was near the end of his life, he was not in a position to change his character, i.e., he could only continue to speak freely, as he always had.

The fact that Socrates was forced to defend himself in a judicial setting was crucial to the nature of his defense. In general, Socrates' conversancy with small groups would have done little to prepare him for a day in court, and his dialectical skills would have been ill-suited to the occasion.[8] Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 41 & 44) also observe that any ironical statement or "pridefully defiant" behavior on Socrates' part would have interfered with the jurors' objectivity and the performance of their lawful duty to ascertain the truth, a frequent lapse in Athenian judicial proceedings which Socrates expressly censures,[9] and that it was neither irony nor arrogance that led to his conviction but rather his insistence "upon offering a defense designed to suit the law, justice, and piety" (*ibid.* 236).[10] They add that, although Socrates' non-conciliatory approach might have appeared to many to be "big talk", this big talk was not mere boasting, since he always offered reasons for his behavior.[11] Finally, it should be kept in mind that the fact that Socrates refused to bend before the dicasts does not mean that he participated aggressively in his own condemnation (*idem*).

Specific correspondences between the two ἀπολογίαι include the following:

1) *The Oracle*: This would have been a delicate subject in any case, and the two accounts vary quite drastically in the way in which it is presented to the jury. Before he mentions the oracle, the Platonic Socrates begs the jury not to get upset if he seems μέγα λέγειν (20E), whereas the Xenophontic Socrates' introductory remark can only be described as extremely provocative: Ἄγε δὴ ἀκούσατε καὶ ἄλλα, ἵνα ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῶν ἀπιστῶσι τῷ ἐμὲ τετιμῆσθαι ὑπὸ δαιμόνων (§14). Wetzel (pp. 402-403) feels that Plato's efforts to mitigate the μεγαληγορία inherent in the report of the oracle is evidence for its original force

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[8]See Finley 62, Reeve 155-58, and Oldfather 206-207. Socrates' rhetorical subtlety in Pl. *Ap.* is in keeping with his disingenuously proclaimed lack of forensic skills (Bonner 177).

[9]See the comment on *Ap.* 23. Socrates' intention to obey the law appears clearly in Pl. *Ap.* 19A (ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον), and Socrates as presented in the *Cri.* believes that the laws derive their validity from the gods and cannot be questioned. Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 38) note that Socrates' professed efforts to abide by the law seem contradicted by Pl. *Ap.* 29D (Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν).

[10]The role of public φθόνος in Socrates' conviction also cannot be ignored. Beyschlag (p. 514) remarks that this element is understated in Plato (see Pl. *Ap.* 18D, 28A and *Euthphr.* 3D) but brought to the fore in Xen. *Ap.* 14 & 32.

[11]Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 236-37. Arnim (pp. 16-17) remarks that every megalegorical remark made by Plato's Socrates is mitigated by his consideration of what is ultimately in Athens' best interest. Note too that on several occasions (see *Ap.* 20E & 37A) Socrates tells the dicasts not to misinterpret his words.

and for its ἀφροσύνη in the eyes of those present at the trial. The ensuing θόρυβος here and elsewhere in Xen. and Plato can be considered a sort of μεγαληγορία index.[12]

2) *The Dialogue with Meletus*: Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 41) point out quite rightly that Socrates' irony at the trial involved a decided risk since, with the exception of his dialogue with Meletus, there was no real intercourse between Socrates and anyone else during the entire process. Again, Socrates was completely out of his element in a forensic setting, and his characteristic irony could have been easily misconstrued without the benefit of a genuine dialogue.[13] Xen.'s Socrates uses the occasion as yet another opportunity to extol his own virtues, while Plato's figure seems strikingly caustic.

3) *Socrates' Refusal to Kowtow*: This is presented by the Platonic Socrates as being contrary to the spirit of the law (35B-D), to the Xenophontic Socrates as being contrary to the actual letter of the law (see *Comm.* IV.4.4). In general, Socrates' attitude towards the law (see *Comm.* IV.4 *passim*) at least partly explains his behavior in court, and his refusal to plead for his life could also be considered megalegorical (see Gigon [1946] 217 and Hackforth 17-18).

4) *The* Πρυτανεῖον *Proposal*: The omission of this proposal in Xen. *Ap.* is quite curious if one considers its potential megalegorical impact on the dicasts, while *Comm.* I.2.64 seems to echo the Platonic version of the event. Wilamowitz maintains that the fact that Socrates actually made this counter-proposal is confirmed by the second vote and by the fact that, if it is a piece of Platonic fiction, it could only have been injurious to his master's memory.[14]

Although the arrogant tone of the Xenophontic Socrates is quite striking, the Socrates figure as depicted by Plato is by no means self-effacing.[15] Kennedy (p. 150) remarks that "success in court demanded the observance of certain rhetorical conventions, of which the most important was the establishment of a sympathetic rapport between speaker and audience". The main similarity between the two ἀπολογίαι consists in the fact that neither figure observes this convention (see

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[12]See the comment on §14 (see too Arnim [p. 15] for his remarks).

[13]Burnet ([1911] lv-lvi) describes Socrates' character as an "enthusiasm tempered by irony". Aristotle (*EN* 1127B) comments as follows on Socrates' irony: οἱ δὲ εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται (οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν)· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. For modern considerations of Socrates' irony, see Vlastos *passim* and Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 39-41. Contrary to Vlastos, D. Morrison ([1987] 10 ff.) finds quite a few instances of irony and paradox in Xen.'s Socrates figure, whereas Chroust ([1955] 62) adopts an intermediate position on this question.

[14]Wilamowitz (1919) 2:50 (see too Chroust [1957] 67, Beyschlag 514, and my comment *ad loc.*).

[15]Ollier (pp. 97-98) sees in the Platonic Socrates an occasional *fierté dédaigneuse*, though it is important to note (see Delebecque 217) that his μεγαληγορία makes its first appearance at the end of his first speech.

Breitenbach 1893 and P. Meyer 755), and it is clear that Socrates' behavior as represented would have seemed to many, as to Xen. and others, to be ἀφρονεστέρα.[16] The main difference between the accounts concerns Socrates' attitude towards his impending death: Xen. justifies Socrates' μεγαληγορία by saying that he was ready to die because he wanted to avoid senility, whereas Plato says that he did not want to live any longer if he had to curtail his philosophical mission. This, as Walton (p. 290) comments, makes Socrates' overweening tone in Xen. deliberate, in Plato unintentional, and if Socrates seems more arrogant in Xen. *Ap.*, it is because he is lacking the Platonic Socrates' subtle irony.[17]

In considering this aspect of Socrates' personality, it is important to distinguish among such traits as arrogance, irony, petulance, etc., distinctions which become easily blurred. Vrijlandt (pp. 3-26) cites an abundance of examples of Socrates' negative characteristics gathered from Plato, Xen., and other sources,[18] among which the following seem the most illustrative for our purposes:

Audacity

Comm. I.2.49-55: The issues of filiopiety and utilitarianism

Nu. 247-48: The traditional gods as no longer relevant (cp. l. 365 ff.)

Bluntness

Comm. I.2.30: Critias' porcine lust

Ibid. I.3.7: Comparison of gluttons with Circe's pigs

Ibid. I.3.11-13: Harsh words to Xen. and Critobulus about lechery

Ibid. I.6.13: Comparison of sophists with whores[19]

Ibid. II.1.15: Harsh remarks about Aristippus' cosmopolitanism

Ibid. III.13.3-6: Demonstrations of patently contradictory behavior in his acquaintances

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[16]See Shero 111. There is no evidence, however, to support Shero's assertion that Socrates was not trying to win an acquittal, only evidence that he was not willing to win one by compromising his values. In any case, it is clear that, because of their vagueness, he was in no position to deny the charges.

[17]See Shero (p. 109), who observes elsewhere (p. 111) that the general tone of Pl. *Ap.* certainly makes it the more idealized of the two ἀπολογίαι. Edelstein (p. 153) cites the following examples of Socrates' arrogance in Plato: *Chrm.* 169C, *Euthd.* 291B, 297B, *Grg.* 461C, 482D, 483A, 517C, *Hp.Mi.* 373B, *Men.* 80A-B, *Phlb.* 20A, R. 333C, 337E, 487B-C, and *Tht.* 169A; to these I would add *Cri.* 52C (σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ἡροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον). For specific instances in Pl. *Ap.*, see Vrijlandt's findings below and P. Meyer 754-55.

[18]The information contained in the fragments of Aristoxenus' biography of Socrates are interesting if not apocryphal (see Vrijlandt 3-4). The relevant fragments are as follows: Fr. 54B (Wehrli ed.): [ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστόξενος ἔφη,] ὅτε δὲ ληφθείη [Σωκράτης] ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τούτου, δεινὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην. οὐδενὸς γὰρ οὔτε ὀνόματος ἀπέχεσθαι οὔτε πράγματος. Fr. 55: Socrates is described as being ἀπαίδευτος καὶ ἀμαθὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος. Fr. 56: ἐπεί τοι καὶ Σωκράτην αὐτὰ ταῦτά φησιν Ἀριστόξενος, ὡς φύσει γεγόνει τραχὺς εἰς ὀργήν, καὶ ὁπότε κρατηθείη τῷ πάθει, διὰ πάσης ἀσχημοσύνης ἐβάδιζεν.

[19]D. Morrison ([1987] 10) notes that each Socrates figure is more savage when dealing with professional sophists and other strangers than with his associates.

Ibid. IV.1.5: Strong language about those who disdain education

Ibid. IV.2.22-23: The ignorant as ἀνδράποδα

Ibid. IV.5.11: Self-indulgence as bestial behavior

Phdr. 258E-259A: Hedonists as ἀνδραποδώδεις (see *ibid.* 238E & 252A, Pl. *Smp.* 183A, *Grg.* 491E, *Ly.* 208B, and *Tht.* 172C-D for similar examples)

Pl. *Ap.* 38C: Prediction of future ill will caused by the death sentence

Ibid. 41D: Censure of his accusers

Disdain

Comm. I.1.9-16: For scientists

Ibid. I.2.6: For those who accept fees for their teaching

Ibid. I.3.4: For those who ignore the divine will

Pl. *Ap.* 35A: For those who beg for mercy from the court

Alc. I 118B: For politicians who are not properly educated

Haughtiness and Condescension

Comm. IV.4.9: Towards his interlocutors in general

Nu. 102: ἀλάζονας [συνόντας] in reference to Socrates' students

Ibid. 140: Haughty behavior of a particular student

Ibid. 223: ὦ 'φήμερε (addressed by Socrates to Strepsiades)

Ibid. 224: ἀντιβολῶ (addressed by Strepsiades to Socrates)

Callias ap. D.L. 2.18: A. Τί δὴ σὺ σέμνη καὶ φρονεῖς οὕτω μέγα;
B. Ἔξεστι γάρ μοι· Σωκράτης γὰρ αἴτιος.

Hostility Caused by Socrates' Behavior

See *Comm.* IV.2.39-40, *ibid.* IV.4.9 *Tht.* 151C, and Pl. *Ap.* 21E, 23A, 24A, 31C, 37C-D

Indignation

Pl. *Ap.* 18B-C (towards the "old accusers")

Ibid. 19C (towards his portrayal in *Nu.*)

Insolent Looks

Nu. 361-62: Socrates' looks interpreted as superciliousness

Pl. *Smp.* 215B: Compared with Marsyas

Ibid. 221B: The retreat at Potidaea

Irony

Pl. *Ap.* 20D: καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν...

Sarcasm[20]

Comm. II.2.7 (regarding Lamprocles' behavior towards Xanthippe)

Ibid. IV.2.4-6 (regarding Euthydemus' callow attitude)

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[20]To this category I would add *Comm.* IV.4.6-8 (regarding Socrates' responses to Hippias' needling).

Pl. *Ap.* 17A (regarding the accusers' persuasive brief)[21]

Self-Aggrandizement

Comm. I.6.6-10, *ibid.* IV.4.11, and *Grg.* 521D ff.

Snideness and Derision

See *Comm.* I.2.32: Comparison of Critias with a bad shepherd

Ibid. IV.4.9: Derisive treatment of elenctic "victims" (cp. I.4.1)

Pl. *Smp.* 219C: Belittlement of Alcibiades' looks

Pl. *Ap.* 33C: Admission that it is not altogether unpleasant to subject people to his ἔλεγχος

Ibid. 40C: "No one is executed in Hades for practicing philosophy."

Stubbornness

Pl. *Ap.* 29D ff.: Refusal to give up his divine mission

Vrijlandt's examples, some of which seem rather forced, have been re-arranged into English categories which are entirely my own, while he himself employs such Latin terms as *superbia, magniloquentia, iactantia, duritia, iracundia,* and *acerbitas,* using *superbia* alone to translate μεγαληγορία, which in my opinion would only include the categories "haughtiness" and "self-aggrandizement" above. From his analysis of these and other passages, Vrijlandt (p. 26) comes to the following conclusions about Socrates' arrogance:

> *I. Socrates non semper erat homo elegans et urbanus, sed saepe durus, incultus, superbus, acerbus, mordax.*
> *II. Xenophon in Apologia sua nobis veram superbiam et magniloquentiam dedit et verum Socratem.*
> *III. Plato nobis hominem divinum sed fictum ante oculos posuit, cuius superbia quoque inhumana et prope divina, languida et contra veritatem est.*

In short, Vrijlandt accounts for Socrates' μεγαληγορία by challenging the opinion held by most scholars that it was uncharacteristic of him to behave in such a manner.[22] According to this perspective, Socrates was indeed arrogant.

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[21] *Per totam Apologiam Socrates iudices alloquitur benevole tanquam discipulos quibus persuadere conatur - non item accusatores cf. 24D* (Vrijlandt 25). Vrijlandt supports this statement by pointing out the Platonic Socrates' use of the didactic σκέψασθε, for example. Bonner (p. 170) remarks that not calling the jurors δικασταί before the sentence was passed does not reveal any bias on Socrates' part, since he could not have been aware of the verdict. There was also a great amount of diversity in addressing jury members.

[22] Derenne (p. 168) seems at least partly to concur by saying that the Socrates that we receive in the Platonic dialogues is stylized, and that anyone so familiar with all walks of life would undoubtedly have had a coarser side to his nature. (See, for example, D.L. 2.18-19 for Socrates' supposed stoneworking background. Derenne's view represents a class bias, of course.) Stone (ch. 14), who would undoubtedly agree with the opinions expressed by Vrijlandt and Derenne, states unequivocally that Socrates intentionally provoked the jury to pass the death sentence and adduces Socrates' so-called callous treatment of Xanthippe in *Phd.* 59E ff. as a prime, though astonishingly weak, example of his insensitivity.

Perhaps a clue to Socrates' behavior can be found in his attitude to the re-established democracy. Although Taylor ([1911] 1) has reminded us that the very comic writers who attacked Socrates for his wayward views also consistently attacked key figures in the democracy themselves, the strongest *prima facie* argument in favor of his anti-democratic proclivities is the fact that he was surrounded by young noblemen who openly professed their admiration for Sparta, as did he (see *Cri.* 52E, *Prt.* 342A ff., *Hp.Ma.* 283A ff., and *Comm.* III.5.14-28: see too Ar. *Av.* 1281).[23] Potentially anti-democratic inclinations in Socrates are to be found in *Comm.* I.2.9-11, I.2.56-61, III.7.6, Pl. *Ap.* 32B-C, 40B, *Plt.* 300E, and *Prt.* 319B-320C.[24] Hackforth (pp. 118-120) believes that the reasons given for Socrates' *Apolitie* in Pl. *Ap.* 40B must reflect Plato's attitude, not Socrates', since the latter would not have been so anti-democratic in the 40's (see, for example, his encouragement of Charmides to enter politics in *Comm.* III.7), and that Plato must have conceived his hatred of democracy during the democratic terror of 410-405. According to Taylor ([1932] 150-52), it is in fact Socrates who is against democracy since the multitude has no knowledge of the good, and Taylor accordingly attributes the harsher opinions in the *Grg.* and *R.* to Socrates and the milder in the *Plt.* and *Lg.* to Plato. Gomperz ([1924] 133) adopts a more extreme position in this matter by stating that Xen.'s short response to the charge that Socrates taught his followers to despise the constitution (see *Comm.* I.2.9 ff.) shows that it was in fact true and that he was probably in favor of overthrowing the democracy by legal, non-violent means. Socrates' opposition to appointment by lot was well known (see *Comm.* I.2.9, *Plt.* 297E ff., Arist. *Rh.* 1393B3 ff., and D.L. 6.8),[25] as was his disdain for the democracy's emphasis on material wealth (with its necessarily banausic basis) over the examination of one's soul, its abuse of legal institutions during the trial of the Arginusae admirals, its ability to be swayed by self-abasing emotional displays made by defendants *ad misericordiam,* etc.

There is, however, nothing to suggest that Socrates was anything other than a law-abiding citizen, and it would be the easiest solution to attribute the tone represented in the two ἀπολογίαι as resulting from a sense of righteous indignation: Socrates, after a long life engaged in the constant political dialectic which characterizes a healthy democracy, was now facing the prospect of being himself subjected to that very fickleness which had been the object of his pointed criticism for

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[23]D. Rankin ([1987] *passim*) believes that the real reason behind the accusation against Socrates was his association with certain oligarchs, and that, by rehabilitating his pro-oligarchic image, Xen. and Plato were also rehabilitating their own.

[24]Stone (chh. 1-9) provides many examples of what he considers to be Socrates' anti-democratic sentiments. Xen. goes to considerable lengths to counter this notion (see, for example, *Comm.* IV.4.16 ff. and *Oec.* 9.14).

[25]Reeve (p. 104) notes, however, that Socrates himself was appointed by lot on several occasions.

so many years.[26] Defenders of Socrates in this respect[27] quite rightly point out that Socrates' dissenting views on unbridled democracy were essential for its own development and self-definition, the full awareness of which is reflected in his comparison of himself in Pl. *Ap*. to a stinging horsefly. As Higgins (p. 42) observes: "Socrates dies because he has lived his life with an earnestness which most men find excessive and irritating."

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[26]See Higgins (p. 41): "Socrates in the *Apology* does not compromise, for to do so would be to pervert the meaning of his life and to make him little better than the perverters of justice who attack him." Blumenthal (p. 173) compares Socrates' actions to the McCarthyist "un-American activities" in the aftermath of the Korean War.

[27]See, for example, Popper (p. 160): "Socrates' criticism was a democratic one, and indeed of the kind that is the very life of democracy"; see too Montgomery (p. 13): "Socrates was loyal in the deepest sense to the democratic ideals, for it is in the last analysis the Socratic challenge to man's irrationalism which offers the ultimate protection to those who would freely seek the Good Life." Vander Waerdt (pp. 17 & 22), who considers Socrates' attitude as an "act of benefaction" intended to benefit his fellow citizens and as the result of a conception of justice which differed fundamentally from that of the polis, states elsewhere (p. 25) that Socrates' "strategy of μεγαληγορία at his trial is one to be judged by its benefit not merely to his immediate audience, but to posterity". See too Reeve 102 and Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 79 ff.

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